Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 16, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00852-CR ——————————— LEONARDO JULIAN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 7 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2510407 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found Leonardo Julian guilty of the misdemeanor offense of violating a family-violence protective order. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.07(a)(3)(A), (g). On appeal, Julian argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the trial court erred in the way in which it charged the jury, and his trial lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the error in the charge. We affirm. BACKGROUND Jennifer Calixto and Leonardo Julian once had a long-term romantic relationship. When it came to an end, Calixto obtained a family-violence protective order against Julian. The protective order barred him from going to or near her residence, which was identified as 9595 Westview Drive #703 in the order. Two months later, Calixto filed a notification of change of address with the court that had rendered the protective order. The notification identified her new address as 1605 Huge Oaks Street, and Calixto checked a box on the notification specifying that she did not want the court to keep her new address confidential. Three months afterward, Julian showed up at 1605 Huge Oaks Street. Calixto awoke sometime after midnight to the sound of loud music and an engine revving. She looked out a window and saw Julian park on the street, exit his vehicle, and approach her own car, which was parked in the driveway. She then dialed 9-1-1. The State charged Julian with violating the protective order. Calixto was the only witness to testify at the resulting trial. The jury found Julian guilty. 2 DISCUSSION I. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict. Julian argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict because there is no evidence that he knew Calixto resided at the address in question—1605 Huge Oaks Street. He maintains this is so because the State failed to introduce any evidence that he received notice of Calixto’s change of address. A. Standard of review The evidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Hernandez v. State, 727 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). Jurors may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and they may rely on their common sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and everyday observations when drawing inferences from the evidence. Id. We may not reevaluate their evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. B. Applicable law 1. Family-violence protective orders On notice and hearing of an application for a protective order, Chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code requires a trial court to render a protective order if it finds family violence has occurred. TEX. FAM. CODE § 85.001(a), (b)(1); see also id. §§ 81.001, 82.041–.043 (mandating rendition of protective order under Chapter 85 3 on finding of family violence and requiring notice of both application and hearing on application). Among other things, a protective order based on family violence may prohibit a person found to have committed family violence from “going to or near the residence” of the person who is protected by the order. Id. § 85.022(b)(3). A protected person’s actual address may or may not be stated in the protective order, depending on whether the protected person requests that this information be kept confidential. See id. § 85.007(a)(1) (protected person may request address, county of residence, and other information be excluded from protective order); see also id. § 82.011 (allowing applicant for protective order to request confidentiality of mailing address and county of residence). When the protected person’s address is kept confidential, it is stricken from the public records of the trial court, and the clerk of court maintains a confidential record of the information accessible only by the court or a law enforcement agency to allow its entry into a law enforcement database. See id. § 85.007(b); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 411.042(b)(6). If the protected person’s address is not kept confidential and is stated in the protective order, he or she “may file a notification of change of address” with the trial court that rendered it “to modify the information contained in the order.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 87.004(a). The clerk of the court is required to attach the notification to the protective order and deliver a copy to the respondent (the one against whom the order was rendered) by registered or certified mail. Id. § 87.004(b)(1). 4 Filing a change-of-address notification “does not affect the validity of the order.” Id. § 87.004(c). Nor does attachment of the notification to the order. Id.1 2. Violation of protective orders A person commits a Class A misdemeanor if, in violation of a family-violence protective order issued under Chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, he knowingly or intentionally goes to or near the residence, as specifically described in the order, of a protected person. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.07(a)(3)(A), (g); Navarro v. State, No. 01-22-00325-CR, 2023 WL 5760869, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). To secure a conviction for this crime, the State must prove two things. It must show the accused had knowledge of the protective order or of the application for the protective order and that a hearing would be held to decide whether to issue one. See Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368, 371–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (explaining that penal statute incorporates Chapter 85’s notice and hearing requirements for issuance of family- violence protective order and thus requires proof of knowledge of order or possibility that one could issue). The State also must show the accused knowingly or 1 Several sections of the Family Code—specifically, sections 82.011, 85.001, 85.007, and 87.004—were amended in 2025, long after the protective order was rendered and the notification of change of address was filed in this case. None of these 2025 amendments are applicable in this appeal. We cite the versions of these sections that were in effect when the order was rendered and the notification was filed. Because the particular provisions discussed and cited in the text were not repealed by the 2025 amendments, our citations remain accurate under the current versions of these statutes. 