T.W. v. J.A.S.-O.

Rel: September 25, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________ CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 _________________________ T.W. v. J.A.S.-O. Appeals from Elmore Juvenile Court (JU-21-174.04 and JU-21-174.05) MOORE, Presiding Judge. T.W. ("the father") appeals from two substantially identical judgments entered by the Elmore Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating his parental rights to D.L.W. ("the child"), who was born on December 16, 2020. We affirm the juvenile court's judgments. CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 Procedural History The father and B.H. ("the mother") are the parents of the child and an older child, R.M.W. ("the child's sibling"). J.A.S.-O. ("the paternal aunt") is the father's stepsister, and she is married to D.C.O. ("the paternal uncle"). On December 18, 2025, the paternal aunt commenced two separate actions by filing a verified petition seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and a verified petition seeking to terminate the father's parental rights to the child. The juvenile court conducted a bench trial on both petitions on March 18, 2026. On March 31, 2026, the juvenile court entered substantially identical judgments in both actions terminating the parental rights of the father and of the mother to the child.1 In the judgments, the juvenile court expressly found the father's testimony credible and found that he was "currently drug free and on the right path." However, the juvenile court also found clear and convincing evidence indicating that the father had abandoned the child, that he was unwilling or unable to discharge his responsibilities to and for the child, 1The mother has not appealed, so we focus the remainder of this opinion on the termination of the father's parental rights. 2 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 that he had failed to maintain regular visits with the child, that he had failed to maintain consistent contact or communication with the child, that he had failed to provide regular support for the child, and that he had failed to adjust his circumstances to meet the child's needs. The juvenile court further found clear and convincing evidence indicating that "there is no actual parental relationship in this case" and determined that terminating the father's parental rights served the child's best interests. The father appealed. The Evidence The record reveals the following. On July 8, 2021, the Elmore County Drug Task Force searched the family home, in which the father resided with the mother, the child, and the child's sibling, and confiscated suspected marijuana and narcotics equipment. The Elmore County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") was notified, and the child and the child's sibling were removed from the home pending further investigation. DHR implemented a safety plan on July 9, 2021. The paternal aunt testified that the child was placed in her care under that safety plan and that the child had remained exclusively in her care since his removal from the parents' custody. 3 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 The father, the mother, the child, and the child's sibling underwent hair-follicle drug testing during DHR's investigation. The results of those tests showed that the father tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine and that the child's sibling tested positive for methamphetamine; the child's test, which was initially pending, later returned a positive result for amphetamine, methamphetamine, cannabinoid, and tetrahydrocannabinol. In September 2021, the father was arrested on two counts of chemical endangerment of a child. DHR and the paternal aunt commenced separate dependency proceedings relating to the child, and, on November 16, 2021, the juvenile court awarded DHR protective supervision over the child. On March 28, 2022, the juvenile court entered identical judgments in the dependency actions, awarding custody of the child to the paternal aunt, noting that the child had been living with her for approximately eight months, and relieving DHR of protective supervision. In those judgments, the juvenile court also stated that the conditions of the father's criminal bond "preclude[d] parental contact" with the child. The record reflects that the father entered a plea agreement on January 23, 2023, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to two counts of 4 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 endangering the welfare of a child, a Class A misdemeanor, see § 13A-13- 6(c), Ala. Code 1975, and second-degree theft. On February 21, 2023, the Elmore Circuit Court entered a sentencing order placing the father on 24 months of supervised probation. At the trial, the father testified that he understood that, as a condition of his bond, he was prohibited from having contact with the child and the child's sibling. When asked whether that prohibition had ended or remained in effect, the father responded that he did not know. The father testified that, while he was on probation, he had failed multiple drug tests and had received two 45-day jail sanctions for probation violations. He further testified that his probation had been extended by eight months following one violation and by six months following another. At the time of the termination-of-parental-rights trial, the father remained on probation; he testified that he was complying with his probation requirements and that his probation officer received monthly reports concerning his progress and drug testing. The father testified that, on April 29, 2025, after contacting his probation officer and expressing that he wanted to stop the cycle of failed drug tests, arrests, and substance abuse, he had voluntarily entered a 12- 5 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 month inpatient substance-abuse-treatment program at the Center of Hope. He testified that he had failed the drug test that was administered to him at intake but that