Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00248-CV IN THE INTEREST OF J.J.L., a Child From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-PA-00998 Honorable Kimberly Burley, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 7, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her child, J.J.L. 1 In her first and second issues, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of her parental rights under statutory grounds (D) and (E). In her third issue, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. 1 To protect the identity of a minor child in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we refer to the child’s parents as “Mother” and “Father.” We refer to the child using the child’s initials or as “the child.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). The trial court’s order also terminated Father’s parental rights to the child; however, Father does not appeal. 04-26-00248-CV BACKGROUND The Department became involved in the underlying case when it received a referral that the child, who was less than a year old, tested positive for THC. The child was taken to the hospital because he was unresponsive, pale, and experiencing seizure-like activity. It was later determined the child ingested marijuana. After the parents could not identify appropriate family members with whom to place the child, the Department sought removal. On June 17, 2024, the Department filed a petition seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights. The trial court held a two-day bench trial on November 14, 2025 and December 19, 2025, although mother did not appear for the second day of trial. The trial court heard testimony from Mother; Father; Alia Coats, the Department’s caseworker since December 2024; and Dana Barnes, an owner and executive director of Carrie Bell Supervised Independent Living. On March 19, 2026, the trial court signed an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to J.J.L. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on statutory grounds (D), (E), (N), and (O) in subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O). The trial court also found it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Mother appeals. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one of the predicate grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence requires “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. -2- 04-26-00248-CV When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply well-established standards of review. See id. §§ 101.007, 161.206(a); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (conducting a factual sufficiency review); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (conducting a legal sufficiency review). “In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental rights, we must ‘look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.’” In re J.L.B., No. 04-17-00364-CV, 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 1, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). “[A] reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “A corollary to this requirement is that a [reviewing] court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. “In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental rights, we ‘must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.’” J.L.B., 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). “A [reviewing court] should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “The [reviewing] court must hold the evidence to be factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence contrary to the judgment is so significant that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of the ultimate finding.” In re M.T.C., No. 04-16-00548-CV, 2017 WL 603634, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). -3- 04-26-00248-CV Further, in a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312, 317 (Tex. 2021). This is because “the trial judge is best able to observe and assess the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility, and to sense the ‘forces, powers, and influences’ that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal.” Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 823 (Tex. App.— Austin 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). We, therefore, defer to the trial court’s factual determinations and judgment regarding credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; see also In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.50 (Tex. 2024) (“Reviewing courts, however, must defer to the factfinder’s judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, including reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.”). STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION In her first and second issues, Mother argues there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings under statutory grounds (D) and (E) but does not challenge statutory grounds (N) and (O). Only one predicate ground finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a termination judgment when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). Therefore, our analysis is usually complete if we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support any single predicate ground. Because the findings under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) have consequences for termination of parental rights as to other children, termination on these grounds implicates significant due process concerns for Mother. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019). Due process requires us to review the trial court’s findings under both -4- 04-26-00248-CV subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code. See N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235– 36; see also R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279 (“Although termination under (P) is sufficient to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, we must also review termination under subsections (D) and (E) because a finding of termination under those grounds may justify termination of parental rights to other children in subsection (M).”); In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022) (“[W]e may not bypass Father’s evidentiary challenges to [s]ubsections (D) and (E) . . . because termination of a parent’s rights under either can serve as a ground for termination of his rights to another child.”). Here, the trial court determined from the evidence that Mother “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child . . . [and] engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child . . . .” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). To endanger a child under subsections (D) and (E) means to expose the child to loss or injury or to jeopardize the child’s emotional or physical health. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 748; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). “Although endanger means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it does not require that there be conduct directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury.” J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 748 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Though both subsections (D) and (E) focus on endangerment, they differ regarding the source and proof of endangerment. In re A.B.R., No. 04-19-00631-CV, 2020 WL 1159043, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Subsection (D) concerns the child’s living environment, rather than the conduct of the parent, though parental conduct is certainly relevant to the child’s environment. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort -5- 04-26-00248-CV Worth 2003, no pet.). Under subsection (E), the cause of the endangerment must be the parent’s conduct and must be the result of a conscious course of conduct rather than a single act or omission. Id. “While illegal drug use alone may not be sufficient to show endangerment, a pattern of drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate related dangers to the child can establish a substantial risk of harm.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. “A reviewing court should not evaluate drug-use evidence in isolation; rather it should consider additional evidence that a factfinder could reasonably credit that demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a risk to the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’” Id. Statutory Ground (D) Subsection (D) allows for termination of parental rights if the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The child’s “environment” encompasses the suitability of the child’s living conditions and the conduct of parents or others in the home. S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360. “Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by a parent or other persons who live in the child’s home can create an environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child as required for termination under subsection D.” In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257, 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied) (alteration omitted). “[A] parent need not know for certain that the child is in an endangering environment; awareness of such a potential is sufficient.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 109 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). Subsection (D) permits termination based upon only a single act or omission. In re R.D., 955 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. denied). The time period relevant to a review of conduct and environment under statutory ground (D) is -6- 04-26-00248-CV prior to the child’s removal. In re J.R., 171 S.W.3d 558, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). “Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in the home is part of the conditions or surroundings of the child’s home under [sub]section D.” In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257, 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet denied) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court heard evidence that the child, who was ten months old at the time, was in Mother’s care when he ingested marijuana. Mother admitted she was in charge of watching J.J.L., but her testimony indicates she was making breakfast and not supervising J.J.L. At first, Mother testified she did not know how the child got into the marijuana or where it came from, but later she testified J.J.L. may have taken the marijuana from an ashtray. Regardless of the source, it is self-evident the child was allowed to wander unsupervised in an environment that contained accessible drugs. The trial court also heard testimony that Mother’s failure to properly supervise the child in this environment caused direct harm to J.J.L. Mother testified J.J.L. became unresponsive and “[l]ooked like he was having a seizure.” Alia Coats, the Department’s caseworker, testified the child was experiencing seizure-like activity and was very lethargic, and the exposure resulted in the child’s hospitalization. Coats confirmed the child tested positive for “cannabinoids or THC.” Having reviewed the record and considered all the evidence in the appropriate light for each standard of review, we conclude the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE -7- 04-26-00248-CV ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); see also H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108; J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s subsection (D) finding. Accordingly, Mother’s first issue is overruled. Statutory Ground (E) Subsection (E) permits termination if the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The trial court must determine “whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the child’s physical well-being was the direct result of [the parent’s] conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act.” In re M.E.