Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00130-CV ___________________________ PAUL SHANTHARAJ JOSEPH, SUSHMA PETER, TRS JOSEPH-PETER FAMILY TRUST, RAJA LAKSHMAN PITTA, PRANATHI GURRAPU AND ANIRUDH SAI REDDY KONDAPUR, Appellants V. DENTON CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee On Appeal from the 431st District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 25-1752-431 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION This is an ad valorem property tax case arising out of denied motions to correct the appraisal roll because of an alleged clerical error. See Tex. Tax Code § 25.25(c)(1). In four issues, Appellants Raja Lakshman Pitta, Pranathi Gurrapu, and Anirudh Sai Reddy Kondapur (the “Property Owners”) complain that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Denton Central Appraisal District (“DCAD”), by arguably not considering their amended petition, and by sustaining certain objections to their summary judgment evidence. We conclude—without needing to reach the pleading and all the evidentiary issues—that the trial court properly granted summary judgment that the Property Owners take nothing on their correction claims. II. BACKGROUND A. The Properties and Property Owners The following two properties are at issue: (1) Property ID: 1004789 (2009 Country Run Lane, Northlake, Texas, owned by Raja Lakshman Pitta and Pranathi Gurrapu); and (2) Property ID: 1004823 (2213 17th Street, Argyle, Texas, owned by Anirudh Sai Reddy Kondapur). According to a settlement statement, the Country Run Lane property sold for $625,000 on June 12, 2023. The Property Owners have alleged that the sale price was erroneously entered as $725,000 into a database and comparable sales grids, which 2 impacted their negotiations with DCAD and their 2024 tax liability. This data point underlies the parties’ dispute. B. The Tax Protests For tax year 2024, DCAD sent notices of the appraised property values to the Property Owners: (1) $784,068 for the Country Run Lake property and (2) $786,000 for the 17th Street property. The Property Owners engaged attorney Ryan Ray to protest the proposed values, and he negotiated with DCAD. Concerning the Country Run Lane property, DCAD offered to settle the account for $725,000, and Ray countered at $684,078 “based on the evidence [he] had at the time.”1 As the negotiations continued, DCAD did not move from the $725,000 value, and Ray said that he “came to believe that $725,000 was the actual purchase price of the property.” So in lieu of having a full hearing and determination by the Denton County Appraisal Review Board (“ARB”), Ray and a DCAD representative signed an agreement to settle the protest at an agreed-upon $725,000 value. See id. § 1.111(e). As for the 17th Street property, Ray and DCAD agreed to a resolved value of $718,000. See id. Ray claimed to have been “unaware that the property had actually been purchased for $635,000.” He further asserted that his decision-making had been “significantly informed” by “[t]he belief that $725,000 was the correct purchase price Ray does not explain what evidence he had or why he did not have complete 1 information, including the correct sale price of the Country Run Lane property. 3 for” the Country Run Lane property, which “shared similar characteristics” with the 17th Street property. C. The Section 25.25 Correction Motions At some point after the negotiated value resolutions, Monica Urbanek—a licensed real estate broker and the Director of Residential Appeals for the Ray Tax Group—spoke with the Property Owners. She says she learned that the North Texas Real Estate Information Systems’ Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”) showed the purchase price of the Country Run Lane property to have been $725,000 when the owner-provided settlement statement showed it to have been $625,000, “revealing a $100,000 discrepancy between the MLS record and reality.” Consequently, around two and one-half months after the settlement agreements had been signed, Urbanek filed motions under Section 25.25 of the Tax Code to correct the appraisal roll, arguing that the erroneous data point underlying the parties’ negotiations—the sale price of the Country Run Lane property—had constituted a “clerical error” affecting the Property Owners’ 2024 tax liability. See id. § 25.25(c)(1). The motion for the Country Run Lane property stated that the “MLS data was incorrectly entered” and that the “correct value should read $625,000 for the 2024 final value.” Similarly, the motion for the 17th Street property stated that the “MLS data was incorrectly entered,” and it claimed that the “correct value should read 4 $635,000 for the 2024 final value.”2 Urbanek believed that the “agreed value[s were] predicated on a mechanical data entry error rather than a subjective appraisal judgment,” and she argued to the ARB “that the incorrect sale price was a clerical error that prevented the appraisal roll from accurately reflecting the factual purchase price.” The ARB denied both motions. D. The Lawsuit The Property Owners then sued DCAD to correct the fair market value of their properties, based not on their denied Section 25.25 motions but instead on a claim that their appraisals had been unequal and excessive. DCAD moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Property Owners’ unequal and excessive appraisal claims were improper and that their sole remedy was to challenge the denied Section 25.25 correction motions. Although DCAD argued that the Property Owners had not pleaded a claim related to their denied Section 25.25 motions, DCAD preemptively moved for summary judgment that the Property Owners were not entitled to a Section 25.25 correction because they had not shown a clerical error or mutual mistake. About a week later, the Property Owners sought leave to amend their petition to allege the clerical error and mutual mistake grounds in support of their denied 2 Notably, the attorney did not claim a clerical error or a mistake in knowledge concerning the $635,000 data point and only attempted to tie the “erroneous sales data” for the Country Run Lane property to his negotiating decisions regarding the market values of the two properties. 