K.W. v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources

Rel: November 13, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 _________________________ K.W. v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources Appeals from Jefferson Juvenile Court (JU-23-30.02 and JU-23-31.02) MOORE, Presiding Judge. K.W. ("the mother") appeals from two materially identical judgments entered by the Jefferson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating her parental rights to her two children, Ja.D.N. ("the daughter") and K.E.W. ("the son"). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the juvenile court's judgments. CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 Background The son was born on January 19, 2020, and the daughter was born on September 14, 2022. Neither child has an identified legal father. The Jefferson County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") obtained custody of the children in January 2023 through dependency proceedings, and the children were placed with their maternal grandmother from January to August 2023, after which they were placed with their maternal great-aunt, subject to the mother's visitation rights. On September 15, 2025, DHR filed separate petitions seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights to the children. The juvenile court consolidated the cases for trial purposes and conducted a trial on April 29, 2026. On May 28, 2026, the juvenile court entered separate judgments terminating the mother's parental rights to the children. The mother filed notices of appeal from both judgments on June 8, 2026. This court consolidated the appeals ex mero motu. Issues Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights, it must find, from clear and convincing evidence, that there are statutory grounds for termination, that there is no viable alternative to termination, and that 2 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 termination serves the best interests of the child. See J.A. v. S.L., 406 So. 3d 129, 139 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). In its judgments, the juvenile court, after considering the factors set forth in Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-319(a), expressly found that the mother was unable or unwilling to discharge her parental responsibilities to and for the children and that the conduct or condition preventing her from properly parenting the children was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The juvenile court also expressly determined that there were no viable alternatives to terminating the mother's parental rights and that termination of her parental rights would serve the best interests of the children. In these appeals, the mother argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights to the children because, she says, it did not receive sufficient evidence to support any of those findings. Standard of Review A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is " ' " [e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. " ' " C.O. v. Jefferson 3 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)). On appeal, this court reviews the juvenile court's factual findings to determine if they are supported by sufficient evidence. " '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly ... establish the fact sought to be proved.' "KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)]. "... [F]or trial courts ruling ... in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. ' § 25-5-81(c)[, Ala. Code 1975]." Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact 4 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id. Analysis Grounds for Termination Section 12-15-319(a) provides, in pertinent part: "If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable to properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the parental rights of the parents." Section 12-15-319(a) sets forth the exclusive statutory grounds for termination, and, because § 12-15-319(a) is phrased in present and future terms, a juvenile court may terminate parental rights only when clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the parent is currently unable or unwilling to discharge his or her parental duties properly and that the conduct or condition of the parent is likely to persist into the foreseeable future. T.W. v. J.A.S.-O., [Ms. CL-2026-0264, Sept. 25, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026). The mother maintains that the 5 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 juvenile court did not receive clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination. The evidence in the record shows that the children were initially removed from the mother's custody on January 11, 2023. At that time, the mother and the children were living with J.N., who, the evidence showed, had physically abused the son on at least two occasions. On the first occasion, J.N. slapped the son so hard that he left a handprint on the son's face. On January 8, 2023, the son was hospitalized with a cigarette burn on, and bruising throughout, his body, which DHR later determined had been caused by J.N. Although the mother was not present at the time of the second incident, DHR removed the children from the mother's custody because of concerns regarding her protective capacity. The mother had photographed the handprint on the son's face following the first incident and circulated it amongst her family members, but she did not contact DHR, and she continued her relationship with J.N. According to a DHR investigator, following the second incident, the mother gave information to the Birmingham police that was not consistent with the nature of the injuries the son had suffered. 