Huynh v. Witte

2026 UT App 150 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS JAYDEN HA HUYNH, Appellee and Cross-appellant, v. DANIEL E. WITTE, Appellant and Cross-appellee. Opinion No. 20220160-CA Filed October 8, 2026 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Paul B. Parker No. 134903429 Daniel E. Witte, Appellant and Cross-appellee Pro Se Julie J. Nelson and Albert N. Pranno, Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-appellant JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred. ORME, Judge: ¶1 Shortly after Daniel E. Witte and Jayden Ha Huynh divorced pursuant to a stipulated divorce decree (the Decree), Witte initiated what would become a highly contentious, nearly decade-long post-divorce dispute in which custody of their shared son (Son) was one of the central issues. Witte, a licensed attorney representing himself, caused the focus of the proceedings to be repeatedly derailed by his excessive and unprofessional filings. This conduct ultimately compelled the district court to sanction Witte pursuant to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring Witte to hire counsel rather than continue representing himself. Later, following a bench trial, the court awarded Huynh sole legal custody of Son and awarded attorney fees to each party for prevailing on different issues. But  Huynh v. Witte after neither party submitted an affidavit of fees for over two years, the court rescinded the fee awards. ¶2 On appeal, we address Witte’s challenges to the district court’s rule 11 sanction and the court’s modification of legal custody. On cross-appeal, Huynh assails the court’s decision to rescind her award of attorney fees. We affirm on all fronts. BACKGROUND 1 The Decree and Petition to Modify ¶3 Witte and Huynh were married in 2005. Son was born in early 2013, and Huynh initiated divorce proceedings five months later. In April 2014, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the district court entered the Decree, which awarded the parties joint legal custody of Son and awarded Huynh sole physical custody. Witte, who lived in California at the time, was granted parent time pursuant to Utah’s relocation statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 81-9-209 (LexisNexis Supp. 2025). 2 Under the Decree, Huynh had the express “right to relocate with [Son] so long as notice has been provided pursuant to” the relocation statute. 1. On appeal from a bench trial, “we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard. However, we present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, n.3, 525 P.3d 534 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023). 2. Renumbering aside, because the applicable provisions of the Utah Code in effect at the relevant time do not substantively differ from those currently in effect in any way material to this appeal, we cite the most recent printed version of the code for convenience. 20220160-CA 2 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte ¶4 Within a year of the entry of the Decree, the parties switched states, with Witte relocating to Utah and Huynh, after giving proper notice, moving with Son to California. Witte filed a pro se petition to modify the Decree in September 2014, and in April 2015, he filed an amended petition to modify and an objection to Son’s relocation to California. In his amended petition, Witte sought sole physical custody of Son but did not request a change to the shared legal custody arrangement. In his supporting memorandum, Witte requested “relief and an order against . . . Huynh as set forth above and for other and such relief as the Court may deem proper.” ¶5 Huynh filed a counterpetition to modify the Decree, but she eventually withdrew that petition. She did not seek a change to legal custody in the withdrawn petition. Rule 11 Sanction ¶6 The litigation soon became, in the words of the district court, “highly contentious.” Huynh first moved to designate Witte as a vexatious litigant in April 2015. See Utah R. Civ. P. 83. She complained that Witte had “filed numerous pleadings in this matter that were excessive in length” and “contain[ed] an exorbitant amount of pages of arguments and exhibits in light of the issues.” She noted that in the preceding seven months, Witte had filed approximately 79 different documents totaling a little over 1,700 pages. Accordingly, Huynh requested that the district court strike all of Witte’s prior filings, enter a default judgment against him, enter an award of attorney fees in her favor, and require Witte to obtain prior judicial approval before submitting any future filings. ¶7 Following a hearing in May 2015, a court commissioner denied Huynh’s motion to designate Witte as a vexatious litigant on the ground that the commissioner could not “make a finding that there is no reasonable probability that [Witte] will prevail on his Petition to Modify.” Nevertheless, the commissioner acknowledged that Witte’s filings included “inappropriate” 20220160-CA 3 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte claims against Huynh’s counsel, “scandalous” “name-calling,” and language that rose “to the level of harassing” and violated the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility. The commissioner further found that the “volume and language in [Witte’s filings] go beyond clarifying the issue.” The commissioner admonished Witte “to take notice that he is close to rising to the