John Anthony Carrion v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed October 8, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00099-CR __________ JOHN ANTHONY CARRION, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 104th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 24506-B MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Appellant, John Anthony Carrion, of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2026). The jury found two enhancement allegations to be “true,” which enhanced Appellant’s punishment range to that of a habitual felony offender, and assessed Appellant’s punishment at forty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. PENAL § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2025). The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. In two issues, Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he committed the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon “without self-defense”—referring to the jury’s implied rejection of his claim of self-defense; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of prior extraneous altercations between Appellant and the victim of the charged offense because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and thus inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. We affirm. I. Factual Background This case arises from an altercation that occurred between Appellant and his then-girlfriend, Sherri Annette Brothers, in Abilene on February 9, 2024. A. Sherri Brothers’s Testimony On the date of this altercation, Brothers donated plasma. While she was in a vehicle in a parking lot and about to leave, Appellant approached and “startled” her, because she did not know he would be there. Appellant got into Brothers’s vehicle, and they drove to a liquor store to purchase beer before heading to Brothers’s mother’s trailer. After arriving there, and before entering the trailer, they began drinking beer. At some point, Brothers told Appellant that she wanted to “change [their] relationship” and “put some stipulations and stuff on it and for [them] not to be together as much as [they] used to be.” Appellant became angry when the proposed “stipulations” were mentioned, retrieved a backpack, and told Brothers that a gun was inside the backpack; he then removed a knife from the backpack and laid it on the dashboard of the vehicle. The two then drove to Appellant’s mother’s home with the knife on the dashboard, and when they arrived Appellant “just went berserk and started stabbing [Brothers] like crazy.” Brothers sustained ten stab wounds that required thirty-seven 2 stitches to close. Brothers stated that when she drove to Appellant’s mother’s home to drop him off, he became frustrated when she suggested that they spend less time together. She further testified that she did not try to stab Appellant, that she “[does not] mess with knives[,]” and that he was “[p]robably” responsible for the cut he sustained to one of his hands. Brothers ran from the vehicle and “beat on [Appellant’s] mother’s door,” who opened the door for her. Appellant’s mother later gave Brothers some towels to help her “clean up” because she was “bleeding profusely,” while Appellant calmly sat inside his mother’s home. At the urging of Appellant’s mother, Brothers drove herself to Hendrick Medical Center in Abilene. Brothers testified about the history of her volatile relationship with Appellant. They dated “on-and-off” from approximately 2014 to 2024, and, according to Brothers, “when it was good, it was good, and when it was bad, it was real [sic] bad.” They frequently argued, “which would eventually end up with [Appellant] hitting [Brothers] or doing something to [her].” At times, he would stab her. Brothers described one specific incident in 2018 where she and Appellant argued, and he punched her in the mouth, “bust[ing] [her] lip” to where you could “see [her] teeth” and held “[s]ome kind of object” against her stomach. As result, she received stitches. When asked on cross-examination why she did not call the police and report Appellant’s abusive conduct, Brothers stated that she probably did not have a cell phone; upon further questioning, Brothers conceded that she texted and called Appellant all day, but also stated that, “Maybe [the cell phone] was under the seat somewhere.” Brothers conceded that it was recommended to not consume alcohol after giving plasma, but she stated that she did anyway and it did not affect her judgment or memory. Brothers also conceded that she told law enforcement that the altercation concerned her seeing someone other than Appellant, when Brothers had previously testified that the altercation occurred after she and Appellant began 3 discussing their relationship. In this regard, she testified, “I just told [Appellant] I was going to start seeing someone. . . . [A]nd that we weren’t going to see as much of each other. . . . I guess [he did not like that].” Brothers initially stated that Appellant placed a gun on the dashboard of her vehicle, but then a few moments later said it was a knife. B. Law Enforcement Testimony Officer Jesse Hanson with the Abilene Police Department (APD) was dispatched to Appellant’s mother’s home that day. Upon her arrival, Officer Hanson spoke with Appellant. Appellant stated that Brothers first stabbed him and in defense he stabbed her; during his discussion with Appellant, Officer Hanson noticed a cut on one of Appellant’s fingers and blood on his clothes. Officer Hanson testified that Appellant said numerous times that he was defending himself and that “she cut [him].” Appellant also stated that he took the knife from Brothers and, after he did, that he only stabbed her once. Appellant’s statements were captured on Officer Hanson’s body camera. When asked how Brothers sustained a stab wound on her shoulder, Appellant said, “Because I grabbed her knife and stabbed her a-s,” asserting, “She stabbed me first!” Officer Hanson opined that after Appellant had control of the knife, a threat no longer existed, and thus it would have been unreasonable for Appellant to stab Brothers multiple times. APD Officer Jessica Watkins testified that she responded to a stabbing call for an injured person at Hendrick Medical Center and met with Brothers there. Officer Watkins observed “cuts to [Brothers’s] left arm, two punctures to her chest and breast area, several wounds on her legs as well as her left hand.” Officer Watkins took Brothers’s statement and photographed her injuries, which consisted of “at least seven” stab wounds. 