Murphy Ward v. the State of Texas

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00047-CR ___________________________ MURPHY WARD, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1809888 Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack  MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION After a jury found Appellant Murphy Ward guilty of the second-degree felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years’ confinement,1 he now appeals. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.02. In three points, Ward argues that the trial court erred in calculating the strike zone2 for alternate jurors, excluding criminal background information about the victim, and overruling Ward’s Batson challenge. We will affirm. II. BACKGROUND3 On August 14, 2022, Talon Connery was moving out of the apartment he had shared with Ward. Ward also shared the apartment with Connery’s mother, Franita. Because Connery and Ward had a contentious relationship, Connery had stored most of his belongings in the trunk of Franita’s car while he lived in the apartment. After spending time with Franita earlier in the day, Connery went back to his then-girlfriend 1 The indictment included one count of aggravated assault against a family member, one count—in two paragraphs—of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. At trial, the State abandoned one paragraph of the second count that alleged aggravated assault by threat. 2 The term “strike zone” is not defined by statute but refers to “the group of potential jurors capable of being on the jury.” Comeaux v. State, 445 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 3 Because evidentiary sufficiency is not at issue, we recite here only the facts of the offense and reserve further detailed background as necessary for analysis. 2 Chelsea’s apartment, where he received repeated calls from Franita informing him that Ward had thrown Connery’s belongings out of the trunk of the car and into the parking lot. While waiting for Connery to arrive, Franita moved his belongings away from the back of the car and piled them on the pavement nearby. Ward backed the car out of its parking space and stopped it in the lane of traffic facing the exit to the street. Connery and Chelsea arrived a few minutes later, and Connery began collecting his belongings. Franita helped him, and they argued while they worked. Chelsea drove her car further into the lot, turned around, parked behind Ward in the lane of travel, and then got out to help Connery and Franita. While Franita and Connery argued, Ward drove the car slowly into the back of Connery’s and Franita’s legs. Connery walked up to the car and slapped Ward. Chelsea walked out of the parking lot and shouted to Connery that they should leave. Ward stepped out of the car, argued with Connery, and then went back to the car. Connery turned to resume collecting his belongings.4 4 The foregoing was based upon Connery and Franita’s testimony at the final trial in this case and surveillance video taken of the apartment complex. Ward recalled several of the events differently. He first denied that he drove into Connery and Franita with the car and then later said that “the car bumped them just a little bit.” The State asked him if “the car did it by itself.” He replied, “That’s correct.” Ward also stated that Connery did not slap him but struck him in the face with a closed fist, picked him up by his collar, pushed him against a nearby fence, and then pushed him back into the car. 3  Ward retrieved Franita’s gun from the locked glove compartment of her car and shot Connery in the back from more than ten feet away.5 Police arrived shortly thereafter and arrested Ward. Ward was indicted for shooting Connery, pleaded not guilty, demanded a trial by jury, and elected to have his punishment, if any, assessed by the trial court. At the end of his trial, Ward was convicted of one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon causing bodily injury and sentenced to thirty-five years’ confinement with no fine. He now appeals. III. DISCUSSION In three points, Ward argues that he was deprived of a fair jury by the trial court’s method of selecting alternate jurors, that his testimony about the victim’s prior bad acts was improperly excluded, and that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge. 5 At trial, Ward said that he did not recall this event because he was “having a seizure or something.” He said that Franita retrieved the gun from the glove compartment and that “from that point on, I remember she and I were wrestling for the gun.” On cross-examination, Ward said he did not recall wrestling with Franita over the gun. He said that while he did shoot Connery in the back, he did so in self-defense because as Connery left he said, “I’ll be back.” Because Ward had seen photographs of Connery with handguns, he was afraid that Connery would arm himself and return. Ward also testified that he did not recall how he got the gun and did not recall shooting Connery. 4 A. Calculation of Alternate-Juror Strike Zone In his first point, Ward complains of the trial court’s method for selecting alternate jurors from the venire panel. He argues that the trial court’s practice of setting strike zones for the jury and for the alternate jurors before allowing the parties to exercise their peremptory challenges deprived him of the right to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. We begin by considering the process of which Ward complains. 1. Background The parties in this case each received ten peremptory challenges for jurors and one additional peremptory challenge for alternates. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 33.011, 35.15. After resolving the parties’ challenges for cause, both Ward and the State agreed with the trial court that the strike zone for the twelve jurors would be veniremembers one through thirty-nine, exclusive of those already struck or released. The trial court then set the strike zone for the alternate jurors to be the next four veniremembers, numbered forty through forty-three. Ward objected, arguing that the trial court erred by calculating the alternate-juror strike zone before the parties had exercised their peremptory challenges. The trial court asked Ward to “direct [it] to a provision in Chapter 35 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that would require the [court] to first determine the [twelve] jurors and then adjust or move the strike zone in accordance with” the objection. Ward responded that “there’s no law either way as to how the 5 [trial court] would decide which jurors are in the zone for being an alternate juror.” Ward argued that the strike zone as calculated could “render someone’s peremptory challenges . . . ineffective.” He explained: In other words, if we did it the [trial court’s] way and I exercised my peremptory challenge on Venireperson [forty-three] and the last person eligible to be on the jury is [forty-one], then I have been denied the exercise of my peremptory challenge because I had to exercise it on someone who wasn’t even . . . a possibility for the jury. The trial court overruled Ward’s objection “[i]n accordance with 35.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure” and recited again the two strike zones: after the challenges were resolved, the jury would be formed from the first twelve eligible veniremembers of those numbered one through thirty-nine, and the alternate jurors would be the first two eligible veniremembers of those numbered forty through forty-three. After both sides exercised their peremptory challenges,6 the trial court selected the first twelve eligible veniremembers to form the jury. The last selected juror’s number was thirty-three. The trial court then selected two alternate jurors from eligible veniremembers numbered forty through forty-three.7 There was one overlapping challenge, and the State exercised fewer than all its 6 challenges. The State struck veniremember forty. Ward struck veniremember forty-three. 7 Veniremembers forty-one and forty-two were selected as alternate jurors. 6  After the trial court resolved Ward’s Batson challenges, he renewed his earlier strike-zone objection and argued that because of the parties’ overlapping peremptory challenge and the State’s having used fewer than all of its challenges, the trial court should have recalculated the alternate-juror strike zone to begin with veniremember thirty-seven.8 The trial court articulated its understanding of his objection: And but for the Court’s earlier ruling[,] the two persons who have been selected to serve as alternates, [veniremembers forty-one and forty-two], according to you, . . . would not even have been within the window of opportunity to serve as alternate jurors because the window of opportunity to serve as an alternate juror would have been [thirty-seven], [thirty-eight], [thirty-nine], and [forty]; is that correct? Ward replied, “That is correct,” and then he elaborated: And, also, when it came time to exercise our peremptory challenge for the alternate, we exercised that on Venireperson [forty-three], and Venireperson [forty-three] is way down the line and was not in the zone of peremptory strikes for an alternate juror. That would have been [thirty-seven], [thirty-eight], [thirty-nine], and [forty]. The trial court then released the unselected veniremembers and proceeded with the trial. Citing the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ward argues on appeal that “[s]election of alternate jurors should be treated as distinct and separate from selection of the We note that this objection directly contradicts Ward’s argument on appeal 8 that his use of his alternate-juror peremptory challenge on veniremember forty-three was “ineffectual because it fell outside the zone of venirepersons from which the alternate jurors were selected” because the trial court did recalculate the strike zone— which the record shows the trial court did not do. 7 primary panel.” We therefore consider the prescribed procedure for selection of alternate jurors. 2. Applicable Law The Code of Criminal Procedure does not directly address whether a trial court should or even may calculate the strike zones for jurors and alternate jurors before allowing the parties to exercise peremptory challenges, but neither does it require the performance of two discrete processes. When forming juries in non-capital felony cases involving a single defendant—such as this one—the State and defendant shall each be entitled to ten peremptory challenges.9 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.15(b). The State and the defendant shall each be entitled to one additional peremptory challenge if—as in this case—two alternate jurors are to be impaneled. Id. art. 35.15(d). Additional peremptory challenges for alternate jurors may be used as to an alternate juror only, and other peremptory challenges allowed by law may not be used against an alternate juror. Id.10 “When the parties have made or declined to If two or more defendants are tried together, each defendant receives six 9 peremptory challenges, and the State receives six peremptory challenges per defendant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.15(b). 10 The Government Code contains a very similar statute, providing “one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law or by rule if one or two alternate jurors are to be impaneled.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 62.020(e). That statute also contains a restriction that additional challenges may be used against alternate jurors only and prohibition against the use of other peremptory challenges against alternates. Id. At least one court interpreting Section 62.020 has held that a trial court does not necessarily err when it does not recalculate the strike zone for alternate jurors when the strike zone for jurors subsequently changes during jury 8 make their peremptory challenges, they shall deliver their lists to the clerk” who “shall . . . call off the first twelve names on the lists that have not been stricken” to form the jury. Id. art. 35.26(a). In a capital case in which the State seeks the death penalty, the court may direct that two alternate jurors be selected and that the first fourteen names not stricken be called by the clerk, with the last two names being the alternate