level of a vexatious litigant in the volume of [filings], and the inappropriate contents of his [filings].” And the commissioner instructed Witte to “follow the [Utah Standards] of Professionalism and Civility.” The commissioner also invited Huynh to file a motion for an order to show cause if Witte violated those standards going forward. ¶8 Witte’s filings did not improve following the commissioner’s admonition. Six months later, in November 2015, Huynh filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for an order to show cause. Following a January 2016 hearing before the district court, the court issued an order holding that Witte had violated rule 11 on a “repeated and consistent” basis. More specifically, the court ruled that between September 2014 and January 2016, Witte violated rule 11 on 27 separate occasions by “submitting pleadings for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in cost of litigation, as well as submitting allegations that do not have evidentiary support.” 3 On the last point, the court found that no evidence supported Witte’s assertions that Huynh’s counsel had lied in the filings, threatened or retaliated against Witte, “attempted to sabotage the mediation process,” or had ideas that were “examples of reverse racism, anti-religious bigotry, Marxist feminist deconstructionalism, extreme leftism, and other related socially-radical nonsense.” The court also found that a 76-page affidavit Witte submitted in response to Huynh’s motion for rule 11 sanctions “was an attempt 3. The district court further concluded that Witte had “gone above and beyond in violating Rule 3 of the Utah [Standards] of Professionalism and Civility through a pattern of accusations against opposing counsel.” 20220160-CA 4 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte to circumvent the page length requirements by placing argument in a document called an affidavit.” ¶9 The court thus ordered that (1) page limits for motions and memoranda would be enforced; (2) Witte must seek court permission to submit overlength pleadings and memoranda; (3) any references to Huynh’s counsel’s “nefarious intent, lying, collaboration, or other unprofessional conduct” would “be stricken from the record but the [filings] themselves will not be stricken”; and (4) going forward, any violation of rule 11 would “follow the procedure outlined in rule 11, which include[s] sending notice to opposing counsel and giving them an opportunity to cure the violation before filing a motion with the Court.” The court declined to award Huynh attorney fees at that time but indicated that any future rule 11 violations would result in an attorney fees award. ¶10 Once more, the court’s ruling did little to improve the volume and content of Witte’s filings. In April 2017, Huynh filed another motion for rule 11 sanctions. Huynh attached to the motion an 18-page summary of all Witte’s alleged violations of rule 11 since the court’s January 2016 order. This time, Huynh requested that (1) the court strike all “objectionable” filings, (2) Witte be required to obtain counsel, (3) Witte “be subject to a pre-filing order requiring [him] to get authorization from the Court before . . . any” filings, (4) she be awarded attorney fees, and (5) the court impose any other sanctions it deemed appropriate. ¶11 In January 2018, following a hearing on the matter, the court entered an order. The court first noted that “this is a highly contentious matter by any standards” and stated that Witte’s response to Huynh’s apparent failure to timely disclose to him her new addresses and remarriage had “been extraordinarily intemperate.” The court further found that, as previously noted by the court commissioner in a minute entry, “the parties’ conflict ha[d] expanded into a conflict between” Witte and Huynh’s counsel, which “development appear[ed] to be the direct result of 20220160-CA 5 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte the tone, content and volume of [Witte’s] communications with counsel and the Court.” ¶12 As an example, the court pointed to Witte’s response to Huynh’s “unnecessar[y] but innocent[]” filing of a Request to Submit for Decision Rule 11 Sanctions. Witte filed an Objection to Request to Submit for Decision Rule 11 Sanctions in which he made additional substantive arguments and disregarded the court commissioner’s “prior admonition not to use single-spacing for any purpose other than quotation.” Huynh’s counsel next felt compelled to file a motion to strike Witte’s objection. The court stated, “This sequence of events represents a perfect illustration of [Witte’s] insistence on continuing to engage in a prolonged conflict” because although Witte’s objection was itself not inappropriate, it “clearly . . . constituted an improper effort to make further substantive argument on the merits of [Huynh’s] original motion after the matter had been fully briefed and argued.” ¶13 The court next expressed its view that because Witte “is a practicing attorney and apparently his area of practice is litigation,” it was “puzzling that he would display such a lack of understanding about proper court procedure as well as either an unfamiliarity, or simply a refusal to comply, with the Standards of Professionalism and Civility.” The court found that some of Witte’s direct communications with Huynh’s counsel were “clearly offensive and abusive,” and while not directly subject to rule 11 sanctions, those