Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00557-CR Randy Wayne Janssen, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF COMAL COUNTY NO. 2024CR0084, THE HONORABLE RANDAL C. GRAY, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Randy Wayne Janssen was arrested and charged with the offense of driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.09 (driving while intoxicated, second offense). Before trial, Janssen filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the encounter with law enforcement that led to his arrest. After a hearing, the trial court overruled the motion, and following a three-day jury trial, Janssen was convicted. On appeal, Janssen contends that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to suppress evidence. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Janssen’s motion to suppress based on the community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, we will affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND At the suppression hearing, Deputy Seth Morris of the Comal County Sheriff’s Office testified. Deputy Morris testified that, on February 12, 2023, at about 11:30 p.m., “I was on FM 1102 and near the intersection of IH 35 access road, and I observed a pickup truck on the side of the road off on the []improved shoulder.” Deputy Morris noted that this was a “dark” and “potentially” dangerous area because it was on the improved shoulder of a blind curve. He pulled up behind the truck because it was Super Bowl Sunday, and “I wanted to ensure the driver within the vehicle was okay due to it being such a[n] alcohol-related event.” “I wanted to ensure that they weren’t either on the side of the road in need of assistance or intoxicated, passed out behind the wheel.” Deputy Morris turned on his spotlight, then put on his red-and-blue flashing lights, which he said he did to identify himself as law enforcement. When Deputy Morris pulled up behind Janssen’s truck, “the brake lights were illuminated,” and “right before [Janssen] exited the vehicle, it appears [] it had been shifted into park.” Janssen got out of his truck immediately and began walking toward Deputy Morris. Deputy Morris got out of his police car and said in a friendly tone, “Howdy, sir. Deputy Morris with the Sheriff’s office. You alright?” Deputy Morris testified that he “informed him that I was just checking out to make sure that he was okay.” Janssen said that he did not need any assistance and that he pulled over to use his phone. When Deputy Morris spoke with Janssen, “I noticed that he had bloodshot, glossy eyes and that he smelled or emitted the odor of metabolized alcohol or an intoxicating beverage.” He also noticed that Janssen was “distancing himself from the vehicle” and had an injured eye. When Deputy Morris asked where Janssen was coming from, Janssen said that “he had just left a Super Bowl party on the south side of New Braunfels.” By that point, 2 Deputy Morris testified that “I had suspicions to believe that he had been driving after consuming alcohol” and proceeded to the DWI investigation. Janssen also testified at the suppression hearing. He stated that he had pulled over to read and respond to a text message but did not need any assistance or indicate that he was in need of assistance. Once he saw Deputy Morris pull up behind him, he testified that “because it was dark outside and on an unbusy road, I felt comfortable stepping out and . . . to make sure that the officer was comfortable and knowing that I was not going to be a threat to him.” But Janssen said that he did not feel free to leave once he saw the red-and-blue lights. At the suppression hearing, the trial court admitted portions of Deputy Morris’s in-car and body-cam videos, which are consistent with the witnesses’ testimony, as well as pictures of the road and area where the incident took place. The trial court overruled Janssen’s motion to suppress, and a jury later found Janssen guilty of driving while intoxicated. Janssen stipulated to a prior conviction of driving while intoxicated and received a sentence of 365-days’ confinement in Comal County Jail, which was suspended for an 18-month period of community supervision, and a fine. Janssen appeals. DISCUSSION On appeal, Janssen argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to suppress. He contends that the community-caretaking exception does not apply in this case.1 1 In his appellant’s brief, Janssen does not directly address the other issues that the State argued before the trial court: that the contact was a consensual encounter before turning into a detention for a DWI investigation and that Deputy Morris had reasonable suspicion to detain Janssen that developed into probable cause for his arrest. In his reply brief, Janssen contends that he effectively rebutted those arguments in the substance of his appeal. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling the motion to suppress based on the community-caretaking exception, we do not reach these arguments. 3 Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under that standard, the record is “viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, and the judgment will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or ‘outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.’” State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In general, appellate courts apply “a bifurcated standard, giving almost total deference to the historical facts found by the trial court and analyzing de novo the trial court’s application of the law.” See State v. Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also Arguellez, 409 S.W.3d at 662 (explaining that appellate courts afford “almost complete deference . . . to [a trial court’s] determination of historical facts, especially if those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor”). “The same deference is afforded the trial court with respect to its rulings on application of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, “we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In addition, a trial court’s ruling on the motion will be upheld if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case regardless of whether the trial court based its ruling on that theory, but “a trial court’s ruling will not be reversed based on a legal theory that the complaining party did not present to it.” Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732. Assuming that Deputy Morris’s encounter with Janssen amounted to a detention and was not a consensual encounter, Janssen’s detention can be justified only if, at the moment of 4 the detention, Deputy Morris had reasonable suspicion to believe that Janssen was, had been, or soon would be engaged in criminal activity, or, if not, that some other exception to the warrant requirement applied. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. One of those exceptions is the police officer’s reasonable detention through the exercise of the community-caretaking function of the job. See Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc)). The community-caretaking function of a police officer’s job is “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). As part of an officer’s duty to “serve and protect,” an officer “may stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe is in need of help.” Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 276 (quoting Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151). Whether an officer properly invoked his community-caretaking function requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose; and (2) whether the officer’s belief that the individual needs help was reasonable. Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). To determine the reasonableness of the police officer’s belief that an individual needs assistance, courts may consider the following non-exclusive list known as the Wright factors: “(1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual—if not assisted—presented a danger to himself or others.” Id. at 855 (citing Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151–52). “As in all Fourth Amendment cases, the facts unique to each case control its result and, in cases involving the community-caretaking exception, may render certain Wright factors inapplicable or afford them 5 varying weight.” Id. These factors “were intended to assist courts in determining reasonableness in this context” and “are not elements of reasonableness.” Id. Here, the trial court heard Deputy Morris’s testimony that he approached Janssen’s truck because “I wanted to ensure the driver within the vehicle was okay” and was not “either on the side of the road in need of assistance or intoxicated, [or] passed out behind the wheel” particularly given the day (Super Bowl Sunday), time (11:30 p.m.), and location (dark area on a blind curve). And as soon as Janssen got out of his truck, Deputy Morris approached him by saying, “Howdy, sir,” introducing himself in a friendly tone, and asking, “You alright?” As the fact finder and exclusive judge of credibility, the trial court could have determined that Deputy Morris detained Janssen because he was primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose. See Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 135, 144 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d). As to whether Deputy Morris’s belief was reasonable, the second Wright factor— the location—weighs in favor of Deputy Morris’s reasonable belief that Janssen needed assistance. As Deputy Morris testified, he saw Janssen’s truck stopped on the side of the road at 11:30 p.m. on Super Bowl Sunday, “a[n] alcohol-related event.” Janssen was in a “dark” and “potentially” dangerous area on the improved shoulder of a blind curve near the intersection of an I-35 access road. Though Deputy Morris could not see Janssen when he pulled up behind Janssen’s truck on the side of the road—and therefore could not evaluate the nature and level of the distress exhibited by Janssen, as in the first Wright factor—this is not dispositive. “In evaluating reasonableness in this context, courts have never required an officer to know, with any degree of certainty, the specific distress an individual may be suffering.” Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 856. The proper analysis is instead “an objective one focusing on what the officer observed and whether the inference that the individual was in need of help was reasonable.” Id. Similarly, Deputy Morris 6 could not ascertain the full extent to which Janssen presented a danger to himself or others, but he could perceive that Janssen was at least a danger to himself or others because he was parked in a “dark” area on the improved shoulder of a blind curve. See id. (noting that officer “could have reasonably concluded that [appellant] was suffering from distress resulting from car trouble, a flat tire, or running out of gas” when he observed appellant pulled over on side of road around 1:00 a.m. in isolated area). Based on the totality of circumstances, the trial court’s determination that Deputy Morris had a reasonable belief that Janssen needed help was “reasonably supported by the record” and was not “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” See Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Accordingly, under the requisite standard of review, in which we are highly deferential to the trial court’s implied findings of historical facts and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement applied to the facts of this case. We overrule Janssen’s issue on appeal. CONCLUSION Having overruled Janssen’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction. 7 __________________________________________ Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Theofanis and Crump Affirmed Filed: October 8, 2026 Do Not Publish 8