Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2026 WY 109 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2026 October 2, 2026 JEREMY SKY GARCIA, Appellant (Defendant), v. S-26-0100 THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County The Honorable Dawnessa A. Snyder, Judge Representing Appellant: Jeremy Sky Garcia, pro se. Representing Appellee: Keith G. Kautz, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leanne J. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General. Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. GRAY, Justice. [¶1] Jeremy Garcia, pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for sentence reduction. We affirm. ISSUE [¶2] Mr. Garcia raises one issue, which we rephrase: Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Garcia’s motion for sentence reduction? FACTS [¶3] Mr. Garcia was charged with nine criminal counts arising from an altercation with his girlfriend. He pled no contest to two of the charges—aggravated assault and battery and strangulation of a household member—and the State dismissed the remaining charges. Each of the offenses that Mr. Garcia pled no contest to carries a maximum sentence of ten years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-502(a)(iii) & (b)(i) (aggravated assault and battery), 6-2- 509 (strangulation of a household member). The district court sentenced Mr. Garcia to five to seven years on each count, to be served concurrently, and credited Mr. Garcia with 263 days of time served. [¶4] Mr. Garcia timely filed a motion pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), seeking to reduce his sentences by one year. In support of his motion, Mr. Garcia asserted he had “no prior drug or alcohol, sexual, or property related offenses,” he had good familial influences, and he had prior work and educational experience. He stated that while incarcerated, he had attended and completed educational programs and that he anticipates obtaining his commercial driver’s license upon release. He cited to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, arguing the district court should examine both the crime and the character of the criminal when imposing a sentence. He also referenced the purposes of criminal sentencing, suggesting that an earlier release date would allow him to obtain substance abuse treatment sooner, furthering the goal of rehabilitation. [¶5] The State filed a response, and the district court denied Mr. Garcia’s motion. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶6] A district court’s ruling on a motion for sentence reduction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion: 1 The sentencing judge is in the best position to decide if a sentence modification is appropriate, and is free to accept or reject information submitted in support of a sentence reduction at its discretion. Our objective on review is not to weigh the propriety of the sentence if it falls within the sentencing range; we simply consult the information in front of the court and consider whether there was a rational basis from which the district court could reasonably draw its conclusion. Because of the broad discretion given to the district court in sentencing, and our significant deference on appeal, this Court has demonstrated many times in recent years that it is a very difficult bar for an appellant to leap seeking to overturn a sentencing decision on an abuse of discretion argument. Tallent v. State, 2024 WY 61, ¶ 7, 549 P.3d 769, 771 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 131, ¶ 7, 473 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Wyo. 2020)). DISCUSSION [¶7] W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) allows the court to reduce a sentence “within one year after the sentence is imposed or probation is revoked . . . .” The rule “functions to ‘give a convicted defendant a second round before the sentencing judge . . . and to give the judge the opportunity to reconsider the original sentence in light of any further information about the defendant.’” Tallent, ¶ 8, 549 P.3d at 772 (quoting Boucher v. State, 2012 WY 145, ¶ 10, 288 P.3d 427, 430 (Wyo. 2012)). [¶8] Mr. Garcia raises three arguments on appeal. First, he contends the district court did not read his Rule 35(b) motion. He points to the order denying his motion for sentence reduction and its use of language from the State’s response—calling his motion for sentence reduction a motion for “Modification.” He also asserts the order offered no explanation, analysis, or meaningful discussion. Second, he claims the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the work he has done while incarcerated, demonstrating his character. And third, he contends the district court failed