5 Section 25.25(c) correction motions. DCAD asked the trial court to deny the motion for leave, asserting that the Property Owners were “attempting to recast this case as a [Section] 25.25 appeal” that would cause DCAD unfair surprise and prejudice. The trial court never expressly ruled on the motion for leave. The Property Owners, in addition to seeking leave to amend, responded to the summary judgment motion and filed affidavits from Ray and Urbanek. Together, both affiants sought to explain that the negotiated values for the two properties had come about as the result of what they characterized as MLS’s “clerical error” in miskeying the sale price for the Country Run Lane property and claimed that this was a mutual mistake. The Property Owners attached various other documents, including comparable sales grids without any proven-up explanation for who had generated them or whether they were even used in the tax protest negotiations. Notably, the Property Owners did not present any deposition testimony or other evidence from DCAD concerning its reasoning underlying the negotiated property values. DCAD filed a reply to the Property Owners’ summary judgment response with objections to their evidence. The trial court sustained a number of DCAD’s objections—including to the entirety of Ray’s and Urbanek’s affidavits—and granted DCAD’s summary judgment motion without indicating which petition the trial court was considering to be the live pleading. The Property Owners appealed.3 At the suit’s inception, a third property owned by Paul Shantharaj Joseph, 3 Sushma Peter, and TRS Joseph-Peter Family Trust was also at issue. Although these 6 III. DISCUSSION In their first and third issues, the Property Owners contend that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on their Section 25.25(c) correction claims. They assert that they met their summary judgment burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact that the alleged “mechanical miskeying of a $100,000 sale price in a third-party computer database that DCAD retrieved and used to set property values” constituted either a clerical error or a mutual mistake entitling them to move forward on their Section 25.25(c) claims seeking to order DCAD to correct the appraisal roll to show the actual sale price of each respective property as its market value for tax year 2024. For the following reasons, we disagree. appellants indicated in the joint motion for leave to amend that they were “seek[ing] leave to file [a] First Amended Petition to . . . voluntarily non[]suit all claims related to” their property, they filed a notice of appeal and then did not file an appellate brief. We notified these appellants that we could dismiss their appeal for want of prosecution unless they filed a brief and an accompanying motion for extension. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b). We have received no response. Because Appellants Paul Shantharaj Joseph, Sushma Peter, and TRS Joseph-Peter Family Trust have failed to file a brief after we afforded them an opportunity to explain the initial failure, we dismiss their appeal concerning their property for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), 43.2(f). But even had they wanted to appeal, assuming that the amended pleading was before the trial court and constituted a nonsuit of these appellants’ claims, we would lack jurisdiction to consider any appeal following their nonsuit. See Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. 2020) (explaining that “the non[ ]suit is not merely the end of the case[—i]t is the end of the [c]ourt’s power to decide the case”); Paskauskiene v. Tex. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. 02- 24-00516-CV, 2025 WL 2370578, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 14, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same). 7 A. Standard of Review In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant met the summary judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c);4 Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008); Provident Life & Accident Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). We also consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848. We must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all the evidence presented. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 4 The Texas Supreme Court recently amended Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a. See Order, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Tex. Feb. 27, 2026). The Court specified that “[t]he amendments apply only to a motion for summary judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026.” Id. DCAD filed its summary judgment motion before that date, so we apply the version of Rule 166a then in effect. 