Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC

FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON OCTOBER 29, 2026 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON OCTOBER 29, 2026 SUPREME COURT CLERK IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON MICHAEL J. LANG, individually, and as ) Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ) FRANK E. COSTA, on behalf of the Estate ) No. 104498-4 and all statutory beneficiaries, ) ) En Banc Respondents, ) ) Filed: October 29, 2026 v. ) ) PLATINUM NINE HOLDINGS, LLC, a ) Washington Limited Liability Corporation, ) doing business as NORTHWEST ) AMBULANCE, a company, ) ) Petitioners, ) ) and ) ) NORTHWEST AMBULANCE CRITICAL ) CARE TRANSPORT, a company; and XYZ, ) a fictitious entity or company; RUBATINO ) REFUSE REMOVAL, INC., RUBATINO ) REFUSE REMOVAL, LLC, a Washington ) Limited Liability Corporation; RUBATINO ) REFUSE, LLC, a Washington Limited ) Liability Corporation; RUBATINO REFUSE ) REMOVAL HOLDINGS, LLC, a ) Washington Limited Liability Corporation; ) RUBATINO LITTER SOLUTIONS, INC., ) Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 a Washington Corporation; RUBATINO ) HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a Washington ) Corporation; and RUBATINO ) ENGINEERING, LLC, a Washington ) Limited Liability Corporation; and XYZ ) Corporation, ) ) Defendants. ) ) MUNGIA, J.—The legislature granted emergency medical technicians (EMTs) immunity from civil liability if they negligently provide emergency medical treatment to a patient. In other words, if an EMT’s treatment of a patient falls below the standard of care expected of a reasonably careful EMT under the same or similar circumstances, the legislature enacted a statute that prevents an injured patient from being compensated for that negligent treatment. However, in that statute, the legislature immunized only acts of medical expertise. It did not immunize an EMT’s acts that did not involve their medical expertise, such as driving an ambulance. Henry Shaw, an EMT, drove an ambulance into a highway divider while taking Frank Costa to the hospital. Northwest Ambulance,1 Mr. Shaw’s employer, admitted that Mr. Shaw was negligent and that his negligence caused the accident. The Northwest Ambulance crew also failed to secure Mr. Costa to the ambulance gurney 1 Platinum Nine Holdings LLC is a Washington licensed ambulance service doing business as Northwest Ambulance and will be referred to as Northwest Ambulance throughout. 2 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 with shoulder restraints. Northwest Ambulance admitted that the crew’s failure to secure Mr. Costa with shoulder restraints was negligent. Northwest Ambulance argues that RCW 18.71.210(1) immunizes it from the negligent acts of its ambulance crew because they were transporting Mr. Costa to the hospital. The statute provides immunity to licensed ambulance services for any act or omission done in good faith by an EMT rendering emergency medical services while transporting a patient to a medical facility. However, RCW 18.71.210(2) limits the scope of that immunity. The immunity applies only “in the performance of the actual emergency medical procedures” and affords immunity only for acts or omissions that are within the EMT’s field of medical expertise. RCW 18.71.210(2). Both parties moved for summary judgment as to whether RCW 18.71.210(1)’s immunity applies to this situation. The trial court ruled in favor of Michael Lang, the personal representative of Mr. Costa’s estate (Estate), finding no immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that an EMT’s negligent driving is not within the scope of rendering emergency medical services as contemplated by the legislature. As discussed below, we do not reach whether failing to secure Mr. Costa with shoulder restraints is within the scope of rendering emergency medical services. We do not need to reach this issue because Northwest Ambulance did not propose a special jury verdict form distinguishing between the two negligent acts. The negligent 3 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 driving alone is sufficient to uphold the verdict. Accordingly, we hold that Northwest Ambulance is not entitled to qualified immunity in this case. I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Factual History Frank Costa, a patient, was transported by a Northwest Ambulance crew to a medical facility. The Northwest Ambulance crew consisted of three people: (1) EMT Jack Wilson, (2) EMT Henry Shaw, and (3) EMT trainee Katelyn Averill. 