- M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 262 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). “Courts may further consider parental conduct that did not occur in the child’s presence, including conduct before the child’s birth or after he was removed from a parent’s care.” A.B.R., 2020 WL 1159043, at *3. “[E]ndangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the child.” J.OA., 283 S.W.3d at 345. “Conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re D.F.S., No. 04-20-00441-CV, 2021 WL 603364, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 17, 2021, pet denied) (mem. op.). “Thus, evidence of illegal drug use by a parent and its effect on a parent’s life and her ability to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct under subsection (E).” Id. As mentioned above, the trial court heard evidence the child was exposed to marijuana while he was in Mother’s care. Mother also admitted that two weeks prior, she saw the child crawling on the floor of her brother’s house and the child had ashes on his face. Although there -8- 04-26-00248-CV was no evidence the child exhibited a reaction to the exposure at the brother’s house, the trial court could have reasonably concluded this was another instance where the child was not being properly supervised in an environment that contained items that were not safe for the child, such as an ashtray. It is axiomatic that a child who is able to get into harmful substances multiple times within a two-week period is exposed to potential harm. And, the harm in this case is not even theoretical, because the child was hospitalized due to his exposure to marijuana the second time he was not properly supervised by Mother. Further, Mother admitted she has a long history of marijuana use. Mother claimed she quit smoking marijuana after she became pregnant with J.J.L.; however, the trial court could have relied on contrary evidence showing that she continued to engage in drug use, especially considering Mother’s testimony was often contradictory and disputed by Coats. See In re E.A.M.V., No 04- 18-0866-CV, 2019 WL 1923214, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 1, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining a trial court can disbelieve a parent’s testimony, and we defer to the factfinder on witness credibility issues). For example, Coats testified Mother had a concerning drug test during the removal investigation, although the test was inconclusive to establish Mother was using marijuana. Coats also testified Mother took a hair follicle test in July 2025 that was positive for drugs, Mother often did not comply with the Department’s requests to drug test, and her last drug test was positive for marijuana. 2 “Illegal drug use creates the possibility that the parent will be impaired or imprisoned and thus incapable of parenting.” A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426. “Evidence that a parent continued to use illegal drugs even though the parent knew her parental rights were at risk is conduct showing a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, which by its nature endangers a child’s 2 During the month between the first and second day of trial, the Department referred Mother for two additional drug tests. Mother did not take either drug test or provide a reason for her failure to comply. -9- 04-26-00248-CV well-being.” See A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d at 271. Based on this evidence, Coats testified Mother has failed to demonstrate that she is not using drugs, and the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Mother’s failure to appear for drug testing indicates she was using drugs. See In re A.M.L., No. 04-19-00422-CV, 2019 WL 6719028, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 11, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The trial court also could have reasonably inferred that [a parent’s] failure to appear for drug testing indicated that [the parent] was avoiding testing because [the parent] was using drugs.”). As such, the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child when she continued to use drugs before and throughout the case coupled with the harm the child experienced when he ingested accessible marijuana while under Mother’s supervision. In sum, the evidence shows that J.J.L. likely had access to and was exposed to ashes from an ashtray while in Mother’s care. Two weeks later, J.J.L. again was unsupervised while in Mother’s care and this time ingested marijuana that caused him to be hospitalized with serious symptoms from the exposure. Mother was unable to explain how J.J.L. came into contact with the drug. However, the trial court heard evidence of Mother’s long history of marijuana use and she produced a concerning drug test during the removal investigation and could have inferred that Mother’s drug use had a causal connection to the child’s ingestion of marijuana. See A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426 (“Drug abuse and its effect on the ability to parent can be part of an endangering course of conduct.”). After the child was removed, Mother continued to engage in marijuana use and did not take meaningful steps to address the Department’s concerns with her marijuana use. 3 See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278 (“[A] pattern of parental behavior that presents a substantial risk of harm to the child permits a factfinder to reasonably find endangerment.”); D.F.S., 2021 WL 3 To add, Mother was shot in the ankle at a party around the time she also tested positive for marijuana. - 10 - 04-26-00248-CV 603364, at *4 (“[A] pattern of drug abuse will support a finding of conduct endangering a child even if there is no evidence that the drug use injured the child.”). Having reviewed the record and considered all the evidence in the appropriate light for each standard of review, we conclude the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the child’s harmful exposure to marijuana coupled with Mother’s continued drug use after the child’s removal was a course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); see also A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d at 271; H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108; J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s subsection (E) finding. Accordingly, Mother’s second issue is overruled. BEST INTEREST In her third issue, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that termination of her parental rights is in J.J.L.’s best interest. When considering the best interest of a child, we recognize the existence of a strong presumption that the child’s best interest is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). However, we also presume that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). In determining whether a parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment, we consider the factors set forth in section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family Code. 4 4 These factors include: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of- home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child [or] the - 11 - 04-26-00248-CV See id. § 263.307(b). We also consider the Holley factors. 