Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 8, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ Nos. 11-25-00023-CR & 11-25-00024-CR __________ RICARDO MOLINA, JR., Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 32nd District Court Nolan County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 15213 & 15214 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Ricardo Molina, Jr., was indicted in two separate cause numbers for the offenses of indecency with a child, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1), (d) (West 2026). In a consolidated trial, a jury convicted Appellant of each offense and assessed his punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in each cause. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered that the sentences imposed be served concurrently. In a single issue in each appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. We affirm. I. Factual and Procedural History J.R.,1 fifteen years old at trial, testified that when she was eleven, Appellant lived in an apartment with her, her younger sister, G.D., and their mother. Appellant was dating their mother and was responsible for the care of J.R. and G.D. while their mother was at work. One day, Appellant called J.R. into the bathroom. Appellant was seated in the bathtub with the shower curtain covering his body. Appellant instructed J.R. to take off her pants and sit on the end of the bathtub. J.R. asked him why and he replied, “[J]ust do it.” J.R. testified that after she complied, Appellant put his finger inside her anus and told her that was what “girls do in the bathtub.” Appellant told her not to tell anybody about what had happened. J.R. confided in G.D. but asked her not to say anything because she was “scared of something happening.” The incident came to light two years later when G.D. told her aunts, with whom she was living. At the time, J.R. was living with her biological father in Lubbock, their mother was homeless, and Appellant was no longer part of their lives. J.R.’s and G.D.’s aunt, V.S., testified that after noticing G.D.’s avoidant behavior around boys, including V.S.’s minor son, she inquired as to why. G.D. revealed what had happened to J.R., and V.S. then arranged a recorded phone call with J.R. The recorded call was admitted into evidence. J.R. told V.S. that Appellant had taken her to the restroom, asked her to pull down her pants, and touched her. 1 To protect the identity of the complainant, we refer to her by the pseudonym given in the indictment and refer to family members with pseudonyms as well. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); see generally TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt. (“The rule does not limit an appellate court’s authority to disguise parties’ identities in appropriate circumstances in other cases.”). 2 Thirteen years old at the time of trial, G.D. testified that she recalled one incident when Appellant had been watching her and J.R. after school, and he had asked them if they wanted to learn about sex. G.D. declined, but she watched Appellant take J.R. into the bathroom. According to G.D., when J.R. exited the bathroom five to ten minutes later, “she looked very frightened.” J.R. declined to tell G.D. exactly what had transpired. In a forensic interview at the Child Advocacy Center, J.R. disclosed that Appellant had touched her “private” and “butt.” J.R. provided a similar statement to the sexual assault nurse examiner, who testified that J.R. said Appellant had asked her to sit on the tub, told her “girls like it when they stick fingers in their butt,” and then proceeded to stick his fingers in her anus. Appellant testified that he dated J.R.’s mother between 2019 and 2022, and he denied ever touching J.R. inappropriately. Appellant opined that J.R. and G.D. manufactured these allegations because he had been “strict” with them. Appellant described J.R. as rebellious and stated that he had caught J.R. watching pornography once, and afterwards, the girls had told him that they were “going to make [him] break up with their mom.” Appellant conceded that by the time the outcry occurred, Appellant was no longer dating their mother, and he had not seen or spoken to the girls in over a year. Appellant was also questioned as to why, when he was notified by the arresting officer that he was being charged with a “sex assault” offense, Appellant assumed it dealt with a child despite not being told it did. Appellant responded, “I didn’t [think it dealt with a child]. I’m just -- a sexual assault, that’s the first thing that comes to the head is a child.” The jury found Appellant guilty of both offenses, and following a punishment hearing, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in each cause. 3 II. Standard of Review We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trier of fact must resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we must “presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicts in favor of the prosecution” and we defer to the factfinder’s factual determinations. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762 (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight that their testimony is to be afforded. See CRIM. PROC. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; 4 Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. A guilty verdict does not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 5 III. Analysis A person commits indecency with a child by contact if he “engages in sexual contact with [a] child.” PENAL § 21.11(a)(1). As relevant to this case, “sexual contact” includes “any touching by [the defendant], including touching through clothing, of the anus . . . or any part of the genitals of a child,” if the act is “committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of [the defendant].” Id. § 21.11(c)(1). Here, Appellant disputes whether the State proved that he possessed the requisite intent, arguing that there was no evidence of his sexual gratification. We accordingly limit our sufficiency review to the challenged element on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (providing that court of appeals issues a written opinion that is “as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”); see, e.g., Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 287, 289 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d) (limiting sufficiency review to the single challenged element); Schuman v. State, No. 11-22-00300-CR, 2024 WL 847692, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 29, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). The indecency-with-a-child offense does not require the State to prove that the defendant was, in fact, aroused or sexually gratified—only that the sexual contact occurred with intent to arouse or gratify himself. See Shamam v. State, 280 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.); Baker v. State, No. 11-23-00073-CR, 2025 WL 1240160, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). It is well-established that the specific intent to arouse or gratify a person’s sexual desire can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, remarks, and all the surrounding circumstances, including the act itself. McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Tienda v. State, 479 S.W.3d 863, 873 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.). No oral expression of intent or visible evidence of sexual arousal is necessary. Roe v. State, 6 660 S.W.3d 775, 782–83 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. ref’d); Tienda, 479 S.W.3d at 873. Moreover, a defendant instructing a complainant not to reveal an event indicates consciousness of wrongdoing, which creates the inference that a defendant harbored the specific intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires. Amador-Castillo v. State, No. 11-24-00124-CR, 2026 WL 1025556, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 16, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The evidence at trial indicates that when J.R. was eleven years old, Appellant instructed her to take off her clothing in their apartment bathroom, touched her anus and genitals, and then told her not to tell anyone. Appellant’s actions, coupled with his instructions to keep his actions a secret, are evidence that he harbored the specific intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires. See id.; see also Roe, 660 S.W.3d 782– 83 (concluding that the action of placing a vibrator on a minor’s genitals could “hardly be considered an innocent activity” and therefore evidence of intent to arouse or gratify). Despite Appellant’s insistence that he never touched J.R. inappropriately and that he lacked the requisite intent, we defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the “sole judge” of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)); see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. As the sole judge of a witness’s credibility, “the jury can believe all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony.” Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The jury’s determination to accept J.R.’s version of the events and to reject Appellant’s version was a decision based inherently on its evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility and within the jury’s sole province. Id.; see also Chambliss v. State, No. 11-21-00046-CR, 2023 WL 2415314, at *9 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 9, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 7 publication) (concluding the jury was free to disregard the appellant’s denials that he had ever been sexually gratified or sexually aroused by a child). We have reviewed the cumulative force of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, as we must, and we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offenses of indecency with a child by sexual contact as charged in the indictments. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue in each appeal. IV. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgments of the trial court. W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE October 8, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 8