2 Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw secured Mr. Costa on a gurney using guardrails and two lap belts positioned over his waist and knees. The EMTs did not use shoulder restraints. Northwest Ambulance’s policy required the use of shoulder restraints. There is no dispute that the EMTs violated the policy by not securing Mr. Costa with the shoulder straps. After Mr. Costa was secured, Mr. Wilson and Ms. Averill remained in the back of the ambulance to monitor Mr. Costa while Mr. Shaw drove. On the way to the hospital, Mr. Wilson believed that Mr. Costa’s heartbeat was becoming irregular. Mr. Wilson called an emergency code. An emergency code allows the driver certain privileges not accorded to other drivers but with the restriction that the driver must 2 In the record, Katelyn Averill is sometimes referred to by her married name, “Omo.” We refer to her as Ms. Averill, the name she used at the time of the accident. No disrespect is intended. 4 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 always drive with due regard for the safety of others. The rules for driving emergency code are set out in RCW 46.61.035: (1) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated. (2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: (a) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; (b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation; (c) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he or she does not endanger life or property; (d) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions. (3) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of visual signals meeting the requirements of RCW 46.37.190, except that: (a) An authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle; (b) authorized emergency vehicles shall use audible signals when necessary to warn others of the emergency nature of the situation but in no case shall they be required to use audible signals while parked or standing. (4) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for the safety of others. After Mr. Shaw began to “drive code,” he noticed a garbage truck farther down the road. Mr. Shaw stayed behind the garbage truck for a while but then sped up. So, when an ambulance is going lights and sirens behind a trash truck going its regular speed[, that] is not really the speed the ambulance wants to go. So I was camping, waiting behind it for a while. And then it finally did start to—to head off and then that’s when I began to overtake—accelerate to begin to overtake it. 5 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 76. Mr. Shaw testified that while it looked like the truck was going to the right, it then began to go back into the lane where he was driving. At the speed Mr. Shaw was traveling, he could not brake without hitting the truck, so he swerved to the right. I hadn’t begun passing, but I was accelerating in order to pass. As they got back in front of me, I was at such a distance where they got in front of me that I engaged my brakes completely. And—and I noticed I was still traveling at such a speed that with my brakes engaged right now and at the speed I’m going, I’m going to hit this guy. I’m not—I’m not slowing down at a quick enough rate to avoid rear-ending this truck. So I swerved to the right because there was that shoulder there. I swerved to the right to get away from hitting him. And I couldn’t see it because of where the garbage truck was positioned to my—say my 2:00—was positioned and then came back in front of me at my 12:00. And there was what’s called a gorder, which is those chevron dividers with like—a lots of times they have sand barrels behind them and stuff like that, that divide the exit ramp from the rest of the—the highway. And I hit that head on when I tried to go—I tried to go around him just to be able to get, slow down—have more room to slow down, maybe in the shoulder, or maybe I could commit to that ramp to start slowing down. But I just avoided him—basically slow down and then I hit that instead. I didn’t see it there and I hit it head on. CP at 74. Mr. Costa was ejected from the stretcher into the ambulance wall, injuring his head, neck, and arm. He died later that day. After the accident, Northwest Ambulance terminated Mr. Shaw’s and Mr. Wilson’s employment. In the termination letter, Northwest Ambulance set forth the bases for the termination. 6 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 This notice of dismissal is issued to you for violation of company policies and Snohomish county code policies which has led up to the decision to end employment at once effective today, November 24, 2020. The impact your behavior created is unacceptable behavior and dismissal for not adhering to the policies. Policies and Transport documentation: 1) Insubordination of company policy in transporting patients with proper restrains, [sic] calling code when essential and lack of defensive driving which caused a preventable accident. 2) Excessive speed while driving code and above our policy limit of 10 miles over posted speed limit. Per policy, “Any speeding that exceeds . . . (10 mph code) over the posted speed limit will be considered a violation of our policy”. 3) Insubordination of the company Code of Conduct and expectations. 