communications were relevant to Witte’s “state of mind.” The court further found that Witte had filed numerous papers with the Court which have no support in the rules or the law. [Witte] has also repeatedly attempted to circumvent the Court’s page limits, despite warnings in the past, by filing papers with lengthy footnotes for no good reason other than to squeeze more words into a smaller space. [Witte’s] papers are replete with comments disparaging [Huynh] and her current husband, as 20220160-CA 6 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte well as [Huynh’s] counsel. [Witte’s] characterizations of the Court in his filings are at best combative and highly disrespectful. And the court noted that Huynh’s “detailed Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions itemizes multiple instances of each of these categories of conduct.” ¶14 The court went on to explain that “the sheer volume and tone of [Witte’s] inappropriate communications to the Court and to counsel, even in the face of efforts by the Court to correct his behavior, demonstrate that [Witte] is acting out of malice and an intent to use the legal process for punitive purposes.” The court also found that as an attorney, Witte had violated at least standards 1, 2, and 3 of the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility and that his “pattern of conduct constitutes an ongoing violation of Rule 11” of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, thereby subjecting him to sanctions. ¶15 Accordingly, after finding that Witte was able to afford an attorney and that his time and efforts would be better spent representing his own clients, the court entered an order requiring Witte to obtain counsel. The court determined that this measure was “entirely justified” given Witte’s “history in this matter.” The court further stated that the sanction would spare the court, Huynh, and her counsel “the necessity of contending directly with [Witte’s] personal animosity” and that Witte “would benefit by having experienced, objective counsel represent and advise him in resolving the issues raised in the current proceedings.” The court also prohibited Witte from communicating directly with Huynh’s counsel. Lastly, the court entered a written order for an award of attorney fees to reimburse Huynh for fees “incurred specifically in responding to [Witte’s] improper filings, in an amount to be established by affidavit of counsel, with the remainder of any fees she has incurred as a result of [his] conduct in the matter to be addressed at trial.” 20220160-CA 7 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte ¶16 Years later, in 2022, Witte challenged the court’s sanctions order in a motion for a new trial, arguing that the requirement that he obtain counsel had deprived him of his right to a fair trial.4 The court rejected his argument, stating that although Witte had a right to self-representation, “this matter has some unusual circumstances.” The court then recounted how “throughout the proceedings,” Witte had accused Huynh “of various bad behaviors with limited or no justification” and his “verbal attacks have gone past inappropriate and are themselves abusive.” The court stated that Witte’s misbehavior also targeted Huynh’s counsel and that Witte had refused to comply with the commissioner’s or the court’s directions. The court noted that the commissioner had also “articulated his frustrations and difficulties trying to get [Witte] to follow the rules, procedures and directions” and that the commissioner had recommended that Witte be required to obtain counsel as “the only solution to the difficult issues presented by [his] behavior.” The court accordingly denied the motion for a new trial. Legal Custody of Son ¶17 In October 2020, Huynh submitted a proposed order certifying various issues for trial, including, as relevant here, the legal custody of Son. Now represented by counsel, Witte objected to Huynh’s proposed order, arguing that the certified issues should be limited to those raised in his own pleadings or those that were certified at a motion hearing because Huynh had no pending counterpetition before the court. Nevertheless, among the issues Witte listed as appropriate for trial certification was “Legal Custody—[Witte’s] request for sole legal custody or final decision making ability to protect against interference, and/or other protective measures.” A few days later, the commissioner 4. In 2018, Witte also petitioned this court for leave to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the order requiring him to obtain counsel. This court denied that petition, and our Supreme Court denied Witte’s petition for certiorari seeking review of our denial. 