Jason Alexander Cisneros v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued September 30, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00719-CR ——————————— JASON ALEXANDER CISNEROS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 230th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1693203 MEMORANDUM OPINION This case arises from a drive-by shooting that took the life of Sierra Rhodd. An unknown number of assailants fired more than fifty rounds into a residence. Sierra, afflicted with cerebral palsy, was struck multiple times while lying in her bed.  The State’s theory was that the shooting was retaliation for an armed robbery earlier that day involving Sierra’s brother and Xavier Fletcher, one of Appellant’s associates. The State presented evidence supporting that theory including communications among Appellant and his associates before and after the shooting, messages reflecting plans for retaliation, evidence of travel before and after the offense, and firearms and ballistics evidence linking Appellant, his associates, and Appellant’s vehicle to ammunition recovered from the scene. Appellant was subsequently indicted for murder. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). The case proceeded to trial. The jury charge authorized conviction under primary actor, party, and co-conspirator theories and included both murder and the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The jury found Appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.04(a). This appeal followed. Appellant raises five issues. None supports reversal. First, he says the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was responsible for the shooting that caused Sierra’s death. Second, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that deadly conduct was a lesser-included offense of murder. Under Texas law, however, Appellant did not preserve this issue. 2  Third, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest on a parole violation warrant because the parole warrant was not supported by “reliable evidence.”1 But on this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. Fourth, he argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection to admission of evidence obtained from his cell phone because, he argues, police conducted an illegal search to obtain the phone’s IMEI number, which they then used in their warrant affidavit. This argument provides no ground for reversal because, even assuming error as to the IMEI number, the warrant was supported by probable cause without it. Finally, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial following a statement by an officer. On this record, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Issue One: Sufficient evidence supports Appellant’s conviction. In his first issue, Appellant argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. On this record, we disagree. 1 Appellant was on parole at the time of the shooting. Police arrested him on a parole violation warrant and recovered evidence that Appellant later sought to suppress. 3  A. Standard of Review The standard of review is well settled. In this sufficiency of the evidence challenge, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the jury to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences. Id. The jury, as the sole judge of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, may choose to believe or disbelieve any witness or any portion of their testimony—and we may not substitute our views for theirs. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 36.13, 38.04; Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination.” Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review “events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting source omitted). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt—and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient. Id.; Carrizales v. State, 4 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). If the “cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction,” each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. “The key question is whether ‘the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.’” Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting source omitted). B. Applicable Law A person commits the offense of manslaughter if he “recklessly causes the death of an individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.04(a). “Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from highest to lowest”: (1) intentional; (2) knowing; (3) reckless; and (4) criminal negligence. Id. § 6.02(d). Murder requires intentional or knowing conduct (or conduct intending to cause serious bodily injury and committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes death), see id. § 19.02(b)(1)–(2); manslaughter requires recklessness, see id. § 19.04(a). Under Texas law, “[p]roof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof of the culpability charged.” Id. § 6.02(e); Wasylina v. State, 275 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Evidence that is sufficient to support a conviction for the greater offense of murder is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Curtis v. State, 573 S.W.2d 219, 221 5 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (affirming manslaughter conviction; “[t]here was sufficient evidence to show that the greater offense of murder was committed”). Additionally, the law of parties allows the State to enlarge the defendant’s criminal responsibility “to include acts in which he may not have been the principal actor.” Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). Under Penal Code Sections 7.01 and 7.02, “an individual can be convicted as a party to an offense if that offense was committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or both.