In re Estate of Paul

2026 UT App 151 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF BRANDON DAVID PAUL KAMALEE KAY PAUL, Appellant, v. KEVAN D. PAUL AND KAREN H. PAUL, Appellees. Opinion No. 20250935-CA Filed October 8, 2026 Fourth District Court, Nephi Department The Honorable Anthony L. Howell No. 233600010 Dusten L. Heugly, Attorney for Appellant Randall L. Jeffs, Attorney for Appellees JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred. ORME, Judge: ¶1 This appeal arises from a dispute between two creditors and the personal representative of Brandon David Paul’s estate (the Estate). The district court ordered the personal representative to pay the creditors’ claims, and in response, she filed several post-judgment motions. As relevant here, the personal representative argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the creditors did not comply with the statutory requirements for their claims. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the creditors had complied with the requirements but that even if they had not, their noncompliance did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Of the motions raised by the personal representative, the only one over  In re Estate of Paul which we have appellate jurisdiction is the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm. BACKGROUND 1 ¶2 On August 5, 2022, Brandon David Paul and Kamalee Kay Paul filed a stipulated divorce petition, which stated, in relevant part, that Brandon2 would receive a building lot in Nephi, Utah (the Lot) that he had purchased with a loan of $136,000 from his parents, Karen H. and Kevan D. Paul (collectively, Parents). But before the district court had the opportunity to review and approve the petition, Brandon passed away on August 8, 2022. The following day, after being notified of Brandon’s passing, the district court dismissed the divorce petition. Consequently, the Lot became an asset of the Estate, and the $136,000 debt to Parents became a liability of the Estate. ¶3 On July 6, 2023, Parents filed a probate petition in which they identified themselves as creditors of the Estate and requested Kamalee’s appointment as personal representative of the Estate. On August 8, 2023, exactly one year after Brandon’s death, the district court granted Parents’ petition and entered an Order of Formal Appointment of Personal Representative, naming Kamalee as the Estate’s personal representative. On September 11, 2023, Parents presented two claims to Kamalee: $17,375 for their payment of Brandon’s funeral expenses and $136,000 for their loan toward the purchase of the Lot. Because Kamalee did not file 1. “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we view the facts and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group Ltd., 2014 UT 13, n.1, 325 P.3d 70 (quotation simplified). 2. Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended. 20250935-CA 2 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul a notice of disallowance of the claims within the 60-day deadline, the claims were deemed allowed under the Utah Uniform Probate Code (the Probate Code). See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-806(1) (LexisNexis 2024). 3 ¶4 After a year passed in which Kamalee did not pay or challenge the claims, Parents filed a motion for entry of an order pursuant to section 75-3-807(1) of the Probate Code for payment of the claims within 30 days. See id. § 75-3-807(1) (2024). Kamalee filed no response to the motion, and the district court granted it on September 3, 2024, entering an order to that effect (the Judgment). Later that month, Kamalee filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. ¶5 After several more months passed without Kamalee complying with the Judgment, Parents obtained a writ of garnishment and served it on Kamalee’s employer. In May 2025, we granted Kamalee’s petition for extraordinary relief and vacated the writ of garnishment because the district court had not entered a ruling at that time establishing Kamalee’s personal liability for the Estate’s unpaid debts. In that same order, this court also denied as untimely Kamalee’s petition for interlocutory review of the Judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 5(a) (providing that a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order must be filed “within 21 days after the entry of the trial court’s signed order”). 4 3. Because the applicable provisions of the Probate Code in effect at the relevant time do not differ from those currently in effect in any way material to this appeal, we cite the current version of the code for convenience. 4. Kamalee’s petition for interlocutory review was filed approximately six months past the deadline. Moreover, the Judgment was a final order for purposes of appeal. See infra ¶ 6. 