he had passed every subsequent drug test administered there and that he had been sober for approximately 11 months at the time of the termination trial. The father also testified that, while at the Center of Hope, he had completed a parenting program and had obtained WorkKeys and OSHA credentials. He anticipated completing the Center of Hope program on April 26, 2026, approximately one month after the termination trial. The father testified that he had started a job with a landscaping company the day before the termination trial and that he hoped the job would provide 40 hours of work each week. The father also testified that his former employer in Elmore County was willing to give him a full-time job if he returned to Elmore County. The father testified that, upon his completion of the Center of Hope program, he planned to stay with his father until he could save enough money to obtain his own residence, although he acknowledged that he had not necessarily discussed that plan with his father. The father did not have a valid driver's license at 6 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 the time of the trial and testified that he needed $610 to have his license reinstated. Regarding his ability to leave the Center of Hope, the father explained that, after six months, residents become eligible for one weekend pass a month and that, by the fourth phase of the program, residents are eligible for a pass every weekend. He testified that, at the time of the termination trial, he was in the "transition phase" and could return home on weekends so long as he complied with the program's requirements, including paying the drug-testing fee associated with his return to the facility at the end of the weekend. The father testified that, by the time of the termination trial, he was going home on passes "almost every weekend" to see the child's sibling and had spent entire weekends with her at the paternal grandfather's home. He also testified that he had initially telephoned the child's sibling on Wednesdays and Sundays of each week, but, he said, he had recently been given his cellular telephone back, so he expected that he would be talking to her by telephone almost every day. The father's contact with the child was substantially more limited. He testified that he had seen the child no more than three times since 7 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 the child was approximately six or seven months old. The father recalled having seen the child on someone's birthday, but he could not recall whether it had been the child's birthday or the child's sibling's birthday or precisely when that encounter had occurred. He also recalled having seen the child at Christmas in either 2021 or 2022 and again on Christmas Day in 2025. The paternal aunt testified that the father's encounter with the child at Christmas in 2022 had been unexpected because she had not known that the father would be at the paternal grandparents' home when they visited. The father testified that he had not had the paternal aunt's or the paternal uncle's telephone number since approximately 2022, and he agreed that, at the time of the termination trial, there had been no contact between him and the paternal aunt and paternal uncle for approximately four years. He testified that he had believed for a long time that his contact with the child was prohibited by his bond and that he had later believed that the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle did not want him to have a relationship with the child. The paternal aunt, however, testified that she had offered the father an opportunity to speak with the child on Father's Day in approximately 2023 and had also 8 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 offered him an opportunity to contact the child on one of the father's birthdays. The father stated that, during the year preceding the trial, he could have asked his father or stepmother for the paternal aunt's or the paternal uncle's telephone number but that he had not done so. The father acknowledged that he had not filed anything seeking custody of or visitation with the child. He explained that he had been waiting until he had completed the 12-month program at the Center of Hope and returned home before he requested visitation with the child because, he said, he did not want to seek involvement with the child while he remained at risk of returning "dirty" and failing the child again. He also testified that he had not sent the child photographs or cards. The father testified that he had not been in a position to provide financial support for the child because he had been "deep in addiction" and that, when he had obtained money, it had gone toward purchasing drugs.2 The father testified that he wanted to become a father in the child's life and to reestablish a relationship with him. He also testified that, if his parental rights were not terminated, he intended to provide financial 2The juvenile court expressly found that the father had not been ordered to pay child support for the child. 9 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 support for the child. At the same time, the father agreed that the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle had taken good care of the child and that the child should remain with them until he could "get on [his] feet and be able to support him." The father further acknowledged that the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle were the only parents that the child knew and that he had not been a parental figure in the child's life for as long as the child could remember. After the paternal aunt filed the termination petitions on December 18, 2025, the father saw the child at the paternal grandparents' home on Christmas Day in 2025. The father and the paternal aunt testified that the family had arranged for the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle to bring the child to the paternal grandparents' home on Christmas morning so that the father could see the