Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00295-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.O., A CHILD ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron In this accelerated appeal, C.Z. (Mother) seeks reversal of a judgment terminating her parental rights to her child, whom we will pseudonymously call, “Amy.”1 TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2), 28.4. By two issues, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support: (1) termination pursuant to subsections (D) and (E), and (2) that termination was in Amy’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Because we 1 The trial court’s order also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the alleged father, E.O., who is not a party to this appeal. Only Mother appealed. conclude there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the findings, we affirm the trial court’s order. I. TRIAL TESTIMONY At a bench trial held on February 27, 2026, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) called two witnesses, Linda Morales, a conservatorship worker for the Department, 2 and Anthony Mendoza, 3 who transported and supervised Mother’s visits with Amy. Mother also called two witnesses, herself and Yvonne Flores, a “conservatorship supervisor” for the Department. These witnesses testified at trial as described below, with the Department’s primary witness being Morales and Mother’s primary witness being herself. A. Linda Morales On direct-examination, Morales explained that she was assigned the case on March 17, 2025, after the Department was granted temporary conservatorship of Amy. According to her testimony, the Department became involved at Amy’s birth because she was born positive for methamphetamines and was having a hard time feeding. Initially, Amy was placed in the hospital’s “NICU” (neonatal intensive care unit) 4 where they addressed her “withdrawals, her seizures,” and her struggles to “take milk.” About a week later, Amy was placed in foster care and was issued “phenobarbital” for the withdrawals and seizures, which she continued to take until May 2025. As to Amy’s development, Morales described her as “doing very well” in foster care. She explained she was “moving 2 Another Department employee worked on the case, but she did not testify. 3 Mendoza did not testify who he is employed by. 4 See MERIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, NICU, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/NICU (last visited September 16, 2026). 2 around, making noises, [and] very active.” 5 Morales testified that Amy has overcome the initial health challenges and “eats very well,” but she did not know about any long-term effects. Morales also testified that Amy goes to occupational therapy and goes more often to her childhood checkups. She agreed, though, that Amy is meeting her milestones with respect to her checkups and is doing well developmentally. Morales confirmed that the foster placement where Amy is located is a foster-to-adopt home, and the foster parent has indicated a willingness to adopt her. Morales testified that to her knowledge at the time of removal and trial, Mother and alleged father, E.O., were in a romantic relationship. Morales also testified that she visited the residence in Rockport where Mother and E.O. lived at the time of removal and trial. 6 She explained that she did a walk-through of that residence in December and took photographs. 7 She described the condition of the home as uninhabitable, saying the “walls are not finished, there’s exposed insulation, they’re sleeping on the floor, there’s no running water, there had not been any electricity, there’s no toilet, and there’s trash and miscellaneous items everywhere.” In an attempt to assist Mother with securing an appropriate living residence, the “[D]epartment . . . provided her with an application for housing, put it in her hands, back in July.” Morales disagreed that Mother has tried to secure an appropriate residence for Amy, and in her opinion the Rockport residence is not a home Amy can be returned to. The dangers in the home for Amy were described 5 In cross-examination, Morales also described Amy as being “very attached to her” placement. 6 The evidence established that Mother lived in at least two other locations, but according to Morales, Mother moved back to this residence a “few weeks” before trial. 7 Ten photographs were admitted into evidence without objection. 3 as it being “a fire hazard, the insulation is exposed. The walls are not finished, flooring is not finished. There’s no running water, there’s no plumbing.” Although she had not seen check stubs, Morales testified that Mother recently secured employment as a “provider” for an “elderly person.” And, Morales testified that Mother “seems to have” addressed her drug usage, as her “last positive was in August.” Morales denied having any information on whether E.O. is sober and denied that he drug tested for the Department. Although Mother is residing with E.O., Morales confirmed that she does not know whether he is a safe and appropriate caregiver. When asked, “Do you know whether [Mother] ever indicated that she and [E.O.] did any drugs together?” Morales responded, “I know they did, he told me.” As to what drug he said they did together, Morales answered, “meth.” Morales denied that Mother demonstrated an ability to provide Amy with a safe environment. According to her testimony, Mother completed her “parenting, her substance abuse, her individual counseling, her psychosocial, and she did get employment.” However, she explained that stable and safe housing “has not been acquired.” Morales denied changes in Mother’s behavior explaining that the “goal on her service plan with . . . Gulf Coast, was to secure stable and safe housing, and she has not achieved that.” Morales testified that at her last visit, E.O. would not let her in, and although Mother was there she, “just shrugged her shoulders” when E.O. would not let Morales in. When asked, “[H]ave you explained to [Mother] that remaining with [E.O.] could be considered a danger to [Amy]?,” she responded, “She’s aware. When he would not participate in any services, when he flat out refused.” 