20220160-CA 8 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte entered an order certifying the issue of legal custody, among other issues, for trial. ¶18 Witte objected to the commissioner’s certification order, arguing that it was entered prematurely and asserting that the purpose of the objection was “to preserve [his] right to complete any open-ended motions or other pending unresolved issues, and confirm [his] rights, pleadings, claims, causes of action, and remedies, are all certified.” Witte sought “reassurance that the . . . core issues being addressed,” including legal custody, “are all for the goal of trying to stop the interference and make modifications to better preserve and grow the father-son relationship.” ¶19 What was initially intended to be a three-day bench trial was held in July 2021. At the outset of trial, Witte’s attorney objected to Huynh’s proposed findings of fact, which included a modification to joint legal custody. Asserting that this was “a new claim,” she pointed out that Huynh had not filed a counterpetition requesting a modification to legal custody. She asserted that the issue was “not fairly pled,” there had been “no discovery on it,” and this was “essentially a trial by ambush.” The court took the matter under advisement, stating that, in the meantime, “[W]e’re going to go forward under the general guise that legal custody is at issue.” ¶20 During Witte’s trial testimony, when Witte’s attorney asked him how he wished to deal with legal custody, Witte responded that he was not seeking a change to legal custody. Huynh, conversely, testified that shared legal custody was “very hard” because Witte did not “agree on anything that [she] believe[d was] best . . . for [Son], even like swimming or karate.” ¶21 On the third day of trial, the district court stated, “Legal custody here is a difficult issue, and, frankly, is really the core of the problem between these two.” But the court stated that because a request to modify the joint legal custody arrangement typically needed to be pleaded in a petition to modify, the court would consider legal custody only if it was “in play.” Accordingly, the 20220160-CA 9 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte court ordered written argument on the matter. In his memorandum, Witte objected to Huynh’s “attempts to modify legal custody,” arguing that legal custody was not at issue because it did not appear in his petition to modify or even Huynh’s withdrawn petition to modify. ¶22 Ultimately, after considering the parties’ memoranda, the court held that the issue of legal custody had been “tried by consent of the parties” and that it would thus “be treated as having been raised in the petition.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). The court stated that “the question . . . is how much attack on [Huynh’s] . . . parenting decisions, abilities, [and] choices suffice until legal custody is an issue, even though . . . Witte denies and says that he has not consented to the issue.” The court then proceeded to read several of the complaints Witte had made against Huynh in both his petitions to modify and another document referenced by the amended petition. This included allegations that Huynh had “demonstrated poor judgment, erratic behavior, and an unstable lifestyle”; had “become involved with a circle of radical, militant activists sympathetic to homosexual and bisexual views who are hostile to natural fathers”; had “dressed up [Son] in homosexual cross-dressing attire[, including] make-up, drag, female clothing, eyeliner, lipstick, nail polish, etc. in the manner of a Southeast Asian lady boy”; and had broken out in a “sudden and violent outburst of infantile, profane rage.” ¶23 The court also pointed to the court commissioner’s order certifying the issue of legal custody for trial and to the fact that Witte had been the first to broach the subject at trial during his own testimony. The court concluded that “the essence of all that is that the issue of legal custody was brought up both in the petitions, in the certified order by the commissioner, and then tried by consent of the parties,” and thus, the court concluded that consideration of issues surrounding legal custody was proper. ¶24 Later, in its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered in January 2022, the court reiterated, 20220160-CA 10 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte By repeatedly attacking [Huynh’s] decisions and choices as a parent in his Petition to Modify and Amended Petition to Modify, . . . Witte has raised the issue of legal custody of [Son] in his pleadings. By first presenting evidence about what he wanted as far as legal custody, and by presenting evidence accusing [Huynh] of dressing [Son] up as a prostitute, and by [Huynh] responding to and presenting evidence on these issues, the parties have, by consent, tried the issue of legal custody. ¶25 After concluding that the issue of legal custody was properly before it, the court continued the trial, setting a fourth trial day for October 2021, at which the best interest of Son would be addressed. Following this fourth trial day, the court determined that “the complete breakdown” of the parties’ ability to co-parent constituted “a material change in circumstances relating to legal custody.” And after a lengthy recitation of facts supporting its decision, the court determined that it was “in the best interest of [Son] that one parent have sole legal custody rather than continue with the constant disputes now present with both parties” and that it was in Son’s best interest that Huynh have sole legal custody of Son. Relatedly, except for a few “[m]inor changes to the parent time schedule,” the court also declined to disturb the sole physical custody granted to Huynh under the Decree. ¶26 The district court again addressed the issue of whether modification of legal custody was properly before the court in its ruling on Witte’s motion for a new trial. 