child. By the time of the trial, the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle had raised the child for almost his entire life, and the paternal aunt testified that her home was the only home that the child remembered. The child refers to the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle as his mother and father and to the father as "Uncle T." Both the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle testified that they intended to adopt the child if the 10 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 parents' parental rights were terminated. The paternal aunt also testified that adoption was the reason that she had sought termination of the parents' parental rights, and she later identified the child's different surname and his approaching school attendance as circumstances that she believed would complicate his family situation. The paternal aunt testified that she was aware that the father had been participating in substance-abuse treatment for nearly a year. She nevertheless expressed concern that the father could relapse after completing treatment and testified that one year in rehabilitation did not, in her view, demonstrate that he could maintain sobriety over the long term. The paternal uncle, by contrast, said that he had heard only good things about the father's recovery and, when questioned concerning the possibility of relapse, indicated that he did not then have a concern about the father's drug use. He also testified that he did not know the father that well. The paternal aunt testified that, if the termination of parental rights was denied, she would continue caring for the child and meeting his physical, medical, educational, and financial needs. She also testified that the father posed no present threat to the child. When asked how the 11 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 termination of parental rights would benefit the child, she testified that the existing situation caused stress for the adults but that she did not believe the child himself was stressed. She further testified that, regardless of whether the parents' parental rights were terminated, the child would remain happy, loved, and cared for and that his life would remain essentially the same. She also confirmed that the child would have stability whether or not her petition was granted. The paternal aunt testified that she did not intend to prevent the father from having contact with the child if his parental rights were terminated. She testified that she would initially require supervised contact between the father and the child because of safety concerns but that she could foresee those concerns being remedied with time and unsupervised contact becoming possible. She nevertheless testified that the father could have a relationship with the child only as "Uncle T." and not as the child's father. The paternal uncle testified that the child's medical care, emotional care, safety, family support, food, and clothing would continue regardless of whether the parents' parental rights were terminated. When asked what would change if the parents' parental rights were terminated, the 12 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 paternal uncle identified the contemplated adoption and a change of the child's surname. The paternal uncle later acknowledged that the child already had stability and testified that termination would not make the child more stable or materially change his physical needs but that it would provide "clarity." The paternal uncle also stated that he had no reason to believe that the father posed a danger or safety risk to the child and later testified that he could not identify a current threat that the father would pose by having contact with the child. Issues The father raises four arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the evidence did not establish that, at the time of the trial, he was unable or unwilling to discharge his parental responsibilities. Second, he challenges the juvenile court's finding of abandonment. Third, he argues that the evidence did not establish that termination served the child's best interests. Fourth, the father contends that maintaining the status quo was a viable alternative to terminating his parental rights. Because, as explained below, clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's finding of abandonment, we pretermit discussion of the father's fourth argument. See W.W. v. H.W., 384 So. 3d 663, 670 (Ala. Civ. App. 13 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 2023) (recognizing that, once abandonment is established, a juvenile court is not required to consider viable alternatives to termination). Standard of Review A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is " ' " [e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. " ' " C.O. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)). On appeal, this court reviews the juvenile court's factual findings to determine if they are supported by sufficient evidence. " '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly … establish the fact sought to be proved.' "KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)]. 14 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 "… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. ' § 25-5-81(c)[, Ala. Code 1975]." Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Current Conditions The father first argues that the evidence did not establish that, at the time of the trial, he was unable or unwilling to discharge his parental responsibilities. He emphasizes his sobriety, his rehabilitation at the Center of Hope, his improved circumstances, and the juvenile court's 15 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 express findings that his testimony was credible and that he was "currently drug free and on the right path." The father's brief, pp. 19-23. Section 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975, is phrased in present and future terms. A juvenile court may terminate parental rights only when it is convinced that the parent is currently unable or unwilling to discharge his or her parental duties properly and that the conduct or condition of the parent is likely to persist into the foreseeable future. K.W. v. Lee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 390 So. 3d 1080, 1089 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). Although a parent's past conduct, standing alone, does not authorize termination, that conduct remains relevant in assessing the parent's current conduct and condition and in predicting whether the conduct or condition is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Id. The father relies on A.A. v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, 278 So. 3d 1247 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018), for the proposition that his history of substance abuse, standing alone, did not establish a current drug problem rendering him unable to parent the child. In A.A., the mother in that case had a history of drug use and unsuccessful substance- abuse treatment, but she had pursued additional drug treatment while residing at treatment facilities during the seven months preceding the 16 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 trial, and there was no affirmative evidence indicating that she was using drugs at the time of the trial. Id. at 1253. This court concluded that the juvenile court could not have been clearly convinced that relapse was so likely or imminent that the mother in that case should have been considered to have a current drug problem interfering with her ability to properly care for her child. Id. Likewise, the father's historical substance abuse, standing alone, could not establish that he continued to have a current drug problem at the time of the trial. As the juvenile court determined, the father's rehabilitation efforts were laudable. By the time of the trial, the father had remained sober for approximately 11 months, had completed a parenting program, had obtained WorkKeys and OSHA credentials, and was approximately one month from completing the Center of Hope substance-abuse program. The juvenile court expressly found the father's testimony credible and found that he was "currently drug free and on the right path." That conclusion, however, does not resolve whether the father had become able to discharge his parental responsibilities by the time of the trial. Although the father had made substantial progress, he remained 17 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 in the Center of Hope program. His first day of paid employment with the landscaping company was the day before the trial, and he testified that he hoped that that job would provide him with 40 hours of work each week. The father also testified that his former employer in Elmore County was willing to give him another opportunity if he returned to live in Elmore County. That potential employment depended on his returning to Elmore County, and, at the time of the trial, the father did not have a valid driver's license. The father planned to stay with the paternal grandfather after completing the 12-month Center of Hope program, although he acknowledged that he had not necessarily discussed that plan with the paternal grandfather. Most significantly, the father testified that the child should remain with the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle until he could "get on [his] feet and be able to support him." As commendable as the father's progress was, the circumstances discussed above existed at the time of the trial; they were not merely historical deficiencies associated with his prior substance abuse. Although the evidence demonstrated that the father desired to become involved in the child's life, the juvenile court reasonably could have been 18 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 clearly convinced that he had not yet become able to discharge his parental responsibilities to the child. See K.W., 390 So. 3d at 1090 (recognizing that whether a parent has " 'truly and completely rehabilitated so as to resume the custody of a child is a question of fact to be determined by the juvenile court' " (citation omitted)). We therefore conclude that the father's first argument does not warrant reversal. Abandonment The father next challenges the juvenile court's finding of abandonment. He argues that the conditions of his criminal bond, his periods of incarceration, and his substance-abuse struggles and treatment provided good cause or excuse for significant periods of his absence from the child's life and bear on whether his conduct was voluntary and intentional. Section 12-15-301(1), Ala. Code 1975, defines "abandonment," in pertinent part, as a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of custody; a withholding, without good cause or excuse, of a parent's presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, or opportunity for filial affection; or a failure to claim parental rights or to perform parental duties. When abandonment continues for the four months immediately preceding the 19 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 filing of a termination petition, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-319(d), creates a rebuttable presumption that the parent is unable or unwilling to act as a parent. We first consider the father's reliance on the conditions of his criminal bond. The March 28, 2022, dependency judgments stated only that the then-current conditions of the father's criminal bond "preclude parental contact" with the child. However, the exhibits relating to the father's criminal proceedings did not establish the terms or duration of a specific condition prohibiting contact. The father testified that he understood that a condition of his bond prohibited contact with both the child and the child's sibling and that, at the time of the trial, he did not know whether that prohibition had ended. He also testified, however, that the bond condition was only part of the reason he