Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00203-CR Brenda CORRALES SUAREZ, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the County Court, Maverick County, Texas Trial Court No. 34932 Honorable Susan D. Reed, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Sitting: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 7, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant, Brenda Corrales Suarez, through counsel and pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, entered a plea of nolo contendere in absentia to criminal trespass, a Class B misdemeanor. 1 Consistent with the plea bargain agreement, the trial court sentenced Corrales 1 Appellant was charged by information with criminal trespass in an area subject to a disaster declaration. Under Penal Code Section 12.50, the punishment range for criminal trespass committed in an area subject to a gubernatorial disaster declaration is enhanced to a Class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.50(a)–(b), 30.05, 12.21. 04-25-00203-CR Suarez to four days in the Maverick County Jail, granted credit for time served, and assessed no fine or court costs. On appeal, Corrales Suarez contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for a speedy trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND On January 19, 2024, Appellant was arrested for misdemeanor criminal trespass at Shelby Park in Maverick County. Two days earlier, Major Arturo De La Garza of the Texas Department of Public Safety issued a written declaration restricting access to Shelby Park. According to the declaration, only individuals entering through designated entry points were authorized to access the park, and persons entering from the riverbanks or other unauthorized locations were prohibited from entering or remaining on the property Appellant was charged by information on January 25, 2024, and set for trial on June 11, 2024. Before her first trial setting, which was later reset to July 11, 2024, Appellant filed a “Motion to Compel Discovery,” requesting numerous documents, recordings, statements, incident reports, and contact information for witnesses. On July 1, 2024, Appellant filed a motion for continuance due to outstanding discovery, and requested the court charge the continuance to the State as a sanction and set a new trial date in August 2024. The trial court granted the continuance and set the trial for December 5, 2024, without objection. The trial court did not rule on the sanctions request. After the State provided Appellant with additional discovery in late July 2024, Appellant filed a second motion to compel information in November 2024. After a hearing on the motion, the court sua sponte continued the December trial setting to March 6, 2025. On December 4, 2024, Appellant filed a written objection to the continuance asserting her right to a speedy trial, and, on January 13, 2025, she filed a motion for speedy trial. The motion asked the court to dismiss the case, or, in the alternative, grant her an earlier trial setting. The court -2- 04-25-00203-CR conducted a hearing on Appellant’s motion for speedy trial on January 27, 2025, during which Appellant requested a dismissal. Relying solely on the exhibits admitted into evidence and the court’s record, Appellant argued the State’s failure to timely turn over exculpatory discovery caused a delay that prejudiced Appellant’s opportunity to present a defense. The trial court denied the motion without issuing any findings or legal conclusions. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement between Appellant and the State, Appellant pled nolo contendere to criminal trespass, and the trial court sentenced her to four days’ confinement. Appellant timely appealed. SPEEDY TRIAL On appeal, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in denying her motion for speedy trial. She requests that we order the case dismissed with prejudice. Because the motion was ruled on before Appellant entered into a plea agreement, it has been properly preserved for appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART 44.02, Martin v. State, 652 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right attaches once a person is arrested or charged. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971)). The Supreme Court has identified four factors that a court should weigh and balance in considering a speedy-trial claim: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the length of delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). “If the defendant can make a threshold showing that the interval between accusation and trial is presumptively prejudicial, then a court must consider each of the remaining Barker factors and weigh them.” Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted). -3- 04-25-00203-CR “[C]ourts must analyze the speedy-trial claim by first weighing the strength of each of the Barker factors and then balancing their relative weights in light of the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted). The State bears the burden of justifying the length of the delay, while the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice. Id. at 280. “Dismissal of the charging instrument with prejudice is mandated only upon a finding that an accused’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was actually violated.” Id. at 281. “When reviewing the trial court’s application of the Barker test, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s historical findings of fact that the record supports, and we draw reasonable inferences from those facts necessary to support the trial court’s findings.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 767–68. While review of the Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, the balancing of the factors is purely a legal question that we review de novo. Id. at 768. A. The Length of Delay The length of delay for speedy trial purposes is measured from the time the defendant is arrested or formally charged to the time of the defendant’s trial or demand for a speedy trial. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Generally, a delay of eight months to a year, or longer, is presumptively prejudicial and triggers a speedy trial analysis.” State v. Lopez, 631 S.W3d 107, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Shaw v. State, 117, S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). The delay between Appellant’s arrest on January 19, 2024, and her motion for speedy trial—filed on January 13, 2025, and heard on January 27, 2025—was approximately twelve months. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 (measuring length of delay from time of defendant’s -4- 04-25-00203-CR arrest to the date of the hearing on his speedy trial motion). We conclude this twelve-month delay is presumptively prejudicial and sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. See Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (recognizing that a delay approaching one year is enough to trigger consideration of the other Barker factors). However, this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of finding a violation of Appellant’s speedy trial right because the delay just exceeds the minimum needed to trigger analysis of the remaining Barker factors. See State v. Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (concluding a delay of eleven months did not weigh heavily in favor of finding a violation of defendant’s speedy trial right). B. Reason for Delay The second Barker factor analyzes “the reason the government assigns to justify the delay.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. A deliberate delay intended to hamper the defense is weighed heavily against the government, while more neutral reasons, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless considered. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. “[A] valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Barker, at 531. “In the absence of an assigned reason for the delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for the delay.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (quoting Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314). Appellant argues that trial-court negligence and the State’s inability to timely produce requested discovery caused the delay in this case. We first examine the seven-month delay from Appellant’s arrest to her trial setting on July 11, 2024. 2 Before the trial setting, Appellant filed several motions in the trial court, including an application for writ of habeas corpus due to lack of 2 Appellant was initially set for trial on June 11, 2024, but during a pre-trial hearing on May 5, 2024, the trial court sua sponte moved the trial date to July 11, 2024. The record does not contain an explanation for, or an objection to, the July trial setting. -5- 04-25-00203-CR probable cause, a motion to compel discovery, a motion to inspect Shelby Park, and a motion to suppress the evidence related to Appellant’s arrest. The trial court denied the application for writ of habeas corpus, 3 granted the motion to inspect Shelby Park, and while not explicitly granting the motion to compel discovery, reminded the State of their discovery obligations. At a pretrial hearing on June 17, 2024, Appellant urged a second motion to compel discovery, specifically requesting the identifying information and any written reports of a Texas Military Department (“TMD”) soldier who her trial counsel argued was the person who had granted Appellant permission to enter Shelby Park. On July 1, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to continue trial, alleging the State had failed to turn over the requested discovery, and requesting a trial setting in August 2024. Appellant argues that the State intentionally delayed trial by withholding witness information and by prohibiting the defense investigator from interviewing TMD personnel when the investigator inspected Shelby Park. 4 However, the record also reveals that during this time period, the State made efforts to obtain and disclose the additional requested discovery. On April 29, 2024, Appellant’s trial attorney informed the court that “the State did provide a list of five [] or four additional officers” not previously disclosed. On June 17, 2024, the prosecutor informed the court that he had personally contacted TMD for the requested discovery. On July 26, 2024, the State provided additional discovery and informed Appellant that “[p]er TMD this is all the information they have in response to your discovery request.” Therefore, at most, the record 3 After the trial court denied the application, Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court, as well as two separate motions for emergency relief requesting a stay of her July 11, 2024, trial setting. See In re Ramos-Trujillo, et al., No. 04-24-00381-CR, 2024 WL 3347687 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 10, 2024, orig. proceeding) (denying Appellant’s petition, which had been consolidated with four other petitions for mandamus seeking similar relief, and denying pending motions for stay as moot). 4 In a sworn declaration attached to Appellant’s motion for speedy trial, the defense investigator stated “[The Texas Department of Public Safety Major] told me I could walk around and take all the photographs I wanted, but that I was not allowed to speak to anyone.” Appellant’s brief contends the April 2024 motion to inspect Shelby Park was filed “for the express purpose of locating [a] witness.” Upon our review of the motion, we can discern no express request to speak to or interview TMD soldiers. -6- 04-25-00203-CR reveals some negligence by the State in obtaining the requested discovery but does not support an implied finding that the State withheld evidence for purposes of trial delay. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 (“Because appellant lost in the trial court . . . we must presume the trial court resolved any disputed fact issues in the State’s favor, and we must also defer to the implied findings of fact that the record supports.”). We hold that this seven-month delay from Appellant’s arrest to her first trial setting weighs only slightly in Appellant’s favor. See Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d at 564 (holding, in the absence of evidence that State withheld evidence for purposes of trial delay, a delay due to discovery issues weighed only slightly in defendant’s favor). The trial court did not provide a reason or explanation for the five-month delay between the July 2024 trial date and the December 2024 trial date, therefore, we may not presume “[]either a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense []or a valid reason for the delay.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. Further, the court did not directly explain why the December 2024 trial date was continued to March 6, 2025; however, at a January 2025 hearing, the court stated, “[t]his is when we were in transition, and the whole docket got dropped.” Thus, the record supports a reasonable inference that the three-month delay between December 2024 and March 2025, resulted from a docketing error that should be charged against the State but not heavily. See Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (discussing how delays due to negligence or overcrowded courts are weighed against the State but not heavily). In total, thirteen months and thirteen days elapsed between Appellant’s arrest and her plea. Nine of those months weigh against the State, albeit not heavily, and five months weigh against neither the State nor Appellant. Therefore, we hold that this factor weighs slightly in favor of finding that Appellant’s speedy-trial right was violated. -7- 04-25-00203-CR C. Assertion of Right “Whether and how a defendant asserts this right is closely related to the other three [Barker] factors because the strength of his efforts will be shaped by them.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282–83. A defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedy- trial claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283. “If a defendant fails to first seek a speedy trial before seeking dismissal of the charges, he should provide cogent reasons for this failure.” Id. Appellant bore the burden of showing that she timely asserted her right to a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Appellant contends that she asserted her right to a speedy trial in correspondence she sent the State on February 4, 2024. The correspondence was filed in the trial court on April 9, 2024, as an exhibit to Appellant’s “Motion to Compel Discovery.” In the correspondence, Appellant’s counsel requests that “the State inform federal immigration authorities that it does not consent to [Ms.] Corrales Suarez departure from the country.” Below that request is the assertion: “To be clear: [Ms.] Corrales Suarez wants the opportunity to have a speedy, fair trial. If [s]he is thrown out of the country, that won’t happen.” However, the primary purpose of the correspondence—as evidenced by the hearing at which Appellant’s counsel urged Appellant’s motion to compel discovery—was to show Appellant’s efforts to obtain the requested discovery, not to assert her right to a speedy trial. Appellant never asserted or argued her right to a speedy trial at the hearing. Accordingly, even if Appellant raised her speedy trial right, she did not do so unambiguously. See Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that a demand for a speedy trial should be unambiguous); State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 826 (Tex. -8- 04-25-00203-CR Crim. App. 1999) (concluding that, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant’s motion to sever and pro forma request for a trial date could not be considered an assertion of his right to a speedy trial); Martinez v. State, No. 01-22-00390-CR, 01-22-00391-CR, 2024 WL 2751393, at *22, & n.12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 30, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the appellate record contained no indication that the defendant asserted his right to speedy trial despite his argument that he asserted his right through his motions for production of evidence). Upon review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s December 4, 2024, “Objection to Sua Sponte Continuance” was the first unambiguous assertion of her right to a speedy trial. 5 Appellant first asserted her right to a speedy trial over ten months after she was arrested and formally charged. Further, while the “Motion for Speedy Trial” requested a dismissal or, in the alternative, an earlier trial date, Appellant’s sole request at the hearing was for a dismissal of the charges. See Laird v. State, 691 S.W.3d 30, 42 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, pet. ref’d) (“[A]lthough [appellant] was persistent in filing pro se motions for speedy trial, it is significant that most of his filings requested in the alternative that his case be dismissed.”). Accordingly, we conclude that this factor weighs slightly against Appellant. D. Prejudice to the Defendant Prejudice to the defendant should be assessed in the light of the interests the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772. The last interest is the most serious because a defendant’s inability to “adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the 5 Appellant’s motion states: “Ms. Corrales objects to the continuance of her trial and re-asserts her right to a speedy trial.” -9- 04-25-00203-CR entire system.