Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 8, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00138-CR __________ WELDON WILLIAM NEEDHAM, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 70th District Court Ector County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. A-23-1084-CR MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Appellant, Weldon William Needham, of three counts of sexual assault of a child, each a second-degree felony, and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(a)(2), (f), 21.02(b), (h) (West 2026). The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) for each count of sexual assault of a child and fifty-three years’ imprisonment in TDCJ for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered that Appellant’s sentences be served consecutively. In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant only challenges his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child, arguing that the evidence is insufficient because “the [S]tate failed to establish evidence of the starting or ending date of the abuse.” Appellant further mentions, albeit briefly, that “the trial court erred in providing a jury charge after the guilt/innocence phase . . . that failed to provide the date or dates necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had committed the crime of continuous sexual abuse”; however, he clarifies that his argument on appeal is that, “[a]s a result of the trial court [sic] and the State failing to produce any evidence as to when the alleged sexual abuse began, the evidence was legally insufficient for the jury to find that Appellant committed [the offense].” In this regard, he specifies that: “[In] Appellant’s only point of error, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support [Appellant’s] conviction as to Count Seven” alleging continuous sexual abuse.1 We affirm. 1 It is unclear whether Appellant is raising a distinct charge-error complaint or if it is his intent to combine this “complaint” with his sufficiency argument. It appears to be the latter. However, to the extent that Appellant attempts to raise this issue, it fails because he advances no argument to support it and does not state what harm, if any, resulted from the charge that was given by the trial court. In fact, Appellant’s only reference to this “complaint” consists of a single, short paragraph in his brief, with no supporting argument or analysis, that generally alludes to the Almanza standard that we employ when reviewing charge-error complaints. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Therefore, we conclude that any such complaint, if there is one, is subsumed within Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which, as we discuss below, supports Appellant’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. 2 I. Factual Background A.A.C. and A.J.C. 2 are the minor victims alleged in Count Seven of the indictment, and which is the subject of this appeal. Therefore, we only recite the facts that are necessary to address the issue raised on appeal. A.A.C.’s and A.J.C.’s mother, K.M., resided with the children in Odessa and frequently spent time with Appellant and her sister, who was common-law married to Appellant. K.M. was raised in Odessa, but she moved to Virginia with A.A.C. and A.J.C. in March 2021. In August 2021, K.M. and the children returned to Odessa. Soon after K.M., A.A.C., and A.J.C. moved back to Odessa, K.M. began noticing how Appellant interacted with A.A.C. when the two of them were alone; Appellant’s behavior made K.M. uncomfortable. Appellant, whom the family referred to as “Bud” or “Uncle Bud,” would “sit in the room with [A.A.C.]” in an area that “was kind of obscured from view.” After the third time this occurred, K.M. stated, “[W]e’re not going to sit with Uncle Bud anymore” because she “was uncomfortable with it.” Because of this, K.M. said that she, A.A.C., and A.J.C. would spend less time at Appellant’s home; however, after her and her sister’s father died, Appellant and her sister “were over at the house sometimes” and she visited their home “several times.” One day, in June 2023, K.M. was at Appellant’s home with A.A.C. and A.J.C. At the time, A.A.C. was eight and A.J.C. was five. Sometime during this visit, K.M.’s sister advised K.M. that she “just caught [Appellant] with [A.A.C.]’s panties down and his phone light on. In the bedroom.” K.M. and the children left immediately. To protect the identity of the child victims and their family members, we refer to them by either 2 pseudonyms or initials. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3). 3 Shortly thereafter, A.A.C. told K.M. that Appellant had touched her “hiney” in the bedroom, which K.M. said, and according to her family’s terminology, refers to “the front private area.” K.M. called and reported this incident to the sexual abuse hotline and local law enforcement. A.A.C. was subsequently interviewed by Berenice Garcia, a forensic interviewer with Harmony Home in Odessa. A.A.C. later told K.M. that Appellant had touched her “hiney” and when K.M. asked, “without panties, with panties?” she replied, “Without panties.” At trial, Garcia testified that, during A.A.C.’s interview, A.A.C. outcried and stated that Appellant “would touch her hiney with one or two fingers under her clothes” and that this had occurred “a lot of times” and ever “since [A.A.C.] was a baby.” Garcia was able to clarify, using an anatomical drawing, that when A.A.C. used the term “hiney,” she was referring to her vagina. A.A.C. also told Lisa