Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00389-CR Anthony TREJO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021CR8003 Honorable Ron Rangel, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 7, 2026 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED A jury convicted Anthony Trejo of criminal solicitation of a minor, a third-degree felony. On appeal, Trejo challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm. BACKGROUND While incarcerated in the Bexar County Jail, Trejo obtained possession of another inmate’s letter that was addressed to the inmate’s seven-year-old sister, S.F. Using the information gathered 04-25-00389-CR from this letter, Trejo wrote his own letter to S.F. informing her that he was available to write and talk to her over the phone and of his desire to meet upon his release. Trejo then explained that he “want[ed] 2 make [his] point across” and advised S.F. that he “mess[es] around with young females and older mid-age,” described the alleged size of his penis and his plans to enlarge it, offered to provide her pictures of it before they met, and asked whether S.F. wanted to engage in sexual intercourse when he got out of jail. Sometime in January 2021, S.F.’s mother received Trejo’s letter—which was addressed to S.F. Unaware of who Trejo was, S.F.’s mother read the letter, became “scared” and “distraught,” and immediately called the San Antonio Police Department. Because the letter originated from within the jail, SAPD advised her to speak to an advocate at the Bexar County Jail. At the jail, Bexar County Investigator Carlos Trevino received S.F.’s mother’s complaint and initiated his investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of his investigation, Investigator Trevino forwarded the case to the district attorney’s office as a misdemeanor harassment charge. On August 31, 2021, a grand jury indicted Trejo on two counts of criminal solicitation of a minor. Count one, a second-degree felony, alleged Trejo solicited aggravated sexual assault of a child, whereas count two, a third-degree felony, alleged Trejo solicited the sexual assault of a child. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 15.031(e), 22.011(f), 22.021(e). The State also provided notice of its intent to use a prior conviction to enhance Trejo’s punishment. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42. The jury trial commenced on March 4, 2025; at its conclusion, the jury found Trejo guilty only of the second count. Trejo elected to have the trial court assess his punishment. The trial court—after finding the enhancement true—sentenced Trejo to 12 years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. This appeal followed. -2- 04-25-00389-CR DISCUSSION In his sole issue on appeal, Trejo assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for directed verdict and argues that the State failed to prove the essential elements of criminal solicitation of a minor beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. 1. Standard of Review In criminal cases, challenging the denial of a directed verdict motion is treated as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Hines v. State, 383 S.W.3d 615, 623 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d). A sufficiency challenge is reviewed pursuant to the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Fraser v. State, 726 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). The evidence is legally sufficient if, when viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. In conducting this review, we do not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our own judgment for that of the jury. Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Instead, our role “is simply to ensure that the evidence presented supports the jury’s verdict and that the State has presented a legally sufficient case of the offense charged.” Id. We presume that the jury resolved any conflicts in evidence and inferences in favor of the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient, we consider all evidence within the record without regard for the propriety of its admission. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The sufficiency of this evidence is then measured against a hypothetically -3- 04-25-00389-CR correct jury charge, “defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging instrument.” Fraser, 726 S.W.3d at 258. The offense of criminal solicitation of a minor occurs when—as relevant here—a person, with intent that sexual assault be committed, requests, commands, or attempts to induce a minor to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surround the actor’s conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute sexual assault of a child. TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.031(a); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054(a)(8). Sexual assault of a child occurs when—regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at the time of the offense—the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(2)(A). Under both sections of the Penal Code, “minor” and “child” are defined as an individual “younger than 17 years of age.” Id. §§ 15.031(f), 22.011(c)(1). We previously held in Ex parte Zavala that the gravamen of online solicitation of a minor under Texas Penal Code 33.021(c) is the solicitation itself; whether the solicited meeting actually occurs is irrelevant since the crime is completed at the time of the solicitation. 421 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d). In the same vein, whether the solicited sexual assault occurred need not be proved; instead, it is the soliciting of a minor to engage in sexual assault which must be proved. Id. 2. The Evidence is Legally Sufficient At trial, the State introduced into evidence Trejo’s letter and the envelope it was mailed in. The letter was addressed to S.F. on the envelope and again within the letter itself, and a rational juror could find that Trejo wrote it and directed it to her. Investigator Trevino searched Trejo’s jail cell and found the letter another inmate had written to S.F. Trevino also interrogated Trejo, and the recording of that interview was admitted as evidence. Trejo first denied authoring the letter -4- 04-25-00389-CR and claimed he was being “set up” by “all the gangs” and “terrorist organizations.” He then admitted writing and mailing it. The letter’s contents permitted the jury to find that Trejo sought sexual intercourse with S.F. He professed his love for “women and young girls of all types,” described his penis in detail, asked repeatedly what her preferred sexual positions were and whether she enjoyed oral sex, and asked her to have intercourse with him when he was released. What Trejo believed about S.F.’s age is the crucial element here. Section 15.031 asks whether the conduct solicited would constitute a listed offense “under the circumstances surrounding the actor’s conduct as the actor believes them to be.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.031(a). Sexual assault of a child requires that the child be younger than 17. Id. § 22.011(a)(2)(A), (c)(1). Trejo denied knowing S.F. was a minor during the interrogation by Investigator Trevino. He testified at trial that he believed she was between 16 and 18 years old when he wrote the letter. Knowledge of S.F.’s exact age is not necessary: the question is whether the jury could rationally find that Trejo believed S.F. was younger than 17. We hold the jury could. Trejo asked S.F. in the letter whether she was “old enough 2 talk 2 men” and whether she was in college or high school. He also professed an interest in “young girls.” The jury was the sole judge of Trejo’s credibility, and it was free to disbelieve his denial while crediting his admission that he believed S.F. might be as young as 16. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608; see also Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“As factfinder, the jury is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses, and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties.”). -5- 04-25-00389-CR Nor does it matter that S.F. never read the letter. Her mother received and read it first. The offense was complete when Trejo made the solicitation. TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.031(a); Ex parte Zavala, 421 S.W.3d at 232. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is legally sufficient to permit a rational jury to find that Trejo intended to commit sexual assault of a child by requesting S.F. to engage in sexual intercourse upon his release from jail and that this conduct would constitute sexual assault of a child under the circumstances as Trejo believed them to be. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 15.031(a), 22.011(a)(2)(A). Trejo’s sole issue on appeal is overruled. 3. Modification of the Trial Court’s Judgment During the punishment hearing, Trejo pleaded “Not True” to the State’s enhancement allegation. The trial court found Trejo’s previous conviction alleged in the State’s notice of intent to use prior conviction for enhancement of punishment to be true; but the written judgment does not reflect Trejo’s plea nor the trial court’s finding on the enhancement. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2 provides appellate court’s the authority to modify a trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); see also French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that appellate courts have the power to “reform a judgment to include an affirmative finding to make the record speak the truth”). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to speak the truth by including Trejo’s plea of “Not True” to the enhancement allegation and the trial court’s finding of the allegation as “True.” CONCLUSION Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. Velia J. Meza, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH -6-