jurors. Id. art. 35.26(b). In a death-penalty case, “the selection of alternate jurors is treated as distinct and separate from the primary panel.” McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). There is no analogous rule in non-capital felony cases. No statute or case law prescribes a two-step procedure for peremptory challenges requiring that peremptory challenges to alternates must be exercised after resolving peremptory challenges to the jury.11 Rather, conduct of voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). That discretion is not limitless and is reviewable for an abuse of discretion. Allridge, 850 S.W.2d at 479. selection due to juror reinstatement after a Batson challenge. See Boones v. State, 170 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). The Court of Criminal Appeals recently referred to submission of all 11 challenges as a single list as “essentially follow[ing] the procedure for non-capital cases.” Chavez v. State, No. AP–77,117, 2026 WL 2435378, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2026). 9  3. Application As a general proposition, we agree with Ward that no statute prohibits the trial court from conducting two discrete processes for jurors and for alternates. But neither is the practice prescribed, based upon the plain language of the statute. Ward complains that the trial court miscalculated the range of veniremembers who were eligible to be alternate jurors. He argues that, because veniremembers thirty-seven, thirty-eight, and thirty-nine would have been eligible to serve as alternate jurors,12 allowing him to exercise a peremptory challenge on veniremember forty-three effectively denied him intelligent use of his alternate-juror peremptory challenge.13 12 Ward argues that the parties’ overlapping peremptory challenge and the State’s not having used all of its peremptory challenges shifted the alternate-juror strike zone and caused his exercise of his peremptory challenge against veniremember forty-three to be ineffectual because it fell outside the strike zone from which alternate jurors were finally selected. However, this is not what the record reflects. The trial court’s initial calculation of the alternate-juror strike zone—forty through forty-three—did not differ from the group of veniremembers from whom the alternates were selected. To the extent that Ward argues that the trial court would have erred had it recalculated the alternate-juror strike zone to comprise veniremembers thirty-seven, thirty-eight, thirty-nine, and forty-one after the parties exercised their peremptory challenges, we do not address hypothetical contentions because we cannot render advisory opinions. See Armstrong v. State, 805 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (“Under article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, courts have no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions.”). 13 Although neither party uses the terms, expressly raised the issue at trial, or provides citations to relevant authority on appeal, Ward’s objection at trial and argument on appeal seem to imply that the veniremembers who were not selected from the end of the first strike zone were, effectively, prospective jurors otherwise qualified to serve who were improperly excused sua sponte by the trial court. See Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that a defendant 10  Ward states that the trial court’s “improper methodology and erroneous strike zone calculation deprived [him] of the intelligent use of his peremptory challenge against the potential alternate jurors, one of whom served on the jury,”14 which he now argues was error of “State constitutional dimension.” However, Ward did not object on any constitutional basis in the trial court. Ward objected twice to the trial court’s alternate-juror selection process. In the first objection, he argued that the alternate-juror strike zone could change if there were overlapping or unused peremptory challenges, potentially depriving him of his alternate-juror peremptory challenge. In his second objection, Ward argued that the can show harm when a qualified juror is improperly excused by establishing that the State exhausted all its peremptory challenges); Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (“If the trial court erroneously excludes a qualified juror, then the state has in effect received the benefit of an additional peremptory strike.”); see also Warren v. State, 768 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (applying holding in Green to non-capital cases). In this case, the State exercised fewer than all its peremptory strikes. Even presuming Ward had made this argument, he could not show harm under this theory. See Green, 764 S.W.2d at 246. 14 After the unselected veniremembers were excused, one juror asked to address the trial court because, although he felt he could not say so before the assembled venire, he would give additional weight to police testimony and would assume Ward was guilty. Ward moved to challenge the juror for cause. The trial court granted the challenge, struck the juror, seated the first alternate in his place, and stated that trial would proceed with one remaining alternate. Asked if that “grant[ed] the relief that [he] requested,” Ward said that it did. Ward did not then object to veniremember forty-one as objectionable or ask for an additional peremptory strike. See Garcia v. State, 663 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (“A timely objection allows the trial court an opportunity to prevent or correct errors.”); Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The two main purposes of requiring a specific objection are to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection so that he has an opportunity to rule on it and to allow opposing counsel to remedy the error.”). 11 trial court should have recalculated the alternate-juror strike zone after striking veniremembers based upon the parties’ peremptory challenges. Although his argument at trial clearly preserved an objection to the trial court’s alternate-juror selection process, Ward did not raise the constitutional argument he now raises. When the trial court asked the legal basis of his objection, Ward said there was none and offered no constitutional basis. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Harrison v. State, 187 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Failure to object can forfeit even an error involving constitutional rights. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We will consider nonetheless the rights Ward argues were at issue. For the proposition that the error was one of constitutional dimension, Ward relies upon a federal case, Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799–800, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2036 (1975). In Murphy, the petitioner argued that he was deprived of a fair trial because he was unable to challenge for cause several veniremembers who “had a vague recollection of the robbery with which the petitioner was charged.” Id. at 800, 95 S. Ct. at 2036. Ward does not explain how this analogizes to a trial court’s alleged error in calculating strike zones, and he does not suggest that he was prevented from challenging any veniremember. Ward buoys his argument with cases standing for the proposition that the constitutional right to counsel includes the right to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges by questioning veniremembers broadly and that a trial court should, as a 12 general rule, give a defendant great latitude in such questioning. See Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 334–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that a defendant was not improperly denied his constitutional right to question jurors on voir dire when he was limited in his questions about a newspaper article); Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that trial court erred by limiting questioning about panel’s specific knowledge about pretrial publicity); Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 724–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting leading questions, speculation, vague questions, duplicitous questions, and duplicative questions), overruled on other grounds, 448 U.S. 38, 51, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2529 (1980). While Ward correctly asserts that trial courts must afford great latitude to questions asked to the panel during voir dire, his objection in the trial court was not made on the basis that he was prevented from asking any question. Further, the record does not show that he was prohibited or restricted from asking any question of any veniremember, much less the four veniremembers who were designated as the strike zone for the alternate jurors before the parties exercised peremptory challenges and from whom the trial court selected the two alternate jurors. Even had he preserved this complaint by presenting a timely and specific objection to the trial court—or were the error of a kind that may be raised for the first time on appeal, see Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 340–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (elaborating on requirements for preservation of “systemic requirement” error and fundamental error 13 and noting differences from “structural” error)—Ward does not show on appeal that he was denied the constitutional right to intelligently use his peremptory strikes under the theory he argues. Rather, the error he alleges and to which he objected was in the trial court’s method of giving effect to the parties’ peremptory strikes as prescribed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, at most, any error that occurred was a violation of a statute designed to help ensure the protection of a constitutional right. See Gray v. State, 159 S.W.3d 95, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Many statutes are designed to protect constitutional rights, but having such a purpose does not convert a statutory right into one of constitutional dimension. Id. Assuming without deciding that Ward is correct and that a defendant has a right to distinct processes for exercising peremptory strikes against jurors and alternates in non-capital felony cases, any error would be a violation of statutory procedure, not a violation of the constitutional provision itself. See Ex parte Long, 910 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Error in the decision to consolidate these procedures would constitute violation of a purely statutory right, and such error is subject to a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b). See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Chavez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). There is no right to have any particular person on the jury. See Ford v. State, 73 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A record will show that the defendant is not harmed by an error in exclusion of a particular person from the jury when the record contains no indication that those 14 who served on the jury were unfit for duty. See id.; Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Ward does not allege that any unfit veniremember served on the jury, and our review of the record does not so suggest.15 Ward and the State both questioned veniremembers forty-one and forty-two, whose answers did not indicate unfitness to serve. Neither party moved to strike any of the proposed alternate jurors for cause. We see nothing in the record to indicate that any veniremember who served as a juror or as an alternate was unfit for duty. See Ford, 73 S.W.3d at 924. Finally, because the law prohibits a judge from allowing exercise of peremptory challenges for potential jurors against potential alternates, see Tex. Code Crim Proc. art. 35.15(d), a trial judge’s setting distinct strike zones for both groups at the same time does not, by itself, indicate that the rules were disregarded or that the jury composition was not impartial. See Chavez, 2026 WL 2435378, at *3; Ford, 73 S.W.3d at 926. We overrule Ward’s first point. 15 Ward argues that “[t]his issue affected [his] rights because venireperson [forty-one], who was the first alternate, ended up serving on the jury and being one of the twelve jurors who decided that [Ward] was guilty of capital murder.” However, Ward was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was not charged with capital murder. 