6 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 In the subsequent dependency proceedings relating to the children, the juvenile court ordered a psychological evaluation of the mother and required her to complete parenting and anger-management classes. Upon examination, Dr. Daniel Lowery, a clinical psychologist, opined that the mother suffered from childhood neglect and physical and sexual abuse, and he diagnosed her with other specified trauma- and stressor- related disorder, unspecified depressive disorder, and unspecified personality disorder. Dr. Lowery recommended that the mother see a psychiatrist for prescribed psychotropic medication to treat depression and anxiety and that the mother participate in outpatient, trauma-based counseling. The mother did not see a psychiatrist as recommended, and, although she did attend some counseling sessions, she admitted that she had not disclosed her childhood trauma to her counselors and that she had not received trauma-based therapy. Dr. Lowery testified that the mother's failure to fulfill his recommendations would potentially concern him if she was to regain custody of the children. The mother ended her relationship with J.N., completed parenting and anger-management classes, and was visiting with the children in 2023 and early 2024. However, in May 2024, the mother was shot twice 7 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 in her back by E.E., Jr., her new live-in boyfriend, in a domestic-violence incident. The mother was hospitalized for over one month, and, at the time of her discharge, she was paralyzed from the waist down. The mother nevertheless identified E.E., Jr., as the person who would care for her upon her discharge from the hospital. The mother testified that, despite her having identified E.E., Jr., as her likely caretaker, she had not resumed her relationship with E.E., Jr. The mother said that E.E., Jr., had later broken into her house and assaulted her, which, she said, had led her to pursue criminal charges against him. The mother subsequently moved in with G.B., her maternal grandmother and the children's maternal great-grandmother, where she was residing at the time of the trial and was sleeping in a converted den. The mother said that she remained partially paralyzed on her right side, that she could walk with leg braces, and that she continued to attend physical therapy. The mother used a wheelchair, but, she said, she could move around the house, prepare food, and bathe without assistance. She acknowledged needing assistance carrying the children's plates during outings. The mother testified that she expected to regain her mobility, but she did not know when that would occur. At the time of the trial, the 8 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 mother was not seeking employment, and she testified that she had resumed working toward obtaining a General Educational Development credential in early 2026. The DHR social worker assigned to the family's case testified that she had offered to obtain housing resources for the mother but that the mother preferred to remain where she was living. The mother admitted that she had been prescribed psychotropic medications for anxiety and depression following her shooting and that she had taken those medications briefly, but she denied that she was currently depressed and needed to continue taking the medications. The mother also acknowledged that her doctors had recommended that she attend outpatient psychiatric treatment, but, she said, she had not followed that recommendation because she had considered it to be unnecessary. The mother stated that she had stopped counseling after a counselor had told her that there was no point in attending if she had nothing to discuss; she testified that she had concluded that her anger- management classes had taught her how to cope. The DHR social worker denied ever telling the mother that a handful of counseling sessions would satisfy the recommendations from the psychological evaluation. 9 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 The mother, who was 25 years old at the time of the trial, testified that she received approximately $1,300 per month in disability benefits and paid certain household utility bills. The mother testified that she had provided money for haircuts for the children and that she had repeatedly sent clothing and shoes for the children but that those items had been returned. The maternal great-aunt testified, however, that she had not received money for haircuts or other items from the mother and that she had returned clothing to the mother only once because the clothing was too small and out of season. The maternal great-aunt testified that the son had exhibited sexualized behavior since entering her home in August 2023 and that the behavior had increased. The maternal great-aunt and another witness also testified that the son had acted inappropriately toward the daughter and that he had had to be separated from her for her safety. According to the maternal great-aunt, she had sought assistance from three behavioral facilities and two therapists but was "not getting anywhere with him." She explained that he initially could not receive counseling because he was nonverbal; by the date of the trial, he had been receiving counseling for approximately a year, and he was receiving therapy at 10 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 school. However, the maternal great-aunt said, she had not seen any improvement. The maternal great-aunt testified that the school contacted her once or twice a week about the son's conduct, which included inappropriate contact with other children and fighting. She confirmed that a December 2025 psychosexual evaluation that had been performed on the son had resulted in a recommendation that he not be left unsupervised when he was with children under the age of 12. The mother initially denied knowing that the son's evaluation had recommended that he be supervised whenever he was around children under the age of 12. The DHR social worker testified that, by the time of the trial, the children had been residing outside of their mother's custody for approximately 40 months and that DHR had exhausted its services to reunite the family. The