Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ________________ NO. 09-25-00218-CR ________________ GRANT AARON BURNS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 221st District Court Montogomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 20-01-01566 ________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Grant Aaron Burns (“Burns”) was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.122(d). The jury assessed Burns’s punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. In one issue, Burns argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a surveillance video that was not properly authenticated. We hold that the trial court 1 did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of surveillance video and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Background On January 28, 2020, Detective Jonathan Jordan, then assigned to the Organized Crime Unit of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, conducted surveillance of Burns. The surveillance began at a residence on Oakwood Drive in Montgomery County, where Burns’s registered vehicle was located. Burns later traveled into the Houston area and entered a neighborhood, where he eventually stopped at a residence before returning north toward Montgomery County. Jordan requested assistance from the Montgomery County Narcotics Enforcement Team. Detective Justin Schutzenhofer joined the surveillance and later observed Burns interact with an unknown male at a gas station in what, based on Schutzenhofer’s training and experience, he believed “was a hand-to-hand drug transaction.” Officers continued surveillance as Burns traveled north into Montgomery County. As part of the team’s surveillance, Detective Michael Uber later reconnected with Burns’s vehicle, observed traffic violations, and relayed the violations to Sergeant Tyler Hall, who was in a marked patrol unit near Rayford Road. Hall conducted a traffic stop in a nearby parking lot off the service road and identified Burns as the driver and Alana McBride as the passenger. Burns denied that illegal 2 narcotics were in the vehicle and refused consent to search, after which Hall requested a canine unit. The canine alerted to the odor of narcotics, and officers searched the vehicle. Officers found an empty syringe and a black “ziplock” bag containing a scale, a “white chalky-type substance,” a pill imprinted with “U31,” additional syringes, currency, and a white envelope. After Burns was transported to jail, detectives searched the surrounding area for anything that may have been thrown from the vehicle. Schutzenhofer testified that he drove through the area where Burns had pulled into the parking lot and observed a white-colored package on the dark, wet concrete. A TruNarc analyzer returned a presumptive positive for the presence of heroin. The recovered package was submitted to the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory, and it was determined the substance contained 123.31 grams of heroin.1 Hall’s dashcam video captured portions of the traffic stop and was admitted without objection. Hall also testified that the dashcam video showed a “white object” appear on the ground near the parking lot entrance. Jordan returned to the area the following day because officers believed surveillance cameras may have captured the incident, and he obtained surveillance video from a nearby building. 1 Forensic Scientist Lauren Chacon explained that the other item, a digital scale containing residue, was not tested because the policy is that they “test up to the highest penalty.” 3 At trial, Hall testified that he had reviewed State’s Exhibit 19, was familiar with its contents, and believed it accurately reflected his observations on the scene. He identified State’s Exhibit 19 as surveillance video “from the building” where the traffic stop occurred. The video had no audio.2 When the State offered State’s Exhibit 19, defense counsel took Hall on voir dire. Hall testified that he did not personally retrieve the surveillance video, was not present when it was recovered, and knew nothing about how it came into the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office’s possession. Defense counsel objected, and the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the surveillance video. The State then published the surveillance video to the jury. Hall testified that it showed the traffic stop and “a white object” coming from Burns’s vehicle, and he agreed that it showed “the suspected narcotics flying out of the vehicle.” Hall also testified that the area depicted in the surveillance video was the same area he had observed on his dashcam video. The State also introduced several screenshots from the surveillance video. Other evidence admitted at trial included three cell phones, more than $1,000 in cash, and text messages from Burns’s phone. Jordan testified that, based on his training and experience, the quantity of heroin, cash, scales, and multiple phones 2 State’s Exhibit 19 bears the label “2020-01-28-Southwest Driveway 2020- 01-28 21:18:58.” 4 were circumstances associated with dealing. He also discussed several text messages concerning quantities, prices, meeting locations, ounces, and a “brick” as communications consistent with drug transactions. The jury found Burns guilty as charged in the indictment and assessed punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Burns timely appealed. In his sole issue, Burns complains that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibit 19, a surveillance video, through Hall, whom he contends could not properly authenticate it or prove chain of custody. [ANT Br. 7–8, 10] Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review a trial court’s ruling on authentication for an abuse of discretion. Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under this deferential standard, if the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, an appellate court must uphold the court’s admissibility decision. Id.; Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citation omitted). A trial judge is given considerable latitude regarding evidentiary rulings. Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848. Rule 901, which governs the authentication requirement for the admissibility of evidence, requires the proponent of an item to “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). The authentication requirement is a “‘liberal standard of admissibility.’” 5 Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849 (quoting Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). The proponent must only produce sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact finder could properly find authenticity. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. “Conclusive proof of authenticity before allowing the admission of disputed evidence is not required.” Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848 (citation omitted). It is ultimately the jury’s role to determine whether an item of evidence is indeed what its proponent claims; the trial court need only make the preliminary determination that the proponent of the evidence has supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic. Id. at 848–49 (citation omitted); Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600. Evidence may be authenticated in a number of ways, including through direct testimony from a witness with personal knowledge, by comparison with other authenticated evidence, or by circumstantial evidence. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638; see also Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600–01; Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Evidence may be authenticated by showing “[d]istinctive characteristics and the like: [a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.” (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(4))). “Video recordings without audio are treated as photographs and are properly authenticated when it can be proved that the images accurately represent the scene 6 in question and are relevant to a disputed issue.” Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849 (citation omitted). “[T]he most common way to authenticate a video is through the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge who observed the scene[.]” Id. In this situation, the sponsoring witness does not have to be the person who operated the camera or video equipment. See Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Another permissible way to authenticate a photograph or video is through testimony that the process or system that produced the photograph or video is reliable. See Standmire v. State, 475 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. ref’d). This means of authentication is most often used when there is no witness that was present at the scene or event depicted in the photograph or video. Id. Analysis In support of his complaint that the surveillance video was not properly authenticated, Burns argues that Hall lacked personal knowledge of the events depicted or of how the video was recorded, retrieved, edited, or preserved, and could not say whether the recording system was functioning properly or the timestamp was accurate. The record supports the trial court’s determination that the surveillance video was sufficiently authenticated and that the State, as the proponent of the evidence, supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848–49 (citation omitted); Butler, 7 459 S.W.3d at 600. Hall was present during the traffic stop, and he had personal knowledge of the scene depicted in the video. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849. He testified that he had reviewed State’s Exhibit 19, was familiar with its contents, and believed it accurately reflected his observations of the scene. He explained that the area depicted in the surveillance video was the same area he had observed during the traffic stop. Although Hall did not personally observe the object leave Burns’s vehicle, he personally witnessed the traffic stop and was familiar with the scene depicted in the video. Therefore, Hall’s testimony supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that State’s Exhibit 19 was what the State claimed it to be—a surveillance video depicting the scene and traffic stop. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848; Standmire, 475 S.W.3d at 344–45. Because the surveillance video was authenticated through Hall’s personal knowledge, the State did not have to authenticate it by other means or methods, such as establishing how the recording was retrieved or preserved or proving the reliability of the recording system or process. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848; Standmire, 475 S.W.3d at 344–45. Accordingly, we hold the trial court acted within the zone of reasonable disagreement and did not abuse its discretion in admitting the surveillance video over Burns’s objection. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848; Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. We overrule Burns’s sole issue on appeal. 8 Conclusion Having overruled Burns’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. AFFIRMED. W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice Submitted on September 11, 2026 Opinion Delivered October 14, 2026 Do Not Publish Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ. 9