Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 2, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00768-CV ——————————— CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant V. ROSE SAVAGE, Appellee On Appeal from the 189th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-09965 MEMORANDUM OPINION In this interlocutory appeal,1 appellant, City of Houston (“the City”), appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment based on 1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8); see also Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338–40 (Tex. 2006) (stating summary judgment motion challenging trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is subsumed under Texas Civil governmental immunity on the premises liability claim brought by appellee, Rose Savage (“Savage”), under the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”).2 In two issues, the City contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion because (1) the City, as the lessor of the premises, owed no legal duty to Savage, and (2) Savage, as a licensee of the property, was required, but failed, to allege that the City had actual knowledge of the purported defective condition or that it was grossly negligent. We affirm. Background Savage filed suit against the City, United Airlines, Inc. (“United”), and Kone, Inc. d/b/a Kone Elevators and Escalators (“Kone”), alleging that she sustained injuries in a terminal at George Bush Intercontinental Airport (“IAH”) when the escalator she was on abruptly stopped and restarted, throwing her backward and causing her to strike her head.3 Savage asserted a premises liability claim against the City, alleging that (1) it owned or was otherwise in control of the premises; (2) the escalator was a condition that posed an unreasonable risk or harm; (3) the Practice and Remedies Code section 54.014(a)(8)); City of Houston v. Garza, No. 01-18-01069-CV, 2019 WL 2932851, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When a governmental unit asserts immunity in a motion for summary judgment, a court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order denying summary judgment.”). 2 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001–101.109. 3 United and Kone are not parties to this appeal. 2 City knew or should have known of the condition; (4) the City had a duty to exercise ordinary care to ensure the premises did not present a danger to her; (5) the City breached its duty; and (6) its breach proximately caused her injury. The City answered, generally denying the allegations in Savage’s petition and asserting governmental immunity among other defenses. The City filed its “Second Traditional Motion for Final Summary Judgment on Governmental Immunity.”4 The City argued that (1) it was not liable for the condition of the premises in question because Savage’s alleged injury occurred in Terminal B, which is primarily leased and maintained by United, and on an escalator in Terminal B that was maintained by United through its maintenance subcontractor, Kone; (2) subject to exceptions not applicable, the City, as lessor, owed no duty to invitees or licensees, such as Savage, for dangerous conditions on the leased premises; and (3) it did not employ Kone in any capacity and was therefore not responsible for its actions or inaction. The City attached several exhibits in support of its motion. In her summary judgment response, Savage argued that the City’s assertion that it owed her no duty failed because there was no evidence that a lease agreement or other document governing the area in question at the time of the incident existed 4 The trial court denied the City’s previous combined motion for no-evidence and traditional summary judgment based on governmental immunity. 3 or negated the possibility that the City retained control or shared responsibility over the premises. In the alternative, Savage requested a continuance to allow her to depose a corporate representative of United and/or the City regarding the issue of control because United’s discovery responses directly contradicted the position taken by the City in its summary judgment motion.5 The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment without specifying its reasons. Failure to Challenge All Grounds In its brief on appeal, the City argues that the trial court erred in denying its summary judgment motion because it lacked jurisdiction over Savage’s premises liability claim for two reasons. First, the City asserts that it leased the premises in question to United and therefore owed no duty of care to Savage. Alternatively, it argues that Savage, as a licensee of the property, was required, but failed, to allege that the City had actual knowledge of the purported defective condition or that it was grossly negligent. 5 Savage asserted in her response that because United’s responses to her first set of interrogatories directly contradicted the City’s assertion that it had relinquished control of the escalator in question to United, she served a second set of discovery requests on United seeking to resolve the issue of control over the escalator. Savage attached United’s responses to the second set of discovery in which it again responded that the City retained control over the escalator at the time of the incident. Thus, Savage’s request for a continuance was supported by verified evidence. 4 An appellant must attack “all independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment.” Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). If an independent ground fully supports the complained-of order or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that independent ground, an appellate court must accept the validity of the unchallenged independent ground and thus any error in the grounds challenged on appeal is harmless because the unchallenged independent ground fully supports the complained-of order or judgment. Andrews v. Hayman, No. 01-23-00038-CV, 2024 WL 234413, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(d)(3), a trial court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment to allow the nonmovant additional discovery. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(d)(3); City of Houston v. Crumpton, No. 14-25-00782-CV, 2026 WL 1506265, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] May 28, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the trial court did not state the basis for its denial of the City’s motion, and thus, the City needed to challenge each possible ground for the adverse ruling. See Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681. In its brief on appeal, the City does not address Savage’s request for a continuance to obtain discovery. Because the City does not address or argue error with respect to one of the asserted grounds that could have supported the trial court’s order, and because we must affirm the denial of a summary 5 judgment motion if it can be sustained on any ground relied upon by the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the City summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Rousseau, No. 14-25-00335-CV, 2026 WL 1691230, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 11, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court’s order denying City’s motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity in slip-and-fall case because City’s appellate brief did not address other arguments presented in appellee’s summary judgment response, including request for continuance to obtain discovery, and therefore failed to challenge each possible ground for adverse ruling); Crumpton, 2026 WL 1506265, at *2 (affirming trial court’s order denying City’s motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity in premises liability suit because City did not address appellee’s argument in summary judgment response regarding need for discovery and therefore failed to challenge on appeal all possible bases for trial court’s ruling); City of Houston v. Henderson, 731 S.W.3d 667, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2026, no pet.) (affirming trial court’s judgment denying City’s motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity because City failed to address in its opening brief nonmovant’s argument that discovery was substantially incomplete). We overrule the City’s first and second issues. We dismiss all pending motions as moot. 6 Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s order. Kristin M. Guiney Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guiney and Johnson. 7