DHR social worker testified that she had supervised some visits between the mother and the children in 2025 and that she, the social worker, had had to chase after the son when he had repeatedly run from the mother and the maternal great-grandmother during a visit because, she said, the maternal great-grandmother had not been able to catch him. At one point, DHR had allowed the mother 11 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 unsupervised visitation, but, in December 2025, supervised visits were resumed. The DHR social worker also said that, at the time of the trial, the mother had not fully complied with the recommendations from Dr. Lowery to obtain prescribed psychiatric medications and to complete trauma counseling, that the mother remained reliant on the maternal great-grandmother to assist her with the children, and that DHR was still concerned about the mother's ability to safely parent the children. The mother testified that she could properly care for the children and that relatives and church members could assist with the children's care when she attended classes or therapy. However, the juvenile court was not required to accept her testimony as credible and conclusive regarding her current ability to discharge her parental responsibilities to and for the children. See M.H. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 375 So. 3d 1270, 1279 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). As a matter of law, in deciding whether the mother was currently able to properly care for the children, the juvenile court was required to consider, among other things, whether the mother suffered from an "[e]motional illness … of a duration or nature as to render the [mother] unable to care for the needs of the child," § 12-15-319(a)(2); whether "reasonable efforts by [DHR] … leading 12 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 toward the rehabilitation of the [mother] ha[d] failed," § 12-15-319(a)(7); and the "[l]ack of effort by the [mother] to adjust ... her circumstances to meet the needs of the child[ren] in accordance with agreements reached, including agreements reached with local departments of human resources or licensed child-placing agencies," § 12-15-319(a)(12). From the evidence presented, the juvenile court could have been clearly convinced that the mother suffers from various psychological disorders that had resulted in her failing to adequately protect the children from abuse. The mother allowed J.N. to independently supervise the children even though she knew that he had previously abused the son. When J.N. again abused the son, she had apparently misinformed the Birmingham police as to how the child was injured. After the children were removed from her custody, the mother ended her relationship with J.N., but she entered into an even more dangerous relationship with E.E., Jr., who shot her and later physically assaulted her while she was in a disabled condition. The mother had still listed E.E., Jr., as her prospective caretaker at one point. Dr. Lowery and the hospital doctors recommended that the mother use psychotropic medications and receive counseling for her psychiatric 13 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 conditions, but the mother did not consistently follow the treatment recommendations and, for the most part, denied that she had any mental- health issues. The DHR social worker testified that the mother had failed to comply with the counseling and other services that DHR had provided to help her resolve her problems. The juvenile court heard undisputed evidence of the special needs of the son and the physical and psychological limitations of the mother; from the evidence, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred that the mother was not able to meet those special needs. Coupled with the mother's limited financial capacity, see C.W. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 826 So. 2d 171, 172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), the juvenile court could have been clearly convinced that, despite the reasonable efforts exerted by DHR, the mother had failed to adjust her circumstances to meet the needs of the children, that she was not currently able to properly care for the children, and that the circumstances preventing her from acting as a proper parent toward the children was likely to persist into the foreseeable future. We find no basis for reversing the determination that there were grounds for termination. 14 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 Lack of Viable Alternatives After a juvenile court has found that grounds exist to order the termination of parental rights, "the court must inquire as to whether all viable alternatives to a termination of parental rights have been considered." Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala. 1990). As a matter of substantive due process, a juvenile court cannot terminate parental rights if the child can be placed into a suitable alternative permanent custodial arrangement that adequately safeguards the child from parental harm. See T.W. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 391 So. 3d 306, 314 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). In these appeals, the mother argues that the juvenile court overlooked that the children could be placed with the maternal great-grandmother.1 The evidence in the record shows that DHR searched for relatives when the children were first removed from the mother's custody in 1In her brief to this court, the mother argues both that the children could be placed in the permanent custody of the maternal great- grandmother without further conditions or that the children could be placed with the maternal great-grandmother subject to DHR's supervision, but the mother did not argue for the latter alternative in the juvenile court, so we do not consider it. See A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 75 So. 3d 1206, 1210 n.3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (recognizing that an appellate court cannot reverse a judgment on an argument not first presented to the trial court). 