4) Insubordination of policy; Drivers must conform to all traffic laws and make allowances for adverse weather and traffic conditions. CP at 132. B. Procedural History 1. The Estate’s Wrongful Death Case Against Northwest Ambulance The Estate brought wrongful death and survival actions against Northwest Ambulance.3 The complaint alleged that the EMTs’ failure to properly secure Mr. Costa to the gurney and failure to avoid the collision were the proximate causes of Mr. Costa’s death. In its answer, Northwest Ambulance raised an affirmative defense 3 The Estate’s complaint also named the company operating the garbage truck, Rubatino Refuse Removal LLC, as a defendant. As Rubatino is not part of this appeal, this opinion focuses solely on the claims against Northwest Ambulance. 7 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 of statutory qualified immunity under RCW 18.71.210, arguing it was completely immune from the Estate’s claims. Licensed ambulance providers are subject to qualified immunity for an EMT’s acts or omissions while rendering emergency medical services in good faith during transport. RCW 18.71.210(1); RCW 18.73.030(11). 2. Summary Judgment Proceedings Both parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Estate’s motion for partial summary judgment sought to strike Northwest Ambulance’s qualified immunity defense. The Estate argued that Northwest Ambulance was not subject to qualified immunity because the EMTs were not rendering emergency medical services under RCW 18.71.210 when driving the ambulance and securing the patient. The Estate asserted that those acts were not part of any “ʻactual emergency medical proceduresʼ” within the EMTs’ field of medical expertise, as is required for the immunity to apply. CP at 36 (quoting RCW 18.71.210(2)). In Northwest Ambulance’s cross motion for summary judgment, it argued that it should be dismissed from the suit because it was subject to qualified immunity. Northwest Ambulance argued that RCW 18.71.210 completely immunized it from suit, not simply from liability for certain negligence claims. 8 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 The trial court denied Northwest Ambulance’s motion and granted the Estate’s motion in part. The court concluded as a matter of law that Northwest Ambulance was not immune from suit because “driving an ambulance is not emergency medical service.” CP at 318. Northwest Ambulance later conceded that its employees acted outside the scope of ordinary care by failing to fully secure Mr. Costa to the gurney and by failing to avoid the collision. However, Northwest Ambulance denied any claims of gross negligence and corporate negligence, reasserting that it was immune from all liability under RCW 18.71.210. 3. Judgment and Appeal Before trial, Northwest Ambulance moved for a revision of the summary judgment order on the issue of qualified immunity. The court denied the motion, and the case went to trial. The jury later rendered a general verdict for the Estate. The jury was not given a special verdict form directing it to state whether it found Northwest Ambulance liable for the negligent driving or for the failure to secure. Northwest Ambulance did not request such a form. Northwest Ambulance appealed, assigning error to the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue.4 Lang v. Platinum Nine 4 The Estate cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals regarding a settlement issue, which has not been raised for review by this court. 9 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 Holdings, LLC, No. 86205-7-I, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 28, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/862057.pdf. Northwest Ambulance again argued that the trial court misconstrued RCW 18.71.210. However, the Court of Appeals rejected its arguments and affirmed that Northwest Ambulance was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 3. 4. Issues Before This Court We granted Northwest Ambulance’s petition for review as to whether the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. 5 Today, we reach only whether an EMT and their employer are entitled to qualified immunity for negligent ambulance transportation. We do not decide whether securing the patient with all required safety restraints (here, the shoulder straps) falls within the scope of rendering emergency medical services. We need not answer that question because, here, the negligent driving was a sufficient basis for the jury’s verdict. Because it went to its affirmative defense, Northwest Ambulance had the burden to propose a special verdict form if it wanted the jury to consider the negligent driving and the failure to restrain separately. Northwest Ambulance did not request a special verdict form, so we need not reach both issues on appeal. See Gerlach v. Cove Apts., LLC, 196 Wn.2d 111, 135, 471 P.3d 181 (2020) (“A party 5 Washington Ambulance Association and Washington State Association for Justice Foundation filed briefs of amicus curiae. 