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01). A person can be criminally responsible for another’s conduct in several ways, including if the person (1) acts “with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense” and (2) “solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2)).2 Similarly, under co-conspirator liability, “if in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the 2 We may look to events occurring before, during, and after commission of the offense to determine if a person is a party to an offense. Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 6 unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of carrying out the conspiracy.” Id. at 13–14 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(b)). “When the trial court’s charge authorizes the jury to convict on more than one theory, as it did in this case, the verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any of the theories.” Id. at 14. C. Analysis The evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s manslaughter conviction. Appellant’s indictment alleged that, on or about September 13, 2020, he unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly caused the death of Sierra Rhodd by shooting her with a firearm. It also alleged that he unlawfully intended to cause serious bodily injury to Sierra Rhodd and did cause her death by intentionally and knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life—shooting her with a firearm. The jury instructions authorized a murder conviction on three alternative theories: (1) Appellant as a primary actor; (2) Appellant as a party, acting with Andre Colson and/or Xavier Fletcher and/or Austin McCalla and/or Emma Presler; or (3) Appellant as a co-conspirator, in agreement with Andre Colson and/or Xavier Fletcher and/or Austin McCalla and/or Emma Presler. 7  The charge also instructed the jury on the law of transferred intent.3 The record contains ample evidence from which a rational jury could have found that Appellant recklessly caused Sierra’s death as a primary actor, party, or co-conspirator. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14 (when charge authorizes jury to convict on more than one theory, guilt will be upheld if evidence is sufficient on any theory). Appellant’s post-robbery communications support a finding that he had a retaliatory motive. • Evidence showed that, on the morning of September 13, 2020, Sierra’s brother, Tanner Rhodd, participated in an armed robbery of Xavier Fletcher, an associate of Appellant. • Testimony revealed that Fletcher did not call the police but said “someone needs to die about this.” • Evidence showed that within minutes after the robbery, Appellant communicated with Fletcher, and then Appellant exchanged messages with Andre Colson about the robbery. • In his messages to Colson, Appellant stated that Fletcher had been robbed and that the robbers had taken a 9-millimeter firearm. Colson replied, “What’s the word?” Appellant texted, “I’m bout to go right there.” Colson then sent, “Swear too good [sic] bro who the lil white bitch or who smh.” Colson added, “Have em call me ASAP bruh.” Colson then said, “Come get me fuck that ima spray they shit up rns fuck that dumb shit.” Appellant responded, “I was thinking the same thing,” followed by “He said it was a bunch of dudes with A.R. 15’s.” Appellant then told Colson that Fletcher can’t call him. 3 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.04(b). The instructions authorized conviction for intending to cause the death of Sierra’s brother, Tanner Rhodd. 8  A rational jury could view these communications as evidence that Appellant shared Fletcher’s retaliatory motive and aligned himself with Colson’s proposal to carry out a violent reprisal. See id. at 13 (jury is permitted to draw reasonable inferences based on evidence). The jury could have found that Appellant’s communications on the day of the shooting reflected coordinated planning. Communications involving Appellant, Fletcher, Colson, Emma Presler, and Austin McCalla leading up to the shooting evidenced coordinated planning: • Presler’s communications with Appellant reflected discussions about travel, timing, and meeting at or near Appellant’s residence shortly before the shooting. • Evidence showed Appellant’s residence was near the Rhodd home. • At 4:30 PM, Appellant texted Presler, asking “R u otw?” followed by, “I’m 30 mins from his[] Spot”. Appellant then texted, “Homie is ready for us, what’s up?” At 6:20 PM, Appellant again texted Presler, “So you’re not coming?” • At 8:39 PM, Appellant texted his home address to Presler. Call‑detail mapping placed Fletcher’s phone near Appellant’s residence at approximately the same time. Presler asked, “We meeting at ur house?” and then texted, “We r leaving now.” Appellant confirmed “Yes.” At 9:23 PM, Appellant texted Presler, “Whats y’all ETA.” Presler replied, “15 jus pulling off on bike” at 10:14 PM. • Around the same time, Colson texted Appellant, “Play get‘em gone is active.” • Evidence showed that Sierra was shot and killed at approximately 11:00 PM. 9  • Cell phone records showed multiple calls between Appellant and Pressler between approximately 10:44 and 11:00 PM. • Call‑detail mapping placed Presler’s and McCalla’s phones near the scene at about 11:00 PM, with Presler’s device remaining in the area. She was stopped nearby by police around 11:06 PM. • Communications continued immediately after the shooting. As Presler was being stopped by police at 11:07 PM, she texted Appellant, “I got pulled over. Fuck,” to which Appellant replied, “Do u have anything” and later, “Your gonna be ok don’t have anything on