8 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2006); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822–24 (Tex. 2005). B. Applicable Law 1. Determining Market Value All taxable property is appraised annually at its market value as of January 1 of each tax year. Tex. Tax Code § 23.01(a). “Market value is the price the property will bring when offered for sale by one who desires to sell, but is not obligated to sell, and is bought by one who desires to buy, but is under no necessity of buying,” City of Harlingen v. Est. of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. 2001) (citation modified), and is further defined statutorily, see Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(7). A property’s market value must be determined by applying “generally accepted appraisal methods and techniques” and by using the same or similar methods and techniques in appraising the same or similar kinds of property. Id. § 23.01(b). Three accepted methods of determining a property’s market value are (1) the market data comparison method, (2) the income method, and (3) the cost method. EXLP Leasing, LLC v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 554 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex. Tax Code §§ 23.011, .012, .013). When a “chief appraiser uses the market data comparison method of appraisal to determine the market value of real property, the chief appraiser shall use comparable sales data and shall adjust the comparable sales to the subject property.” Tex. Tax Code § 23.013(a); see also Est. of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d at 182 (explaining the comparable sales approach). Comparability is 9 determined based on numerous factors, including date of the sale, “similarities [in] location, square footage of the lot and improvements, property age, property condition, property access, amenities, views, income, operating expenses, occupancy, and the existence of easements, deed restrictions, or other legal burdens affecting marketability.” Tex. Tax Code § 23.013(b)–(d). A property’s recent sale price is generally relevant but not the sole factor.5 See Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. by & through Crigler, 694 S.W.3d 752, 762 (Tex. 2024); Est. of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d at 182; Bailey Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 823–825 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ) (considering evidence of the price the buyer paid two months before January 1); see also Vill. Place, Ltd. v. VP Shopping, LLC, 404 S.W.3d 115, 133 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing various cases discussing how a property’s purchase price can evidence its value depending on the purchase’s circumstances). 2. Protesting a Property’s Appraised Value If an appraisal district determines that the appraised value of a property is greater than in the preceding year, it must provide written notice of the increase to the property’s owner within a certain time frame. Tex. Tax Code § 25.19(a)(1). A 5 Nathan Morey, Unequal and Unfair: Why Texas Should Require Mandatory Sales Price Disclosure to Reconcile the Texas Property Tax Code with the Texas Constitution, 41 St. Mary’s L.J. 553, 565 (2010) (“Market value should not be confused with the sales price of real property. While the sales price in a routine transaction is often the result of the type of bargaining described in [S]ection 1.04(7) of the Code, it is not an absolute indication of market value.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 10 property owner then has the right to challenge the change in appraised value by timely filing a protest. Id. §§ 41.41(a)(1), 41.44(a)(1). This court has previously described the “unique remedies” a taxpayer has to challenge an appraisal district’s actions. J-W Power Co. v. Jack Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 02-22-00082-CV, 2024 WL 5162690, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). On the one hand, Chapter 41 of the Tax Code provides a broad remedy that “allows a property owner to file a protest for substantive challenges to property appraisals.” Id. (quoting Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 40 (Tex. 2018)); see Tex. Tax Code § 41.44. On the other, taxpayers have a “more circumscribed remedy” in Chapter 25 of the Tax Code. J-W Power Co., 2024 WL 5162690, at *4 (quoting Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at 40); see Tex. Tax Code § 25.25. Thus, “the tax appraisal protest scheme evidences the Legislature’s intent to restrict substantive challenges to the appraisal rolls—making them ‘fixed’ after the period for chapter 41 protests has elapsed, with the exception of allowing limited error-correction.” Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at 41 (citing Anderton v. Rockwall Cent. Appraisal Dist., 26 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied)). Unlike the substantive protests allowed by Section 41, Section 25.25 provides for limited error correction that “include[s] only objective and ministerial matters such as” a clerical error. Id. at 40 (citing Anderton, 26 S.W.3d at 543); Tex. Tax Code § 25.25(c)(1). By statute, a “clerical error” is an error: 11 (A) that is or results from a mistake or failure in writing, copying, transcribing, entering or retrieving computer data, computing, or calculating; or (B) that prevents an appraisal roll or a tax roll from accurately reflecting a finding or determination made by the chief appraiser, the appraisal review board, or the assessor; however, “clerical error” does not include an error that is or results from a mistake in judgment or reasoning in the making of the finding or determination. Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(18). Importantly, corrections—including those for a clerical error—“do not involve the substantive re-evaluation of a property’s market value.”6 Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at 40 (quoting Anderton, 26 S.W.3d at 543). When seeking review of a denied Section 25.25 correction motion, the taxpayer bears the burden of proof. J-W Power Co., 2024 WL 5162690, at *5 n.6 (citing Stacy Fam. Enters., Inc. v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist., No. 02-13-00170-CV, 2013 WL 6564299, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)). C. Analysis Before we get to the heart of this appeal—whether the trial court properly granted DCAD’s summary judgment motion—we set the stage by briefly taking up the Property Owners’ fourth and second issues concerning the pleadings and the summary judgment evidence. 6 The supreme court has recognized that Section 25.25(d) permits “some substantive re-evaluation of a property’s value, but its application is expressly limited by the statute.” Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at 40 n.5 (citing Tex. Tax Code § 25.25(d)). Here, the Property Owners did not seek relief under Section 25.25(d), so it is not at issue. 12 1. The Pleadings In their fourth issue, the Property Owners complain that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion for leave to amend. Because neither party got a written ruling on that motion, and the final judgment indicated only that the trial court had “taken judicial notice of the [c]ourt’s files showing the history of this case,” we must determine whether the trial court is presumed to have considered the amendment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 63; Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Cessor, 668 S.W.3d 611, 625–26 (Tex. 2023) (concluding that an unobjected-to late amended answer had been before the trial court in the absence of a showing of surprise or prejudice and in light of the trial court’s certification that it had considered “the court’s file”); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490–91 (Tex. 1988) (assuming that the trial court had considered and based summary judgment on an amended petition filed four days before the summary judgment hearing absent record evidence to the contrary). Because we conclude that the Property Owners did not carry their summary judgment burden on their Section 25.25(c) correction claims, we will assume without deciding that the trial court properly considered the Property Owners’ amended petition in granting DCAD’s summary judgment motion. We therefore need not decide the Property Owners’ fourth issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 13 2. The Evidence In their second issue, the Property Owners complain that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining DCAD’s evidentiary objections to Ray’s and Urbanek’s affidavits. As we will explain, we need not fully decide this issue. When a trial court sustains a party’s objections to summary judgment evidence, and the proffering party does not challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, we cannot consider the excluded evidence. See CSHK Dubai Contracting LLC v. Ali, No. 02-24-00209-CV, 2025 WL 1840468, at *8 n.21 & *16 n.25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“On appeal, CSHK does not challenge the trial court’s orders excluding [certain] evidence. Therefore, we do not consider the excluded evidence.”). Because the Property Owners have not challenged all the trial court’s summary judgment evidentiary rulings, we do not consider the unchallenged excluded evidence. See id. The Property Owners attached eleven summary judgment exhibits, including Ray’s and Urbanek’s affidavits, to their summary judgment response. DCAD objected to all the exhibits, and the trial court sustained numerous specific objections, excluding Ray’s and Urbanek’s affidavits; an MLS Property Data Sheet concerning the Country Run Lane property; a spreadsheet of alleged negotiations and settlement figures with DCAD concerning various properties, including the Country Run Lane property; and an email from Ray to DCAD’s attorney, eight months after suit had been filed. 14 On appeal, the Property Owners do not challenge each specific ruling. Concerning the excluded documentary evidence, the Property Owners do not complain of the trial court’s excluding the MLS Property Data sheet, the spreadsheet, or the email. And as for the affidavits, the Property Owners attack every specific evidentiary ruling concerning Ray’s affidavit but do not attack all concerning Urbanek’s affidavit. The trial court sustained DCAD’s objections (1) to the entirety of Urbanek’s affidavit based on hearsay and legal conclusion grounds, (2) to its paragraph 5 for lack of personal knowledge, and (3) to its paragraphs 6, 7, and 9 for speculation. On appeal, however, the Property Owners complain only of the trial court’s hearsay and legal conclusion rulings7 and do not challenge the trial court’s other specific rulings pertaining to paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9 of Urbanek’s affidavit. So those four paragraphs, along with the excluded documentary evidence, are not before us. See id.; see also Kuzmin v. Schiller, No. 05-13-01394-CV, 2015 WL 150206, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Where the trial court sustains objections to summary judgment evidence and [the] appellant does not challenge the evidentiary ruling on appeal, [the] appellant has waived error regarding that ruling and we may not consider the excluded evidence.”); Walker v. Schion, 420 S.W.3d 454, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Because the only evidence Walker 7 The Property Owners also complain about DCAD’s relevancy objection, which the trial court overruled. 