5 intentionally went to or near a protected person’s residence. See id. at 371; see also Wesley v. State, 605 S.W.3d 909, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (penal statute requires proof accused visited place prohibited by protective order and did so with understanding that visiting this place violated order). C. Analysis The record contains ample evidence that Julian had knowledge of the protective order. The order recites that he appeared at the hearing resulting in the order’s issuance, and Calixto testified that he appeared by ZOOM at the hearing. In addition, the protective order indicates that the parties agreed to its issuance. Julian does not dispute that he knew of the protective order. Nor does he dispute that he knew it prohibited him from going to or near Calixto’s residence. Julian instead asserts there is no evidence that he knew Calixto resided at 1605 Huge Oaks Street when he went there. He argues that this is so because the State failed to introduce any evidence that a copy of the change-of-address notification filed by Calixto showing she had since moved to this address was delivered to him. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 87.004(b)(1) (clerk must deliver copy of notification). But the State did not need to prove delivery of a copy of the change-of-address notification as an element of the offense. While the introduction of evidence of delivery is one way in which the State could have proved that Julian knew Calixto resided at 1605 Huge Oaks Street, the State was not restricted to this method of 6 proving he knew she lived there. See Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 915–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (while statute requires proof of knowledge, it does not require knowledge to be proved in particular way, such as by proof of delivery or receipt of order in question). The State could instead prove Julian knew this via circumstantial evidence. See id. at 916. Julian acknowledges the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Hammack, and he concedes that the State could prove he knew Calixto resided at 1605 Huge Oaks Street via circumstantial evidence. But he says the State did not do so. On the record before us, we disagree. The State introduced evidence that: ● per section 87.004 of the Family Code, Calixto filed a notification of her change of address to 1605 Huge Oaks Street in December 2023; ● in her notice, Calixto checked a box indicating that she did not want this new address to be confidential (withheld from those receiving notice); ● the notice states the statute requires the clerk of the court to attach it to the original protective order and send it to the respondent (Julian); ● several months after Calixto filed the notice, in March 2024, Julian drove to 1605 Huge Oaks Street, arriving sometime around midnight; ● during this visit, Julian played a Spanish love song loudly enough for Calixto to hear it even though she remained inside the residence; and ● Calixto understood this love song as an expression of Julian’s continued feelings for her: how much misses her and his inability to move on. Standing alone, none of these six circumstances necessarily shows that Julian knowingly or intentionally went to or near 1605 Huge Oaks Street with the awareness that Calixto resided there and that his visit therefore violated the 7 protective order. But when considered together, a rational juror could reasonably infer Julian went there knowing that this is where Calixto resided so that he could convey to her how he felt about her and the end of their romantic relationship. See Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt, so long as cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support jury’s guilty verdict). 2 2 The parties spar over the significance of the statutory requirement that the clerk deliver the change-of-address notification to Julian. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 87.004(b). Citing civil decisions, the State argues we should presume the clerk sent and Julian received this notice because there is a presumption that public officials discharge their legal duties. Julian says doing so would impermissibly shift the burden of proof to him. We need not wade into this dispute. The jury was not instructed on any such presumption in the charge, which rightly told the jury that Julian was neither required to prove his innocence nor required to produce any evidence at all and further explained that he did not have the burden to prove anything. But having been informed of the clerk’s statutory duty to deliver the change-of-address notification to Julian by the notification itself, which states this on the face of the document and was admitted into evidence, the jury could have taken this duty into account, along with the other surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether they together raised an inference that Julian knew Calixto resided at 1605 Huge Oaks Street when he went there. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (appellate court looks to combined and cumulative force of all evidence, viewed in light most favorable to verdict, when deciding whether inferences necessary to support guilty verdict are reasonable). Julian also argues there is no way he could have independently discovered that Calixto filed the notification, as it was misfiled under a different cause number than the protective order. Delivery or discovery of this notice are not the only ways in which Julian could have become aware of Calixto’s new address, of course. But in any event, there is no evidence that the change-of-address notification was misfiled. The cause number for the protective-order proceeding was 2023-68750, and the notification mistakenly transposed two of these digits to read 2023-67850. Nonetheless, the only copies of the protective order and change-of-address notification in the trial record consist of a single document in which the order and notification are combined as one and which the district clerk has certified as a true and correct copy of the original filed or recorded with the clerk’s office. This indicates that the change-of-address 8 Julian points out that he and Calixto had previously lived together at 1605 Huge Oaks Street before their relationship ended, he knows the elderly couple who owns this home and also resides there, and he remained there only briefly during the March 2024 episode.3 Julian seems to suggest these circumstances show his presence that night was innocent and without knowledge that he would find Calixto there, rather than a knowing or intentional violation of the protective order. Perhaps a rational juror could have drawn this inference from these circumstances—though we note such a juror might reasonably question why Julian would choose to visit an elderly couple after midnight while loudly playing a love song. But the jurors did not draw the inference Julian urges, and even when the evidence supports reasonable but conflicting inferences, we must defer to the jury’s resolution of this evidentiary conflict. Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). The evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Julian is guilty of violating the family-violence protective order. We overrule his first issue. notification was filed in the correct case, as the notification is affixed to the protective order as required by statute. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 87.004(b). 3 The elderly couple are the Harpers, Joe and Josephine, who are 92 and 72 years old, respectively. Julian and Calixto have known the Harpers for many years, and Calixto testified they are like family to her. 9 II. The trial court did not reversibly err in the way it charged the jury. Julian argues that the jury charge was erroneous because it did not require the jury to find that he had “been served or given notice of” Calixto’s change of address. Without this additional instruction about Calixto’s change of address or an instruction explaining the law regarding evidentiary presumptions, Julian claims the existing jury charge “resulted in an unconstitutional presumption” of service or notice of this change of address because it “left out that he had to ‘know’ the address where he was not supposed to be.” Having failed to make these objections in the trial court, Julian says these errors in the jury charge egregiously harmed him. A. Standard of review We review all complaints of jury-charge error. See Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We first assess whether the charge is erroneous. Id. If it is erroneous, we then determine whether the error was harmful under the applicable harm standard: some harm for complaints raised at trial and egregious harm for complaints that are being raised for the first time on appeal. Id. B. Analysis Julian’s complaint is directed at the application paragraph, which the Court of Criminal Appeals has described as “the ‘heart and soul’ of the jury charge” because it “specifies the factual circumstances under which the jury should convict or acquit.” Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Julian 10 asserts that the application paragraph here did not specify the factual circumstances under which the jury could render a guilty verdict in that it did not require the jury to find that Julian knew he was going to or near Calixto’s residence when he visited 1605 Huge Oaks Street and thus was knowingly violating the protective order by doing so. We disagree that the application paragraph was erroneous in this way. The application paragraph reads as follows: Now, therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about March 21, 2024, in Harris County, Texas, the Defendant, Leonardo Julian, did then and there unlawfully, with knowledge of the issuance of a family violence protective order issued under Chapter 85 of the Family Code, intentionally, violate said order by intentionally or knowingly go[ing] to or near a place specifically described in the order, to wit: the residence of a protected individual, namely 1605 Huge Oaks St Houston, Texas, then you [w]ill find the defendant ‘guilty’ of violating a protective order as charged in the information. (Emphasis added.) Fairly read, this application paragraph required the jury to find that Julian knew of the protective order and intentionally violated it by intentionally or knowingly going to or near the residence of a protected person—specifically, 1605 Huge Oaks Street. The first use of “intentionally” in the application paragraph required Julian’s violation of the protective order to be intentional in nature, and the jury charge had already defined “intentionally” by specifying that one “acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct . . . when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct.” So, the application paragraph excluded accidental or unintentional violations of the order. It required 11 the jury to find that Julian intended to violate the order by going to 1605 Huge Oaks Street, which implicitly was possible only if he knew Calixto resided there. It could not have been his conscious objective to violate the order without that knowledge. To be sure, the application paragraph arguably could have been clearer in this respect. But we need not endorse it as a model jury charge to hold that it is not erroneous. See Mayer v. State, 494 S.W.3d 844, 853–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (jury charge that did not explicitly require jury to find defendant had knowledge of accident to convict him of offense of failing to stop and render aid was not ideal or model charge but was not erroneous given that such knowledge was impliedly required by charge); see also Herrera v. State, No. 02-25- 00153-CR, 2026 WL 1700303, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 11, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (charge not erroneous even though not a model of clarity so long as it adequately states applicable law). It is enough that the charge conveyed to the jury that Julian had to understand he was violating the order to be found guilty. The application paragraph of the charge did so. Thus, the charge is not erroneous in the way Julian asserts. We overrule his second issue. III. Julian’s lawyer was not ineffective in failing to object to the jury charge. Julian asserts his trial lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object that the charge did not require the jury to find he violated the protective order by going to 1605 Huge Oaks Street knowing that Calixto resided there. As we have 12 rejected Julian’s contention that the jury charge was erroneous in this way, we likewise reject his ineffective-assistance claim; a defense lawyer does not render deficient performance by failing to make objections to the jury charge that lack merit. See Vaughn v. State, 888 S.W.2d 62, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994) (counsel not ineffective by failing to object to jury charge absent error in charge), aff’d, 931 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Lewis v. State, 693 S.W.3d 453, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. ref’d) (ineffective-assistance claim premised on lawyer’s failure to object to jury charge necessarily fails when appellate court holds charge was not erroneous). We overrule his third issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. David Gunn Justice Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Gunn. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 13