4 Although Morales explained she initially could not locate E.O., she was able to do so in June at his premises, but it did not go “well. He used a lot of profanity. He wasn’t going to do anything, I’m just going to sign my rights away because I don’t have time for all this S-H-I-T.” Morales acknowledged that E.O. never actually signed his rights away, but she denied that he had engaged in services, done anything for the Department, or ever tried to contact her. She confirmed E.O. has also been aggressive towards her when she has gone to the home. On cross-examination, Morales denied making an early-on decision that Amy was going to live with her foster family. And, apart from maintaining stable and safe housing, Morales agreed that Mother has completed everything. The following relevant exchange then ensued: [Mother’s counsel]: Okay. Is it your testimony to this court that regardless of her complying with every other condition of her plan, working, staying clean, reporting, doing everything she needs to do, going to visit her child, because she is economically disadvantaged, . . . and cannot afford to go get her own apartment or live somewhere else, that that is sufficient for you to terminate her rights? [Morales]: It’s the Department’s recommendation. [Mother’s counsel]: Who makes those decisions? You? [Morales]: I don’t. We staff it. We go through all of the facts. We go through the history. Again, she denied making a decision that it is better for Amy to live with her foster family because they have a nice home with more money. When asked by Mother’s counsel, “[W]hat problem do you have with allowing her to have some rights to her child?” 5 Morales answered, “The environment that she is living in.” Morales also testified that Mother had not applied for housing because the Department called the local housing authorities, as Mother had indicated she was on a waiting list. If Mother was able to get housing, Morales testified her objection would be having E.O. in Amy’s life. On further cross-examination, Morales explained that E.O. is Amy’s alleged father because he did not submit to a court-ordered paternity test. She also confirmed he was ordered to do services. When asked by E.O.’s counsel, “And I don’t think you ever saw him use drugs, fair?” Morales responded, “He told me he uses daily.” According to Morales, she observed that Mother moved “four” times during the case. Additionally, Morales confirmed Mother had a theft charge during the case and said Mother indicated at a previous hearing that she would be taking a plea deal. She did not know, however, if that had happened. As far as Mother’s compliance with her family plan, Morales explained, “[s]he completed a program July 25th, and her goal—she was able to recognize her own behaviors, parenting, healthy boundaries, relapse prevention, and ways to create safer relationships and environment, but that has not happened.” Morales described her concerns with the parents as their “situation is unstable.” Further, with respect to her family plan, Morales testified that Mother is to “surround herself with persons who do not have criminal background or engage in illegal substances, that has not happened. And the housing, the safe housing, stable housing.” On re-direct examination, Morales did not believe Mother could provide stability for Amy. She expanded on this as follows: [Department’s counsel]: Because although poverty is a concern, are there some additional stability red flags that the department has identified? 6 [Morales]: Yes. [Department’s counsel]: And what are those? [Morales]: Her living situation, the environment she’s in, the people that live on the lot. Even the lot is unstable. They owe three years of back taxes. I don’t how long they can stay there, that is also concerning, where is she going to go? When asked, “What’s the underlying reason that the [D]epartment believes it is in the best interest of this child for the mother’s rights to be terminated?” she responded, “For the entire time of this case, [Mother] has not secured stable and safe housing for this young baby.” As for the benefits Amy would receive if parental rights were terminated, Morales explained Amy “could achieve permanency in the only home she’s known and with the only parents she’s known.” On re-cross examination, with respect to Mother’s employment, she described it as unstable because “if the lady passes or they let her go, she cannot find another caretaker in that same agency. It’s not an agency.” She denied knowing B.O. or that B.O. called expressing an interest in adopting Amy or that Mother told her S.O. wanted to be considered for placement. 8 B. Anthony Mendoza Mendoza testified on direct examination that he has been transporting Mother to Houston since the week of Christmas, and he supervises the visits. The visits have been “going pretty good.” He explained that they pick Amy up from daycare, and Mother is “really good about putting the baby in the car seat.” They then take Amy to the local 8 When Mother testified, she identified B.O. as E.O’s older sister, and S.O. as E.O.’s cousin. When discussing B.O., it appears Mother’s counsel is referring Morales to some notes, but these notes were not admitted into evidence. 7 McDonald’s and sit for two to three hours depending on the visit. He denied that Mother has ever been inappropriate with Amy, and he has not had any sobriety issues with Mother. He confirmed the visits have been appropriate, and he had no concerns with Mother’s ability to care for Amy during the visitation. On cross-examination, he described Mother as “real good with [Amy].” He confirmed that Mother brings her items, snacks, buys her food at McDonald’s, and interacts with the child the entire time. He confirmed that Amy is attached to Mother. And, Amy is bonded with Mother during the visit. C. Mother Mother testified she applied for housing in Portland and Beeville. The housing application for Beeville was done on July 12, 2025, and it was submitted on her phone. 