15 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 January 2023 and again in February 2025 and that it sent certified letters to potential resources for both children. The DHR social worker testified that no recipient other than the maternal great-grandmother had expressed an interest in custody and that the mother's December 2025 relative-resource form had identified only the maternal great- grandmother. At the trial, the mother also identified her stepmother as another person who she would recommend for custody, but the mother has abandoned that suggestion on appeal. The maternal great-grandmother was 70 years old at the time of the trial, and she testified that she had lived in her house in Selma for approximately 29 years, that it had 3 furnished bedrooms, and that, at the time of the trial, only she and the mother were living there. The maternal great-grandmother said that she wanted custody of the children and that she would require the mother to leave the house if it was necessary to obtain their custody. The mother also testified that she would leave the house if it was necessary for the maternal great- grandmother to obtain custody of the children. The maternal great-grandmother planned to retire on May 10, 2026, and expected her retirement and Social Security income to cover 16 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 her bills and also allow her to support the children. On cross- examination, however, she acknowledged that she had not calculated whether her combined retirement income would cover her expenses. The DHR social worker testified that she had evaluated the maternal great-grandmother's house in March 2025, when the maternal great-grandmother's husband, J.B., still lived there. The DHR social worker testified that DHR had rejected the proposed placement at that time because the mother had identified J.B. as having sexually abused her during her childhood. The maternal great-grandmother had allegedly known about that conduct; the DHR social worker had been unable to obtain information about the couple's health and medications, and J.B. had not cooperated with the evaluation. J.B. died on August 18, 2025. When questioned about that evaluation, the mother acknowledged that she had alleged that J.B. had molested her in her psychological evaluation, but she maintained that "those allegations got twisted up." The mother later denied that J.B. had sexually abused her and said that the perpetrator was her cousin. Dr. Lowery, however, testified that the mother had described repeated sexual abuse by a cousin between ages 9 17 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 and 13 and had separately reported that J.B. had also molested her when she was 15. The maternal great-grandmother denied knowing of any such conduct by J.B. before learning of the allegations during the trial and testified that she would have acted had she known. The DHR social worker acknowledged that the maternal great-grandmother had never told her that she was aware of that conduct by J.B. The DHR social worker reevaluated the maternal great- grandmother's house on April 15, 2026, but DHR continued to oppose placement. The DHR social worker cited the history of alleged sexual abuse, the son's sexualized behavior, the mother's reliance on the maternal great-grandmother, and concerns about the maternal great- grandmother's ability to supervise both children and care for them until adulthood. The DHR social worker also described a report concerning an underage granddaughter who had become pregnant while living in the maternal great-grandmother's house and concerns about inadequate supervision of the children when the maternal great-grandmother worked. The maternal great-grandmother acknowledged that another granddaughter had become pregnant at the age of 14 while living with her. 18 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 The maternal great-grandmother testified that she was in good health and could supervise the children. When questioned about the son's needs, however, the maternal great-grandmother initially had not known that his evaluation had recommended that he never be left unsupervised with children under the age of 12. Once she was informed of that restriction, the maternal great-grandmother had proposed keeping the son with her, obtaining help, providing separate sleeping arrangements, and using cameras at night. The maternal great-aunt, by contrast, questioned whether the maternal great-grandmother could attend to the mother and also supervise both of the children, particularly given the son's behavior. A viable alternative to termination may exist when a suitable relative is willing and able to provide custodial care for a child. See R.L.M.S. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 37 So. 3d 805, 812 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). As the mother points out in her brief, DHR bears the burden of initiating the investigation into proposed relative resources and of proving a relative's unsuitability based on current information. D.S.S. v. Clay Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 755 So. 2d 584, 591 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); V.M. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 710 So. 2d 915, 921 (Ala. 19 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 Civ. App. 1998). Ultimately, it is the juvenile court that must decide, from the evidence presented, the suitability of a relative to act as a permanent custodian for a child. See R.L.M.S., supra. In these cases, the juvenile court specifically found that DHR had investigated all possible viable alternatives and concurred with DHR that there were no potential relative resources available for placement of the children. The juvenile court implicitly rejected the maternal great- grandmother as a suitable relative to serve as a permanent custodian for the children. The foregoing evidence demonstrates that, on at least two separate occasions, DHR investigated the possibility of placing the children with the maternal great-grandmother and that DHR presented several valid reasons for disqualifying her as a potential placement for the children; that evidence fully supports the juvenile court's finding that the maternal great-grandmother was not a suitable person to serve as a permanent custodian for the children under any proposed arrangement. 