Duffin v. Duffin

2026 UT App 156 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS JAMES M. DUFFIN III, Appellant, v. BRANDY E. DUFFIN, Appellee. Opinion No. 20241384-CA Filed October 16, 2026 Third District Court, West Jordan Department The Honorable Matthew Bates No. 184400962 James M. Duffin III, Appellant Pro Se T. Jake Hinkins, Attorney for Appellee JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge: ¶1 We return again to the dispute between James M. Duffin III and Brandy E. Duffin. This appeal arises from the district court’s efforts to enforce several financial obligations imposed on James 1 in the parties’ ongoing divorce proceedings. James principally challenges the court’s use of its contempt authority to enforce a $30,299.83 attorney fees judgment that has remained unpaid since 2020. But events occurring during this appeal have rendered that challenge moot because the judgment is now being enforced through garnishment, a procedure James acknowledges 1. Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their given names with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.  Duffin v. Duffin is proper, and no contempt sanction remains enforceable given the specific language of the court’s contempt order. James’s remaining challenges concern a November 2024 attorney fees award and the treatment of a daycare arrearage. While we reject James’s challenge regarding the attorney fees award, we remand the matter for the court to determine the amount of James’s outstanding daycare arrearage. BACKGROUND ¶2 James and Brandy divorced in 2020 following a contentious divorce proceeding that has generated several subsequent disputes and appeals. This appeal concerns the district court’s rulings regarding Brandy’s efforts to enforce several financial obligations arising from the divorce, including unpaid child support and daycare expenses and an attorney fees judgment entered in her favor. The Original Divorce Decree and the Attorney Fees Judgment ¶3 Following a bench trial, the district court issued an oral ruling on March 13, 2020. Among other things, the court found that Brandy had demonstrated a need for assistance in paying the attorney fees she incurred during the divorce proceedings and that those fees were necessary for her to defend herself. But because Brandy had not prevailed on all of her claims, the court ruled that it would “award her 60 percent of her attorneys fees.” ¶4 The district court subsequently entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce on April 2, 2020. Consistent with its oral ruling, the court awarded Brandy sixty percent of her attorney fees. 2 The decree did not determine the specific amount of the award or establish a schedule for its payment. That amount was determined later. On June 17, 2020, 2. We affirmed this award on appeal. See Duffin v. Duffin, 2022 UT App 60, ¶¶ 33–37, 511 P.3d 1240. 20241384-CA 2 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin the court entered an Order and Judgment of Fees and Costs providing that “[j]udgment hereby enters against” James and in favor of Brandy in the amount of $30,299.83. Brandy thereafter pursued various means of collecting the judgment, including garnishment and execution, but the judgment remained unpaid. The 2023 Enforcement Proceedings ¶5 The parties returned to court several years later on James’s petition to modify the divorce decree and motion to enforce and on Brandy’s motion for an order to show cause and motions to enforce. Among other things, Brandy alleged in the order to show cause that James had failed to pay child support and had made no payments toward the outstanding child support arrearages or the attorney fees judgment. And Brandy’s two motions to enforce included many of these same factual claims, as well as multiple other allegations concerning James’s failures to follow provisions of the decree related to parent-time and custody. ¶6 The district court held a three-day bench trial in May 2023. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found James in contempt. With respect to the unpaid attorney fees judgment, the court stated that “there was an order made,” that “[i]t was a clear order,” and that James “had the ability to comply.” The court noted that James had “not made any effort” or “paid any amount at all towards those unpaid attorney fees.” It further explained that had James been paying “$50 a month or $100 a month or something like that,” the court might have found that he was making a good-faith effort to comply. ¶7 The district court memorialized its rulings in findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final order entered on August 31, 2023. 3 The court found James in contempt for failing to satisfy his financial obligations and imposed thirty days in jail and a $1,000 fine, both of which it suspended to permit James to purge the 3. We affirmed the district court’s custody and parent-time decisions in Duffin v. Duffin, 2025 UT App 136, 578 P.3d 751. 