4  APD Officer Jordan Hancock testified that he secured and processed the evidence in the vehicle that Brothers drove to Hendrick Medical Center. The photographs taken by Officer Hancock showed blood in Brothers’s vehicle. APD Detective Eric Heinz testified that, based on law enforcement’s preliminary investigation, it was determined that Appellant was the primary aggressor. Detective Heinz interviewed Appellant who was eager to share his version of the altercation. Detective Heinz noticed that Appellant’s injury was on his non-dominant hand, which he testified was significant because typically perpetrators of stabbings sustain injuries to their non-dominant hand, the hand not holding the knife, while they are trying to hold on to the person being stabbed. Lindsey Hoxsey, the communications manager and custodian of records for Abilene 9-1-1, testified about three 9-1-1 calls made on February 9, 2024. The calls were made by Appellant, Appellant’s aunt, and a security guard at Hendrick Medical Center. In Appellant’s 9-1-1 call, he stated, “I always carry a knife wherever I go” and that he “cut her,” claiming it was in self-defense. He stated that his mother told him, “You hit her about like two or three times,” and he responded, “Well, d--n, she was trying to stab me.” II. Analysis A. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because a rational jury could not have rejected his claim of self-defense. 1. Standard of Review We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 5 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Similarly, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the rejection of a defensive theory asserted by him, such as self-defense, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty of all essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also could have found against the defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (reaffirming Saxton). To support a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce some evidence to support the defense; the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove it. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608 (citing Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)); Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14. Once the defendant produces that evidence, the State’s burden does not require the production of additional evidence to disprove the defense; instead, it requires only that the State prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594– 95. Furthermore, because the State must rebut a defensive issue by establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we review sufficiency challenges to the jury’s rejection of a defensive issue under the traditional legal sufficiency standard. Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see also Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. 6  When a defendant raises a justification defense, such as self-defense, a finding of guilt by the jury is an implicit rejection of the defensive theory. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594–95; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see also Miller v. State, 712 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. filed). Therefore, because a claim of self- defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, the jury is free to accept or reject the defensive theory, either version of the facts, and any part of a witness’s testimony. Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 912 n.3. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). As such, we defer to the factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 7 667 S.W.3d at 761; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. A guilty verdict does not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 2. Application As relevant here, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another” and he “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.” PENAL §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2). “Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain . . . or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2025). “Deadly weapon” is defined as “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). In turn, “[s]erious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes . . . serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46). 8  In asserting self-defense, the use of force is justified “when and to the degree the [defendant] reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the [defendant] against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” Id. § 9.31(a). Similarly, a person is justified in using deadly force against another (1) if he would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31 and (2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes that deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id. § 9.32(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (West 2019). “‘Deadly force’ means force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 9.01(3) (emphasis added). “The reasonably believes language contains subjective and objective components.” Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (emphasis added). First, a “defendant must subjectively believe that another person used or attempted to use unlawful force (Section 9.31) or deadly force (Section 9.32) against the defendant and that the defendant’s use of unlawful or deadly force in response was immediately necessary.” Id. Second, a defendant’s subjective belief must be objectively reasonable, because a reasonable belief is one that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the defendant. Id. (citing PENAL § 1.07(a)(42)). A defendant’s belief that deadly force was immediately necessary is presumed to be reasonable if: (1) the defendant knows or has reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used was committing or attempting to commit an enumerated offense as described by Section 9.32; (2) the defendant did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and (3) the defendant was “not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.” See id. § 9.32(b). The defense is not available if the provocation was only verbal or 9 the defendant provoked the other’s use of force unless the defendant abandons the encounter or clearly communicates his intent to do so with a reasonable belief there is no means of escape, and the other continues to use force against him. Id. § 9.31(b). Moreover, evidence of self-defense may be raised by “other witnesses’ testimony about the defendant’s acts and words at the time of the offense.” Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 33 (citing Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). Appellant argues that “the story of Brothers was so convoluted that no rational factfinder could have believed that Appellant was the aggressor.” The State responds that the evidence shows that Appellant placed a knife on the dashboard of the vehicle then used it to stab Brothers without provocation, which is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and the jury resolved the inconsistencies in Brothers’s testimony against Appellant. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s claim of self-defense. A rational jury could have determined, as it apparently did in this case, that Appellant provoked the altercation with Brothers, thereby rebutting the presumption that Appellant’s belief that his use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. See PENAL § 9.32(b); see also Baker v. State, No. 11-25-00015-CR, 2026 WL 1898557, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 2, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Harrell v. State, No. 11-22-00261-CR, 2024 WL 39936, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 4, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). Further, the evidence also supports the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s claim that he subjectively believed that his use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself from Brothers’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, and that the deadly force he used was commensurate with the deadly force alleged to be used against him by Brothers. See PENAL §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(a), (b); see also Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 32– 33; Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). 10  In Barron, we analyzed a sufficiency challenge in a self-defense context. See Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 404–05 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). There, the evidence supporting the defendant’s claim of self-defense was primarily based on his statements, and we emphasized that the defendant’s claim largely turned on a credibility determination—which is within the jury’s sole province to resolve. Id. at 404. Here, like the evidence that the defendant contended supported his claim of self-defense in Barron, the evidence upon which Appellant relies to support his self- defense assertion is derived almost entirely from the statements that he made to law enforcement after the altercation. Because, Appellant’s theory of self-defense was inherently a credibility determination for the jury to resolve, the jury was free to reject it. See Saxton, 804 S.W.3d at 914; see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611– 13; Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404. Further, when the record supports conflicting inferences, as it does here, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762. As with the discrepancies in Barron, evidence was presented that diluted Appellant’s claim of self-defense—namely that he told police he had stabbed Brothers only once when she in fact had at least seven stab wounds. See Hill v. State, 99 S.W.3d 248, 253 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction rejecting his self-defense claim when there is evidence that both supports his claim and evidence that contradicts it). Because Appellant claims to have stabbed Brothers only after he took the knife from her, Officer Hanson testified that this would have dispelled any potential threat and negated the need for Appellant to stab Brothers “seven times.” Detective Heinz testified about wounds that appear on the non-dominant hand of a perpetrator—like Appellant’s injuries—because of a stabbing incident. Moreover, Brothers’s testimony—that Appellant “went berserk” and began stabbing 11 her without provocation—further negates Appellant’s claim. See Padilla v. State, 254 S.W.3d 585, 589–90 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d) (discussing how a victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a jury’s guilty verdict for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon). Appellant also asserts that inconsistencies in Brothers’s testimony renders the evidence insufficient. Appellant points to the inconsistencies regarding Brothers’s cell phone placement, the effect of consuming alcohol after giving plasma, what she told law enforcement about how the altercation began, and which object Appellant placed on the dashboard of the vehicle—a gun or a knife. However, as we have said, when inconsistencies exist in a witness’s testimony, the jury may believe all, some, or none of the testimony, and we resolve the inconsistencies in favor of the verdict. Fernandez v. State, No. 11-17-00110-CR, 2018 WL 1595660, at *3 (Tex. App.