20 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 Therefore, the mother has not proven that the juvenile court committed reversible error in finding that there were no viable alternatives to termination.2 Best Interests of the Children Section 12-15-319(a) provides, in pertinent part, that, "[i]n a hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the best interests of the child." "Even in cases in which grounds for termination exist and no other viable alternative may be implemented, a juvenile court still must make a separate determination that termination of parental rights serves the best interests of the child .... " 'Whereas the first two elements exist to protect the parent's rights, this third element exists to protect the child's interests.' Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d [1051,] 1068 [(Ala. 2022)] (Parker, C.J., concurring specially). The best-interests-of-the- child inquiry focuses exclusively on the impact of the termination on the needs and interests of the child. In considering the best interests of the child, a juvenile court is determining not whether it can terminate parental rights, but whether it should terminate parental rights for the benefit of the child for whom the remedy is intended. See S.D.P. v. U.R.S., 18 So. 3d 936, 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (Moore, J., concurring specially). 2The mother does not develop a cogent legal argument that the juvenile court should have maintained the status quo, so we do not consider that potential viable alternative. See A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 75 So. 3d 1206, 1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). 21 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 "In examining whether termination of parental rights promotes the best interests of the child, a juvenile court should consider all the traditional best-interests factors, see Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981) (holding that, in deciding what is in the best interests of the child, the fact- finder should consider, among other things, the emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child), but the court should primarily focus on the effect of the proposed termination on the child's needs for security, stability, and permanency. See S.D.P., 18 So. 3d at 944 (Moore, J., concurring specially). By allowing a juvenile court to involuntarily sever the rights of a parent so that the child can be adopted without the consent of that parent, termination of parental rights is a remedy that is specially designed to meet the particularized needs of a child for a stable and permanent custodial arrangement. … Thus, at a minimum, when deciding whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, a juvenile court should focus on whether termination of the legal relationship between the child and the parent will protect the welfare of the child and promote the stability and permanency of the child." J.A. v. S.L., 406 So. 3d at 139-40. The mother argues that the finding that termination served the best interests of the daughter should be overturned based on J.A., supra, in which this court reversed a judgment terminating the parental rights of a noncustodial parent. In J.A., M.J.A. was born on October 2, 2021, out of a nonmarital relationship between J.A., his father, and S.L., his mother. J.A. and S.L. lived together briefly after the birth of M.J.A., but 22 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 they separated on September 17, 2022, and, as the Dale Juvenile Court found, after their separation, J.A. effectively abandoned M.J.A. On March 8, 2023, S.L. filed a petition to terminate J.A.'s parental rights. At the trial, S.L. testified that she did not file the petition to free M.J.A. for adoption by another man or to protect the child from J.A., who she admitted was not a threat to M.J.A. The Dale Juvenile Court entered a judgment terminating J.A.'s parental rights, and J.A. appealed to this court. On appeal, this court explained that, even when a noncustodial parent has abandoned a child, a juvenile court must still determine that termination of the noncustodial parent's parental rights will serve the best interests of the child. J.A., 406 So. 3d at 139. To make that determination, a juvenile court must receive clear and convincing evidence that the child, who will lose a parent if the petition is granted, will benefit in return by being protected from harm from the noncustodial parent or by gaining permanency and stability. See Ex parte Brooks, 513 So. 2d 614, 617 (Ala. 1987). Citing numerous cases, this court said that, "when a child is safely residing in a stable and permanent custodial arrangement with a custodial parent, and no adoption of the child is 23 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 contemplated, the best interests of the child are not served by termination of the noncustodial parent's parental rights." J.A., 406 So. 3d at 140. Because the evidence in the case showed that S.L. was adequately meeting M.J.A.'s security, permanency, and stability needs and that termination of J.A.'s parental rights would not promote M.J.A.'s welfare, this court concluded that the judgment terminating J.A.'s parental rights did not advance the best interests of M.J.A., and we reversed the judgment. 