10 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 challenging the validity of one theory supporting an undifferentiated verdict is not entitled to a new trial unless it objected to the use of the verdict form at trial and proposed a special verdict form to clarify the jury’s findings.”). II AMBULANCE TRANSPORTATION IS NOT COVERED BY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). We uphold a trial court’s grant of summary judgment when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Here, the parties do not present any genuine issue of material fact. Instead, they dispute whether ambulance transportation is subject to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Accordingly, we review the qualified immunity statute de novo to ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We look at the plain language of the statute and consider related provisions to determine the statute’s meaning. Id. at 10. A. Qualified Immunity Applies to Acts Done While Rendering Emergency Medical Services Within an EMT’s Field of Medical Expertise RCW 18.71.210 provides that a licensed ambulance service will not be liable for any acts or omissions of an EMT “done or omitted in good faith while rendering emergency medical service . . . to a person who has suffered illness or bodily injury.” RCW 18.71.210(1). In other words, licensed ambulance services are entitled to 11 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 qualified immunity for the ordinary negligence of its EMTs while rendering emergency medical services. The statute specifies that [t]his section shall apply to an act or omission committed or omitted in the performance of the actual emergency medical procedures and not in the commission or omission of an act which is not within the field of medical expertise of the physician’s trained advanced emergency medical technician and paramedic, emergency medical technician, or first responder, as the case may be. RCW 18.71.210(2). Accordingly, the statute limits immunity only to acts or omissions that are part of “actual emergency medical procedures.” Id. It is undisputed that Northwest Ambulance is a licensed ambulance service under RCW 18.71.210(1)(f) and that Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wilson were EMTs acting in good faith while transporting Mr. Costa. However, the parties dispute whether driving an ambulance is within the scope of rendering emergency medical services. We hold that it is not. While “any licensed ambulance [provider]” is immune from liability under RCW 18.71.210(1)(f), the scope of that immunity is limited to “medical treatment and care,” RCW 18.73.030(11), and to “actual emergency medical procedures.” RCW 18.71.210(2). Based on plain language and statutory context, qualified immunity does not apply to an EMT’s negligent driving of an ambulance. 1. The Plain Language Shows That Driving an Ambulance Is Not an Act Done While Rendering Emergency Medical Services Northwest Ambulance argues that driving an ambulance is within the scope of emergency medical services rendered by an EMT. However, the definition of 12 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 “emergency medical service” treats transportation as distinct from rendering emergency services. “Emergency medical service” is limited to “medical treatment and care which may be rendered at the scene of any medical emergency or while transporting any patient in an ambulance to an appropriate medical facility, including ambulance transportation between medical facilities.” RCW 18.73.030(11). Thus, only “medical treatment and care” can be an emergency medical service. While the statute mentions ambulance transportation, it does not define the act of transport itself as a form of medical treatment or care. Instead, the statute uses the phrase “while transporting” to describe when medical treatment or care may be provided. The dissent reads the definition differently, arguing that “the statute expressly ‘include[s] ambulance transportation.’” Dissent at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting RCW 18.73.030(11)). However, the quoted portion of the definition—“including ambulance transportation between medical facilities”—does not define driving an ambulance as an emergency medical service. Instead, it makes clear that care may still be considered “emergency” care even when given to a patient being transported between facilities, not only between the scene of an injury and a hospital. In short, while medical treatment and care may be rendered during ambulance transport, the act of driving is not itself medical treatment or care under the qualified immunity statute. 