5 See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors are not exhaustive. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). “The absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” Id. In analyzing these factors, we must focus on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). Evidence that proves one or more statutory ground for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (holding same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) grounds and best interest, but such evidence does not relieve the State of its burden to prove best interest). “A best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. child’s parents . . . ; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills . . . ; and (13) whether an adequate social support system . . . is available to the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b). 5 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 n.9 (Tex. 2013). - 12 - 04-26-00248-CV denied). “A trier of fact may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct and determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” Id. The evidence supporting the endangerment grounds also supports the trial court’s best interest findings. “Continued illegal drug use by the parent is conduct that jeopardizes parental rights and may be considered as establishing an endangering course of conduct, and that termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re J.S.R., No. 04-21-00517-CV, 2022 WL 1559107, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 18, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (alterations omitted). As mentioned in the statutory grounds section, Mother has had a long history of illegal marijuana use. The trial court could have reasonably inferred that Mother’s drug use was a contributing factor to the child’s hospitalization. The Department referred Mother to substance abuse treatment and inpatient drug treatment, but Mother failed to engage in either service. The Department also referred Mother to drug testing two to three times per month since May 2025. Mother also failed to comply with drug testing. Thus, the evidence shows that Mother continued to use drugs after the child was removed and did not take the necessary steps to address the Department’s concerns with her drug use. “Illicit drug use is relevant to multiple Holley factors, including the child[]’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the child[] now and in the future, Mother’s parental abilities, the stability of Mother’s home, and the acts or omissions which may indicate an improper parent-child relationship.” In re A.N., No. 04-19-00584-CV, 2020 WL 354773, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court also considers the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child and whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or those who have access to the child’s home when determining whether Mother can provide J.J.L. with a safe - 13 - 04-26-00248-CV environment that is presumed to be in his best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.307(a), (b)(3), (b)(8). Here, the child’s exposure to marijuana while in Mother’s care caused severe harm that resulted in the child’s hospitalization. The child’s hospitalization from drug exposure in connection with Mother’s continued drug use supports the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in J.J.L.’s best interest. To address the Department’s concerns that led to removal, Mother was given a service plan. Coats testified Mother reviewed her service plan after it was created, and the Department explained to Mother what the service plan required of her. Mother was told that failure to comply with her service plan could result in termination of her parental rights. The service plan, which was admitted into evidence, contains Mother’s signature acknowledging the importance and obligations of the service plan and that failure to achieve the goals of the service plan could jeopardize her rights to J.J.L. Mother’s service plan required her to maintain stable income and safe and stable housing, successfully complete a parenting course, attend all visitation with the child, take a drug assessment and follow all recommendations, including but not limited to drug treatment and drug education classes, submit to and pass random drug tests when requested by the Department, participate in individual counseling, and successfully complete domestic violence classes. Coats opined the child’s best interest is served by Mother’s compliance with the service plan. Coats testified, however, that Mother is not in compliance with her service plan. As mentioned above, Mother was not compliant with her drug-related services. Mother claimed she had stable housing with her aunt (“Aunt”) and uncle (“Uncle”). However, Coats testified that the Department attempted to reunify the child with Mother at Aunt and Uncle’s home in May 2025, but Aunt and Uncle “were unwilling to allow [Mother] to move into their home and - 14 - 04-26-00248-CV continue providing care for her and [J.J.L.].” Coats has been unable to verify that Mother lives with Aunt and Uncle. She requested access to the home through Mother twice, but Mother has refused to allow access to the home. Based on this evidence, the trial court could have disbelieved Mother’s contention that she has a stable home with Aunt and Uncle. This evidence that Mother does not have a stable home and cannot provide for the child’s emotional and physical needs supports the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.3d at 372. Mother also did not successfully complete a parenting course. Coats testified Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from parenting classes three different times. Coats opined Mother’s