5 See supra ¶ 16. In that order, the court reaffirmed its conclusion that the issue had been fully adjudicated with the consent of the parties, stating, “This court ultimately found that the issues referred to were brought up and tried by consent, had been raised in the pleadings or were certified for trial. This court noted that [Witte’s] frequent 5. In the interim, Witte sought Judge Parker’s disqualification. Associate Presiding Judge Laura S. Scott denied this request in March 2022. See infra note 12. 20220160-CA 11 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte accusations concerning [Huynh’s] ability to parent placed all the evidence considered at trial in issue.” Attorney Fees ¶27 At the conclusion of the fourth day of trial, on October 27, 2021, the district court awarded attorney fees “over the joint and legal custody issue” to Huynh from the bench. The court asked Huynh’s counsel to prepare an affidavit of fees within 60 days and indicated that Witte would then have 30 days to respond. No such affidavit was submitted within that timeframe. ¶28 In its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered 75 days later, on January 10, 2022, the court held that Huynh had prevailed on four issues, including “[l]egal and physical custody,” and awarded her attorney fees on those issues. The court also awarded Witte attorney fees associated with two issues it found he had prevailed on at trial, namely “[m]inor changes to the modification of parent time” and “[h]ealth insurance premiums reimbursement.” The court ordered each party to “submit affidavits on attorney fees taking into consideration fees already awarded on some of these issues.” But the court’s written order did not set a deadline for submitting those affidavits. ¶29 Witte subsequently filed his motion for a new trial on January 20, 2022, see supra ¶¶ 16, 26, and he filed a notice of appeal on February 7, 2022. In April 2022, because the motion for a new trial was still pending and because the attorney fees award remained outstanding, this court issued an order stating that “jurisdiction in this court has not yet been perfected” and staying the appeal “pending the entry of a final, appealable order and the resolution of postjudgment motions that toll the time to appeal.” See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). ¶30 The district court denied Witte’s motion for a new trial in December 2022, and Witte subsequently filed with this court a Motion, Notice, and Memorandum on Appeal to Begin 20220160-CA 12 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte Progression of Appeal After “Final” Order and Judgment. 6 In January 2023, this court issued another order indicating that the appeal “remain[ed] stayed pursuant to rule 4(b) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] pending the entry of a final, appealable order, including the contemplated award of attorney fees.” And in November 2023, after no further progress was made in the district court on the matter of attorney fees, this court issued another order directing the parties to “file fee affidavits in the district court within 28 days” and stating that failure to do so by either party would result in dismissal of the appeal without prejudice. Both parties then filed their attorney fees affidavits before the 28-day deadline. ¶31 In conjunction with his fee affidavit, Witte moved for the district court to rescind its prior attorney fees awards and enter final judgment. In April 2024, following a hearing, the district court granted the motion. The court ruled that “the deadlines and requirements for submitting the affidavit of attorney fees were not met pursuant to the Court’s deadlines ordered from the bench on October 27, 2021,” and that, in any event, the affidavits would be untimely under rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court stated that “[y]ears went by without either party filing any attorney fee affidavit or motions” since October 2021 when it, from the bench, “gave sixty days to submit any fee affidavits with thirty more days for any opposition.” The court also indicated that it was “not pleased with either party’s recent affidavit submissions, which make disproportionate requests for minor issues.” For those reasons, the court declined to award attorney fees in the matter and entered final judgment. ¶32 Thereafter, the stay of the current appeal was lifted, and the appeal proceeded to briefing. 6. On appeal, Witte has resumed representing himself. But in the district court, he continued to be represented by counsel. 20220160-CA 13 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶33 Although Witte’s briefing is largely unfocused, see infra Part I, we parse two main issues that he raises on appeal. First, he challenges the district court’s requirement that he obtain counsel as a sanction entered pursuant to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In reviewing the imposition of rule 11 sanctions, we employ “a three-tiered approach: (1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanctions to be imposed are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Ward v. McGarry, 2024 UT App 169, ¶ 27, 561 P.3d 200 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 564 P.3d 957 (Utah 2025). ¶34 Second, Witte assails the court’s modification of legal custody. Specifically, he challenges the court’s determination that the issue of legal custody was tried by the consent of the parties under rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. “We review the trial court’s application of rule 15(b) for correctness.” In re A. Dean Harding Marital & Family