13 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 The dissent further argues, “The majority’s interpretation defeats the purpose of the immunity, which is to allow EMTs to think and act quickly in an emergency without second-guessing themselves because of the risk of liability.” Id. at 5. This argument fails for two reasons. First, this argument ignores the plain meaning of the words the legislature used in the statute. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that the legislature intended to allow ambulance drivers to drive the ambulance below the standard expected of a reasonably prudent ambulance driver and not allow an injured patient to recover for that negligence. Likewise, there is nothing in the legislative history that supports this assertion. Second, the dissent’s construction is undermined by the fact that the legislature does not provide immunity from civil liability for the negligent driving of law enforcement officers or firefighters. The legislature does not prevent people from being compensated for injuries caused by the negligent driving of law enforcement officers or firefighters when they are responding to emergencies. It would be anomalous to believe that the legislature provided that immunity for an ambulance driver who happens to be an EMT. 2. Reading the Qualified Immunity Provision in Context Further Demonstrates That Transport Itself Is Not Covered Reading RCW 18.71.210(1) and (2) together further demonstrates that transport itself is not within the scope of emergency medical services rendered by an EMT. 14 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 RCW 18.71.210(2) clarifies subsection (1) by limiting qualified immunity to acts or omissions done or omitted while performing “emergency medical procedures.” WAC 246-976-010(33) defines “emergency medical procedures” as “skills that are performed within the scope of practice of EMS [(emergency medical services)] personnel certified by the secretary under chapters 18.71 and 18.73 RCW.” 6 The WACs set out the required training for EMTs to receive certification, including training on various medical procedures. See RCW 18.71.205; WAC 246-976- 023(4)(a) (referencing the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) approved skills and procedures list (DOH 530-173) for EMS training requirements); see also WAC 246-976-182(1)(c) (providing that EMTs are authorized to provide patient care only “[w]ithin the scope of care that is included in the approved instructional guidelines/curriculum or approved specialized training and is included on the department-approved EMS skills and procedures list (DOH 530-173) for the individual’s level of certification”). Driving an ambulance is not included in an EMT’s training or certification requirements as proscribed by the WACs. The dissent points out that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw received some training on how to drive an ambulance. First, this training is irrelevant to the central question in this case: whether the plain language of the statute expresses the legislature’s intent to 6 Since there is no statutory definition of “emergency medical procedures” as used in RCW 18.71.210, we look to the related preexisting regulatory definition for guidance on the term’s plain meaning. 15 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 grant EMTs immunity for negligent driving. Second, the state does not include emergency vehicle driving training in any part of the EMT certification process. If driving an emergency vehicle was meant to be considered “rendering emergency medical service,” then training would be a required part of the certification process. Third, there are no state standards for what training is required. Indeed, Northwest Ambulance allowed Mr. Shaw to drive an ambulance with the barest of training. Mr. Shaw’s training in emergency driving was limited. Mr. Shaw testified: Q. Okay. For—for driving—and this—I'm somewhat curious about this because you go through all the training for the EMT. Do you guys have like driver training or is that just kind of on that third ride- along, there's like, “Hey, man, go ahead and drive”? A. Yeah. So the driver training is a—is a PowerPoint that we took in the classroom. CP at 707. Mr. Shaw recalled that the PowerPoint training lasted “maybe an hour or two.” CP at 709. That was the extent of his training before he started driving ambulances for Northwest Ambulance. Id. Despite the lack of training, Mr. Shaw was willing to drive code and figure it out on the job. A. Looking back on it, looking back on it. At the time I didn’t—I didn’t—you know, I would never back down from—from—if someone—you know, at that time I’m a very impressionable EMT. If someone asks me to do something, I’m going to try to do it, whatever— to whatever extent—you know what I mean? So if they ask you to drive code, I’m going to figure out, even if I haven’t been trained. And I—I don’t want to speak for other people in 16 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 my position. But a lot of us were brand new EMT’s [sic] that were kind of gung-ho. We