u.” A rational jury could infer coordinated planning of the participants’ meeting, travel, and movements immediately before the shooting and that Appellant remained in communication with them afterward. See id. (jury may draw reasonable inferences based on evidence). Evidence linked Appellant and his associates to vehicles at the scene. Evidence also linked Appellant and his associates to vehicles involved in the shooting. • Surveillance video from the night of September 13th showed three vehicles traveling in tandem toward the scene: a dark-colored car resembling Appellant’s black Toyota, a motorcycle (lights off), and a red Ford F‑150. • Right before the shooting, at around 10:56 PM, surveillance video showed the dark-colored car followed by the motorcycle and the red truck heading toward the Rhodd residence. Minutes later, the video showed the dark-colored car and the red truck leaving without the motorcycle. • At approximately 11:06 PM, police stopped the red Ford F‑150 less than a mile from the scene. Presler was the driver; the truck was registered to Austin McCalla. 10  • Police officers found a motorcycle crashed in front of the Rhodd home. • Surveillance video also showed a white male walking away from the scene immediately after the shooting. Witness testimony identified him as McCalla. Viewed cumulatively, this evidence permitted a rational jury to infer that the three vehicles traveled together to the Rhodd residence, that McCalla was the motorcycle rider, and that Appellant’s vehicle was part of the coordinated movements to and from the scene of the shooting. See id. Eyewitness testimony linked Appellant and his vehicle to the shooting. The jury also heard from witnesses who connected Appellant and his vehicle to the scene. • Neighbor Emely Jimenez testified she heard rapid gunfire-like sounds, saw two to three people running in the street, and observed a black car and red truck stopping and going in the same direction as the runners. • Neighbor Israel Rivera testified that, after the shooting, he encountered a “dark-colored vehicle,” “hatchback” car stopped by his front-yard ditch with a short female at the passenger side. • He testified that when the door opened, a male driver with a short buzz cut was illuminated. • Rivera testified that he identified for police from photo arrays a black Toyota as similar to the vehicle he saw, and he picked Appellant as the driver with 90% certainty. This testimony corroborated the surveillance evidence identifying a dark vehicle near the scene and connected Appellant, his vehicle, and the coordinated 11 movements observed immediately after the shooting. See Shah v. State, 414 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (“It is well-established that the testimony of a sole witness to an offense may constitute legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction.”). Firearm evidence corroborated other evidence of Appellant’s participation. The following firearm evidence likewise connected Appellant to the shooting. • The jury heard that, two days before the shooting, Appellant, Colson, and Fletcher went to a gun store, and Colson purchased two Springfield 9-millimeter pistols. • One of those 9-millimeter pistols was the firearm later stolen by Tanner Rhodd from Fletcher; another was found on Colson when he was arrested with Appellant. • The State’s firearms expert linked 9-millimeter cartridge casings recovered from the scene to those weapons. • When Appellant was arrested while driving his black Toyota, officers recovered a 5.7x28 cartridge casing from the windshield area of Appellant’s vehicle. The State’s firearms expert testified that this casing matched the 5.7 casings recovered from the shooting scene. This evidence permitted a rational jury to infer that Appellant’s vehicle was present at the scene or was used to transport at least one firearm used in the shooting. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. * * * Legal sufficiency review requires us to consider whether “the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” 12 Id. Here, the evidence showed a retaliatory motive; Appellant’s embrace of retaliatory violence; coordinated communications arranging meetings, travel, and timing before the offense; surveillance and cell-site evidence placing the participants together before and during the shooting; eyewitness testimony identifying Appellant and his vehicle near the scene; and firearm evidence linking Appellant, his associates, and his vehicle to weapons used in the attack. Viewed together and in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant recklessly caused Sierra’s death, either through his own conduct or as a party to the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01, 7.02(a)–(b), 19.04(a); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13–14 (evidence was sufficient to convict getaway driver of aggravated assault of public servant as a party, despite claim he had no knowledge his co-actors had guns or would shoot at the game warden, and appellant had no guns, never tried to run, followed the warden’s instructions, and was cooperative with law enforcement).4 In response, Appellant argues there is no actual evidence that he was at the Rhodd home, possessed or fired a firearm on September 13, 2020, aided or 4 Although the jury convicted Appellant of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter rather than murder, the evidence is legally sufficient to support that verdict. Evidence that would support a finding that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused Sierra’s death as a party to the offense supports a finding that he acted recklessly; proof of a higher culpable mental state constitutes proof of lower culpable mental states. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.02(e); Curtis, 573 S.W.2d at 221. 13 encouraged anyone to commit murder or manslaughter, or agreed with anyone to commit deadly conduct. He also says there was no evidence that his vehicle was at the scene or that he was driving that night. But as our sister court aptly explained, such arguments “all lead to inferences that were rejected by the jury, and under our standard of review, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s decision.” Melgar v. State, 593 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (not addressing defendant’s arguments because they all involved inferences rejected by the jury), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, No. PD-0243-20, 2022 WL 2240263 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2022). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination.” Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26. Appellant also emphasizes conflicts in the vehicle-identification evidence, including testimony concerning a gray vehicle seen nearby after the shooting. But “[t]his point merely highlights a conflict in the evidence, and we presume that the jury resolved that conflict.” Melgar, 593 S.W.3d at 924; accord Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26. When, as here, “the inferences made by the factfinder are reasonable in light of the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, the conviction will be upheld.” Nowlin v. State, 473 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citation modified). Considering the evidence in 14 the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.03(c), 19.04(a); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. II. Issue Two: Appellant did not preserve his argument concerning a lesser-included offense instruction. In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct the jury, as a lesser-included offense to the murder charge for which he was indicted, on the offense of deadly conduct under Texas Penal Code Section 22.05(b)(2). Appellant did not preserve this issue. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense only if a two-part test is satisfied. Simms v. State, 629 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). First, the lesser offense must be included within “the proof necessary to establish the charged offense.” Id. Second, there must be “some evidence in the record that would permit the jury to rationally find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense.” Id. A requested lesser-included-offense instruction is treated like a defensive instruction for preservation purposes. See Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452, 461– 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). To preserve a complaint about the refusal of such an instruction, “the defendant must point to evidence in the record that raises the lesser-included offense.” Id. at 461. The defendant must “set[] out, on the record, the 15 specific evidence that supports a rational basis for rejecting the greater offense but supporting the lesser offense.” Id. at 462; accord Green v. State, 713 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). “[G]eneral or insufficiently specific objections do not preserve error for appeal.” Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 462. Absent specificity, error is preserved only when the evidence is “manifest” from the record. See id. at 462–63. Appellant did not preserve this complaint. At the charge conference, Appellant requested a lesser-included offense instruction on deadly conduct under Texas Penal Code Section 22.05. The State objected that deadly conduct was not a lesser-included offense of murder as charged; it further argued that Appellant had identified no evidence showing that, if guilty, he was guilty only of deadly conduct. Appellant did not respond by identifying any evidence (or any factual theory) that would have allowed the jury rationally to reject murder as charged while finding him guilty of only deadly conduct. See id. at 461–62. That omission is significant. Under Williams, a defendant preserves a complaint about the denial of a lesser-included instruction only by making the trial court aware by “set[ing] out, on the record, the specific evidence that supports a rational basis for rejecting the greater offense but supporting the lesser offense.” Id. at 462. A general assertion that the evidence supports the lesser offense is insufficient when the defendant does not point to the facts that negate the greater offense and support only the lesser. See id. at 462–64 (defendant failed to preserve 16 complaint as to jury instruction on lesser-included offense where defendant failed to alert trial court to specific evidence supporting the lesser offense).5 Appellant did not preserve this issue. See Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 461–62; Green, 713 S.W.3d at 875. III. Issue Three: Appellant’s parole violation warrant argument does not support reversal. Appellant was on parole during the investigation into Sierra Rhodd’s killing.6 After the shooting, Appellant was arrested pursuant to a parole violation warrant.7 In his third issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 5 Additionally, this is not a case where evidence raising the lesser-included offense is manifest from the record. See Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 462; Green, 713 S.W.3d at 875. Appellant did not identify evidence showing that, if he was guilty, he was guilty only of deadly conduct. Instead, his defensive theory was that he did not participate in, aid, encourage, or conspire in the shooting at all. That theory would support acquittal, not a rational finding that Appellant committed only deadly conduct. See Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 463 (“None of this specific evidence was manifest because the defensive theory was that he did not commit any crime.”); see also Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“If, however, the defendant simply denies commission of the offense . . . then the charge on the lesser offense would not be required.” (citations omitted)). 