State v. Hararah

2026 UT App 157 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH, Appellee, v. HOUSTON RAEFAT HARARAH, Appellant. Opinion No. 20240453-CA Filed October 16, 2026 Second District Court, Farmington Department The Honorable Ronald G. Russell The Honorable Noel S. Hyde No. 231700395 Emily Adams and Rachel Phillips Ainscough, Attorneys for Appellant Derek E. Brown and Connor Nelson, Attorneys for Appellee JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge: ¶1 Houston Raefat Hararah appeals his two forcible sexual abuse convictions. He argues that the presiding judge abused his discretion in denying Hararah’s motion to disqualify both the trial judge assigned to his case as well as all the remaining Davis County district court judges. He also challenges the trial court’s decision to sentence him to concurrent prison sentences rather than probation. Neither challenge is successful, and we affirm.  State v. Hararah BACKGROUND The Charges 1 ¶2 Hararah “matched” with a woman (Victim) on a dating app, and the two began messaging each other. Then in a subsequent phone call, the two agreed to meet in person. Hararah picked Victim up from her apartment, after which they drove to a bar in downtown Ogden. From the beginning of the encounter, Victim found Hararah’s comments “off-putting,” and after a couple of drinks at the bar, Victim “didn’t want to be on the date anymore” and told Hararah she wanted to go home. On the way to take Victim home, Hararah offered her $200 to “make out” with him. Victim “really needed money at the time,” so she agreed, stating that she was willing to make out with Hararah but that she would not participate in “sexual touching”; she specified that she would keep her clothing on but also agreed, when asked, that Hararah could touch her buttocks over her pants. ¶3 Hararah pulled over on the side of a dirt road, and the two began making out. At some point, Hararah removed Victim’s pants and “immediately started touching [her] privates on the outside of [her] underwear.” Victim “really didn’t like that,” so she “squirmed,” moved Hararah’s hand away, and “told him [she] didn’t want him to touch [her] there.” After some repositioning and more kissing, Hararah again reached his hand down and Victim felt “contact on [her] skin” on her “vaginal . . . opening area.” She “jolted away from him” and stated that she “didn’t want [him] to do that.” But after some more kissing, Hararah touched her vaginal area again. She again told him no. A bit later, Victim “could feel [Hararah’s] fingers directly touch [her] 1. “On appeal from a jury trial, we review the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.” State v. Speights, 2021 UT 56, n.1, 497 P.3d 340 (quotation simplified). 20240453-CA 2 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah anus,” and she decided that this was “the last straw.” She “raised [her] voice” and demanded to be taken home. Hararah did not initially comply, but after Victim brandished a taser, he drove her home. ¶4 After arriving home, Victim called 911 to report the incident. Based on her allegations, the State filed charges against Hararah in Davis County, charging him with aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and three counts of forcible sexual abuse. The Motion to Disqualify ¶5 Shortly before trial was scheduled to commence, Hararah filed a motion, along with a supporting affidavit, seeking the disqualification of not only the judge assigned to his case but of all district court judges in Davis County. The motion was based on a “recent[]” discovery that Victim was the niece of a different district court judge in Davis County. In the motion, Hararah did not assert any claim of actual bias on the part of the assigned judge. Instead, the motion acknowledged both that there was “no reason to believe that any of the other Davis County judges ha[d] personal knowledge and/or information related to the connection between” Victim and the judge who is her uncle and that there had “been no information provided to suggest that [that judge had] disclosed his relationship to [Victim] with other members of the bench.” Nonetheless, Hararah argued, “[G]iven the close nature of the association between the district court judges and their support staff, it’s highly likely this information will become known at some point during the trial.” And Hararah argued that based on the “collegial nature of the association” among the members of the Davis County bench, there was an imputed conflict of interest that required disqualification of all district court judges in Davis County. 20240453-CA 3 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah ¶6 The assigned judge, pursuant to rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, certified the disqualification motion to the presiding judge of the district. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(b)(2)(A) (“The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge.”). ¶7 The presiding judge, after raising some concerns as to the timeliness of the motion, determined that even if timely, the motion and supporting affidavit were “insufficient to justify [disqualification] of the assigned judge or disqualification of all judges in Davis County.” The presiding judge stated that the motion and affidavit acknowledged that Hararah was not “aware of any facts that demonstrate bias, prejudice, or a conflict of interest,” and that the allegations contained therein were “only speculation, based upon an extended-family relationship between an alleged victim and a judge who is acknowledged to be uninvolved in the case.” The presiding judge therefore denied the motion, concluding, “Such speculative and uncorroborated concerns are not sufficient to support a finding of bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest on the part of the assigned judge. While such concerns would require closer scrutiny if the judge with the family relationship were involved in the case, they do not, based on the fact of the relationship alone, justify the disqualification of all judges in Davis County.” Trial and Sentencing ¶8 The case then proceeded to trial. The jury convicted Hararah of two counts of forcible sexual abuse—one count based on touching Victim’s vagina and the other count based on touching her anus—and acquitted him of the remaining charges. ¶9 At sentencing, the trial court began the proceedings by noting that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report (the PSR) prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. The court then 20240453-CA 4 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah asked the prosecutor and the defense attorney if there were any corrections that needed to be made to the PSR, and both responded in the negative. The court also stated that it had “taken the time to