Montoya, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), that “[Appellant] touch[ed] her hiney under her clothes,” and that “it happened” more than ten times but less than twenty. Like Garcia, Montoya was able to confirm with A.A.C., by using a diagram, that when A.A.C. referred to her “hiney,” she meant her vagina. In addition to her disclosures to Garcia and Montoya, at trial, A.A.C. testified that Appellant touched her “front privates” with his finger underneath her underwear “every time that [they] would go [to Appellant’s home]” and that “[i]t would always hurt.” During her interview with Garcia, A.J.C. initially did not discuss her interactions with Appellant. However, during a second interview with Garcia, A.J.C. made outcries of Appellant’s sexual abuse that occurred when he touched her “hiney.” As with A.A.C., Garcia confirmed that A.J.C. meant her vagina when she referred to her “hiney.” A.J.C. also told Abigail Carrasco, a SANE nurse, that Appellant “touched her in her privates” and indicated on a diagram that she was referring to “the female genitals as the area where [Appellant] touched her.” At trial, 4 A.J.C. testified that Appellant touched her “private” with his hand “[m]ore than one time” and that “once it felt like a massage.” II. Analysis In his sole issue, Appellant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that he committed the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. A. Standard of Review We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. This standard is deferential 5 and accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Thus, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. Each fact need not point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the charged offense as defined in a hypothetically correct charge for the case. Morgan v. 6 State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240. B. Application A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if: (1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and (2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is: (A) a child younger than 14 years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the victim at the time of the offense. PENAL § 21.02(b). The term “act of sexual abuse” means an act that violates one or more penal laws as specified in Section 21.02(c), which includes the offense of indecency with a child by contact. Id. §§ 21.02(c)(2), 21.11(a)(1). Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of the children because “the State failed to establish evidence of the starting or ending date of the abuse due to a complete lack of testimony considering that evidence.” The State contends that there is sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that Appellant 7 committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against the children during a period of thirty days or more in duration. We agree with the State. “[A]lthough the exact dates of the [sexual] abuse need not be proven, the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child does require proof that there were two or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration.” Michell v. State, 381 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); see Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). For decades, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that child victims cannot be expected to testify with the same clarity and ability that is expected of mature and capable adults. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore, “[t]he legislature created the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child in response to a need to address sexual assaults against young children who are normally unable to identify the exact dates of the offenses when there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse.” Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561; see Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 890 n.7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring)). Moreover, the uncorroborated testimony of a child victim, without more, is sufficient to support a conviction for a sexual offense. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07 (West 2023); Chapman v. State, 349 S.W.3d 241, 245 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d); see also Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134. Count Seven of the indictment alleged that: [Appellant] . . . during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, to-wit: from on or about the 1st day of March, 2022, through on or about the 15th day of June, 2023, when [Appellant] was 17 years of age or older, did commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against children younger than 14 years of age, namely, acts constituting Indecency with a Child by Contact in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 21.11, to- 8 wit: with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, intentionally or knowingly engage in sexual contact with “AAC” and “AJC”, . . . children who were then and there younger than 17 years of age, by then and there touching the anus or any part of the genitals of said [children]. Here, sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support Appellant’s conviction. K.M. testified that after her father died in March 2022, “there were several times where [she, A.A.C., and A.J.C.] did go over to [Appellant’s] house.” K.M. also testified about the June 2023 incident where Appellant sexually abused both A.A.C. and A.J.C. at his home. According to A.A.C., Appellant’s acts