9 For employment, she explained she is a caregiver for an elderly lady, and she has been doing that “[s]ince [she] got out of jail September 29th.” She agreed she picked up a misdemeanor theft case and, it is “still not resolved.” Mother denied that she would go to prison for that and stated, “I’m just going to do community service. That’s it.” Mother described learning that E.O.’s older sister, B.O., wanted to adopt Amy, but denied the Department ever asked her about B.O. 10 Mother also described providing Morales with E.O.’s cousin, S.O., but when she offered the name, she was told “that’s not what they’re looking for, it’s not what they’re interested in or something, and then that it’s already too late.” Mother agreed that she completed her services and made changes, 9 It appears the trial court and parties reviewed a screenshot of the application for housing in Beeville, but a screenshot was not admitted into evidence. Mother explained that she did not have a screenshot for the “one” in Portland. 10 Given the context of the conversation, it appears Mother learned this information from the de- identified file, i.e., from produced discovery. 8 stating, “I’m sober. And then all my classes, I did learn a lot from my classes. I have a job now. I get out of the house. I have bills to pay now.” She denied, however, having the money to get a new apartment or rent a house. As for her bills, she pays for a storage fee, her phone, toiletries, rent, “two-something a month[,]” electricity, and water. Mother testified that the house in Rockport now has electricity and water, and she had a bed despite Morales’s testimony otherwise. She denied that anyone from the Department discussed with her resources for getting her GED or offered to help obtain her driver’s license. She also denied hearing the term Catholic Charities from anyone at the Department. And, she agreed she did not have much of a support system. Although she previously resided with her grandfather, “he said [she] had to leave” when he learned from her prior caseworker that she had tested positive. Mother described her plan as “eventually mov[ing] to a different spot” and “getting into a different home, a better home.” With regards to her plans for work, Mother stated, “Yeah, so the lady that I—that I work with—or work for, she also—the one that has power of attorney over this lady, she works through an agency, so she will just give me certain people that need help, and she’ll give me their numbers and I’ll go do an interview with them, and I’ll have a job. So I’m not too worried . . . if she passes, about me being jobless.” As far as her bond with Amy, she described Amy as starting to get more familiar with her, hanging on to her, and remembering her. Mother confirmed that she is asking that her parental rights not be terminated, and to find it is not in Amy’s best interest. Mother also confirmed that if she had the opportunity to get another home, she would live in a different one away from E.O. When asked if that was her plan, Mother responded, “Yes. That’s what it’s going—that’s what it’s pushing 9 to.” Mother also confirmed she wants Amy, wants to at least maintain a relationship with her, see her occasionally, and know about her. If she can get her own apartment or home, she would also like to have Amy on weekends and believed once she gets on her feet, she could do other things. On cross-examination, Mother denied that there were any other potential fathers besides E.O. Before obtaining her current sobriety, Mother admitted to being a methamphetamine user for about “a year and a half.” She denied, however, that E.O. ever gave her drugs. Mother described her relationship with E.O. as “a very rocky and difficult subject.” She did not know why he does not come to court and stated, “He’s his own person. He just kind of blocks me out every time I talk to him about it.” She believed the relationship is healthy “in a way.” But, when it comes to Amy, “it’s just a hard topic.” Mother said E.O. has an adult son, but she is unsure where he is. Mother also believed E.O. was a good dad because she has seen how he is towards other people’s kids. However, she denied she would have another child with him given his lack of compliance in this case, and she does not plan to marry him. Mother denied any drug use during the case, and stated, “My sobriety date is in like a week.” She could not explain the positive August hair follicle test, though. Mother acknowledged that a friend was possibly going to give her a trailer, but she ultimately declined, explaining that the friend “wanted to be controlling, so [she] kind of just backed out of it.” Mother denied that E.O. hangs around with people or brings people over that are not good or who have criminal records, stating, “Nobody comes over. Now that I’m not using anymore, nobody comes over anymore. Nobody even—we don’t even smoke cigarettes inside like we used to smoke in the trailer.” When asked, “So are you saying 10 that you know [E.O.] doesn’t use?” Mother answered, “Not in front of me.” Mother also testified that she feels Amy is in a “good place” right now, but she does not “want to lose her, like completely. I still want to know about her. I still want to see her.” On further cross-examination, Mother stated that “at the moment” she is planning on staying with E.O., but “probably not for much longer.” When asked how she planned to support Amy if she were returned, Mother said, “[by] applying for child[]care, and, hopefully, I have my own transportation and stuff by now. And I have been looking into . . . getting my driver’s license and all that stuff.” And, when asked if she thought she was prepared to take Amy home today, Mother answered, “Honestly, no, not at this point, but I will eventually be.” Mother indicated she planned to remain in the current