— Eastland Mar. 30, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Lee v. State, 259 S.W.3d 785, 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (finding the evidence to be legally sufficient that the jury rejected the defendant’s self-defense claim despite there being inconsistencies among the witness’s accounts of what they observed). We have reviewed all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, and we hold that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and could have also found against Appellant on his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. As the courts for decades have held, a guilty verdict is tantamount to and an implicit rejection of the defendant’s claim of self- defense and version of events. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611–13; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404. Such is the case here. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. 12  B. Rule 403 In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted extraneous evidence of a previous incident and prior arguments between him and Brothers because that evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. TEX. R. EVID. 403. In particular, Appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of Brothers’s testimony regarding the 2018 incident, where Brothers stated that Appellant punched her in the mouth and held “[s]ome kind of object” against her stomach. 1. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence—including extraneous-offense evidence—under an abuse of discretion standard. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Arevalo v. State, 675 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We will uphold the trial court’s decision if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670–71 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.). “The [trial] court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added). “Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible.” Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 402). Further, Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that such evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. See Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Rodriguez v. State, 732 S.W.3d 289, 294 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, pet. ref’d) (citing Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). Thus, the party who opposes the admission of evidence bears the burden to 13 overcome this presumption by showing the opposite—that the probative value of the proffered evidence is substantially outweighed by any of the dangers listed in Rule 403. Rodriguez, 732 S.W.3d at 294. Trial courts are given “substantial discretion in ‘balancing’ probative value on the one hand and ‘unfair prejudice’ on the other.” Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on orig. subm.)). Therefore, “[a]s long as the trial court’s ruling is within the ‘zone of reasonable disagreement,’ there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s ruling will be upheld.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343–44 (quoting Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391 (op. on reh’g)). 2. Application The Court of Criminal Appeals in Gigliobianco outlined a six-factor test for balancing the probative nature of evidence with its potential harm under Rule 403. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The factors that the trial court must consider and balance are: (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Id.; Roe v. State, 660 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. ref’d). We will address each factor in turn. However, before we do, we note at the outset that, in circumstances such as this, evidence of extraneous conduct is admissible. As we have held, when an accused raises a claim of self-defense, as Appellant did here, the State may introduce 14 evidence of prior acts of violence or other misconduct committed by the accused against the victim of the charged offense to show intent, that he was the aggressor, and to rebut the asserted defensive theory. Render v. State, 347 S.W.3d 905, 921 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing Halliburton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)). Additionally, Article 38.371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for the admission of evidence of prior acts of violence and other aggressive behavior that have occurred between the defendant and the victim to illustrate the nature of their relationship. Luna v. State, 687 S.W.3d 79, 102 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d); see CRIM. PROC. art. 38.371 (West Supp. 2025). The first factor focuses on the inherent probative value of the proffered evidence. “[P]robative value” refers to how strongly an item of evidence “serves to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation[,] coupled with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.” Roe, 660 S.W.3d 784– 85 (quoting Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641). When the defendant raises a claim of self-defense, his motive is placed in issue. See Halliburton, 528 S.W.2d at 218; see also TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). Here, evidence of the prior arguments and the 2018 incident between Appellant and Brothers is probative of Appellant’s motive, intent, and the nature of their relationship. Appellant contended that Brothers was the aggressor and that he only stabbed her in self-defense. At the time of the altercation that led to the charged offense, Appellant and Brothers had been in a volatile, “on-and-off” relationship for approximately ten years. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that this extraneous-offense evidence was probative to show Appellant’s motive and to explain the dynamics of his and Brothers’s relationship. As such, the first factor weighs in favor of admission. The second factor concerns the proponent’s need to present the extraneous evidence. It is reasonable to conclude that the State had a significant need to present 15 this evidence because there were no independent witnesses to the stabbing. In Luna, we addressed the importance of this type of evidence when the only witnesses to an altercation are the alleged perpetrator and the victim, especially when the perpetrator challenges the victim’s credibility, as Appellant did in this case. See Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 103 (The appellant challenged the victim’s credibility, but evidence of his prior assaults and abusive conduct against her tended to make it less likely that a complainant fabricated the charged offenses.). Moreover, the need to present this evidence is especially high when the accused asserts that the victim was the aggressor. See id. Here, like in Luna, Appellant challenged Brothers’s credibility, provided a contrary version of events, and asserted that it was Brothers who was the aggressor. Therefore, the State’s need for this evidence to both rebut Appellant’s self-defense claim and to rehabilitate Brothers was great. As such, the second factor weighs in favor of admission. As for the third factor, the evidence does not suggest that the jury made a decision on an improper basis. The term “unfair prejudice” does not mean that the evidence is merely harmful to the opposing party, “[r]ather it refers to ‘an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). In Luna, the extraneous offenses that were admitted were not as serious when compared to the offense with which the defendant was on trial and convicted. Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 104. In that case, the extraneous offenses consisted of the defendant tackling the victim, kicking her, choking her, and giving her a concussion, while the charged offense involved, in part, splitting her pancreas in half and killing her unborn child. Id. As with the disparity in Luna, the one extraneous offense that was presented related to Appellant punching Brothers in the mouth—that resulted in her receiving stitches—while he pressed an object against her stomach. That extraneous 16 act is in stark contrast to Appellant’s much more egregious conduct—stabbing Brothers with a knife ten times which required thirty-seven stitches to close the wounds. Further, to mitigate any potential improper consideration of the extraneous evidence, the trial court included a limiting instruction in its charge that read “[t]he State is offering this evidence to rebut the defense’s theory of self-defense[,]” and that the jury should not consider this evidence for any other purpose. Absent evidence to the contrary, and there is none, we presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. See Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Render, 347 S.W.3d at 921. Thus, given the nature of the admitted extraneous-offense evidence, the trial court’s limiting instruction, and its charge, there is little, if any, risk that the jury based their verdict on an improper basis. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of admission. As to the fourth and fifth factors, there is minimal risk, if any, that the extraneous evidence would tend to confuse, distract, or mislead the jury. The extraneous-offense evidence was not scientific in nature, nor was it overly complex. See Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 104 (holding that evidence favored admission when it was in the form of testimony by a lay witness who described the acts “in a factual, straightforward manner”); Blake v. State, No. 11-23-00165-CR, 2024 WL 3607930, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 1, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (describing how when the evidence is not scientific or complex, that can weigh in favor of admission). Therefore, the fourth and fifth factors weigh in favor of admission. As for the sixth factor, minimal time was spent developing the evidence of Appellant’s prior extraneous acts. Appellant’s trial spanned two days and the discussion of his extraneous offenses, both during direct and cross-examination, 17 covered about eleven pages of the trial transcript, whereas the testimony of the other six individuals who testified covered over ninety-five pages. See Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 104 (holding that the time used to develop the extraneous-offense evidence was a small fraction when it covered only thirteen pages of a one-hundred-eighty-page record). Thus, the time needed to develop this evidence can hardly be characterized as excessive. Additionally, Appellant appears to concede that the time devoted to the extraneous issues was minimal when he states in his brief that “there was little time required to present the evidence of the extraneous offense information.” Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of admission. Having balanced all the Gigliobianco factors and considering the highly deferential standard of review that we must employ, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted extraneous-offense evidence of Appellant’s prior interactions with Brothers. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue. III. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE October 8, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 18