15 cites in support of his defamation claim was struck by the trial court in an unchallenged evidentiary ruling, we cannot consider that evidence on appeal.”). The question becomes whether we need to address the complained-of sustained objections to Ray’s affidavit and to paragraphs 1–4 and 8 in Urbanek’s affidavit. We do not. As we will explain, even had the trial court considered that evidence along with the other unchallenged documentary evidence, the Property Owners did not carry their summary judgment burden. Therefore, we partially overrule the Property Owners’ second issue complaining about the trial court’s exclusion of paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9 of Urbanek’s affidavit. We need not otherwise address this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 3. The Summary Judgment Ruling In its motion for summary judgment, DCAD argued that Section 25.25(c) permits an appraisal review board to “direct changes to the appraisal roll only to correct limited, statutorily defined errors, including clerical errors that affect a property owner’s tax liability.” See Tex. Tax Code § 25.25(c)(1). DCAD maintained that the Property Owners were improperly seeking a substantive re-evaluation of their property values and could show neither a clerical error nor a mutual mistake. We agree. a. The Nonexcluded Evidence Ray averred about his negotiations with DCAD, but he did not indicate which data either he or DCAD were actually looking at. Ray generally swore that he 16 negotiated through a “collaborative process” with DCAD, and he explained that he had accepted DCAD’s suggested $725,000 value for the Country Run Lane property because he had believed that to be the property’s “actual purchase price.” He further acknowledged that he had agreed to resolve the 17th Street property at $718,000— even though he claimed no other alleged clerical error or mistake about that property—based on his decision about the Country Run Lane property. Ray concluded—without citing any evidence from DCAD—that “[i]t is now evident that both [DCAD] and I relied upon erroneous sales data for” the Country Run Lane property. He further averred, “This shared reliance on a mechanical data error constituted a mutual mistake of fact that prevented a true ‘meeting of the minds’ regarding the market value of these properties.” As for Urbanek’s affidavit, once paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9 are excluded, her affidavit explained that she had “managed the investigation and subsequent filing of the Section 25.25(c) motions to correct clerical errors for” the two properties. Urbanek described accessing the MLS data that indicated that the Country Run Lane property “was purchased on June 12, 2023 for $725,000.” She said that she had then compared that data to an “[o]wner-[p]rovided [s]ettlement [s]tatement” that had “confirm[ed] the actual purchase price was $625,000, revealing a $100,000 discrepancy between the MLS record and reality.” Urbanek also swore, “I appeared before the ARB and argued that the incorrect sales price was a clerical error that prevented the 17 appraisal roll from accurately reflecting the factual purchase price. Despite the evidence of this transcription error, the ARB denied the motion.” b. Claim of Mutual Mistake Against this evidentiary backdrop, we consider first the Property Owners’ mutual mistake correction claim.8 “The doctrine of mutual mistake must not routinely be available to avoid the results of an unhappy bargain,” Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. 1990), but “when parties to an agreement have contracted under a misconception or ignorance of a material fact, the agreement will be avoided,” id. at 264; Winegar v. Martin, 304 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). Proving a mutual mistake requires evidence showing that both parties were acting under the same misunderstanding of the same material fact. Winegar, 304 S.W.3d at 668. A party cannot rely solely on evidence of their own self-interested beliefs and must offer proof that the other contracting party suffered from the same mistake of fact. See id. at 667–69 (holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment where the defendant failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on mutual mistake); City of The Colony v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 735–36 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d) (concluding that the plaintiff had produced no evidence to support a mutual mistake); N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Chisos Joint 8 The Property Owners pleaded that “the Settlement and Waiver Agreements are voidable due to mutual mistake. Both the District and Plaintiffs’ representative[s] relied upon the same erroneous data point, which prevented the agreements from reflecting the parties’ true intent.” 