failure to complete parenting classes is especially concerning because the child had been removed for nearly eighteen months and during that time Mother could not commit herself to a nine-week parenting course to show that she can adequately parent the child. Coats further stated the parenting classes would enable Mother to understand the child’s developmental delays and foster his growth and development. This evidence goes directly to Mother’s parental abilities and supports the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (providing the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody and the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child are best- interest factors considered by the trial court); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(12) (providing a trial court should consider “whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills” when determining whether the parent can provide a safe environment for the child). Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from counseling twice from the same counselor. Coats’s testimony indicates Mother was referred for a third time to a different counselor but was - 15 - 04-26-00248-CV unsuccessfully discharged a few months before trial for failure to engage in the counseling sessions. Mother admitted she stopped counseling two months before trial and acknowledged her refusal to participate in counseling was a violation of her service plan. Mother testified she stopped going to counseling because she “felt like counseling wasn’t helping [her].” When determining a child’s best interest and whether a parent can provide the child with a safe environment, the trial court should consider “the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services . . . .” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10). Mother’s refusal to engage in, and complete counseling services weighs in favor of termination. Mother successfully completed her domestic violence course. Coats expressed a concern that Mother did not achieve the goals of the domestic violence course because she believed Mother was still in a relationship with Father and there were allegations of domestic violence between them. However, the Department did not sufficiently develop the concerns with domestic violence beyond stating there were allegations of domestic violence at the beginning of the case. Accordingly, we do not rely on the domestic violence concerns in our holding today. Mother also attended forty-seven out of seventy visits with the child. Coats stated Mother missed some visits because she was sick or she did not have transportation, and she missed several visits in June when she was recovering from a gunshot wound. Coats testified Mother’s visits with the child were appropriate, the child recognized Mother, and the child shared a bond with Mother. Coats also testified that Mother only attended two out of five visits in the month between the first and second day of trial. Mother did not give the Department notice she was going to miss these visits, and the child was brought to a visitation center while he waited for Mother to arrive. - 16 - 04-26-00248-CV Based on the evidence regarding Mother’s noncompliance with her service plan, Coats opined Mother has not sufficiently addressed the Department’s concerns that led to removal and has not shown she can appropriately care for the child or meet the child’s needs. In contrast, Coats testified the child has done great in his foster family’s care. J.J.L. was in the foster family’s care from September 2024 to January 2025. It appears from the record that J.J.L. was placed with Aunt and Uncle from January 2025 to May 2025; however, the child was placed again with the foster family in May 2025 and has continued to live with them since then. In the foster family’s care, Coats testified the child is speaking “so many words” and is “always smiling.” According to Coats, he seems excited when he speaks to the foster family or they are talking to him, and he is comfortable in their home. The foster family has a great routine and often takes the child to activities. Since being in the foster family’s care, J.J.L. has successfully passed all of his developmental therapies and is doing “very well.” See In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (“The stability of the proposed home environment is an important consideration in determining whether termination is in the child’s best interest.”). The Department’s permanency goal is adoption by the foster family and the foster family is willing to adopt the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.3d at 372 (providing the trial court should consider the plans for the child by individuals or the agency seeking custody when determining whether parental termination is in the child’s best interest). In sum, the trial court could have reasonably relied on evidence that Mother’s substance abuse harmed J.J.L., and Mother’s failure to address her illicit drug use weighs in favor of termination. To add, the evidence shows Mother failed to complete most of her services and supports the Department’s contention that Mother has not shown that she can adequately supervise or parent the child. J.J.L. was removed when he was ten months old and, at the time of trial, he - 17 - 04-26-00248-CV was two years old. Coats testified J.J.L. has not been in Mother’s care for the majority of his life. In contrast, J.J.L. has been in his foster family’s care for nearly a year. According to Coats, J.J.L. is thriving with his foster family and “putting him back in the care of either parent would further result in trauma on this child and [is] not in his best interest.” Having reviewed the record and considered all the evidence in the appropriate light for each standard of review, we conclude the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2); H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108; J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; see also generally In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (recognizing a reviewing court need not detail the evidence if affirming a termination judgment). Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. Accordingly, Mother’s third issue is overruled.