Trust, 2023 UT App 81, ¶ 66, 536 P.3d 38 (quotation simplified). But “because the trial court’s determination of whether the issues were tried with all parties’ implied consent is highly fact intensive, we grant the trial court a fairly broad measure of discretion in making that determination under a given set of facts.” Pilot v. Hill, 2019 UT 10, ¶ 9, 437 P.3d 362 (quotation simplified). In sum, whether the issue of legal custody was tried by consent “is a fact-intensive mixed question of law and fact entitling the trial court’s decision to broad deference.” Id. ¶35 Huynh cross-appeals the district court’s rescission of its initial attorney fees award. “We review a district court’s decision [whether] to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, but review its underlying legal conclusions for correctness.” Miner v. Miner, 2025 UT App 64, ¶ 13, 571 P.3d 788, cert. denied, 574 P.3d 526 (Utah 2025). We also “review a district court’s decision to reconsider an earlier decision for an abuse of discretion.” Jordan 20220160-CA 14 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte Constr., Inc. v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 2017 UT 28, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 296. ANALYSIS I. Witte’s Briefing ¶36 Before reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments, we are compelled to first address the quality and content of Witte’s briefing. On appeal, Witte has resumed representing himself and, regrettably, has continued many of the same briefing practices— both in form and substance—that characterized his disruptive conduct in the district court. Rather than assisting this court in navigating a complicated, nearly decade-long post-divorce dispute, his sprawling and largely disorganized brief has served as more of a hindrance than a help. Put differently, Witte has fallen well short of his “responsibility to assist the judiciary in advancing jurisprudence through diligent advocacy, adherence to our rules, and competent representation.” Lamb v. Lamb, 2024 UT App 16, ¶ 20, 545 P.3d 273. ¶37 Witte’s principal brief does not come close to following the format mandated in rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (requiring principal briefs to contain specific sections appearing in a prescribed order). In Witte’s brief, the “Statement of the Case” section curiously appears after what is effectively his argument section, toward the end of the brief. And rather than providing an objective, non-argumentative recitation of the facts of record, Witte uses his factual background section as a platform to restate his subjective trial-level assertions, some of which contradict the district court’s findings of fact. See, e.g., infra ¶ 39 & nn. 8–10. Moreover, most of the facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal do not appear in that section of Witte’s brief at all but have instead been woven, frequently alongside extensive editorializing and absent larger context, directly into the argument section. This has proved 20220160-CA 15 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte particularly burdensome to untangle in a case where the district court record exceeds 17,300 pages. ¶38 Next, what is effectively the principal brief’s argument section features an extensive and inappropriate overuse of bold text and underlining that has proved distracting. Although “[i]talics or boldface may be used for emphasis,” id. R. 27(a)(2), their “unrestrained and unnecessary use” constitutes “a written form of shouting” that is “simply inappropriate in an appellate brief,” B.A.M. Dev., LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, ¶ 71 n.30, 87 P.3d 710 (Orme, J., dissenting). Further, despite the district court’s admonitions, Witte has continued his practice of, in the words of the court, “filing papers with lengthy footnotes for no good reason other than to squeeze more words into a smaller space.” See Utah R. App. P. 27(a)(1) (“The text must be double spaced, except for matter customarily single spaced and indented.”). To make matters worse, Witte’s principal brief contains no fewer than 95 footnotes, several of which are nearly a full page in length and contain substantive arguments scattered throughout. Witte’s burying substantive legal contentions in a cascade of footnotes, combined with the generally unfocused nature of his presentation, has forced this court to expend an inordinate amount of time simply trying to decipher the actual issues presented. But navigating through the smoke of the principal brief as best we can, we have identified two cognizable issues presented for our review: (1) the rule 11 sanction requiring Witte to retain counsel and (2) the modification of legal custody of Son. 7 7. To the extent Witte intended to advance additional issues on appeal, those issues are inadequately briefed, and we do not reach their merits. See Lamb v. Lamb, 2024 UT App 16, ¶ 17, 545 P.3d 273 (“A party may not simply point toward a pile of sand and expect the court to build a castle. In both district and appellate courts, the development of an argument is a party’s responsibility, not a judicial duty.”) (quotation simplified). 