6 Appellant was on parole for 2015 convictions for burglary of a habitation and for failure to stop and render aid after an accident causing injury or death. 7 A “parole violation warrant” is issued by the director of the pardons and parole division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the director’s designee, or the board of the pardons and parole division on order of the Governor. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.251; see also Ex parte White, 400 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (referring to this type of warrant as a “parole revocation warrant” or “blue warrant”); Diaz v. State, 110 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. ref’d) (referring to the warrant as a “parole violation warrant”). We use the same term as the parties do. 17 suppress evidence obtained as a result of that arrest. Appellant contends that the parole violation warrant was invalid because parole authorities lacked “reliable evidence,” as required by Texas Government Code Section 508.252(4), that he posed a danger warranting his immediate return to custody. We disagree. A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion and apply a bifurcated standard of review.” Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “At the hearing on the motion, the trial court is the sole factfinder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.” Armstrong v. State, 713 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). Therefore, we “afford[] almost complete deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, especially when those determinations are based on assessments of credibility and demeanor.” Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 877. However, “[w]e review de novo legal questions and mixed questions” of law and fact “that do not turn on credibility and demeanor.” State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). When, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and will assume it made findings that are consistent with its ruling and that are supported by the 18 record.” Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 877. “If the ruling of the trial court is correct under any applicable theory of law, we will sustain its ruling.” Id. B. Analysis Viewing the suppression evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determination, we conclude that Appellant failed to show the parole violation warrant was invalid. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the related motion to suppress. “[P]arolees do not enjoy the same level of Fourth Amendment protection accorded defendants only suspected of a crime.” Garrett v. State, 791 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see also Ex parte Zubiate, 710 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (“Due process affords the States ‘wide latitude’ in designing parole-revocation proceedings,” and parolees do not enjoy the “full panoply of rights” of regular defendants). Texas Government Code Section 508.252 authorizes issuance of a parole warrant on several grounds. As relevant, a warrant may be issued for a parolee if: [T]here is reliable evidence that the person has exhibited behavior during the person’s release that indicates to a reasonable person that the person poses a danger to society that warrants the person’s immediate return to custody. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.252(4) (emphasis added). The statute does not prescribe the form that the reliable evidence must take, nor does it require a probable-cause 19 affidavit or the same showing necessary to obtain an arrest warrant for a new criminal offense. See id.; Garrett, 791 S.W.2d at 139–41. In Garrett, for instance, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected an argument that the State was required to produce an affidavit supporting a parole violation warrant or satisfy the same procedural requirements as an ordinary warrant. Id. The Court observed that the parole warrant statute8 “makes no mention of affidavits”; the Court then held that the parole officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing provided an adequate basis to review the warrant’s validity. Id. at 140–41. Under Texas law, the relevant question is whether the record supports the trial court’s finding that parole authorities had reliable evidence indicating that Appellant’s conduct while on parole showed he posed a danger to society warranting immediate return to custody. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.252(4). Here, the record supports that finding. At the suppression hearing, Appellant’s parole officer, R. Jones, testified. She stated that, on September 29, 2020, Investigator Thompson emailed Jones a letter advising her that Appellant had become a suspect in the Sierra Rhodd shooting and other shootings. The letter was admitted into evidence. Jones further testified that, in addition to the letter, she 8 Garrett analyzed Section 508.252’s predecessor (Article 42.18), which provided in relevant part: “A warrant for the return of a paroled prisoner may be issued by the board in cases of parole or mandatory supervision, where there is reason to believe that he has committed an offense or violated a condition of his parole.” Garrett, 791 S.W.2d at 138 (citation modified). 