residence with E.O. “because that’s pretty much all I’m working with right now.” As for the safety of her current residence, Mother indicated she would not let anything happen to Amy and does not think she would be in any harm. She admitted the trash outside needs to be cleaned up but testified they fixed up the inside. Mother further explained that she and E.O. would not let Morales in the residence on her last visit because she “had figured out that [Morales] didn’t want the baby coming home.” So, according to Mother, there was no point. She did not think it would have helped if Morales could have verified things were better because “nothing’s ever going to be enough and [E.O.] is still there.” D. Yvonne Flores On direct-examination, Flores denied that she believed that people that are economically disadvantaged should not get access to their children. She was not aware of a list the Department had to refer people for certain things and only knew of Catholic 11 Charities. Flores testified that Mother has made “some” changes in her life. She denied that the Department made a premature decision to leave Amy in her foster placement. When asked whether Mother doing her entire plan and not having the money to get a place was sufficient to terminate her parental rights, Flores explained that “whenever we review and stop the cases, it’s based off of information, not necessarily an opinion that we believe.” On cross-examination, Flores denied that Morales sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights from the onset of the case. She explained that a month prior to the initial permanency hearing, the Department does a “structured decision-making tool in our system” and “based off of that information entered in there, it helps us determine whether we should change the rules at that time or if we should continue with reunification efforts.” Flores also denied that Mother had made sufficient progress for the Department to recommend a full return and monitor, but she acknowledged “there was progress made.” However, according to Flores, they usually do a “step-up” of unsupervised visits to a return and monitor, but that was never reached in this case due to Mother’s instability and the living environment. E. Order As referenced above, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights and thereafter reduced its oral ruling to writing. This appeal ensued. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A trier of fact must find two elements by clear and convincing evidence before it can involuntarily terminate parental rights: (1) that a parent’s act or omission satisfies a statutory ground for termination found in Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code; 12 and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. See id. §§ 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802–03 (Tex. 2012). Clear and convincing evidence means “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. Involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights, Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985), and consequently, termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. In re H.S., No. 24-0307, ____ S.W.3d ____, ____, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8 (Tex. June 5, 2026). In parental termination proceedings, our legal and factual sufficiency standards honor this elevated burden of proof while respecting the factfinder’s role. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018). Where the distinction lies between legal and factual sufficiency is in the extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered. Id. When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, a reviewing court “may not disregard undisputed evidence even if that evidence is inconsistent with the verdict or finding.” In re H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *8 (citing In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022)). We “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re K.N., No. 24-0881, ____ S.W.3d ____, ____, 2026 WL 1614378, at *7 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). In comparison, a factual sufficiency analysis, “requires weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. We must consider “whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding” in a factual-sufficiency review. Id. “Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of 13 the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. Under both legal and factual sufficiency standards, we defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses “so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re O.J.G., No. 13-25-00145-CV, 2025 WL 1912201, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 10, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In a bench trial, the judge is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 311–12, 317 (Tex. 2021). III. PREDICATE GROUNDS First, Mother argues there is legally and factually insufficient evidence supporting termination of her parental rights under subsections (D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). A. Applicable Law Subsections (D) and (E) involve findings of endangerment to the child. In re C.J.C., No. 08-26-00083-CV, 2026 WL 2018453, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 10, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Under subsection (D), a trial court may terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The endangerment analysis under subsection (D) focuses on evidence of the child’s physical environment but permits termination if the Department proves the parent’s conduct 14 caused the child to be placed or remain in an “endangering environment.” In re L.D.M.W., No. 09-25-00495-CV, 2026 WL 1250188, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 7, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 721–23 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)). “Subsection (D) addresses the child’s surroundings and environment rather than parental misconduct, which is the subject of subsection (E).” In re A.L.H., 624 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (quoting In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 926 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)) (citation modified). The endangering conditions or surroundings include unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s home. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 721. Subsection D allows for termination based upon only a single act or omission. In re P.H.S., No. 04-25-00838-CV, 2026 WL 1828577, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 24, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). The relevant time frame for evaluating subsection (D) is typically before the child’s removal because, as a general matter, “conditions or surroundings cannot endanger a child unless that child is exposed to them.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749. Under subsection (E), a trial court may terminate parental rights if, in addition to a best-interest finding, it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). To “endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. A finding of endangerment under subsection (E) requires evidence that the endangerment was the result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re H.H., No. 12-26-00143-CV, 2026 WL 2212811, at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2026, no 15 pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). “Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; the statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent.” In re S.W., No. 14-25-01153-CV, 2026 WL 1506476, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2026, pet. denied) (citation omitted). Relevant evidence in determining whether a parent engaged in a course of endangering conduct includes conduct that occurred before and after the child’s birth, in the child’s presence and outside the child’s presence, and before and after removal by the Department. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Further, endangerment “does not require [the parent’s conduct] to directly harm the child.” In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760, 764 (Tex. 2025) (quoting In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024)). Instead, the proper inquiry is whether there is evidence that the parent “exhibited a pattern of behavior presenting a substantial risk of harm” to the child. Id. “Conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability, including instability in housing arrangements, endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re C.J.C., 2026 WL 2018453, at *11 (citations omitted). The primary difference between subsection (D) and (E) is that subsection (D) focuses on the child’s conditions or surroundings, while subsection (E) focuses on the parent’s or another’s conduct whether by overt act or by omission. In re I.R., No. 13-24- 00632-CV, 2025 WL 1261430, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 1, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). “Even still, parental conduct is relevant to the child’s environment under subsection (D) because the conduct of a parent or another person in the home can create an environment that endangers the physical and emotional well- being of a child as required for termination under subsection (D).” In re C.W., No. 05-25- 16 00991-CV, 2025 WL 3722810, at *15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted). Because the evidence pertaining to subsections (D) and (E) are interrelated, we consolidate our review of the endangerment findings. In re J.C.B.G., No. 04-25-00675-CV, 2025 WL 4862158, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 17, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted); see In re B.C.F., No. 13-24-00210-CV, 2024 WL 4224007, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). B. Analysis The evidence at trial showed that Mother used methamphetamine during her pregnancy, Amy was born positive for methamphetamine, Amy exhibited feeding problems after birth, and Amy was also treated for seizures and withdrawals following her birth. See In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (per curium) (“Drug use during pregnancy supports a finding of direct injury to the child.”); In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749 (“Certainly, Mother’s use of controlled substances while pregnant created a dangerous environment for [the child.]” (citation modified)). Based on Mother’s testimony, her methamphetamine use spanned her entire pregnancy. That evidence is coupled with Mother’s recent decision to return to live with E.O., who admitted to Morales that he engages in “daily” drug use, and who had been aggressive towards Morales. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (concluding there is some evidence of endangerment under subsection (E) after reasoning, among other things, that the father “admitted to daily marijuana use before the twins were born, although he testified that he never used drugs in his older daughter’s presence”); see also In re K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *14 (explaining that “we [have] affirmed the termination 17 of parental rights of parents who use illegal drugs chronically, or while caring for children.”) (citing In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278); In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281 (“When a pattern of drug use is coupled with credible evidence of attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the children, a factfinder reasonably can find endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being under (D) and (E).”); see generally In re S.W., 2026 WL 1506476 at *5 (describing Father’s aggressive behavior towards Department personnel and concluding this evidence was relevant to an endangerment finding under subsection (E)). In other words, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that despite