20220160-CA 16 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte ¶39 Lastly, we address another of Witte’s unfortunate practices that he has carried over from the district court: the personal attacks directed toward Huynh, her legal counsel, and the district court. For example, Witte asserts that Huynh’s marriage to her current husband began as “a secret concealed adulterous relationship” and unnecessarily accuses her of “[a]dultery and gold-digging.”8 He also characterizes her move to California as a “straw relocation move-away scheme” and claims that she “fabricated evolving debunked fictitious narratives about why [she] relocated, including unpled, spontaneous, new false smearing allegations during trial.” 9 Witte has also directed vitriol at Huynh’s legal team, claiming that one of her trial attorneys (who, to be clear, is not named in the caption or body of this opinion) was a “radical left-wing . . . activist” who suffered from “severe alcohol, drug, mental health, and gender confusion problems”; “stank of drugs and alcohol”; and “exhibited signs of mental, psychological, and emotional instability.” He digresses to unnecessarily accuse another of Huynh’s attorneys of various misconduct, such as not disclosing Huynh’s “adultery” for many years, “tampering with a lease” to conceal the identity of Huynh’s husband, and “filing a fabricated story about a private investigator accosting and frightening” Son. Finally, Witte targets the district court, accusing it of being “apoplectic” that he had washed makeup off Son 10 and of acting “maliciously, repeatedly, 8. The district court found that although Huynh met her current husband in 2012, they did not begin a romantic relationship until after she filed for divorce from Witte in 2013. 9. The district court found that Huynh moved to California “because the warmer climate was better for her parents’ health and to take advantage of a job opportunity that provided training and a route to advance into a better job, specifically, a financial advisor.” 10. Neither party has indicated that Son’s gender identity does not align with his biological sex or that he otherwise identifies with (continued…) 20220160-CA 17 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte and in knowing defiance of governing legal authorities.” Witte also asserts that the court’s order that he retain counsel was motivated by “retaliatory animus” toward his moral and religious beliefs. See infra note 12. ¶40 Such personal attacks are inappropriate in judicial proceedings. As a licensed attorney, Witte remains fully responsible for understanding and adhering to the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility, and he appears to have violated, at the very least, the first and third of those standards. Standard 1 directs that “lawyers shall treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner.” And standard 3 mandates that lawyers “shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to other counsel or the court improper motives, purpose, or conduct” and must “avoid hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words.” Standard 3 further cautions that filings should never “disparage the integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary unless such matters are the LGBTQ+ community. Rather, Witte asserted at trial that Huynh dressed Son “up as a prostitute.” The district court noted that in support of this claim, Witte testified to one instance in which Son arrived for parent time wearing makeup. But the court observed that Witte had provided “poor quality” photographs in which Son’s clothing, in the court’s assessment, was “not unusual for a child [Son’s] age and the only makeup that can be seen is fingernail polish on one or two fingers and the thumb.” The court declined “to find that there’s anything improper about [Son] having makeup or being dressed” in the manner shown in the photographs. The court further stated that although “the way both parties dealt with [that situation was] troubling,” the court was “more disturbed” by Witte’s reaction to seeing Son in makeup, which was “to wash this poor child off with a garden hose rather than to deal with that in another manner.” In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court did not side with either parent on this issue, nor did the court reference the issue in its best-interest analysis. 20220160-CA 18 2026 UT App 150  Huynh v. Witte directly relevant under controlling substantive law.” Far from presenting reasoned legal advocacy, Witte’s continued disparagement of Huynh, her counsel, and the district court is a breach of professional decorum that degrades the judicial process. 11 II. Rule 11 Sanction ¶41 Witte challenges the district court’s sanction entered pursuant to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring him to obtain counsel. Witte characterizes the order as an unconstitutional denial of his right to self-representation under the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. 12 He asserts that 11. We also note that the space used for unnecessary and inappropriate personal attacks would have been better spent developing actual legal arguments, particularly given this court’s denials of Witte’s repeated requests to file overlength briefs. 12. Witte also asserts that the district court acted out of animus toward his sincere religious beliefs and in an effort to curtail his “petitional speech concerning transgender and LGBT matters” when it ordered him to retain counsel and later modified legal custody. Judge Scott addressed this claim when ruling on Witte’s motion to disqualify Judge Parker. See supra note 5. After acknowledging Witte’s “deeply held beliefs about what is