Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 16, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00794-CV ——————————— BRENDA JOHNSON, TAMARA RHODES, AND BRAYLEE BUSBY, Appellants V. KRIS AND SARA ZURITA, Appellees On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Case No. C168248 MEMORANDUM OPINION The appellants, Brenda Johnson, Tamara Rhodes, and Braylee Busby, appeal from a temporary injunction in a case brought by their neighbors, Kris and Sara Zurita, for negligence, trespass to land, and property damage. In two issues, the appellants contend the temporary injunction is void for failing to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 and the trial court abused its discretion in granting its overly broad temporary injunction unsupported by the evidence. We hold the temporary injunction violates Rule 683 and is thus void. We vacate the injunction. Background The appellees, Kris and Sara Zurita (the “Zuritas”), are neighbors who share a fence line with Brenda Johnson, Tamara Rhodes, and Braylee Busby, mother, daughter, and granddaughter, who reside together.1 The Zuritas sued the appellants for negligence, gross negligence, trespass, vandalism, and conversion. The Zuritas alleged, among other things, the appellants allowed their animals to enter on the Zuritas’ property and caused harm to their property and livestock, shined bright lights toward their home, and harassed them by various means. The Zuritas also sought a declaratory judgment that the appellants are not allowed to enter onto any property that they do not themselves own. The appellants brought counter-claims against the Zuritas for trespass, conversion, and harassment. The Zuritas sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin 1 Although Braylee Busby used to live with Brenda Johnson and Tamara Rhodes, she does not currently reside with them. 2 the appellants “from entering or allowing the entry by their livestock, non-livestock animals, or other persons” on the Zuritas’ property. Temporary Injunction Order The trial court granted the Zuritas’ application for temporary injunction in the following order: BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 2nd of September, 2025, came to be heard the Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary injunction. The witnesses were sworn and provided testimony. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and the evidence, and being of the opinion that the Temporary Injunction should be ordered, AND FINDING that the Defendants have trespassed by traversing the property lines, allowing livestock and dogs to traverse the property line, have harassed the Plaintiffs by shooting in their direction, dumping, spreading corn to attract wildlife onto the Plaintiff’s property, dumping dead animals into the creek, and threatening the Plaintiffs, and IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in their claims for trespass, and harassment; and because of the multiplicity of actions needed to address each and every event, and the lack of an adequate remedy, a temporary injunction is appropriate; and IN ORDER TO preserve the status quo, and to prevent further disturbances of this kind, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants, Brenda Johnson, Tamara Rhodes, and Braylee Busby, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them, are hereby enjoined and prohibited from: 1) Entering onto the Plaintiff’s property; 2) Allowing their livestock to roam onto the Plaintiff’s property, including cows, horses, dogs, and pigs; 3 3) Firing any firearm in the direction of the Plaintiff’s home, goats, or children; 4) Obstructing the county road that serves both residences with branches, rocks, or other materials; 5) Threatening to run over any person or animal with a vehicle; 6) Taking any action, or making any utterance, intended to harass or offend. IT IS FURTHER ORDER[E]D, that the Plaintiff’s bond is set at $100. Plaintiffs shall execute and file with the clerk a bond to the adverse party, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, or cash, to be approved by the clerk, in the sum fixed by the judge, conditioned that the Plaintiff will abide the decision which may be made in this cause, and that he will pay all sums of money and costs that may be adjudged against him if the temporary injunction shall be dissolved in whole or in part. The appellants brought this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4). Validity of the Temporary Injunction In their first issue, the appellants contend that the temporary injunction is void because it fails to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. “A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). “A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.” Id. To obtain a temporary injunction, an applicant must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against the opposing party; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable 4 injury in the interim. Id. Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. Once the court decides to grant injunctive relief, the order itself must comply with Rule 683. InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986). Rule 683 governs the form and scope of injunctions and temporary restraining orders. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. Its requirements “are mandatory and must be strictly followed.” InterFirst Bank, 715 S.W.2d at 641. Pursuant to Rule 683, “[e]very order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; Conlin v. Haun, 419 S.W.3d 682, 685–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet). An order that violates Rule 683 is void. Conlin, 419 S.W.3d at 687. Here, it is undisputed that the temporary injunction order does not set the case for trial on the merits. The Zuritas contend that the inadvertent omission of a trial date is an error that should be remanded to the trial court because it can easily be clarified, added, or changed and would not likely be the cause of another interlocutory appeal. But our precedent is clear. See Clark v. Hastings Equity Partners, LLC, 651 S.W.3d 359, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (holding order’s failure to comply with Rule 683 renders it void); Conlin, 419 5 S.W.3d at 687 (dissolving temporary injunction when order did not set case for trial). In Conlin, we rejected the argument that a non-compliant temporary injunction is voidable, not void. See Conlin, 419 S.W.3d at 687 (discussing Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2000)). Likewise, here, the non- compliant temporary injunction cannot be remanded to add a trial date because it is void. See id. We sustain the appellants’ first issue. We hold that the temporary injunction order’s failure to set the case for trial on the merits as required under Rule 683 renders the order fatally defective and thus void.2 Conclusion We vacate trial court’s September 12, 2025 order granting the temporary injunction. Clint Morgan Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan and Dokupil. 2 Because of our disposition, it is not necessary to address the appellants’ remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 6