Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00443-CV ___________________________ WINDELL BRACKENRIDGE, Appellant V. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., MCCARTHY HOLTHUS LLP, AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., Appellees On Appeal from the 17th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 017-377342-26 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION In this interlocutory appeal, Appellant Windell Brackenridge, acting pro se, challenges the trial court’s denial of his application for a temporary injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4). In a single issue, Brackenridge argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “entering an unqualified denial” of his temporary-injunction application without receiving evidence. He contends that because the trial court determined that the defendants had not received reasonable notice of the temporary-injunction hearing, it should have reset the hearing to a later date instead of denying the application. But because the record does not indicate that the trial court’s ruling was based on the notice deficiency alone and because Brackenridge did not affirmatively request an opportunity to present evidence at the temporary-injunction hearing after the trial court signaled its intention to rule on his application, we will affirm. II. BACKGROUND In April 2026, Brackenridge sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS); and the law firm of McCarthy Holthus LLP seeking temporary injunctive relief to prevent his home from being sold at an impending foreclosure sale. In his petition, he alleged that Wells Fargo lacked authority to foreclose on his home because his original mortgage loan documents identified NTFN, Inc. as the lender. Although Brackenridge acknowledged in his 2 petition that MERS was identified in the original deed of trust “as nominee or beneficiary” and that an assignment of the deed of trust conveying it from MERS, as NTFN’s nominee, to Wells Fargo had been recorded in the deed records in December 2023, he nevertheless alleged that there were “unresolved” issues regarding Wells Fargo’s authority to foreclose on his home because the defendants had failed to establish “who[m] MERS [had been] acting for” when the assignment was executed, “whether MERS had authority from that entity,” or “whether the individual signing for MERS had authority.” On May 28, 2026, Heather Gram-Chavez, an attorney with McCarthy Holthus, filed an answer on behalf of Wells Fargo and MERS as well as a separate verified answer on behalf of McCarthy Holthus itself. The following day, Brackenridge served notice on the defendants that a hearing on his temporary-injunction application had been set for June 4, 2026.1 At the June 4, 2026 hearing, Brackenridge appeared pro se, and Felix Hill, a McCarthy Holthus attorney, appeared on behalf of the firm. Hill explained that Wells Fargo had decided to “handle this [case] with their in-house team” and stated that he was not aware that his firm currently represented MERS “in any capacity.” 1 The notice reflected that Brackenridge’s “Motion for Limited Expedited Discovery Before Temporary Injunction Hearing” had been set for hearing at the same time as his temporary-injunction application. The trial court denied Brackenridge’s discovery motion along with his temporary-injunction application, but this appeal concerns only the temporary-injunction ruling. 3 Because Brackenridge had given the defendants only six days’ notice of the temporary-injunction hearing and because McCarthy Holthus was the only defendant who had appeared at the hearing, the trial court stated at the hearing’s outset that it would “probably at least” deny Brackenridge’s temporary-injunction application “without prejudice” as to the non-appearing defendants because it was unclear that they had received reasonable notice. The trial court then allowed Hill to present argument on behalf of McCarthy Holthus. Hill provided relevant background information to the trial court concerning the scheduled foreclosure sale and the litany of lawsuits that Brackenridge and his wife had filed to delay the sale. Specifically, Hill explained that Brackenridge had defaulted on his mortgage in December 2023 and had made no payments since that time; that Brackenridge and his wife had filed at least three previous state-court lawsuits and numerous federal-court lawsuits seeking to stop Wells Fargo from foreclosing on their home, all of which had been dismissed; and that Brackenridge and his wife had been declared vexatious litigants by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. After hearing Hill’s argument and giving Brackenridge an opportunity to respond, the trial court announced that it was “ready to rule.” When the trial court made this announcement, Brackenridge did not object or ask for the opportunity to present any evidence; rather, he simply responded, “Yes, Judge.” The trial court then orally ruled that it was “denying [Brackenridge’s] [a]pplication for [t]emporary 4 [i]njunction.” Following the hearing, the trial court signed an order in accordance with its oral ruling. Brackenridge filed a motion to reconsider in which he attempted to address the trial court’s concerns about the sufficiency of the notice provided to the defendants and asked the trial court to schedule a new hearing on his temporary-injunction application. After the trial court denied this motion, Brackenridge commenced this interlocutory appeal. III. DISCUSSION In his sole appellate issue, Brackenridge contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his temporary-injunction application without receiving evidence instead of resetting the hearing on the application to address its concerns about the lack of adequate notice to the defendants. We disagree. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Issuing a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the purpose of which is “to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). A temporary-injunction applicant bears the burden to plead and prove: “(1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Id. “The trial court exercises its sound discretion in deciding whether to issue a temporary injunction, and we may reverse that decision only if we conclude that the 5 trial court abused its discretion because its actions were ‘so arbitrary that [they] exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.’” Hernandez v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-20-00225-CV, 2021 WL 520456, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204). On appeal, we limit the scope of our review to the validity of the temporary-injunction order and do not review the merits of the underlying case. See Intercontinental Terminals Co. v. Vopak N. Am., Inc., 354 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, drawing all legitimate inferences from the evidence, and deferring to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 312 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). “However, we review the trial court’s application of the law to established facts and the resolution of pure legal questions de novo.” Hernandez, 2021 WL 520456, at *6 (first citing Jelinis, LLC v. Hiran, 557 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); and then citing Tom James of Dall., Inc. v. Cobb, 109 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). B. Analysis The crux of Brackenridge’s appellate complaint is that the trial court improperly denied his temporary-injunction application without receiving evidence. But as the party bearing the burden of proof, Brackenridge had an affirmative duty to urge the trial court to receive evidence before it ruled. See Hibbler v. Walker, 6 593 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ); see also Cameron v. Cameron, 601 S.W.2d 814, 815–16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ) (holding that appellant could not complain on appeal that the trial court had erred by denying her the right to present evidence in support of her oral objections to the master’s report concerning the property division in a divorce case because she had “made no suggestion to the court that [s]he wished to present any evidence” and had instead “apparently acquiesced in the [trial] court’s ruling that the master’s findings and recommendations would be adopted”). By failing to object or to urge the trial court to receive evidence when it announced that it was “ready to rule,” Brackenridge effectively waived his complaint that the trial court erred by denying him the right to present evidence in support of his temporary-injunction application.2 See Cameron, 601 S.W.2d at 816; Hibbler, 593 S.W.2d at 400. Brackenridge’s contention that the trial court should have reset the temporary-injunction hearing rather than denying his application is premised upon his presupposition that the sole basis for the trial court’s ruling was the inadequate hearing notice. But nothing in the trial court’s oral ruling or in its written order supports that presupposition. Although the trial court stated at the beginning of the 2 As noted, Brackenridge filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s denial of his temporary-injunction application. But in this motion, he did not raise an objection to the trial court’s failure to receive evidence at the June 4, 2026 hearing. Rather, he merely attempted to address the trial court’s concerns about the sufficiency of the notice provided to the defendants. 7 hearing that it was inclined—at a minimum—to deny Brackenridge’s temporary-injunction application “without prejudice” as to the non-appearing defendants because it was unclear that they had received adequate notice, the trial court did not actually rule until it had heard argument from McCarthy Holthus, and it never stated that its ruling was based solely on procedural grounds (i.e., a lack of adequate notice). And because Brackenridge bore the burden of proof and failed to present any evidence, the trial court would not have abused its discretion by denying his application on the merits. See DGM Servs., Inc. v. Figueroa, No. 01-16-00186-CV, 2016 WL 7473947, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming denial of temporary-injunction application because appellant had failed to carry its burden of “producing some evidence of each element necessary for a temporary injunction”); cf. Newton v. State, No. 05-08-00153-CR, 2009 WL 2196118, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2009, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (“Because [the appellant] bore the burden of proof and produced no evidence in support of his request, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request.”). In sum, because (1) Brackenridge failed to object or to urge the trial court to receive evidence when it announced its intention to rule on his application, (2) nothing in the record supports Brackenridge’s presupposition that the trial court’s ruling was based solely on lack-of-notice grounds, and (3) the trial court had the discretion to deny Brackenridge’s temporary-injunction application on the merits 8 because he bore the burden of proof and failed to present any evidence, we cannot conclude that an abuse of discretion occurred. Accordingly, we overrule Brackenridge’s sole issue. IV. CONCLUSION Having overruled Brackenridge’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order denying his temporary-injunction application. /s/ Dana Womack Dana Womack Justice Delivered: November 12, 2026 9