20241384-CA 3 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin contempt. But the court did not then determine the amount James would be required to pay each month toward his outstanding obligations. Instead, it directed the parties to determine the amount of the outstanding arrearages and the amount being withheld by the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) for unpaid child support. The court contemplated that once that information was available, it would determine what additional amount James should pay toward his outstanding obligations. ¶8 The August 2023 order also awarded Brandy the attorney fees she incurred in bringing the motions to enforce as well as in defending against James’s motions that were unsuccessful, and it directed her to submit an affidavit documenting those fees. The district court did not determine the amount of that attorney fees award at that time. The September 2024 Hearing and Order ¶9 Approximately one year later, the parties again appeared before the district court to determine the amount James should pay toward his outstanding obligations. At a hearing on September 16, 2024, the parties generally agreed that ORS could withhold fifty percent of James’s net income until his child support arrearage was satisfied. The discussion concerning the attorney fees judgment was more complicated. James maintained that the attorney fees judgment did not contain a payment schedule and that he therefore could not be held in contempt for failing to comply with one. He argued that imposing a payment plan on the existing judgment would require modifying the prior order but acknowledged that Brandy could instead employ ordinary judgment-collection procedures. Specifically, his counsel stated, “[I]t is my understanding at this point that when a judgment does not have a payment plan built into the judgment itself, in order to add one, you would have to file a petition to modify that order imposing a payment plan, or one can do other things like [seek] a writ of garnishment.” 20241384-CA 4 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin ¶10 The district court declined to revisit its earlier contempt determination. It explained that regardless of “whether the [c]ourt made a mistake over a year ago in holding [James] in contempt, finding that there was an order that he pay attorneys fees, [and] that he willfully failed to pay those attorneys fees,” the time to challenge that determination had passed. The court therefore treated the issue before it as determining how James would satisfy his outstanding obligations and purge the previously entered contempt. ¶11 The district court ordered that fifty percent of James’s net income be applied to the child support arrearage until that obligation was satisfied. The court then determined that after the child support arrearage was satisfied, twenty-five percent of his income could be applied toward the attorney fees judgment. The court stated that James should make those payments voluntarily but also told Brandy’s counsel that, if Brandy preferred “to have a judgment entered and just be able to garnish [James’s] wages to make it easy,” the court was “happy to sign a garnishment order as well.” James’s counsel then suggested “for the sake of a clean record that a garnishment be entered,” and Brandy did not object. ¶12 On September 24, 2024, the district court entered a written order (the September Order) reflecting its ruling. It ordered ORS to garnish fifty percent of James’s net monthly income until his child support arrearage was paid in full. Once that arrearage was satisfied, James was to pay twenty-five percent of his net monthly income toward the daycare arrearage and the attorney fees judgment. The court further stated that James could make those payments voluntarily or Brandy could “issue a garnishment to have these amounts paid to purge [James’s] contempt.” The November 2024 Order and The Current Appeal ¶13 Thereafter, James, now representing himself, moved to amend, stay, or set aside the September Order and requested a new hearing. Among other things, he renewed his contention that the district court could not use its contempt authority to compel 20241384-CA 5 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin payment of the attorney fees judgment because no previous court order required him to make payments toward that judgment according to a particular schedule. James also argued, in a footnote, that the attorney fees judgment had been satisfied and that, consequently, the September Order should be set aside under rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ¶14 Brandy, meanwhile, sought the attorney fees the district court had authorized in its August 2023 order for litigating and defending the enforcement motions. On November 27, 2024, the court entered an order (the November Order), wherein it denied James’s motion and awarded Brandy $6,422.50 in additional attorney fees. ¶15 James now appeals both the September Order and the November Order. He raises five claims of error, the first two of which each challenge the district court’s treatment of the attorney fees judgment and which we consider together. He also challenges the attorney fees awarded in the enforcement action, the court’s apparent rejection of his contention that the attorney fees judgment had been satisfied, and the court’s treatment of the daycare arrearage. Subsequent Proceedings ¶16 Events occurring while this appeal has been pending have narrowed the dispute concerning enforcement of the attorney fees judgment. On February 9, 2026, Brandy applied for a writ of continuing garnishment. Her application identified the June 2020 attorney fees judgment of $30,299.83 and the November 2024 attorney fees award of $6,422.50, for a total principal amount of $36,722.33. The district court issued a Writ of Continuing Garnishment (the Garnishment) that same day, directing James’s employer to withhold a portion of his earnings to satisfy the judgments. ¶17 In light of those developments, we asked the parties to address whether James’s challenges concerning the district court’s use of contempt to enforce the attorney fees judgment had become 20241384-CA 6 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin moot upon entry of the Garnishment. See In re adoption of L.O., 2012 UT 23, ¶ 7, 282 P.3d 977 (“Although it is the duty of each party to inform the court of any circumstances which render moot one or more of the issues raised, the court may also raise the issue of mootness sua sponte to further a core judicial policy of limiting the scope of its power to issues in controversy.” (quotation simplified)). James responded that they had not, maintaining that the contempt determination continues to have collateral consequences. Brandy did not respond. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶18 James has identified five issues stemming from alleged mistakes the district court made when issuing the September Order and the November Order. The first two issues are interrelated and concern the court’s use of its contempt authority to enforce the attorney fees judgment. Specifically, James argues that the court’s actions in modifying the terms of the attorney fees judgment to include a payment schedule and in finding him in contempt for failing to pay toward the attorney fees judgment were improper. While these two issues are subject to different standards of review, we need not articulate these standards because we conclude that these issues have been rendered moot by entry of the Garnishment. “An issue on appeal is considered moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants or, in other words, when the requested relief appears to be impossible or of no legal effect.” State v. Legg, 2016 UT App 168, ¶ 9, 380 P.3d 360 (quotation simplified), aff’d, 2018 UT 12, 417 P.3d 592. ¶19 James next challenges the November 2024 attorney fees award. “We generally review a [district] court’s decision regarding attorney fees in a divorce proceeding for an abuse of discretion. However, the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review for correctness.” Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 2010 UT App 261, ¶ 12, 241 P.3d 365 (quotation simplified). 20241384-CA 7 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin ¶20 James also argues that the district court erred in ruling on his post-hearing motion to set aside the September Order under rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. “We review a district court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Capital Stack UT LLC v. Reddy, 2025 UT App 103, ¶ 10, 575 P.3d 1192 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 43 (Utah 2026); see also Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ¶ 9, 2 P.3d 451 (“A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown rule 60(b) grounds, and this court will reverse the trial court’s ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion.” (quotation simplified)). ¶21 Finally, James argues that the district court erred by ordering him to make payments toward a daycare arrearage judgment. “Interpretation of a divorce decree presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.” Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 14, 294 P.3d 600. ANALYSIS I. James’s Challenge to the District Court’s Use of Contempt to Enforce the Attorney Fees Judgment Is Moot. ¶22 James’s first two arguments on appeal challenge the district court’s use of its contempt authority to enforce the attorney fees judgment. He contends that although the court awarded Brandy sixty percent of her attorney fees in the original divorce proceedings and later reduced that award to a $30,299.83 judgment, no order required him to make payments toward that judgment according to a specified schedule. Thus, he argues, his failure to make payments on that debt could not constitute contempt. 20241384-CA 8 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin A. Subsequent events have eliminated the controversy concerning how the attorney fees judgment may be enforced. ¶23 It is true that James did not invite the contempt determination he challenges on appeal. He argued below that the district court could not use contempt to enforce a payment schedule that did not exist. But his preservation of that argument does not necessarily mean that a live controversy remains. At the hearing on September 16, 2024, James’s attorney expressly acknowledged that garnishment was a proper means of enforcing a money judgment and acceded to that procedure: “[I]t is my understanding at this point that when a judgment does not have a payment plan built into the judgment itself, in order to add one, you would have to file a petition to modify that order imposing a payment plan, or one can do other things like [seek] a writ of garnishment.” The court assented to that suggestion and ruled that James could make those payments voluntarily or, if he did not, Brandy could “issue a garnishment to have these amounts paid to purge [James’s] contempt.” (Emphasis added.) ¶24 Then, on February 9, 2026, Brandy applied for a garnishment to collect the outstanding attorney fees judgment that James had failed to pay. Under the circumstances of this case, this rendered the issue of James’s contempt moot because it operated to purge James’s contempt as per the district court’s ruling. “The defining feature of a moot controversy is the lack of capacity for the court to order a remedy that will have a meaningful impact on the practical positions of the parties. When a case is moot in this sense, the parties’ interest in its resolution is purely academic.” Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 24, 289 P.3d 582. Here, the relief James seeks is to reverse and vacate the court’s contempt finding, but the previously suspended contempt sanctions are no longer enforceable. Because the attorney fees judgment is now being collected through garnishment and the previously suspended contempt sanctions are no longer enforceable and have been eliminated pursuant to the court’s specific ruling, reversing the 20241384-CA 9 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin earlier contempt determination would not alter James’s existing obligation to pay the judgment or Brandy’s right to collect it through garnishment. 