Christopher Andre Neville v. the State of Texas

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ________________ NO. 09-24-00300-CR ________________ CHRISTOPHER ANDRE NEVILLE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause Nos. F21-37104 ________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Christopher Andre Neville was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a child, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02. The jury convicted Neville and assessed his sentence at forty years of incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On appeal, Neville presents thirteen issues for our review in which he challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings regarding testimony and exhibits. His 1 complaints fall into several broad categories, including hearsay, speculation, and relevancy. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Background Several witnesses testified at trial, but we will discuss only the background facts necessary for the determination of the issues on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring us to hand down an opinion as brief as practicable that addresses all issues raised and necessary to the appeal’s final disposition). Neville’s indictment alleged the following: CHRISTOPHER ANDRE NEVILLE, hereafter styled the Defendant, in Jefferson County, Texas, during a period that was thirty (30) or more days in duration, to-wit: from on or about 16TH day of JUNE, TWO THOUSAND AND NINETEEN through on or about the 6TH day of SEPTEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND NINETEEN, and anterior to the presentment of this indictment, when the Defendant was 17 years of age or older, did then and there commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against [Kaci], a child younger than 14 years of age, namely, Indecency with a Child under Texas Penal Code Section 21.11(a)(1 ), namely: The Defendant with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, did then and there touch the genitals of [Kaci], and The Defendant with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, did then and there touch [Kaci] with the Defendant’s genitals[.] 1 1 We use a pseudonym to protect the privacy of the victim and her family in this case. See Tex. Const. art. 1, § 30 (protecting crime victims’ “right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”). 2  At trial, Beaumont Police Officer Jacob Froman testified that on September 7, 2019, he was dispatched to a domestic disturbance between a husband and wife. When he arrived, he encountered Mother who told Froman information regarding Kaci. Over Neville’s objection, the trial court admitted a copy of Froman’s body camera footage which was played for the jury with a limiting instruction. Froman testified that Mother told him about sexual abuse of her seven-year-old daughter, Kaci. Froman did not speak to Kaci but verified that she was safe with Mother. Mother told Froman that Neville was on drugs. Mother told Froman about two incidents of “indecency with a child[]” including one that happened after Kaci’s birthday in June. Mother told Froman that Kaci was touched by Neville over-the- clothes genital-to-genital contact, and over-the-clothes finger to genital contact. Mother told him that Kaci specifically said Neville’s “middle part[.]” Froman explained that he spoke to another officer who told Froman that based on Kaci’s accusations he wanted to do a report, notify CPS, get a sexual assault nurse examination, and have her interviewed at Garth House. Froman found Neville hiding behind the AC unit outside the home, but he did not arrest Neville that night. Darrell Lebeouf Beaumont Police Detective Darrell Lebeouf was the on-call detective that night. He testified that he received a call “in reference to a 7-year-old child that had made an outcry to her mother that she had been inappropriately touched by her 3 father.” Lebeouf later investigated the allegations, and his investigation uncovered two acts of sexual abuse that were thirty days or more apart and occurred between June 15, 2019 and August 2019. Based on the information gathered during his investigation, he determined probable cause existed to charge Neville with continuous sexual abuse of a child. Dana Hebert Next, the State called Sexual Assault Nurse Dana Hebert. Hebert explained her educational and professional background, the duties of a Sexual Assault Nurse, and how to conduct a Sexual Assault Nurse Examination (SANE). Hebert conducted a SANE on Kaci in the early morning hours of September 7, 2019, in the hospital. A copy of Hebert’s sexual assault forensic report from Kaci’s examination was admitted at trial over Neville’s objections. The report included a written narrative about her patient history from Kaci regarding the assault, including Kaci’s telling Hebert, “He put his middle part on my middle part. I had my clothes on, but he didn’t have his clothes on.” She also related what Mother told her that day: Spoke with mother[.] She reports that she was told this has happened five times. The first was after [Kaci’s] birthday [in June 2019]. Law enforcement came and had Christopher Neville leave and that he cannot be there for the next 24 hours, but then can return. Then reports the kids are scared of him. 4 Mother Mother testified that she has three children, including “Kris” and Kaci, who are Neville’s biological children. Mother described her marriage as deteriorating before Kaci’s outcry, testifying that Neville used drugs and was verbally, and sometimes physically, abusive. Neville objected to the testimony on the grounds that it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. The trial court overruled the objections and gave the jury a limiting instruction. Mother stated that towards the end of 2019, she and Neville were separated and getting divorced. She testified Kaci was afraid of Neville, explaining, I mean, the majority of whippings are -- were normal. I can kind of tell when it wasn’t normal because I do remember him -- I was, like, you have to get [Kaci]. She’s out of control. She’s out of control. And I guess he got tired of