to consider his character during the initial sentencing which violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. [¶9] The district court’s order, entitled “Order Denying Sentence Modification,” is short. It states only that the matter, “having come before the Court upon the request of the Defendant, the Court having reviewed Defendant’s Request and the State’s Response, and the Court, . . . being otherwise well-advised in the premises . . . hereby” orders that Mr. Garcia’s “Motion for Sentence Modification shall be . . . denied.” A district court “is required only to consider the motion and supporting materials.” Wiegand v. State, 2025 WY 3, ¶ 10, 561 P.3d 772, 775 (Wyo. 2025) (citing Hurtado v. State, 2023 WY 63, ¶ 8, 2 531 P.3d 306, 308 (Wyo. 2023)). Mr. Garcia’s assertion that the district court did not read or consider his motion is speculative and unsupported by the record. The order’s reference to the motion as a request for “modification” does not demonstrate that the court failed to consider it. 1 The order confirms the district court properly considered Mr. Garcia’s motion—it reviewed the motion and the State’s response and was “well-advised in the premises.” The district court “need not elaborate on its rationale . . . .” Wiegand, ¶ 10, 561 P.3d at 775. “The fact that the order does not describe the specific information . . . provided in support of [Mr. Garcia’s] motion does not establish an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Boucher, ¶ 12, 288 P.3d at 430). [¶10] Mr. Garcia’s motion for sentence reduction was based in part on his work at the Wyoming Honor Farm, including horse training and courses he had completed, or planned to complete, while there. Mr. Garcia has used his time at the Wyoming Honor Farm well, and that effort is to his credit. [¶11] However, “commendable behavior alone does not provide a basis to reverse the district court’s decision.” Wiegand, ¶ 11, 561 P.3d at 775; Tallent, ¶ 9, 549 P.3d at 772 (quoting Harper v. State, 2023 WY 49, ¶ 8, 529 P.3d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 2023)). “We have long held the view that it would be unwise to usurp what is properly a function of the district courts by finding an abuse of discretion in denying a sentence reduction motion simply because it was supported by evidence of a defendant’s commendable conduct while incarcerated.” [Harper, ¶ 8, 529 P.3d at 1074] (quoting Hart v. State, 2016 WY 28, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d 877, 879 (Wyo. 2016)). Moreover, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the district court because the district court “is in the best position to decide if a sentence modification is appropriate and is free to accept or reject information submitted in support of a sentence reduction at its discretion.” Blair [v. State], 2024 WY 22, ¶ 6, 543 P.3d [919,] 921 [(Wyo. 2024)]. Wiegand, ¶ 11, 561 P.3d at 776. Mr. Garcia has not carried the “substantial burden” of establishing the district court abused its discretion. Tallent, ¶ 9, 549 P.3d at 772. [¶12] Finally, we do not consider Mr. Garcia’s contention that his original sentence was illegal because the district court failed to consider evidence regarding his character in 1 When addressing W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motions, we have treated the terms modification and reduction as related. We have stated the district court is in the best position to decide whether “a sentence modification is appropriate” on a Rule 35(b) motion for reduction. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 2023 WY 49, ¶ 5, 529 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Mitchell, ¶ 7, 473 P.3d at 1257); Hart v. State, 2016 WY 28, ¶ 9, 368 P.3d 877, 879 (Wyo. 2016). 3 violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. An illegal sentence is one that “exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law.” Sides v. State, 2021 WY 42, ¶ 15, 483 P.3d 128, 133 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Pfeil v. State, 2014 WY 137, ¶ 24, 336 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Wyo. 2014)). Rule 35(a) is the vehicle to challenge an illegal sentence. Rule 35(b) is a discretionary request to reduce an otherwise lawful sentence. A claim that a sentence is illegal is properly brought in a direct appeal or a Rule 35(a) 2 motion, not a Rule 35(b) motion. See Wiegand, ¶ 12, 561 P.3d at 776 (Rule 35(b) “cannot be used to attack the validity of a conviction, nor may it be used as a substitute for a properly filed appeal.” (quoting Harper, ¶ 6, 529 P.3d at 1073)). Mr. Garcia’s Rule 35(b) motion is not a proper vehicle for an illegal-sentence claim. [¶13] Affirmed. 2 Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” 4