20250935-CA 3 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul ¶6 Kamalee then filed a motion to certify the Judgment as final pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, along with both a motion to dismiss that challenged the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to stay the proceedings. During a hearing on the motion to certify, the court ruled that the Judgment was already final and therefore did not require certification under rule 54(b), concluding that “this order resolved all of the issues between [Parents] and the estate” and that there was “no just reason to delay collecting on this judgment.” On June 24, 2025, the court entered a written order denying rule 54(b) certification and denying the motion to stay the proceedings. In its order, not only did the district court note that the “specific language that the Creditors’ claims must be paid within 30 days” put the parties “on clear notice that the issues in the proceeding had been fully and finally adjudicated,” it also reasoned, “It would be improper for this Court to enter a separate Rule 54(b) certification many months after the entry of a final order of this Court.” ¶7 At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Kamalee argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Parents did not comply with the Probate Code’s statutory requirements for presenting a claim. The district court disagreed and denied the motion, concluding, “By virtue of the probate petition filed by [Parents], this Court obtained and has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims that any creditors assert against the Estate.” In its oral ruling, the court explained: The concept of subject matter jurisdiction relates to the relationship between the claim and the forum that allows for the exercise of jurisdiction. That’s from the Johnson case.[5] The concept of subject matter jurisdiction is that whether the court lacks authority to hear types of cases rather than 5. The court was referring to Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 1100. 20250935-CA 4 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul when it simply lacks the authority to grant relief in an individual case. So in this case, the court certainly has authority to hear this class of cases. The probate action was filed in Juab County district court. The probate action is still pending. Even if I were to disallow the claims of [Parents], the court would still have subject matter jurisdiction to address those claims. So the motion to dismiss is denied. The court does have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims and these parties. The court went on to find that Parents had commenced the probate action within the one-year period required by Utah Code section 75-3-803(1) (the Nonclaim Statute), so it concluded, “By virtue of the probate petition filed by [Parents], this Court obtained and has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims that any creditors assert against the Estate.” See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2025). The district court concluded, “Whether [Parents] complied with particular statutory requirements regarding presentation of claims is a factual question, not a subject matter jurisdiction question, which this Court has already addressed and resolved in this Court’s prior orders.” The court then entered its order denying the motion to dismiss on July 21, 2025. This appeal followed. ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 Kamalee challenges four of the district court’s orders: the Judgment, the denial of the motion to reconsider, the denial of rule 54(b) certification, and denial of the motion to dismiss. “We have jurisdiction to review only those rulings from which a timely notice of appeal was filed.” Ross v. Barnett, 2018 UT App 179, ¶ 18, 436 P.3d 306, cert. denied, 437 P.3d 1247 (Utah 2019). See also Reisbeck v. HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, ¶ 5, 2 P.3d 20250935-CA 5 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul 447 (“Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives [appellate courts] of jurisdiction over the appeal.”). Under our appellate rules, an appeal “must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Therefore, “it is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal.” Beverlin v. Beverlin, 2025 UT App 72, ¶ 24, 572 P.3d 428 (quotation simplified). ¶9 Here, Kamalee filed her notice of appeal on August 12, 2025. The only order being challenged that falls within the preceding thirty-day period is the denial of the motion to dismiss, issued on July 21, 2025. The Judgment was entered over eleven months earlier, on September 3, 2024. And as the district court correctly concluded, the Judgment was final and appealable when it was entered because the “order resolved all of the issues between [Parents] and the estate.” See Ross, 2018 UT App 179, ¶ 22 (concluding that an order “was a final, appealable order” because it “determined the substantial rights of the parties and resolved all issues at stake”). Once the Judgment was entered, the orders on post-judgment motions could be separately appealed. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (listing post-judgment orders for which the appeal time runs “from the entry of the dispositive order”). See also NPEC, LLC v. Miller, 2019 UT App 175, ¶ 6, 453 P.3d 654 (explaining that some types of post-judgment orders are “separately appealable”). With respect to the post-judgment orders, the only one that was timely appealed was the order denying the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the sole issue we have appellate jurisdiction to address is Kamalee’s challenge to the district court’s denial of her motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ¶10 “We review jurisdictional issues for correctness.” In re A.J.B., 2017 UT App 237, ¶ 12, 414 P.3d 552, cert. denied, 421 P.3d 440 (Utah 2018). Likewise, a motion to dismiss is reviewed for 20250935-CA 6 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul correctness. See Lavender v. FCOI Preserve, LLC, 2025 UT App 47, ¶ 37, 569 P.3d 1037, cert. denied, 570 P.3d 660 (Utah 2025). ANALYSIS ¶11 Kamalee contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. Specifically, she argues that the Nonclaim Statute “divests” the district court of subject matter jurisdiction because Parents missed the statutory deadline for filing a claim against the Estate. In response, Parents contend that they met the statutory deadline and, in any event, whether the district court obtained jurisdiction does not hinge on the timeliness of the claim. We agree with Parents on both fronts. I. Parents’ Statutory Compliance ¶12 First, the Probate Code prescribes both when and how claims may be presented against a decedent’s estate. In terms of timing, the Nonclaim Statute requires, in relevant part, that “claims against a decedent’s estate which arose before the death of the decedent” must be filed within “one year after the decedent’s death.” Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2025). The Probate Code provides two paths to present a claim against a decedent’s estate. Under the first path, a creditor may present a claim to an appointed personal representative or to a court clerk. Id. § 75-3-804(1)(a) (2024). The claimant must include “a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed.” Id. Under the second path, a “claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal representative . . . to obtain payment of the claim against the estate, but the commencement of the proceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting the claim.” Id. § 75-3-804(1)(b). ¶13 Here, Parents took the second path. Brandon passed away on August 8, 2022. Parents initiated probate proceedings on July 20250935-CA 7 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul 6, 2023, by filing a petition that requested the formal appointment of Kamalee as the personal representative of the Estate and that identified their “interest in this matter [as] that of a creditor of the decedent and a person having a property right in or a claim against the decedent’s estate.” See id. Kamalee argues that Parents’ claim is deficient because it does not include “(a) a written statement of the claim, (b) the basis of the claim, or (c) the amount claimed.” Parents respond that those requirements apply to claims presented under the first path, not the second, and there are no such requirements for a claim presented through the commencement of a proceeding. Compare id. § 75-3-804(1)(a), with id. § 75-3-804(1)(b). ¶14 We need not address the merits of this argument because Parents are correct that Kamalee’s opportunity to challenge the petition’s adequacy has long since passed. As noted above, Kamalee missed the sixty-day deadline to contest the claims, which results in the claims being deemed allowed. See id. § 75-3-806(1) (“If the personal representative fails to mail notice to a claimant of action on the claim within 60 days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired, this failure has the effect of a notice of allowance.”). Further, Parents timely presented their claim against the Estate by commencing a proceeding within “one year after the decedent’s death” when they filed the petition for Kamalee’s appointment as the personal representative of the Estate that identified them as creditors of the Estate. See id. § 75-3-803(1). II. The District Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction ¶15 Second, even if Parents had missed the statutory deadline with an inadequate initial petition, the district court still had subject matter jurisdiction over Parents’ claims. Kamalee contends that the Nonclaim Statute is a jurisdictional bar to untimely claims. For support, she cites Walker v. Stowell (In re Estate of Ostler), 2009 UT 82, 227 P.3d 242, in which the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a claim against an estate was 20250935-CA 8 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul jurisdictionally barred because the plaintiffs failed to file the claim within the statutory deadline. Id. ¶¶ 1, 21. This holding was largely influenced by the Colorado Supreme Court, which viewed Colorado’s nonclaim statute as “jurisdictional in character.” See In re Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 76 (Colo. 1981) (en banc). See also Ostler, 2009 UT 82, ¶¶ 19–21. ¶16 Kamalee also cites Nebeker v. Summit County, 2014 UT App 244, 338 P.3d 203, as support for the proposition that the Nonclaim Statute is a jurisdictional bar. In Nebeker, this court held that a probate court judgment was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore not subject to collateral attack. Id. ¶¶ 20–27. But in discussing the district court’s reasoning