Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN ON MOTION FOR REHEARING NO. 03-25-00317-CV Monte Albert, Appellant v. Madeena V. Albert, Appellee FROM THE 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-24-009046, THE HONORABLE LAURIE EISERLOH, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION We withdraw our opinion and judgment dated August 20, 2026, and substitute the following in its place. Monte Albert’s motion for rehearing is overruled. Pro se appellant Monte Albert appeals from the trial court’s final decree of divorce, terminating his marriage to appellee Madeena V. Albert. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. BACKGROUND On December 10, 2024, Madeena filed for divorce, and on March 17, 2025, Monte counterpetitioned for divorce. A final bench trial was held on April 10, 2025. Madeena testified that he and Monte initially connected online via Facebook. During their courtship, Madeena and Monte met twice in person. On December 10, 2023, Madeena and Monte married, and around that same time, Madeena immigrated from India to the United States and moved into Monte’s home in Pflugerville, Texas. Madeena testified that during the first month he and Monte lived together, Monte’s behavior “was kind of okay,” but that after that, “things started changing.” Monte became “controlling” and his tone was “aggressive” during disagreements. In June of 2024, the two ceased living together. Madeena decided to join the United States Army. Madeena testified that he worked as a mechanic for the Army and was stationed in the state of Washington. Madeena explained that Monte waffled on Madeena’s decision to join the Army. Initially, Monte was against the decision. But after learning more about the benefits he would be entitled to as the spouse of a servicemember, Monte “agreed” with Madeena’s decision to join the military. However, after a while, Monte expressed that he no longer supported Madeena’s decision to enlist. According to Madeena, Monte began communicating with both Madeena and other service members in an aggressive fashion. An email exchange between Monte and a captain of the Army reflects that Monte accused the Army of “BRAINWASHING” Madeena and “inject[ing] something in [Madeena’s] brain.” Monte asked the Army to make Madeena return his calls and to deliver Madeena to him “in the same mint condition” Monte left him in. Eventually, Madeena applied for and was granted a one-year domestic violence protective order by a Washington state court. For his part, Monte testified that he believed that the Army had implanted a chip in Madeena’s brain or that Madeena had been “possessed somehow” by the Army. Monte also 2 believed that Madeena “took advantage of [Monte]” to obtain a legal immigration status and that Madeena had “lied in his wedding vows.” Monte asked that Madeena be ordered to make payments for “mental cruelty,” for the “pre-Army emotional investment” Monte devoted, and for certain expenses incurred during the parties’ courtship and subsequent wedding. A premarital agreement drafted by Monte and signed by both parties was admitted into evidence. In it, the parties agreed generally that all property would be presumed to be separate property and all debts would be separate debts, except where it was clearly shown that the parties intended to share the property or debts. Monte testified that certain debts, such as debt taken out to attend a tax-lien course and certain credit card debt, were jointly taken out and that he and Madeena should therefore be jointly liable for them after the divorce. The trial court granted the parties’ divorce on the ground of insupportability, found that no community property had been accumulated during the marriage, ordered Monte to be responsible for the tax-lien educational course and the disputed credit-card debts, and ordered the parties to split Madeena’s attorney’s fees 50/50. This appeal ensued. II. ANALYSIS On October 16, 2025, we notified appellant that the two separate briefs he filed in this appeal did not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and we instructed him to file a compliant brief by no later than October 30, 2025. On October 21, 2025, Monte filed a supplemental brief in response to our notice. Below are the issues Monte lists in the brief submitted in response to our October 16 notice, and a summary of the argument he makes with respect to each: 3 1. “Entrapment & Misrepresentation”: The Army misrepresented Madeena’s job duties. 2. “Army-Engineered Separation”: The Army “indoctrinate[ed]” Madeena, and interfered with Monte’s and Madeena’s marriage, in violation of Monte’s “due process and marital rights.” 3. “Institutional Bias & Equal Protection”: The Army diminished the importance of Monte and Madeena’s marriage “due to its same-sex and minority character,” in violation of the Due Process clause, Equal Protection clause, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. 4. “Guardianship Necessity”: Madeena is incapable of making decisions for himself and Monte should be appointed as his guardian. 5. “Erroneous Allocation of Attorney’s Fees and Financial Responsibility”: The trial court should not have split Madeena’s attorney’s fees between Monte and Madeena. Instead, it should have ordered the Army to pay based on its wrongful conduct. “We hold pro se litigants to the same procedural standards as we do litigants represented by counsel to avoid giving pro se litigants an unfair advantage.” Veigel v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc., 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.). We construe briefs “reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by waiver.” Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). Substantial, not strict, compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure is all that is required from parties. Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). However, we need not tolerate “substantive defects and ‘flagrant[ ]’ formal defects.” Id. When a party flagrantly violates the briefing rules, we have discretion to choose between requiring rebriefing or deeming an issue waived. See Fredonia State Bank v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994). Here, we requested rebriefing, allowing Monte the opportunity to correct the briefing 4 errors that rendered his initial briefs inadequate. However, the brief Monte submitted in response to our October 16 notice is still inadequate. For instance, Monte does not cite any portions of the clerk’s or reporter’s records. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Instead, he cites exclusively to exhibits attached to his brief that were not admitted into evidence below and that were not otherwise included as part of the appellate record. See Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) (“It is elementary that, with limited exceptions not material here, an appellate court may not consider matters outside the appellate record.”). Aside from citing the Equal Protection clause, the Due Process clause, and the Immigration and Nationality Act, Monte does not cite any legal authority in the argument section of his brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). And to the extent that Monte cites these authorities, he does so only to suggest that the United States Army violated those laws. However, the Army was not a party below, nor is it a party on appeal, nor do we generally have jurisdiction to reexamine military decisions. See, e.g., American K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 259 (Tex. 2018) (political question doctrine renders military decisions nonjusticiable). And Monte does not explain how we can possibly grant him redress against the Army despite these facts. We conclude that the issues Monte raises with respect to the Army’s allegedly wrongful conduct have been inadequately briefed, and we overrule them. The single thread of argument that impliedly underlies each of the “issues” in Monte’s brief is that he believes Madeena lacks the capacity to make decisions for himself based on the Army’s actions, and that the trial court could not grant a divorce while Madeena was incompetent. But parties are presumed competent. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 576.002(b) 5 (“There is a rebuttable presumption that a person is mentally competent unless a judicial finding to the contrary is made under the Estates Code.”); Bartee v. Bartee, No. 11-18-00017-CV, 2020 WL 524909, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that party failed to overcome presumption that she was competent during trial-court proceedings). Monte does not discuss what evidence he presented below to overcome this presumption. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We conclude that the issues Monte raises with respect to Madeena’s alleged incompetence have been inadequately briefed, and we overrule them. We run the risk of advocating on Monte’s behalf if we construe his brief any more liberally than we already have. See Baish v. Allen, No. 02-17-00146-CV, 2019 WL 1284900, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Identifying and determining the number of issues Baish is presenting puts us in the precarious position of possibly over-advocating or under-advocating on his behalf when, as a neutral adjudicator, we should not be advocating for any party at all.”). Because an issue raised on appeal unsupported by analysis or citation to legal authority presents nothing for the court to review, we conclude that the issues Monte raises have been inadequately briefed, and we overrule them. See Strange v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). III. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce. Any pending motions—aside from Monte’s motion for rehearing, which is overruled—are dismissed as moot. 6 __________________________________________ Maggie Ellis, Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis Affirmed on Motion for Rehearing Filed: October 8, 2026 7