had not maintained contact with the child and that his continuing substance abuse was another reason. The father also asserts on appeal that his February 2023 sentencing relieved him of the bond conditions "by operation of law." The father's brief, p.25. We need not decide whether, as the father contends, his February 2023 sentencing ended the alleged restriction on the father's 20 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 parental contact with the child. Even accepting the father's assertion for purposes of his argument, his voluntary conduct after that point remains relevant to whether he abandoned the child. The father relies on C.F. v. State Department of Human Resources, 218 So. 3d 1246, 1250 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), in which we held that involuntary imprisonment, standing alone, does not constitute abandonment. However, C.F. also holds that a juvenile court may consider a parent's voluntary conduct toward his or her child before and after incarceration in determining whether the parent abandoned the child. Id. Thus, although the father's periods of incarceration could not themselves establish abandonment, his voluntary conduct outside those periods remained part of the abandonment inquiry. Although the father testified that he understood that a condition of his bond prohibited him from having contact with the child, he also testified that, by the time of the trial, he regularly spent weekends with the child's sibling and maintained telephone contact with her. The father acknowledged that, since he had been in treatment at Center of Hope, he could have obtained the paternal aunt's or the paternal uncle's contact information from his father or stepmother but that he had not done so. 21 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 He also had never sought custody of or visitation with the child, had never provided financial support for the child,3 and had not sent the child photographs or cards. The father estimated that he had seen the child no more than three times since the child was approximately six or seven months old. The father also explained that, while addressing his substance abuse, he had been waiting until he completed the Center of Hope program and returned home before seeking visitation because he did not want to become involved with the child only to return "dirty" and fail again. Even while making substantial progress in treatment, the father did not seek custody or visitation and did not obtain the paternal aunt's or the paternal uncle's contact information despite acknowledging that he could have done so. In R.S. v. R.G., 995 So. 2d 893 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), R.S. had visited his child intermittently, but he had provided no child support during the 3Section 12-15-319(a)(9), Ala. Code 1975, identifies as a factor to consider in determining whether termination of parental rights is appropriate a parent's failure to provide for a child's material needs or to pay a reasonable portion of support "where the parent is able to do so." Although the evidence establishes that the father provided no financial support for the child, it does not establish his financial ability to provide support during the relevant period. We therefore do not rely on § 12-15- 319(a)(9) as an independent factor supporting termination. 22 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 21 months preceding the final hearing, despite his ability to do so, had sent no letters or cards, and had never petitioned for custody. Id. at 903. This court concluded that the evidence supported the juvenile court's finding of abandonment. Id. In L.L. v. J.W., 195 So. 3d 269 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), this court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported a finding of abandonment when L.L. had not contacted her child for approximately a year and a half and had never supported the child. Id. at 273. Those cases illustrate that isolated or intermittent acts of visitation or communication do not, by themselves, preclude a finding of abandonment when the parent's broader course of conduct demonstrates a failure to claim parental rights or perform parental duties. The paternal aunt filed the termination petitions on December 18, 2025, and the Christmas 2025 visit occurred after the petitions were filed. The evidence establishes that the visit was planned, but it does not establish when the family first discussed or arranged the visit. We therefore do not infer that the father made no effort whatsoever during the four months preceding the filing of the petition to contact the child. Even assuming that the Christmas visit had been contemplated before 23 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 the petitions were filed, however, that circumstance would not, standing alone, foreclose a finding of abandonment. As § 12-15-301(1) makes clear, abandonment is not limited to physical absence; it also encompasses the failure to claim parental rights or to perform parental duties. Considering the father's prolonged absence from the child's life, his extremely limited contact with the child, his failure to seek visitation or custody, and his failure to obtain readily available contact information, even while making substantial progress in treatment, the juvenile court reasonably could have been clearly convinced that the father had abandoned the child. We therefore conclude that the father's second argument does not warrant reversal of the judgment. Best Interests The father next argues that the evidence did not establish that termination of his parental rights served the child's best interests because the child was already safe and in a stable household and because the evidence did not show that termination would materially promote the child's welfare, security, stability, or permanency. He also relies on the existing custodial arrangement as evidence indicating that termination was unnecessary to serve the child's best interests. 