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. A defendant bears the initial “burden to make some showing of prejudice, but a showing of actual prejudice is not required.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772. Appellant was released on bail shortly after her arrest, therefore the first interest the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect is not implicated. See Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d at 565 (concluding defendant’s interest in preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration was not implicated where she was released on bail). With regard to the second interest, Appellant contends that the delay caused her severe anxiety because her criminal case could affect her immigration case. However, Appellant relied exclusively on the statements and arguments made by her trial counsel at the hearing and outlined in her motion for speedy trial. “[S]tatements of an attorney on the record may only be considered as evidence if the attorney ‘is speaking from first-hand knowledge.’” Gonzalez v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Tex. Crim. App 2014) (quoting State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). Here, there is no evidence that Appellant’s trial counsel had any “first-hand” knowledge. Accordingly, we hold that there was no evidence to support her assertions that the delay caused her to suffer anxiety and stress. See Roque v. State, 693 S.W.3d 771, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (concluding appellant did not establish evidence that delay caused him to suffer “substantial anxiety and concern” beyond the blanket assertion in his pro se motion for speedy trial); see also Taylor v. State, 729 S.W.3d 863, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2026, no pet.) (concluding that appellant did not show prejudice where, without presenting evidence or detailing specifics, she generally asserted that the complained of delay made her anxious and concerned); cf. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 654 (concluding appellant’s testimony that he suffered from anxiety was “at least some evidence” of prejudice). - 10 - 04-25-00203-CR Finally, Appellant argues that the delay impaired her ability to present a defense because she was unable to find a material witness, TMD Sergeant Alberto Villapando Lozano. “To claim prejudice because of a missing witness, a defendant must show that: (1) the witness was unavailable at the time of trial; (2) the witness’s testimony would have been relevant and material, and (3) he exercised due diligence in an attempt to locate the witness.” State v. Guerrero, 110 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citing Clarke v. State, 928 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d)). While the record suggests that Sergeant Villapando was missing and that Appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to locate him, Appellant failed to present any evidence that Sergeant Villapando’s testimony would have been relevant and material. Appellant’s counsel argued that Sergeant Villapando’s testimony could have established a legal defense because, as she alleged, he gave Appellant permission to enter Shelby Park. However, there is no evidence that Appellant’s trial counsel spoke from “first-hand” knowledge. See Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 811 (holding statements of an attorney may only be considered evidence if the attorney “is speaking from first-hand knowledge”). Aside from trial counsel’s arguments, Appellant presented no testimony, sworn affidavits, or any other source of evidence to explain how Sergeant Villapando’s testimony was relevant and material to her defense. Cf. Puckett v. State, 279 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (concluding defendant made showing of prejudice where he testified about the loss of witnesses who could have provided testimony at odds with the State’s theory of the case); State v. Brandley, No. 03-19-00602-CR, 2021 WL 3437887, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding defendant presented some evidence of prejudice where defendant testified about what information the missing witnesses would have been able to provide). - 11 - 04-25-00203-CR Consequently, because Appellant did not provide evidence to make a showing of prejudice, this factor weighs heavily against Appellant. E. Balancing the Barker Factors While the first two factors—presumption of an unreasonable delay and the State’s failure to explain the delay—support Appellant’s position slightly. The last two factors do not. Appellant’s tardy assertion of the right weighs slightly against her, and the fact that she presented no evidence that she suffered prejudice from the delay weighs heavily against her. We conclude that the weight of the four factors, balanced together, is against a conclusion that Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. See Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 316 (concluding defendant’s right to speedy trial was not violated when he demonstrated no serious prejudice by three-and-one-half- year delay between arrest and trial); Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d at 566 (concluding defendant’s right to speedy trial was not violated where first two factors weigh only slightly in defendant’s favor and last two factors weigh against her). CONCLUSION Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s speedy-trial ruling, deferring to the trial court’s resolution of the facts, and conducting a de novo balancing analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the information with prejudice based upon Appellant’s speedy-trial claim. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s single issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment. Lori Massey Brissette, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH - 12 -