20 communicated with Investigators Thompson and Garcia by telephone and email on multiple occasions and received additional information regarding the investigation into Sierra’s killing. Based on that information, Jones prepared a parole violation report and submitted it through the normal chain of command to the parole warrant specialist, who determines whether to issue a parole warrant. Jones further testified that the information forwarded as the basis for the warrant concerned only Appellant’s suspected involvement in the shooting of Sierra Rhodd, not a no-billed allegation or any other allegations. As Jones explained, after reviewing the submitted information, the warrant specialist issued the warrant. The record shows that, before issuing the warrant, the parole warrant specialist requested additional information from Investigator Thompson.9 After hearing evidence and argument, the trial court denied the motion to suppress based on this parole warrant. The court found Jones’s testimony “reliable, credible and truthful,” and concluded the warrant was lawful. 9 The record reflects that, before the warrant issued, law enforcement had information that Appellant had been linked to the crime scene by eyewitness identification, vehicle evidence, witness statements, a tip, surveillance, and information from someone who knew Appellant. 21  On this record, and in light of the trial court’s finding that Jones was “credible, reliable, and truthful,” the trial court could reasonably have determined that parole authorities received sufficient reliable information before the parole warrant issued. See Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 887; Garrett, 791 S.W.2d at 139–41. The nature of the reported conduct further supports this finding. Again, the question is whether parole authorities had reliable evidence indicating that Appellant’s conduct while on parole showed he posed a danger to society warranting immediate return to custody. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.252(4). Here, investigators were not alleging a minor or technical parole violation. They were investigating Appellant’s suspected involvement in a retaliatory drive-by shooting into an occupied residence—a shooting that resulted in Sierra’s death. The warrant specialist decided to issue the warrant after information concerning the investigation was given to the specialist through the parole process (and after related follow up). Appellant argues that the warrant rested only on improper references to a prior no-billed allegation and uncorroborated suspicion. But the record supports the trial court’s rejection of that characterization. Jones testified that the warrant was based only on Appellant’s suspected involvement in Sierra Rhodd’s death, not on a prior no-billed allegation or any unrelated investigation. And credibility determinations are for the trial court. Armstrong, 713 S.W.3d at 902. 22  Viewing the suppression evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determination, the record supports the trial court’s implied finding that parole authorities had reliable evidence that Appellant had exhibited behavior during release indicating that he posed a danger to society warranting immediate return to custody. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.252(4); Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 887; Garrett, 791 S.W.2d at 139–41. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. We overrule Appellant’s third issue. IV. Issue Four: The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s evidentiary objection concerning his cell phone. In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the admission of evidence obtained from his cell phone. Appellant contends that Investigator Garcia conducted an unlawful Fourth Amendment search when he opened the SIM-card tray of Appellant’s cell phone, removed the SIM card, and read the phone’s IMEI number—which the Investigator then included in his affidavit seeking a warrant to search the phone’s digital contents (as information identifying the phone).10 Appellant’s position is that the police impermissibly 10 Appellant’s argument focuses solely on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because he does not separately brief an argument under the Texas Constitution, we focus our analysis on the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Young v. State, 563 S.W.3d 325, 329 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). 23 obtained the phone’s IMEI number, which then supported the warrant affidavit. He argues the evidence obtained from the phone—which the police obtained after the warrant issued—was inadmissible and should have been excluded. We disagree. Assuming without deciding Appellant’s position that opening the SIM-card tray and viewing the IMEI number constituted an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence anyway because the warrant affidavit established probable cause even after the IMEI number (which Appellant argues was improperly obtained) is excised. A. Standard of Review “We review a trial judge’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.” Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “A trial judge abuses his discretion when his decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. When the evidence is the subject of suppression, we review the trial court’s ruling under a bifurcated standard of review on appeal. Oseguera-Viera v. State, 592 S.W.3d 960, 963 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). As explained, the reviewing court gives almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, but it reviews the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. The appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. When the trial c