24 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 "It is well settled that the paramount concern in a termination-of- parental-rights action is the best interest of the child." W.W., 384 So. 3d at 671. Thus, " 'even when a parent has abandoned his or her child, a juvenile court must still "consider whether the termination of the [parent's] parental rights would serve the child's best interest." ' " Ex parte M.P., [Ms. SC-2024-0684, Mar. 7, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2025) (quoting Morgan ex rel. K.J.W. v. T.R.W., 419 So. 3d 579, 586 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), quoting in turn W.W., 384 So. 3d at 670). In making that determination, a juvenile court should focus on whether termination of the legal relationship between a child and his or her parent will protect the child's welfare and promote the child's stability and permanency. J.A. v. S.L., 406 So. 3d 129, 139-40 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). The father argues that the child was already safe and stable in the paternal aunt's and the paternal uncle's home. The paternal aunt testified that she would continue meeting the child's needs if termination of the parents' parental rights was denied and that the father posed no present threat to the child. She further testified that the child would remain happy, loved, and cared for regardless of the disposition of the cases and that his life would remain essentially the same. The paternal 25 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 uncle likewise testified that the child's care and physical needs would remain unchanged, that the child was already stable, and that termination would provide "clarity." He also identified no present danger or safety risk posed by the father. Relying on those circumstances, the father cites W.W. and J.A. in support of his argument that termination was unnecessary to protect the child's welfare or to promote his stability and permanency. In W.W., although the juvenile court had properly found abandonment, this court concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that termination was in the child's best interests when the record did not establish that the parent's abandonment had caused the child in that case mental distress and termination would leave that child without a legal father because no prospective adoptive parent had been identified. 384 So. 3d at 670-71. Similarly, in J.A., the child in that case was already safely residing with the custodial mother, continuing the legal relationship with the father in that case did not threaten that child's safety or stable custodial arrangement, and maintaining that relationship did not implicate that child's prospects for adoption. 406 So. 3d at 139-41. 26 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 In this case, unlike in W.W. and J.A., the permanency interests of the child would be advanced by the termination of parental rights because both the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle testified that they intended to adopt the child. They had raised the child for almost his entire life, and the evidence clearly reflected that the child recognized them as his mother and father, so, as the juvenile court found, termination of parental rights with adoption was the best permanency plan for the child. The termination of parental rights with adoption would afford the child legal recognition of his existing family unit and secure to the child as permanent a custodial arrangement as the law allows. Furthermore, the juvenile court also could have been clearly convinced that termination of parental rights would also advance the stability interests of the child. In this context, stability mainly refers to the " 'stability in the psychological and emotional relationship a child has with his or her [custodian].' " J.A., 406 So. 3d at 141 (quoting T.C. v. Y.R., 162 So. 3d 920, 928 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (Moore, J., dissenting)). The child had developed a strong relationship with the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle, and he understood them to be his parents. The juvenile 27 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 court evidently determined that that relationship should be protected from unwarranted disruption. The father indicated in his testimony that the custodial arrangement had benefited the child, but he believed that the child should remain with the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle until he could "get on [his] feet and be able to support him." That testimony showed that the father planned on becoming more involved with the child if his parental rights were not terminated. By terminating parental rights and allowing the child to be adopted, the juvenile court could ensure that the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle, as lawful parents, would have control over any contact between the father and the child. See Ala. Code 1975, § 26-10E-28(a) ("After entry of the final judgment of adoption, the adoptee shall be treated as the legal child of the adoptive parent or parents and shall have all rights and be subject to all the duties arising from that relation."). Whether the termination of parental rights served the best interests of the child was a question of fact for the juvenile court to decide. J.A., 406 So. 3d at 139. The trial court received sufficient evidence to be clearly convinced that termination of the father's parental rights would enable the child to be adopted and secured in the only family unit the 28 CL-2026-0264 and CL-2026-0265 child had ever really known. On appeal, this court cannot reweigh the evidence to reach a different determination. We therefore conclude that the father's third argument does not warrant reversal of the judgments. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's judgments terminating the father's parental rights. CL-2026-0264 -- AFFIRMED. CL-2026-0265 -- AFFIRMED. Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur. 29