15 B. Exclusion of Victim’s Criminal History In his second point, Ward complains that the trial court erred by excluding his testimony about Connery’s prior bad acts. Ward argues that this testimony about Connery’s criminal history and prior bad acts was necessary to show that Connery was the first aggressor and that Ward was reasonably in fear of Connery. Ward argues that specific acts of violence may be introduced to demonstrate the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear of the complainant or that the complainant was the first aggressor. See Torres v. State, 117 S.W.3d 891, 896–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 1. Background Before trial, the trial court granted a motion in limine as to Connery’s prior criminal history. On cross-examination at the trial, Ward asked Franita whether she recalled that Ward and Connery had fought approximately one year before the shooting. Franita did recall that they fought but could provide no additional details. After Franita testified, Ward moved to lift the order in limine as to Connery’s criminal history, arguing that it would be admissible as impeachment and, as a “primary theory,” that the violent acts Connery had committed supported his being the first aggressor in his confrontation with Ward. Ward offered documents detailing Connery’s criminal history, including charges of assault causing bodily injury to a family member, assault on a family member by impeding breath or circulation, interference with emergency requests for assistance, possession of a prohibited weapon, and violation of a bond or protective order. The State argued against their 16 admission because, with the exception of the Class A misdemeanor charge of possession of a prohibited weapon for which Connery had completed community supervision, the charges were dismissed or rejected. The trial court declined to rule on the admissibility of the evidence at that time and left the order in limine in place. After the State’s direct examination of Connery, Ward again moved to lift the order in limine. The trial court lifted the order as to Connery’s completed community supervision for possession of a prohibited weapon but otherwise left it in place. On cross-examination, Ward asked Connery about the offense and community supervision. Connery acknowledged that he had been convicted and that he was placed on community supervision for the offense.16 Ward also testified. He said that he was afraid and that Connery “was going to beat [him] to death.” When Connery walked away from the car after striking Ward, Ward heard Connery say, “I’ll be back.” Ward feared that Connery would return with a handgun, which was why he shot Connery. After Ward testified and while the jury was out of the courtroom, he made an offer of proof related to his history with Connery “regarding the relationship between [Connery] and his mother.” The offer of proof consisted of additional testimony. 16 Ward also asked Connery whether he ever fought with Ward and pushed him to the ground. Connery said that he had defended himself when Ward had choked him. 17  In the additional testimony comprising his offer, Ward said that he had gone to Johnson County to get Connery out of jail “[b]ecause of Shara,[17] his girlfriend,” and that he “thought it was for marijuana.” Ward had posted bond for Connery for “being violent with Shara,” although Franita did “all the work with it” and Ward only paid for the bond. Ward did not specify a timeframe when these events occurred and did not recall any specific incident of violence. Ward also said he recalled that Connery had been on probation for possession of a prohibited weapon but did not specify when. Ward recounted giving money to Connery and Shara for Christmas and Connery’s being dissatisfied with the amount he received, saying he should have been given more. Ward said he had seen Connery wrestle with Franita or grab her hand. He also testified that Franita had once been brought home by police after driving while intoxicated and that Connery “had jumped on her in the car and the store owner called the police.”18 Ward recalled that Connery had once placed Ward’s wheelchair in front of a neighbor’s apartment door. When the neighbor became angry, Connery cut through the neighbor’s screen door with a pocket knife, and the neighbor shut Connery’s 17 Connery testified that he had dated Shara before dating Chelsea and that he was, at the time of trial, married to Shara. 18 Ward testified that he had paid a neighbor twenty dollars to retrieve the car. 18 fingers in the apartment door. Ward did not specify a date or time period or whether police had been called. Ward had also heard about an incident when Connery pushed a former employer and was fired, although he had only heard of the event from Franita and did not know any other details. The trial court excluded the evidence. 2. Applicable Law We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree. Id. Evidence of specific bad acts by a victim of assault are admissible only to the extent they are relevant for a purpose other than to show character conformity.19 See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). A defendant may not offer evidence of the victim’s prior specific acts of violence to prove the victim’s violent character and hence that the 19 Citing Torres, Ward argues that “[w]hen a defendant in a homicide prosecution raises the issue of self-defense, he may introduce evidence of the deceased’s violent character.” See 117 S.W.3d at 894. While a correct statement of the law, Ward does not explain why this rule controls in this case. 19 victim acted in conformity with that character trait at the time of the assault. See Seidule v. State, 622 S.W.3d 480, 490–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (citing In re Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). Because a complainant’s unambiguous, violent, or aggressive act needs no explaining, evidence of the complainant’s extraneous conduct admitted in conjunction with his unambiguous act would have no relevance apart from its tendency to prove the victim’s character conformity and, thus, would be inadmissible. James v. State, 335 S.W.3d 719, 728 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 205–06 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet ref’d); Mai v. State, 189 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d). Therefore, two conditions must exist before a complainant’s extraneous act will be admissible to support a claim of self-defense: (1) some ambiguous or uncertain evidence of a violent or aggressive act by the victim must exist that tends to show the victim was the first aggressor; and (2) the proffered evidence must tend to dispel the ambiguity or explain the victim’s conduct. James, 335 S.W.3d at 728. 