in that case, which relied on Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 234 P.3d 1100, this court noted that “a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction even where the court may have general jurisdiction to resolve the type of dispute presented ‘when the statute permitting a party to sue another party requires statutory compliance, as with notice of claim requirements for suit against governmental entities.’” Nebeker, 2014 UT App 244, ¶ 26 (quoting Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 9). This court went on to suggest that “an argument can be made that the Probate Code’s time limits for claim filing are the sort of statutory compliance requirements that fit within this principle.” Id. (quotation simplified). Yet this court acknowledged that such an argument had not been made by Summit County and consequently declined to analyze it, let alone incorporate it into its holding. Id. Instead, the court criticized the “County’s use of unanalyzed quotes” from cases, including Ostler, to support its position and admonished the county to remember its “obligation to thoroughly analyze the case law and its application to the facts of the present case.” Id. ¶ 27. ¶17 The same can be said for Kamalee’s briefing in this case, which pulled quotes from Nebeker and Johnson without discussing their context or analyzing how claim requirements for suits against governmental entities compare to the Probate Code’s claim requirements. See Hess v. Canberra Dev. Co., 2011 UT 22, ¶ 25, 20250935-CA 9 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul 254 P.3d 161 (“Meaningful analysis requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.”) (quotation simplified). At most, Nebeker and Johnson acknowledge that statutory compliance is a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction in limited instances, such as claim requirements for suits against governmental entities. See Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 9; Nebeker, 2014 UT App 244, ¶ 26. However, those cases have not determined whether the same holds true for claims brought pursuant to the Probate Code. Thus, Kamalee’s reliance on those cases is unpersuasive. ¶18 Importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has recently revisited and ultimately refined its holding in Ostler, concluding that “it is sufficient and preferable to refer to the Nonclaim Statute as establishing a ‘bar’ rather than a ‘jurisdictional bar.’” Huitron v. Kaye, 2022 UT 36, ¶ 27, 517 P.3d 399. In Huitron, the Court stated, “The language of the statute says nothing about jurisdiction. It states only that late claims are ‘barred.’ And we will not add words to the statute that are not there.” Id. ¶ 28 (quotation simplified). Thus, on the heels of Huitron, the Nonclaim Statute should not be viewed as a jurisdictional bar. ¶19 Accordingly, even if Parents had not timely filed their claims against the Estate, the Nonclaim Statute would not have divested the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. The relevant question when “determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction” is “whether the court has authority over the general class of cases to which the particular case at issue belongs, rather than on the specific facts presented by any individual case.” In re adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 33, 266 P.3d 702. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 33–35 (concluding that the district court’s adoption ruling was valid despite the statute that provided jurisdiction to another state); Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 10 (concluding that the district court that granted the parties’ divorce decree had subject matter jurisdiction despite the fact that the parties were never legally married); Nebeker, 2014 UT App 244, 20250935-CA 10 2026 UT App 151  In re Estate of Paul ¶ 26 (concluding that the district court properly applied Johnson to assert it had subject matter jurisdiction over probate proceedings even if the claims against the estate were untimely). ¶20 Here, the Probate Code’s statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction allows district courts to “hear and determine formal proceedings involving administration and distribution of decedents’ estates.” Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2025). Therefore, “[j]ust as a court adjudicating a contract dispute has the authority to determine that no contract exists without losing subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute,” Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 12, a court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a petition for probate, regardless of whether the parties complied with the Probate Code’s statutory requirements. ¶21 In sum, the district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that “[b]y virtue of the probate petition filed by [Parents], this Court obtained and has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims that any creditors assert against the Estate.” CONCLUSION ¶22 The district court correctly concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Parents’ claims. ¶23 Affirmed. 20250935-CA 11 2026 UT App 151