wanted to be the—you know, we wanted to be the [set] it and forget it person and—and be reliable. So we didn’t want to say, you know, “I can’t—I can’t do that.” You know, you figure out how you can do it and you do it. CP at 710. The dissent asserts that Mr. Shaw took an emergency vehicle incident prevention course. Dissent at 8. However, as noted by the dissent, Mr. Shaw took that course after the accident at issue in this lawsuit. In fact, Northwest Ambulance did not provide that training to Mr. Shaw; instead, Mr. Shaw received that training from his next employer. CP at 744. The dissent asserts, “As the record shows, driving an ambulance requires specialized training beyond that of an average driver.” Dissent at 8. Just the opposite: the record shows that Mr. Shaw was an average driver who was put in a position of driving an ambulance in an emergency situation. RCW 18.71.210(2) does not provide immunity for the “commission or omission of an act which is not within the [EMT’s] field of medical expertise.” Although an EMT is trained to perform emergency medical procedures during ambulance transport, as noted, there is no requirement by the State or Northwest Ambulance that the driver receive specialized training for emergency driving. Moreover, driving itself does not involve any medical expertise. An EMT who is driving cannot also attend to patient care or render medical services. Indeed, RCW 17 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 18.73.150 provides that if there are two or more EMTs operating the ambulance, the nondriving EMT must be with the patient attending to their care. That was the case here. Northwest Ambulance EMTs operate ambulances in teams of at least two, with one EMT responsible for providing patient care while the other EMT drives. Accordingly, an EMT driving an ambulance is not performing an emergency medical procedure within their field of medical expertise. 3. Subsection (4) Expands Qualified Immunity to Acts or Omissions Done or Committed in Good Faith During Transport to Certain Nonmedical Facilities. It Does Not Expand Qualified Immunity to Transport Itself Contrary to Northwest Ambulance’s main argument on appeal, RCW 18.71.210(4) does not establish that transport itself is subject to qualified immunity. Instead, subsection (4) reinforces our conclusion that ambulance transport is different from the emergency medical services rendered by an EMT. The subsection provides: This section shall apply also, as to the entities and personnel described in subsection (1) of this section, to any act or omission committed or omitted in good faith by such entities or personnel involved in the transport of patients to mental health facilities or chemical dependency programs, in accordance with applicable alternative facility procedures adopted under RCW 70.168.100. RCW 18.71.210(4). Subsection (4) was adopted to expand qualified immunity to acts or omissions done or committed in good faith during transport to certain nonmedical facilities. However, the provision does not expand qualified immunity to transport itself. 18 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 A brief history of the law makes this clear. At the time the legislature established qualified immunity under RCW 18.71.210, ambulance services were statutorily allowed to transport patients only to medical facilities. The legislature later amended chapter 18.73 RCW to allow ambulance services to also transport patients to certain nonmedical facilities, such as mental health facilities and chemical dependency programs. RCW 18.73.280. When the legislature made that amendment to chapter 18.73 RCW, it also amended the qualified immunity statute to cover emergency medical services rendered during transport to such nonmedical facilities through subsection (4). LAWS OF 2015, ch. 157, §§ 4, 5; RCW 18.71.210(4). Accordingly, subsection (4) did not carve out qualified immunity for transport itself. Instead, it extended qualified immunity for an EMT’s ordinary negligence while rendering emergency medical services during transport to medical and certain nonmedical facilities alike. B. Ambulance Services Are Not Subject to Immunity for an EMT’s Negligent Driving. Instead, EMTs Are Subject to a Standard of Reasonable Care for Emergency Vehicle Drivers Altogether, the plain text of the statute and related provisions demonstrate that ambulance transportation itself is not covered by the qualified immunity statute. While we need not look further under our plain text analysis, two other statutes support the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to provide qualified immunity for negligent ambulance transport. 