Mother achieving her own sobriety, she chose to resume residing, at least temporarily, with a chronic drug user, thereby creating a dangerous environment for Amy. See In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 262–64 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (concluding there was legally sufficient evidence under subsection (E) after reasoning in part that “the man with whom Appellant and [the child] lived at the beginning of the case also admitted having a problem with cocaine”). Additionally, it was undisputed that E.O. failed to drug test throughout the entirety of the case, and although Mother denied that he used illegal drugs “in front” of her, the trial court could have reasonably inferred again that her decision to live with him when she was aware that he failed to drug test contributed to an endangering environment for Amy. See In re S.G., No. 02-24-00045-CV, 2024 WL 1792764, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, April 25, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that the quantum of evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E) after reasoning, among other things, that “Mother continued to 18 live with Father despite his refusal to take court-ordered drug tests, and she arrived at visits with Father while he smelled of marijuana”). Moreover, despite Mother’s denial of her own drug use while the case was pending, the trial court was entitled to consider Morales’s testimony that Mother tested positive in August, as well as Mother’s inability to explain the result. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346; In re L.A.T., No. 13-19-00217-CV, 2019 WL 4493702, at *5 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that the trial court’s finding under subsection (E) is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence after explaining, among other things, that “Mother’s drug use evidenced by her positive drug tests throughout [the child’s] case could also be considered by the trial court”); M.R. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-23-00510-CV, 2024 WL 589907, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s decision to use illegal drugs while the termination suit is pending, and the parent knows he is at risk of losing his child, may support a finding of endangerment under subsection (E).” (citations omitted)); In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d at 262–64 (concluding there was legally sufficient evidence under subsection (E) after reasoning in part that “[a]ppellant denied ever using cocaine or methamphetamines but could not explain why she had tested positive for both (as well as other drugs) in April and May 2008”). Finally, despite Mother’s argument that the Department’s housing evidence was incomplete and speculative, it was undisputed where Mother resided at the time of trial as well as Mother’s refusal to allow Morales to inspect the home on her last visit. See In re S.A.L., No. 13-23-00045-CV, 2023 WL 3879856, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg June 8, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding the evidence legally sufficient 19 under subsections (D) and (E), in part because “Mother did not allow the Department access to her apartment so that they could conduct the requisite home evaluations required for reunification” (citation omitted)). Additionally, since she had denied Morales access to the home, the trial court was free to disbelieve Mother that the home had been recently cleaned and now had water and electricity. Instead, the trial court could have believed Morales’s testimony that the “walls” were still “not finished,” it lacked running water and electricity, and “there” remained “trash and miscellaneous items everywhere.” See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“In a bench trial, the trial judge is the factfinder who weighs the evidence, resolves evidentiary conflicts, and evaluates witnesses’ credibility.”). Apart from two housing applications (neither of which were admitted into evidence) being discussed by Mother and assuming they were submitted, the evidence does not otherwise reveal the status of the applications. Instead, the evidence revealed that Mother chose to live with E.O. for an uncertain amount of time. Based on the above, we disagree with Mother’s argument that the evidence demonstrates that her financial hardship or poverty served as the basis for the trial court’s endangerment grounds. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(c)(2) (providing that evidence that a parent is economically disadvantaged “does not constitute clear and convincing evidence sufficient for a court to make a [termination] finding under Subsection (b)”); see also In re A.B.-G., No. 01-24-00509-CV, 2024 WL 4982500, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 5, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“While poverty is not a basis for terminating parental rights, the preceding evidence indicates that the mother’s living circumstances continued to be unstable through trial and that the recurrence of 20 homelessness or something close to it was quite possible.”). Instead, we conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support termination under subsections (D) and (E), and we overrule her first issue. IV. BEST INTEREST Second, Mother argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding because the “evidence demonstrated substantial rehabilitation, consistent visitation, employment, continued sobriety, and ongoing efforts towards reunification.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). A. Applicable Law “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and- circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013). It is child-centered and focuses on the well-being, safety, and development of the child. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. There is a strong presumption that termination is not in a child’s best interest; thus, a parental-termination order “must alw