4 Thus, “the controversy is eliminated such that it renders the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect.” State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 6, 357 P.3d 547 (quotation simplified). 5 B. The November 2024 attorney fees award does not preserve a live controversy concerning the contempt determination. ¶25 James nevertheless contends that the controversy remains live because the November 2024 award of $6,422.50 in additional attorney fees constitutes a collateral consequence of the contempt 4. Our ruling on this point is case-specific: because the district court specifically ordered that James’s contempt would be purged if a writ of garnishment issued, the entry of the Garnishment in this case operated to nullify James’s contempt. In another case in which the court made no such specific order, entry of a writ of garnishment would not necessarily purge any contempt related to a failure to pay the underlying amounts owed and would therefore not necessarily render moot any contempt order. 5. Because James’s challenge is moot, we express no opinion on whether the district court properly invoked its contempt authority in punishing James for failing to pay the attorney fees judgment. We note, however, that other courts have distinguished between an order directing a party to perform a specific act and a money judgment enforceable through ordinary collection procedures. See, e.g., Kayode v. Midas Constr., LLC, 312 A.3d 1229, 1233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (concluding that, where adequate remedies such as execution are available, contempt generally is not an appropriate means of enforcing a money judgment, including an attorney fees award). Nothing about that distinction, however, relieved James of his obligation to satisfy the valid judgment entered against him. That judgment has remained unpaid since 2020, and our disposition today leaves both the judgment and Brandy’s right to enforce it through lawful collection procedures undisturbed. 20241384-CA 10 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin determination. But as we explain below, that award rests on an independent statutory basis and does not solely depend on the challenged contempt determination. See infra ¶ 27. Accordingly, the fee award does not preserve an otherwise moot controversy concerning the district court’s earlier use of its contempt authority. II. The District Court Did Not Err in Awarding Brandy Attorney Fees Incurred in the Enforcement Proceedings. ¶26 James challenges the November 2024 attorney fees award, arguing that the award was not authorized by statute, was unsupported by the evidence, and was unreasonable. We disagree on all fronts. ¶27 First, the district court was statutorily authorized to award Brandy attorney fees. In August 2023, the court “determined that James [had] violated the court’s decree of divorce, found him in contempt, and ordered him to pay Brandy’s fees.” The court expressly determined that such an award was authorized under section 81-1-203(2) of the Utah Code, which provides that a court may award attorney fees in “an action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property . . . upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.” Id. § 81-1-203(2). 6 The court concluded that Brandy was entitled to fees under this statute because her motions sought to enforce provisions of the decree governing the parties’ custody and parent-time arrangements as 6. James repeatedly claims that “the plain reading of [Utah Code section 81-1-203(2)] does not permit the award of attorney fees for enforcement of an attorney fee judgment.” We need not decide whether he is correct. Though Brandy’s enforcement efforts also sought enforcement of the unpaid attorney fees judgment, the court was not required to specifically parse out the fees for each portion of the effort, only generally for the motions to enforce. And in any event, as will be discussed, the court did not award Brandy all her claimed fees because she did not fully prevail. 20241384-CA 11 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin well as James’s financial obligations to support his children and Brandy had prevailed on those motions. This decision falls squarely within the wide discretion accorded to a court in a domestic case. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 10, 176 P.3d 476. ¶28 The award was also supported by sufficient evidence and was reasonable. “Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the [district] court’s sound discretion.” Id. (quotation simplified). However, if a court elects to award fees, such fees must be reasonable and “be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact.” Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992); see also Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989–90 (Utah 1988) (discussing factors a court should consider in fixing the amount of reasonable fees). The party requesting an award “has the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award.” Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 268. ¶29 Here, Brandy claimed that the attorney fees she incurred in prosecuting the motions to enforce totaled $7,030.83. To support this claim, she filed a fee declaration and a billing statement from her counsel. After evaluating this evidence, the court identified several instances in which the billing statement did not “sufficiently explain what work was done,” and the court therefore concluded that Brandy had not carried her burden to show that all the work done by her attorney was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the motions to enforce. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. The court therefore awarded fees “only for work that it determine[d] from court records and the billing statement clearly related to the motions to enforce.” In addition, the court elected to apportion one-third of the hours billed “preparing for and attending the hearing on the motions to enforce” as recoverable fees because “about a third of the evidence and arguments [at the consolidated hearing on the motions to enforce and the petition to modify] were dedicated to the motions to enforce.” Based on all this, the court awarded 20241384-CA 12 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin Brandy $6,422.50 in attorney fees. Thus, the court’s award was supported by the evidence. ¶30 James’s arguments attacking the award as unreasonable are also unavailing. First, he argues that the amount imposed was excessive and therefore unreasonable because the motions to enforce “were not difficult or novel” and filing multiple similar motions was not “necessary.” While the “novelty and difficulty of the issues involved” and the “necessity” of litigation are certainly things the court may consider in determining a reasonable fee, see id. at 989 (quotation simplified), the court is by no means required to analyze every reasonableness factor that has been identified by Utah’s appellate courts when setting an award, see Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56–57 (Utah 1998) (“A trial court may . . . select, according to the factually varied context of each particular case, the factors that are most relevant to its fee calculation . . . .”); Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989–90 (listing factors that “may be explicitly considered in determining a reasonable fee” (emphasis added)). We cannot say that the district court here exceeded its substantial discretion by failing to explicitly consider certain factors. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 56 (“[W]e have hesitated to accentuate any of the available factors that may inform a court’s fee appraisal. Instead, we have simply insisted that the trial court gear its assessment to accomplish the purpose of attorney fees, i.e., to reasonably compensate counsel for their time reasonably expended in pursuing the underlying case in accordance with the authorizing contract or statute.”). ¶31 Finally, James argues that the attorney fees award was unreasonable because Brandy was awarded fees for unsuccessful claims. He asserts that although Brandy “prevailed on only three . . . of her approximately dozen or more allegations” in her motions to enforce, the district court did not consider this fact when awarding fees. Relatedly, he claims that the court “arbitrarily divided the trial fees into one-third.” We find no merit in either argument. As already noted, the court is given wide discretion in determining whether a fee is reasonable, and we will not disturb such a determination unless it is “beyond the limits of 20241384-CA 13 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin reasonability or not based on an evaluation of the evidence.” Strohm v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 2013 UT 21, ¶ 52, 308 P.3d 424 (quotation simplified); see also Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 (explaining that the district court must conduct “an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the parties’ evidentiary submissions”). In considering Brandy’s fee request, the court carefully combed through her counsel’s entire fee declaration and billing statement and identified entries it found were not plainly related to the motions to enforce. The court also clearly articulated why it was dividing the trial-preparation fees into thirds. Moreover, the number of allegations on which Brandy prevailed is but one of the factors that the court was entitled—but not required—to consider when determining the reasonableness of the fee request. Cf. Utah Transit Auth. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2015 UT 53, ¶ 58, 355 P.3d 947 (explaining that determining the prevailing party requires the consideration of several factors and “depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case” (quotation simplified)). ¶32 In sum, we are not persuaded by any of James’s challenges to the November 2024 attorney fees award. The district court was statutorily authorized to order the award, and the court did not abuse its wide discretion in setting the amount of the award. III. James Has Not Demonstrated that the Attorney Fees Judgment Was Satisfied. ¶33 James argues that the district court erred in ruling on his post-hearing motion to set aside the September Order under rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, he contends the court “failed to address” his argument that the attorney fees judgment “had been satisfied.” He claims that the court’s “failure to rule” on this argument “necessitates remand for additional findings.” We disagree. ¶34 In his post-hearing motion, James stated in passing that he was entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(5) because “the judgment ha[d] been satisfied.” (Quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).) The only 20241384-CA 14 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin argument or evidence he put forth to support this assertion was contained in a footnote, stating as follows: “[Brandy’s] own