Jorge Arellano v. Magdaleno Villegas
CourtTexas Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-0207
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0207
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Jorge Arellano,
Petitioner,
v.
Magdaleno Villegas,
Respondent
═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════
PER CURIAM
Respondent Magdaleno Villegas sued Petitioner Jorge Arellano
for injuries sustained in connection with a car wreck. The trial court
rendered a no-answer default judgment against Arellano, awarding
Villegas $605.44 for past lost wages, $4,233 for past medical expenses,
$15,000 for past mental anguish, $35,000 for past physical impairment,
$50,000 for past physical pain and suffering, and $150,000 in exemplary
damages. At the court of appeals, Villegas requested a remittitur
eliminating some of those damages: She stated that she “does not
contest Arellano’s [evidentiary-sufficiency] complaints about the trial
court’s award of damages for lost wages, medical expenses, mental
anguish[,] and physical impairment,” and she requested that the court
“order a remittitur” of the judgment reducing the amount awarded by
$54,838.44.” ___ S.W.3d ___, 2025 WL 284912, at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2025, pet. denied). The court of appeals held the evidence legally
insufficient to support the mental-anguish, physical-impairment, and
exemplary-damages awards, and it remanded for a new trial on those
issues. It affirmed the awards for lost wages, medical expenses, and
pain and suffering.
In this Court, in her briefing on the merits, Villegas asked us to
“reverse and render a judgment that [she] take[] nothing on all other
categories of damages” except pain and suffering because she “does not
wish to pursue a new trial” on those damages. In her response to
Arellano’s motion for rehearing, she reiterates, consistent with
representations in her merits briefing, that she is “willing to abandon
the opportunity for a new trial” on the damages categories that the court
of appeals remanded, and that she seeks an affirmance only as to the
award for pain and suffering. She also “does not disagree” with
Arellano’s contention that, at a minimum, this Court should have
reduced the damages award in accordance with her concessions. But
she now affirmatively acknowledges, seemingly for the first time, that
the record does not support the lost-wage and medical-expense awards
the court of appeals affirmed. Specifically, her response states that “the
record did not contain sufficient evidence to support some of the
damages that the court of appeals affirmed”—that is, the lost-wage and
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medical-expense awards. It appears Villegas did not offer that express
concession in her prior briefing.
About two months after merits briefing concluded (and more than
a year after the decision below issued), we decided Huffman Asset
Management, LLC v. Colter, 740 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2026). Relevant here,
we expressed heightened skepticism “of default judgments, regardless
of the precise legal issue under consideration or the procedural posture
in which the case arises.” Id. at 485. A separate writing underscored
that default judgments are “barely tolerable”; in fact, in recent years
they have become “nearly verboten.” Id. at 486 (Huddle, J., concurring).
If it were not clear previously, Huffman leaves no doubt that no-answer
default judgments require enhanced scrutiny to safeguard “the
legitimacy of our legal system.” Id. at 485 (majority opinion).
Villegas’s confession of error, read against the principles Huffman
articulated, compels us to conclude that the judgments below cannot
stand. We direct the court of appeals to reassess Villegas’s evidentiary
submissions and her concessions, including whether her abandonment
of a new trial on the remanded categories depends on affirmance of the
pain-and-suffering award. In addition, the court’s analysis of that
award relied in part on the same evidence offered to support the
lost-wage and medical-expense awards, which Villegas now expressly
concedes the record does not support. The court of appeals may
therefore consider on remand whether the concessions bear on that
analysis as well. Although we express no view on the merits of the
pain-and-suffering award, we expect the court of appeals on remand to
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carefully assess and explain whether sufficient evidence supports that
portion of the judgment. See id.
Accordingly, we grant Arellano’s motion for rehearing, grant the
petition for review, and, without hearing oral argument, TEX. R. APP.
P. 59.1, vacate the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to
that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
OPINION DELIVERED: November 20, 2026
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