of sexual abuse occurred “every time” she went to Appellant’s home and that she had been sexually abused by Appellant ever since she was “a baby.” In Wishert, we addressed a similar challenge. See Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 328–29 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d). There, the victim, while unable to present the specific dates of when the sexual abuse had occurred, testified that she was abused “almost every time” she was at the defendant’s home— she had lived at the defendant’s home during the summer and the following school year. Id. at 329. We concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. Id. Like the evidence in Wishert, A.A.C. testified about the frequency of Appellant’s sexual abuse. In fact, the testimony here is stronger than that in Wishert—according to A.A.C., the abuse occurred “every time” she was at Appellant’s home, as opposed to “almost every time.” While there is no evidence of the precise date that Appellant’s sexual abuse began, the evidence shows that at least two instances of sexual abuse occurred when A.A.C. was at Appellant’s home. These incidents occurred sometime after the death of K.M.’s father in March 2022— K.M. testified that she and her children went to Appellant’s home several times after her father’s death—and later in June 2023. The time span between March 2022 and 9 June 2023 well exceeds the statutorily required thirty-day period. See Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 329 (discussing how evidence that the victim was at the defendant’s home “intermittently from 2014 through 2017,” coupled with the victim stating the abuse occurred almost every time she stayed there supported the jury’s verdict that the defendant continuously sexually abused the child victim). Given A.A.C.’s disclosures to Garcia and Montoya and her testimony that Appellant touched her vagina with his finger underneath her clothes and in the bedroom “every time” that she went to Appellant’s home, a jury could reasonably conclude that, at a minimum, the two above encounters, alone, involved sexual abuse that amounted to indecency with a child by contact. See PENAL §§ 21.02(c)(2), 21.11(a)(1). And the sheer number of occasions that Appellant had sexually abused A.A.C.—at least ten times—further supports the jury’s verdict. See Soto v. State, No. 11-19-00214-CR, 2021 WL 3235881, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that because the sexual abuse occurred at least six times supported the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child). Moreover, A.A.C.’s testimony that Appellant’s acts of sexual abuse occurred repeatedly since she was a baby is, without more, sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt. See Lindsey v. State, No. 11-23-00237-CR, 2025 WL 51907, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 9, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (discussing how testimony that the sexual abuse began at a certain age can help establish the period of time such abuse occurred for purposes of meeting the requisite thirty-day period). Appellant further argues that the evidence allowed the jury to impermissibly speculate as to the dates when the alleged acts of sexual abuse occurred. However, “[s]peculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of the facts 10 and evidence presented.” Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). Conversely, “an inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). Here, the jury did not need to guess or speculate about the dates that Appellant’s acts of sexual abuse occurred. Instead, it was permitted to draw the reasonable inference, based on the evidence discussed above, that Appellant’s sexual abuse of A.A.C. spanned a duration that exceeded thirty days. In Lindsey, the appellant, like Appellant here, argued that because the precise dates of when the acts of sexual abuse occurred could not be determined, the only conclusion that could be reached by the jury was based on speculation. Lindsey, 2025 WL 51907, at *3–4. However, we reasoned that the evidence showed that the acts of sexual abuse began sometime before the victim was nine and ended on a certain date, and that this was sufficient to satisfy the thirty-day duration requirement and uphold the appellant’s conviction. Id. at *4. Thus, like the fact-based conclusion in Lindsey, there is a definitive time-period here that establishes at least when the sexual abuse began—in March 2022—and when it ended—in June 2023. Therefore, the jury’s finding that Appellant sexually abused A.A.C. continuously as contemplated by Section 21.02 is one that is based on a permissible logical inference, not speculation. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the record contains evidentiary puzzle pieces that the jury could have carefully fit together to rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s sexual abuse of A.A.C. occurred and exceeded a duration of thirty days or more. See Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“The trier of fact fits the pieces of the . . . puzzle together and weighs the credibility of each piece.”). Therefore, 11 considering the cumulative force of all the evidence, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child as charged in Count Seven of the indictment. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue. III. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgments of the trial court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE October 8, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 12