3. Application Ward argues that the testimony was necessary to show that Connery was the first aggressor and that Ward was reasonably in fear for his life.20 20 Although Ward details the testimony related to Connery’s criminal history, he challenges only the exclusion of his proffered testimony. 20  However, Ward admitted to bumping Connery and Franita with the car. Connery’s conduct in striking Ward was unambiguously aggressive, whether a slap as Connery claimed or a punch with a closed fist as Ward claimed. Consequently, the conditions above are not met. See id.; see also Valencia v. State, No. 01-24-00260-CR, 2025 WL 2724018, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 25, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding trial court properly excluded evidence of victim’s “generic assault cases” that defendant alleged would establish victim’s intent or motive to attack him); Fish v. State, 609 S.W.3d 170, 179 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (holding trial court properly excluded victim’s past acts of violence against her ex-husband and boyfriend to explain reasonableness of her son’s state of mind in hitting her with a car); Mai, 189 S.W.3d at 321 (holding prior criminal acts were properly excluded where victim jumped on defendant and pulled his hair); Reyna v. State, 99 S.W.3d 344, 346–47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding trial court properly excluded evidence that victim had been in unspecified prior fights, had been convicted of burglary of a habitation, had carried a gun “from time to time,” and was a drug dealer when record showed that victim flashed a gun and fired it). Under this analysis, Ward’s proffered testimony about Connery’s prior acts does nothing more than attempt to show character conformity, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); James, 335 S.W.3d at 728; Mai, 189 S.W.3d at 321. 21  We overrule Ward’s second point.21 C. Denial of Batson Challenge After voir dire, Ward objected to the State’s use of three of its peremptory challenges to strike African-American veniremembers. The State offered reasons for each of the three peremptory challenges that the trial court found to be facially race-neutral and not to be pretextual. Ward now complains in his third point that his objection to the State’s peremptory challenge against one veniremember— twenty-eight—should have been sustained because the State’s proffered reason— disliking the veniremember’s responses to a question—was pretextual.22 21 We also note that the trial court excluded the evidence, inter alia, as hearsay under Rule 802. See Tex. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay is generally not admissible unless a statute, rule of evidence, or other rule provides otherwise. See id. In the trial court, Ward did not offer any exception to the rule against hearsay and does not now challenge the propriety of the trial court’s exclusion as hearsay of his recitation of the events he said he only heard about through Franita. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d), 803. 22 Because Ward concedes on appeal that the State offered valid, race-neutral, non-pretextual reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges as to the other two challenged veniremembers and our review reflects that the trial court properly denied his Batson motion as to those two, we do not further address those arguments. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(5). We similarly do not address Ward’s bare contention that the State’s decision to exercise only eight of its ten peremptory challenges might have been a racially motivated attempt to avoid reaching another African-American veniremember. See Black v. State, 358 S.W.3d 823, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (overruling conclusory, unsupported subsidiary complaints as inadequately briefed); Dornbusch v. State, 262 S.W.3d 432, 438 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (declining to address inadequately analyzed contention on appeal). 22  1. Applicable Law The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits race-based jury selection. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986); Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.261(a). In the face of perceived purposeful discrimination, a defendant may object to one or more of the State’s peremptory challenges to address the race-based concerns. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.261(a); Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 421 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. at 1719). Trial courts follow a three-step process to resolve Batson challenges. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476–77, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207 (2008); Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). First, the movant must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476, 128 S. Ct. at 1207; Watkins v. State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden of production shifts to the nonmovant to articulate a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476–77, 128 S. Ct. at 1207; Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447. At this second step, the explanation need only be race-neutral on its face. See Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447. The explanation must be reasonably specific and must be related to the case being tried. See Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 10