financial declaration(s) also show that she no longer owes that attorney fee amount or that her father . . . paid the attorney fees[,] further demonstrating that ‘the judgment has been satisfied.’” (Quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).) Though James is correct that the district court did not specifically take up this point when rejecting his rule 60(b) motion, the failure to do so is immaterial in this case for multiple reasons, the most obvious of which is that James did not submit sufficient evidence to support that he is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(5). See Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 64, 150 P.3d 480 (explaining that a movant is generally entitled to relief under rule 60(b) “if (1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of [rule] 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense” (emphasis added)). ¶35 The relevant portions of rule 60(b) provide, “On motion and upon just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a judgment, order, or proceeding” if “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged . . . .” Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). James apparently construes this language as permitting a court to set aside a judgment that has been partially satisfied, and he asserts that this is the case here because Brandy’s father allegedly paid Brandy’s attorney bills. But James did not put forth any evidence to support this allegation and, in any event, the judgment at issue was entered against James and in favor of Brandy, not Brandy’s attorney. Even assuming Brandy’s father paid some or all of her attorney bills, that fact does not establish that James’s judgment obligation to Brandy was fully satisfied. Thus, even assuming James’s factual assertions are accurate, he would not necessarily be entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(5). We accordingly reject his request to remand this issue for additional findings. 20241384-CA 15 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin IV. We Remand for the District Court to Determine the Amount of the Daycare Arrearage. ¶36 Lastly, James argues that the district court erred by ordering him to make payments toward a daycare arrearage judgment. His challenge has two parts. First, he contends that no daycare arrearage judgment exists in the record, “as no judgment was entered specifying the total fixed . . . amount allegedly owed.” Second, he asserts that the court failed to make adequate findings regarding which of Brandy’s claimed childcare expenses she was entitled to under the terms of the parties’ divorce decree. 7 We agree on both points. While the court previously determined that James failed to satisfy his obligation to reimburse Brandy for daycare expenses and properly ordered him to pay that obligation, the orders before us do not quantify the outstanding balance—there is no identified sum certain for daycare arrearages in the record. Because a repayment order must identify the obligation being repaid with sufficient certainty to permit enforcement and appellate review, we remand this matter for the 7. The divorce decree provides that the parties “shall equally share the reasonable work-related childcare expenses.” In challenging the adequacy of the findings, James advances several arguments concerning the reasonableness of the expenses claimed by Brandy. Notably, he asserts that Brandy failed to inform him that she was sending the children to daycare despite the fact that the decision was a legal custody matter, that he was available to watch the children during the time they were at daycare, and that the advisory guidelines favor parental care over surrogate care and provide that unpaid care arrangements are preferred. We note that we have already addressed and rejected these arguments in a prior related appeal. See Duffin v. Duffin, 2025 UT App 136, ¶¶ 28–37, 578 P.3d 751. Specifically, we held that the daycare decision in this case is a physical custody decision, Brandy is not required to send the children with James while she is working, and the district court acted within its discretion in determining not to follow the preference for parental or unpaid care under the circumstances of this case. See id. 20241384-CA 16 2026 UT App 156  Duffin v. Duffin purpose of allowing the court to determine the amount of the daycare arrearage and enter findings supporting that determination. 8 CONCLUSION ¶37 James’s challenges to the district court’s use of its contempt authority to enforce the attorney fees judgment have been rendered moot, and his other challenges concerning the attorney fees judgment are unavailing. But because the court has not yet quantified the amount of the daycare arrearage James owes to Brandy, we remand this issue so that the court may determine that amount. 9 8. Importantly, on this issue, our disposition should not be read as disturbing the district court’s determination that James owes unpaid daycare expenses. We simply cannot affirm an amount that was never determined in the first place. 9. Brandy asks this court to award her attorney fees incurred on appeal. “Generally, when the [district] court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal.” Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotation simplified). The district court awarded Brandy attorney fees for prevailing on her motions to enforce. Brandy has prevailed on that portion of this appeal. Therefore, Brandy is entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal related to the motions to enforce. On remand, the court should also determine the amount of that award. 20241384-CA 17 2026 UT App 156