review” several letters submitted on Hararah’s behalf, including ones from his mother and grandmother. ¶10 The court stated that it found the information in the PSR helpful, but the court also noted that it had taken “the opportunity to listen to the testimony at trial and hear very carefully what occurred, the conduct involved, and the impact of the crime on [Victim].” The court then specifically acknowledged several factors weighing in Hararah’s favor: I know, Mr. Hararah, I’m sure you’ve done some great things in your life, and I appreciate the fact that you volunteer for the homeless. You’ve got a grandmother who loves you, and a mother who loves you, and they wrote great letters regarding your character. And they know that you have the ability to change and to become the person you need to be in your life. And I believe that you can change yourself and move forward. I appreciate the fact that you’ve been working on yourself in jail. Nonetheless, the court indicated that, “[a]t the same time,” it needed to also consider the impact of the crimes on Victim, Hararah’s past misdeeds, and “the needs of justice that need to be met.” Because the crimes here “led to the very real impact on another person,” the court imposed a one-to-fifteen year prison sentence for each conviction. However, the court also determined that, considering various factors, including “the factors outlined in the [PSR],” it was appropriate to run the two sentences concurrently with one another. ¶11 The court then reiterated, 20240453-CA 5 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah But again, the impact of this crime and the seriousness of it and the fact that I think, based even on the letters that I reviewed that have been provided regarding your character, I think that your past has indicated that you’re a predator, and that you are dangerous. And that this prison sentence is necessary, not just . . . for rehabilitative purposes, but also to protect the public from that kind of behavior. ¶12 Hararah now appeals his convictions and sentences. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶13 Hararah first challenges the presiding judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify the assigned trial court judge. “Determining whether a trial judge committed error by failing to recuse himself or herself under the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct is a question of law, which we ordinarily review for correctness. However, if the trial judge complie[d] exactly with rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in handling the motion for disqualification, then the burden shifts to the petitioners to make an additional showing of either actual bias or abuse of discretion.” State v. Asta, 2018 UT App 220, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d 664 (quotation simplified). ¶14 Next, Hararah challenges the trial court’s sentencing decision. “Because trial courts are afforded wide latitude in sentencing, a court’s sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A court exceeds its discretion if it acts with inherent unfairness in imposing a sentence, imposes a clearly excessive sentence, or fails to consider all legally relevant factors.” Id. ¶ 16 (quotation simplified). 20240453-CA 6 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah ANALYSIS I. The Motion to Disqualify ¶15 Hararah first argues that the presiding judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to disqualify both the trial judge assigned to Hararah’s case as well as all other district court judges in Davis County. We disagree. 2 ¶16 “As a general rule, a judge has a duty to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary and should disqualify [himself or] herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ¶ 21, 135 P.3d 874 (quotation simplified). In assessing an asserted appearance of bias, we employ a “reasonable person” test that “looks to see whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would believe that the judge’s impartiality could be questioned.” Id. ¶ 22 (quotation 2. Despite the presiding judge’s statement that there was “insufficient information before the court to support a finding that the motion [was] timely,” the judge went on to determine that “[e]ven if” the motion was timely, it was “insufficient to justify” the requested disqualification. And because we ultimately affirm the presiding judge’s ruling on the merits, we need not reach the underlying timeliness issue. Thus, we need not address Hararah’s argument that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not sufficiently establishing the timeliness of the motion for disqualification, and we therefore also deny Hararah’s related motion brought under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to remand for the entry of further findings related to this argument, see Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) (“A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court’s determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 20240453-CA 7 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah simplified); see also Fullmer v. Fullmer, 2015 UT App 60, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 14 (“The question of a judge’s impartiality is determined by viewing the question through the eyes of a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances.” (quotation simplified)). “The word ‘reasonable’ connotes the idea that judges are not subject to disqualification in every situation where their impartiality is questioned, particularly when the potential for bias is remote.” Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ¶ 21; see also Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 767 P.2d 538, 544 n.5 (Utah 1988) (“An appearance of bias or prejudice is sufficient for disqualification, but even disqualification because of appearance must have some basis in fact and be grounded on more than mere conjecture and speculation.”). ¶17 Hararah points to the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct— particularly its provision that a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned when close family members are involved in a case before the court, see Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(2)—to argue that disqualification was required here. But that provision does not address the situation before us. That provision speaks to the impartiality of a judge who is assigned to a case in which his or her family members are involved. And indeed, the presiding judge recognized that if the judge who was related to Victim had been the assigned judge here, “closer scrutiny” would have been required. But the presiding judge determined that, without more, the simple fact that there was a familial relationship between Victim and another judge in the county