me telling him. And he literally -- he says, ‘This is why I don’t like doing this,’ and he literally grabbed [Kaci] by her arms and body slammed her. Mother spoke to the police after Kaci’s outcry. Before Mother called the police, she recalled that two incidents occurred on the night of September 6, 2019. First, when Kaci was bathing, Neville was in the bathroom cleaning up and gave Kaci a look that scared her. Mother stated that to her knowledge, it was abnormal for Neville to be around Kaci when she was naked at that age. Later that night, while Mother slept, Kaci knocked on her door and woke her up. She described Kaci as “very anxious and scared.” Kaci told Mother that Neville had “been coming in her room and putting his middle part on her middle part.” Kaci told Mother she was 5 scared, and Mother asked her if she was sure and how long it had been going on. Mother then called Kaci’s older brothers into the room and asked if anything had happened to them, which both brothers denied. Mother confronted Neville that night. She testified that Neville “wasn’t surprised.” She reached this conclusion “[b]ecause [of] the response he gave me: ‘You can just have full custody.’ It’s not: ‘Oh, no. I didn’t do that. I would never do that to my child.’ ‘You can just have full custody. I’m not going to go through that.’” After this conversation, Mother and her children locked themselves in the same room, and Mother called the police. Kaci told Mother about times she was abused right after her birthday in June 2019 and a school event in August or September 2019. Mother denied that Kaci’s outcry had anything to do with her divorce or an attempt to get custody of her children. After Kaci’s outcry, she attended counseling at Garth House. Mother recalled that she pulled Kaci out of counseling because she had a problem talking about what happened, and “I just couldn’t see her go through that.” Mother also recalled that in the summer of 2019, she found Neville naked in Kaci’s bed, but Kaci was not in her room and was on the floor by her brother. Kim Hanks Kim Hanks works as a program director of the Forensic Interviewing Program in the Family Advocacy Program at the Garth House Child Advocacy Center. Kaci 6 was interviewed at Garth House after her outcry, and Hanks observed the interview before she attended court. Hanks testified that it appeared Kaci resisted giving all the details of her abuse during her session. “I felt like she went around the actual subject of the actual abuse, body parts, went around it and discussed a lot of the details around it. But then [the forensic examiner] had to come back in again and ask more pointblank detailed questions.” Several other witnesses testified at trial, including Kaci. Due to the limited issues on appeal, we need not address their testimony. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Neville of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and after a separate trial on punishment, the jury sentenced him to forty years of incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Neville timely appealed. Standard of Review We use an abuse-of-discretion standard to review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence. See Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id. at 616. If the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal even if the trial judge gave the wrong reason for the correct ruling. De La 7 Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This standard of review applies to each issue Neville raises on appeal. Issues One through Five: Hearsay In his first five issues, Neville challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings regarding hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by statute, the rules of evidence, or by other rules prescribed under statutory authority. See id. 802. Once the opponent of hearsay evidence properly objects, it becomes the proponent’s burden to establish that an exception applies that would make the evidence admissible despite its hearsay character. See Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 578-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “When hearsay contains hearsay, the Rules of Evidence require that each part of the combined statements be within an exception to the hearsay rule.” Sanchez v. State, 354 S.W.3d 476, 485-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Tex. R. Evid. 805. We review a trial court’s hearsay rulings for abuse of discretion. See Elsik v. State, 714 S.W.3d 27, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2026). Issue One In issue one, Neville argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted Froman’s body camera footage which contained conversations 8 between Froman and his patrol sergeant and between Froman and Mother both of which Neville argues constituted inadmissible hearsay. When the State presented the body camera footage at trial, Neville objected on the grounds of hearsay and relevance for “conversations between Officer Froman, another officer, and [Mother] talking.” The trial court, after first overruling the objection, held a hearing outside the jury’s presence. The trial court then sustained Neville’s objection as to the conversations between Froman and the patrol sergeant, but overruled Neville’s objections regarding the conversation between Froman and Mother, stating, “This is the very essence of an excited utterance, plus it’s divulging an outcry statement that is also admissible.” The trial court also gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the evidence. Although hearsay is generally inadmissible, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 provides an exception for an outcry statement made by a minor describing an offense, such as continuous sexual abuse of a child, if the outcry is the first such statement to a person over the age of 18, and if certain statutory conditions are met such as notice, a hearing, and the minor’s availability to testify at trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072. Appellant does not argue these conditions were not met in this case, and we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that Kaci’s statement to Mother, which was otherwise hearsay, was an admissible outcry statement under article 38.072. 