406 So. 3d at 141. This case differs materially from J.A. Unlike M.J.A., the daughter in this case is not safely residing with a natural parent in a stable and permanent custodial arrangement. The daughter resides with the maternal great-aunt pursuant to a custody judgment that was entered in the prior dependency case, under which the mother has certain visitation rights with the daughter. DHR petitioned the juvenile court to terminate the mother's parental rights to the daughter, among other reasons, to allow the maternal great-aunt to adopt the daughter. The maternal great-aunt testified that the daughter was thriving in her home and that she wanted to adopt her. The maternal great-aunt had cared for the daughter since the daughter was approximately 10 months old, and she 24 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 described herself as the only mother that the daughter knew. The maternal great-aunt also said that, at the time of the trial, the daughter continued to call her "mom." That evidence clearly shows that the daughter would benefit from the termination of the mother's parental rights by being freed for adoption by the only proper caretaker she had ever known so that she could continue to thrive. See A.N.S. v. K.C., 628 So. 2d 734 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). The evidence fully demonstrated that the welfare of the daughter would be advanced by the termination of the mother's parental rights because, although she would lose a maternal parent, the daughter would gain permanency and stability through adoption by the maternal great-aunt. Regarding the son, the maternal great-aunt testified that she originally had intended to adopt him as well but that, after his sexual misbehavior increased despite her best efforts to help him, she had changed her mind and decided that she wanted the son removed from her home by May 1, 2026. The juvenile court appointed a special advocate for the child who testified that, in April 2026, the son had told her that he did not want to return to the mother's custody. By the time of the trial, the son's permanency plan was adoption with no adoptive resource. 25 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 Nicole Peoples, a program manager in DHR's resource division, testified that she had reviewed the son's information after learning of the change in his permanency plan. She described DHR's efforts to locate adoptive homes for dependent children through local foster families, other adoption resources, and Websites, including Heart Gallery and AdoptUSKids. She testified that she had begun looking for potential placements for the son the day before the trial and had identified two local families interested in adopting a child of the son's age who has some of the same behaviors the son had been exhibiting. According to Peoples, an AdoptUSKids reverse search on the morning of the trial had also identified 26 listed families that she described as "willing to adopt him, his age and everything." She agreed that there was a significant likelihood of adoption even with his current profile. Peoples testified that DHR had successfully obtained adoptions for children with behaviors similar to the son's behaviors. When asked whether, based on her review of his profile, he was adoptable and whether DHR could find an adoptive resource for him in the foreseeable future, she answered: "Yes, absolutely." Peoples estimated that an 26 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 adoption could be finalized within "a couple of months" after an actual family was found. On cross-examination, Peoples confirmed that the son's Heart Gallery listing mentioned his sexual behavior but that it provided "just a generic description," rather than the full details of his behavior. She explained that placements involved a transition period and agreed that a prospective family could decide not to adopt after the son entered the home, which, she said, would require the process to begin again. She also agreed that DHR would have to contact prospective families to determine whether they were still interested in the son. In her brief, the mother points out that termination of her parental rights will not secure a joint permanent custodial arrangement for both of the children, but she fails to develop any legal argument that the judgments should be reversed on that ground, so we do not consider that point further because we consider it waived. See Asam v. Devereaux, 686 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). We do, however, address the mother's argument that the termination of her parental rights will not serve the best interests of the son because, she says, the evidence did not show that he was likely to be adopted. As we have explained, "before 27 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the parents of special- needs children, a juvenile court must consider whether the children will likely achieve permanency through adoption." T.W. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 391 So. 3d at 316 (emphasis added). We thus consider whether the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to determine that the son would likely be adopted. In C.M. v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, [Ms. CL-2025-0848, July 10, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026), we reversed a judgment because we determined that the evidence was not sufficient to clearly convince the Mobile Juvenile Court that P.M. would likely be adopted upon termination of his mother's parental rights. The evidence showed that P.M., an 11-year-old child, had special educational needs and severe mental-health and behavioral problems that had disrupted his placements in a series of foster homes. At the time of the termination trial, P.M. was residing in a group home, where he was receiving psychotherapy. The permanency plan for P.M. was termination of C.M.'s parental rights and adoption with no identified adoptive resource. Although that permanency plan had been in place for over one year, the Mobile County Department of Human Resources had not 28 CL-2026-0513 and CL-2026-0514 successfully loca