did not “justify the disqualification of all judges in Davis County.” ¶18 Hararah asserts that this familial connection creates an appearance of bias for the trial judge assigned to this case, positing that the two judges are “close colleague[s]” and that “an average judge in [the assigned judge’s] position was unlikely to be neutral, knowing that he was presiding over the case of alleged sexual assault for his colleague’s niece.” But this reasoning seems 20240453-CA 8 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah to be largely based on the assertion made in Hararah’s original motion that due to “the close nature of the association between the district court judges and their support staff,” the discovery of the familial connection by the assigned judge was “highly likely.” Thus, these assertions are based entirely on conjecture. Hararah acknowledged in his motion that there was “no reason to believe that any of the other Davis County judges ha[d] personal knowledge” of the familial connection. And he has presented no facts indicating that the judge related to Victim had a close relationship of any kind with the assigned judge or that the nature of their relationship with support staff had problematic implications here. 3 Nor was such a showing made in relation to any of the remaining members of the Davis County bench. ¶19 In sum, where the only fact presented was that Victim is related to a different district court judge in the same county, we agree with the presiding judge that Hararah’s “speculative and uncorroborated concerns [were] not sufficient to support a finding of bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest on the part of the assigned judge.” We thus see no abuse of discretion in the presiding judge’s denial of the motion to disqualify, and we therefore affirm that ruling. II. Sentencing ¶20 Hararah next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison rather than affording him the privilege of probation, asserting that the court “failed to adequately consider all of the evidence before it” and that the 3. It seems unlikely that Hararah could have presented facts weighing in his favor on this matter because the assigned judge later stated on the record that he worked in a different courthouse from the judge related to Victim, that he therefore did not “interact with [that other judge] very often,” and that he had not “had any communication with [that judge] regarding this case.” 20240453-CA 9 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah sentences were “clearly excessive under the circumstances of the case.” Again, we disagree. ¶21 Hararah points to several circumstances that he argues the trial court failed to properly consider in arriving at its decision. But we have no reason to think that the court overlooked any of the considerations upon which Hararah relies. ¶22 Indeed, several of the considerations Hararah raises were specifically mentioned by the trial court. For example, Hararah asserts he had “a prosocial influence in the community,” as demonstrated by his volunteer work and the care he provided for his grandmother, and he also points to the steps he had been taking while incarcerated to change his lifestyle and to a letter submitted to the court by his mother that spoke to his “positive improvements.” But the trial court specifically recognized Hararah’s volunteer efforts and the supportive letters from his family, and the court also stated that it “appreciate[d] the fact that [he had] been working on [him]self in jail.” Similarly, although Hararah points to weaknesses in the State’s case that he argues the court overlooked, the court referenced its “opportunity to listen to the testimony at trial and hear very carefully what occurred,” which suggests the court was precisely aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Hararah. ¶23 Other considerations raised by Hararah are cast in a different light by the actual language of the PSR—which the trial court said it had reviewed and which Hararah’s counsel indicated was not in need of any corrections. For example, Hararah asserts that his criminal history “was minor,” that he had no criminal associates, that he accepted responsibility for his actions, and that he had shown he could be successful on probation. But the PSR indicated that Hararah had “a criminal history dating back to 2006, with prior convictions for assault and alcohol-related offenses,” that his time of incarceration “indicat[ed] criminal acquaintances,” that “[h]e place[d] some blame on [Victim] and 20240453-CA 10 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah his drinking habits,” and that prior probation “had been successfully terminated once and unsuccessfully terminated twice.” Likewise, although Hararah argues that the court should have considered that he never “threatened” Victim or was “violent” toward her (but was, in his words, just “persistent in wanting to engage in sexual activities”), the PSR indicated that he “shows signs of anger, assaultive behavior, and aggression,” “lacks impulse control,” “and has a disregard for the feelings of others.” ¶24 Thus, we are not convinced that the trial court ignored the various considerations raised by Hararah. Hararah clearly disagrees with the way the court weighed the various considerations, but that is simply not adequate to show an abuse of the court’s discretion. 4 See State v. Epling, 2011 UT App 229, ¶ 22, 262 P.3d 440 (“Although [the defendant] would have liked the trial court to rely more heavily on the factors that he considers mitigating, he has not shown that the trial court failed to consider these factors completely. . . . The fact that the trial court assessed the relevant factors differently than [the defendant] would have liked does not indicate that it exceeded its discretion.”). ¶25 When viewing the full spectrum of the evidence before the court—including the seriousness of the crimes and their impact on Victim, which are factors the court considered significant—we cannot say that the court exceeded its considerable discretion in determining that Hararah was “dangerous” and “a predator” and that incarceration was therefore warranted here, consistent with 4. We further note that despite the trial court’s decision to sentence Hararah to prison, many of the factors that he considers mitigating factors may have been behind the trial court’s determination to run the two sentences concurrently instead of consecutively. 20240453-CA 11 2026 UT App 157  State v. Hararah the recommendation of the PSR. We therefore affirm the court’s sentencing decision. CONCLUSION ¶26 The presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Hararah’s motion to disqualify. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Hararah to prison. We therefore affirm. 20240453-CA 12 2026 UT App 157