9  Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides an exception allowing for the admission of hearsay if the statement “relat[es] to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Tex. R. Evid. 803(2). This excited-utterance exception is based on the principle that when a declarant makes such a statement, the declarant is incapable of the kind of reflection that would enable the declarant to fabricate information. Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). To determine whether a statement is an excited utterance, courts must determine whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event or condition. Id. (citations omitted). “[U]nder the excited-utterance exception, the startling event may trigger a spontaneous statement that relates to a much earlier incident.” McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The event triggering an excited utterance and the event it describes may be separated by days or even months. See Hunt v. State, 904 S.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d). The startling event itself need not be the crime. See id. at 816; see also McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 239. For example, in Hunt, a child’s statement concerned an incident of abuse that occurred three months prior to the outcry. 904 S.W.2d at 815. The child made the statement after watching a news story on television that caused her great concern and fear regarding her own sexual abuse. See id. The court of appeals held that despite the three-month intervening passage of 10 time, the startling nature of the television program and the victim’s demeanor during her outcry rendered the statement sufficiently reliable to fall under the excited- utterance hearsay exception. Id. at 816–17. In determining whether a statement falls under the excited-utterance exception, we consider the following non-dispositive factors: (1) whether the exciting event is startling enough to evoke a truly spontaneous reaction from the declarant; (2) whether the reaction to the startling event is quick enough to avoid the possibility of fabrication; (3) whether the resulting statement is sufficiently “related to” the startling event to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of the statement; and (4) whether the statement was made in response to a question. Pickron v. State, 515 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 241; Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). The statements at issue related to Neville’s behavior—actions which frightened Kaci to a point where she was afraid to be alone with Neville. Kaci told her Mother that Neville’s “middle part” touched her “middle part” and Mother confronted Neville who, according to Mother, did not deny abusing Kaci. Mother in turn locked herself and her children in her bedroom and called the police. As the trial court noted, the body cam footage shows “what is happening at the moment of -- the 11 very moment that the police are entering into the investigation upon a – immediately or soon after the call of the report of an alleged serious sexual abuse allegation against a child.” Taking these factors into consideration, they support the admission of the statements as excited utterances. See Pickron, 515 S.W.3d at 465. The startling event triggering Kaci’s statements and Neville’s presence at home and subsequent barricade in Mother’s bedroom showed the thought of being alone with Neville was exceptionally traumatic. Like Hunt, the events immediately preceding Kaci’s statements to Mother were sufficiently shocking and startling, and Mother’s demeanor was sufficiently disturbed rendering Mother’s statements to Froman reliable as excited utterances. See Hunt, 904 S.W.2d at 815-17. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Mother’s statements to Froman were excited utterances and admitting the statements into evidence as an exception to the rule against hearsay. See McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 241; see also Irsan, 708 S.W.3d at 611; Elsik, 714 S.W.3d at 34. We overrule Neville’s first issue. Issues Two and Three Next, Neville challenges Lebeouf’s testimony. In his second issue, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing Lebeouf to testify regarding his conversation with Froman, and in his third issue, he argues that Lebeouf’s testimony in which “he made determinations concerning the time frame” of the assaults was based upon hearsay, and, therefore, inadmissible. 12  Lebeouf testified that around 2:00 a.m. on September 7, 2019, “[t]he officer called me and said that he was on a call in reference to a 7-year-old child that had made an outcry to her mother that she had been inappropriately touched by her father.” Neville objected to the testimony as hearsay and repetition, and the State argued the testimony was “information is to help aid the jury in understanding what the detective’s next steps were in his investigation.” The trial court overruled the objection, finding the testimony could “be considered by the jury for that purpose only. Not for the truth but for an understanding of why the officer took the next steps, how he responded to those -- that information. And for no other purpose.” Later, Lebeouf testified regarding his determination of the timeline of events, and the defense objected to it as hearsay. The State countered, telling the trial court that Lebeouf’s testimony was offered not for the truth, but “to explain how this detective made the determination of 30 days or more in duration[,]” and the evidence will be “supplanted with further testimony[,]” by other witnesses. The trial court overruled the objection, explaining, “It’s how he determined that period of time, what he used to determine. Again, the jury shall give the credibility and weight they feel it deserves. The State has also said that will be – that evidence will be supplanted with further testimony.” Generally, an investigating officer may testify to how a defendant became a suspect in an investigation without such testimony constituting hearsay. See Dinkins, 13 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Lyle v. State, 418 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). However, the officer’s testimony cannot, through artful questioning, be offered to prove the veracity of his investigation. Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Such a sequence of questioning and answering may constitute impermissible hearsay “where there is an inescapable conclusion that a piece of evidence is being offered to prove statements made outside the courtroom[.]” Id.; Head v. State, 4 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Whether the disputed testimony violates the hearsay prohibition necessarily turns on how strongly the content of the out-of-court statement can be inferred from the context.”). A police officer “should not be permitted to relate historical aspects of the case, replete with hearsay statements in the form of complaints and reports on grounds that []he was entitled to tell the jury the information upon which []he acted.” Schaffer, 777 S.W.2d at 115 (citations omitted). In Schaffer, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained, “In short, ‘statement’ as defined in [Rule 801] necessarily includes proof of the statement whether the proof is direct or indirect.” Id. at 114 (emphasis in original). Here, Lebeouf did not repeat Kaci’s allegations for the truth of the matter asserted but instead explained that the timelines of the purported abuse allegedly spanned greater than thirty days, which established probable cause for their 14 investigation of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Additionally, Lebeouf confirmed through his testimony that this was part of his investigation and involved the need to verify Mother’s report that Kaci outcried against Neville. We are unpersuaded that the prosecutor’s line of questioning and Lebeouf’s responses indicate that the State intended to prove the truth of Kaci’s statements. See id.; Head, 4 S.W.3d at 262–63. The record reflects that the statements were admitted to explain the steps of Lebeouf’s investigation including determining whether Mother had fabricated the allegations against Neville and whether Kaci had actually made an outcry to Mother about Neville, so that Lebeouf could determine whether he needed to move forward with his investigation of Kaci’s allegations. See Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 347. The record does not reveal an inescapable conclusion that Lebeouf’s testimony was offered to prove that Kaci’s allegations against Neville were true. See Head, 4 S.W.3d at 262-63 (whether the disputed testimony violates the hearsay prohibition turns on whether the strength of the inference produces an “inescapable conclusion” that the evidence is being offered to prove the substance of an out-of-court statement); Schaffer, 777 S.W.2d at 115 (recognizing the admissibility an officer’s hearsay statements have and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the events and that are not introduced for the truth of any implications). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Lebeouf’s testimony because it could have reasonably concluded that the evidence had a purpose other than to prove the truth 15 of the matter stated, such as describing what precipitated the investigation and how Neville became a suspect. See Head, 4 S.W.3d at 262; Schaffer, 777 S.W.2d at 115. Even if the trial court had erroneously admitted the testimony, there would be no reversible error because Kaci later testified without objection that Neville sexually abused her, including the timeframe of the abuse. See Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (any error in the admission of the complained-of evidence was harmless because the record established that essentially the same evidence was admitted elsewhere in the record without objection); Gant v. State, 153 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. ref’d) (where erroneous admission of evidence is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence proving the same fact, the erroneous admission is harmless); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) (requiring courts to disregard non-constitutional errors that do not affect a party’s substantial rights). We overrule Neville’s second and third issues. Issue Four In his fourth issue, Neville argues that the trial court erred when it admitted a copy of the SANE report over his objection. At trial, Neville objected to pages 6 and 7 of State’s exhibit 6, the SANE nurse’s report, the written recitation of the patient’s history. The State responded that the document was subject to medical exception under the hearsay rule. The trial court overruled the objection finding the document was subject to the hearsay exception “Rule 803, subpart 4, statements for purposes 16 of medical diagnosis or treatment[.]” On appeal, Neville argues that the “report contained assumptions of what the alleged victim meant when she spoke to her, and what the nurse inferred from the conversations.” According to Neville, the SANE examiner’s testimony showed that she went beyond medical diagnosis and testified she was collecting “evidence[,]” and this is not an exception to the hearsay rule because the “substance of her testimony admittedly went beyond information for treatment, and related to law enforcement purposes instead.” As this Court recently explained in Potter v. State, There are several exceptions to hearsay, including an exception for “[a] statement that: (A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to— medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.” Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). This exception presumes that the patient understands the importance of being truthful with the medical personnel involved to receive an accurate diagnosis or treatment. See Puderbaugh v. State, 31 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref’d); Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d). For statements to be admissible under Rule 803(4), the proponent of the evidence must show that: (1) the declarant was aware that the statements were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and that proper diagnosis or treatment depended on the veracity of the statement; and (2) the particular statement offered is also “pertinent to treatment[;]” that is, it was reasonable for the healthcare provider to rely on the particular information in treating the declarant. See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589, 591; Hanke v. State, No. 09-14-00326-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 9884[,] at *18 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 588- 91; Mbugua v. State, 312 S.W.3d 657, 670-71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d)); Prieto v. State, 337 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d). 17 No. 09-21-00386-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1652, at *24 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 6, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Hebert testified “our primary purpose when seeing a patient is that we are there to medically examine them, make sure that they’re medically okay.” She stated that she meets with the child to take a patient history before she has any encounters with anyone else. She also testified that she sometimes does not receive a referral statement. She explained that the history is obtained “word for word what [the patient] says. We ask open-ended questions[,]” and she takes that patient history to form her medical diagnosis. Hebert explained that it is important to note whether the patient has washed, wiped, or brushed her teeth before the examination, due to the evidence collection and if any fluids collected from the patient will be used in evidence collection. This Court and others have previously rejected similar arguments. See e.g., Berkley v. State, 298 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (holding that statements made by sexual assault victim to a SANE nurse, which were included in medical records, were not testimonial because statements were made for purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (concluding the trial court did not err in admitting the statements the victim made to a sexual assault nurse about the assault under Rule 803(4)); see also Green v. State, No. 09-15-00220-CR, 2017 Tex. App. 18 LEXIS 598, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem op., not designated for publication) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion concluding that the nurse’s testimony and report were admissible over Green’s hearsay objections under Rule 803(4) of the Texas Rules of Evidence). We conclude that the records in question fit within Rule 803(4)’s medical exception. See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 (explaining analyzing records admitted under 803(4), “it seems only natural to presume that adults, and even children of a sufficient age or apparent maturity, will have an implicit awareness that the doctor’s questions are designed to elicit accurate information and that veracity will serve their best interest[]”); see also Ramos v. State, No. 13-22-00293-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 9546, at *45-46 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Dec. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op. not designated for publication) (no evidence in the record, besides the SANE’s testimony that she “collect[s] evidence[,]” to show a bias in the collection of evidence or that the victim was untruthful in her statements during the examination). We reject Neville’s argument that Hebert was merely collecting evidence to be turned over to law enforcement. As demonstrated by Hebert’s testimony in this case, and by the contents of her report, the purpose of the exam was for diagnosis and treatment. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Kaci’s statements during the SANE examination were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment. See Prieto v. 19 State, 337 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d). Because the statements were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling the objection and admitting the SANE records and testimony into evidence. See Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 189. We overrule issue four. Issue Five In his fifth issue, Neville argues the trial court erred by admitting testimony from Mother “concerning hearsay statements of the child while she was in counseling.” Specifically, testimony that Kaci “freaked out” and that counseling was too much for her. At trial, Neville objected to Mother’s testimony regarding Kaci’s reaction to counseling after her outcry on relevance and hearsay grounds. In overruling the objection, the trial court stated the following: All right. Well, it -- the theory of the State is that this is wrapped up within the context of the crime itself and that the jury is entitled to determine whether the complainant is indeed victimized in this case, that the crime actually was committed. Y’all challenged it and pleaded not guilty, which you have a right to, and they have a right to show any evidence that can be relevant to help the jury determine if a crime was actually committed or not. And the responses made by complainants are relevant. How they respond to alleged actions can be part of the equation and the jury analyzing the facts of the case. Overruled. Go ahead. 20 At defense counsel’s request, the trial court instructed the jury on admissibility and the burden of proof. Error preservation is a systemic requirement and must be reviewed by an appellate court, even when the issue is not raised by the parties. Bekendam v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 governs error preservation. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. A party cannot present a complaint for appellate review unless the record shows that the party timely objected or made a motion stating the grounds for the requested ruling, unless the grounds were apparent from the context. Id. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Null v. State, 690 S.W.3d 305, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). A party must also obtain a ruling from the trial court or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule on the objection. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Null, 690 S.W.3d at 318. Requiring a timely, specific objection serves two purposes: (1) it informs the judge of the basis of the objection and gives him a chance to rule; and (2) it provides opposing counsel an opportunity to respond to the complaint. Null, 690 S.W.3d at 318; Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citation omitted). Here, although the trial court overruled Neville’s relevance objection, Neville did not obtain a ruling on his hearsay objection. Without a ruling, the hearsay objection preserved nothing for our review on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Null, 690 S.W.3d at 318. We overrule his fifth issue. 21  Issues Six through Nine: Speculation In his next four issues, Neville complains that the trial court erred by admitting speculative testimony from various witnesses. Texas Rules of Evidence 602 and Rule 701 apply when a party objects that the testimony sought is speculative. See Tex. R. Evid. 602, 701; Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 364-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Turro v. State, 950 S.W.2d 390, 403 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d). Rule 602 requires that a witness have personal knowledge of the matter on which he or she is testifying. Tex. R. Evid. 602. Rule 701 allows a lay witness to express an opinion when the opinion is rationally based on the witness’s perception and is helpful to the jury’s understanding of the witness’s testimony or to the jury’s determination of a fact at issue in the case. See id. 701; Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The first prong of Rule 701 requires a witness to rationally base his or her testimony on what he or she perceives. See Tex. R. Evid. 602, 701; Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 364-65; Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The personal knowledge of the events forming the basis of the witness’s opinion may come directly from what the witness sees, hears, or smells, or otherwise from the witness’s experience. Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 535; Fairow, 943 S.W.2d at 898. An opinion is rationally based on a witness’s perception if the opinion is one a reasonable person could have drawn under the circumstances. Fairow, 943 S.W.2d 22 at 900. The second prong of Rule 701 requires that the witness’s opinion be helpful to the trier of fact. See Tex. R. Evid. 602, 701; Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 364. There is no “bright line” test indicating when an opinion is helpful. Fairow, 943 S.W.2d at 900. “This consideration is especially prudent when the opinion concerns culpable mental state.” Id. Issues Six and Seven In his sixth issue, Neville argues the trial court erred by allowing Froman to speculate as to what Kaci meant by referencing her “middle part[,]” to Mother and that he believed it to be genitalia. Similarly, Neville argues that Hebert’s testimony about what Kaci meant when she said “middle part” during her forensic interview was erroneously admitted speculation. Neville contends that witnesses were not qualified to provide such opinions and that such speculation was inadmissible. “The prosecutor was allowed to elicit improper opinions and conjecture that necessarily relied on speculation. Appellant made pointed objections to the complained-of evidence.” Froman’s testimony was as follows: [THE STATE]: Officer Froman, when -- in your experience, would you expect a 7-year-old child to describe a male’s genitals as their middle part or a penis? A. As a middle part. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, object to speculation. 23  THE COURT: Overruled. He can answer that if it’s -- the question is asked to him. He can answer that. And he can draw reasonable inferences from the statements of witnesses, just like this jury can. Go ahead. Q. [THE STATE]: So, were you trying to put words in someone’s mouth when you used the word “penis” or the word “genitals” when you were talking to [Mother]? A. No, sir. Q. Would you have done that if you were talking to [Kaci]? Would you have used those kind of more sophisticated or adult-like words? A. No, sir. Q. So, when [Mother] told you that [Kaci] had reported her middle part being touched by her father’s middle part, did you make an inference that she was talking about either genitals or penis to genitals contact? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you have any, I guess, concern with that inference looking back on it now? A. No. I still stand by what I said. That’s what I interpreted her meaning. Maybe I should have asked a little bit more further questions, but I was under the impression that it was genital-to-genital contact. Froman reiterated during cross-examination that he would not change his interpretation now. During her testimony, Hebert stated the following: [THE STATE]: Okay. So, do you -- the description of what specifically the child was reporting kind of towards the end here, the child uses the term “middle part.” A. Yes. 24 Q. Is that a term that is consistent with the vocabulary of 7-year-old child, in your experience? A. Yes. Q. When the child explained “middle part,” did it appear to you based on what she was explaining to you in that exam room that she was talking about her genitals or her sexual organ? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection – A. Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- speculation, your Honor. THE COURT: Do you know the answer to that? THE WITNESS: I assumed that that is what she was saying. THE COURT: You’re drawing a reasonable inference from what’s being said? THE WITNESS: Well – THE COURT: Is that -- is that – THE WITNESS: I’m not – [THE STATE]: Here’s what I -- let me back up a little bit. Q. [THE STATE]: I don’t want you to assume; but if you inferred that from what she told you, then I do want to know that. A. I understood -- I mean, I would be honest,