19 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 1. The Legislature Knows How To Provide Immunity for Ambulance Transportation but Did Not Do So Here First, the legislature has established qualified immunity for emergency medical transportation in other contexts, unlike here. Specifically, RCW 4.24.300(1) provides qualified immunity for volunteer providers of emergency or medical services “in the rendering of such emergency care or in transporting such persons.” In that statute, the legislature specifically carved out qualified immunity for volunteers for the distinct acts of care or transportation. By contrast, in the statute at issue here, the legislature limited the scope of qualified immunity to an EMT’s acts or omissions done while rendering medical care and treatment. RCW 18.71.210. We must assume the different language in the two statutes shows a different legislative intent. State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586, 817 P.2d 855 (1991). Volunteers are immune from liability for care and transportation alike while EMTs are immune only for care. 2. The Legislature Has Established That Drivers of Emergency Vehicles Are Required To Act with Ordinary Care. Providing Qualified Immunity for Negligent Ambulance Transportation Would Create a Statutory Conflict Second, it makes sense that the legislature did not carve out qualified immunity for ambulance transportation since it has already established a standard of reasonable care for emergency vehicle drivers. The statute on driving emergency code, RCW 46.61.035, provides certain privileges for drivers of authorized emergency vehicles 20 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 when responding to emergency calls, including allowing ambulances to disregard certain traffic rules while driving code. However, the statute makes clear that the driving privileges “shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.” RCW 46.61.035(4). Accordingly, ambulance drivers are not immune from liability for negligent driving but are held to the ordinary standard of care for emergency vehicle drivers. III CONCLUSION The legislature granted EMTs immunity from liability for their negligent acts or omissions while rendering emergency medical services. This immunity includes their rendering medical services while the patient is being transported. However, Northwest Ambulance contends that the legislature, in enacting RCW 18.71.210(1), intended to give ambulance drivers who are EMTs something that the legislature has not given law enforcement officers or firefighters—the right to drive negligently and not be held responsible for that negligent driving. Its argument fails. A plain reading of the statute demonstrates that the legislature granted EMTs immunity from civil liability for their negligent acts only in providing medical treatment, not for negligent driving. Indeed, the plain language of the statute and related statutes shows that EMT ambulance drivers have a duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. We affirm. 21 Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al. No. 104498-4 _______________________________ WE CONCUR: Melody, J. 22  No. 104498-4 MONTOYA-LEWIS, J. (dissenting)—The legislature granted civil immunity for an emergency medical technician (EMT) or paramedic’s acts or omissions “while rendering emergency medical service.” RCW 18.71.210(1). I disagree with the majority that only medical procedures that require medical expertise are immunized and that “rendering emergency medical services” does not include operating an ambulance. Majority at 11-12. The legislature broadly defined “emergency medical service” to include the services provided by operating an ambulance. RCW 18.73.030(11). Further, “actual emergency medical procedures” “within the field of medical expertise” recognizes that different types of emergency medical service providers are licensed to perform varying levels of medical skills and procedures, and the immunity applies when those providers perform medical services for which they are qualified. RCW 18.71.210(2). I would conclude summary judgment should have been granted to Northwest Ambulance because RCW 18.71.210(1) expressly immunizes it from liability for injuries resulting from the ambulance crash. I dissent. Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4 (Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting) FACTUAL BACKGROUND Frank Costa was a cancer patient at Genesis HealthCare Center in Everett. After Mr. Costa’s lab results came back abnormal, Genesis determined that Mr. Costa needed to go to the emergency department at Providence Medical Center to receive medical treatment. Genesis requested an ambulance to transfer Mr. Costa to the hospital. Northwest Ambulance sent an ambulance staffed by Jack Wilson (lead EMT), Henry Shaw (driver and EMT), and Katelyn Averill (EMT in training). For transport, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw secured Mr. Costa on a gurney using guardrails and lap belts secured over both his waist and knees. Although Northwest Ambulance’s policy required the use of shoulder restraints, the EMTs did not strap Mr. Costa’s shoulder