18 Venture I, 142 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (stating that the defendant had failed to establish a fact issue precluding summary judgment where it “offered evidence showing its own beliefs about the purpose of the agreement” but did not offer “evidence that [other entity] likewise suffered from a mistake of fact”); Tyson v. Alexander, 672 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1984, no writ) (concluding that “[a]lthough [appellant] argue[d] that the mistake was mutual, the only summary judgment evidence of mutuality [wa]s his conclusion, in his affidavit, that ‘such mistake was bilateral,’” which did not satisfy the summary judgment rules). Similarly, Ray’s affidavit summarily concluded that DCAD must have been operating under the same mistake as he was, but he offered nothing to support that belief other than his own assumptions.9 Additionally, because sale price is but one data point among the many that must be used in determining market value, see Tex. Tax Code § 23.013(a)–(d); Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 694 S.W.3d at 762; Est. of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d at 182; Bailey Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 848 S.W.2d at 825; see also Vill. Place, Ltd., 404 S.W.3d at 133, the Property Owners did not prove that—whether or not DCAD knew the Country Run Lane property’s sale price was actually $625,000—DCAD would have automatically agreed to resolve both property tax 9 In the section of their summary judgment response containing their mutual mistake argument, the Property Owners do not argue—much less point to any evidence—that DCAD shared in their mistake. Rather, they argued, “Plaintiffs would not have agreed to a $725,000 valuation had they known the MLS data was a transcription error and the actual purchase price was $100,000 lower.” 19 protests at the sale price of each property as they had requested in their Section 25.25(c) motions, see Tex. Tax Code § 1.111(e). Ray’s affidavit was the only evidence the Property Owners cited concerning their mutual mistake claim, and the Property Owners’ evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether DCAD was actually mistaken in fact when it negotiated the 2024 property values.10 See Winegar, 304 S.W.3d at 667–69; City of The Colony, 272 S.W.3d at 735–36; N. Nat. Gas Co., 142 S.W.3d at 456; Tyson, 672 S.W.2d at 626. Because the Property Owners offered no evidence from DCAD demonstrating that it suffered from the same mistake of fact that Ray claimed to have had while negotiating with DCAD, the trial court did not err by granting DCAD’s summary judgment on the Property Owners’ mutual mistake correction claim. We overrule the Property Owners’ third issue. 10 Although the Property Owners claim in their briefing that other documentary evidence, including a property review field card and sales grids, came from DCAD and offer explanatory arguments about the documents, they did not offer any evidence—not even a business records affidavit—to prove up where the documents came from, who created them, and—more importantly—who relied on them during the valuation negotiations. Any explanation about the records—beyond what the records say on their face—is outside the record. See Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e do not consider factual assertions that appear solely in briefs and are not supported by the record.” (quoting Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006))). In the absence of any explanatory evidence, we cannot infer (1) any document’s source, including DCAD, or (2) DCAD’s use of or reliance upon any of the documents the Property Owners included with their summary judgment response. See id. 20 c. Claim of Clerical Error Turning to the Property Owners’ clerical error claim, we consider a case from a sister court of appeals that faced a similar summary judgment situation. See Marubeni Am. Corp. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 168 S.W.3d 860, 862–63 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In Marubeni, in response to a summary judgment motion on a taxpayer’s Section 25.25(c) claim, the taxpayer claimed that certain errors in data that it had provided the taxing authority constituted a clerical error. Id. In that case, however, the taxpayer “offered no summary judgment evidence from the persons who made the alleged errors, and its representative . . . testified that she had not determined the source or the reason for all of the alleged errors.” Id. at 863. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that the taxpayer “did not establish, as a matter of law, that its alleged errors were ‘clerical errors’ subject to correction under [S]ection 25.25(c).” Id. Like the taxpayer in Marubeni, the Property Owners have provided nothing beyond Ray’s and Urbanek’s affidavits to support their bare claim of a “mechanical data error” or “transcription error” to show that a clerical error occurred. They presented no evidence from DCAD, any of the Property Owners, or MLS explaining the circumstances behind the alleged “mechanical data error” or “transcription error.” For example, the Property Owners presented no evidence concerning how DCAD used the data point either in its comparable sales analysis or in its reasoning behind the negotiations that led to the two settlement agreements. Importantly, the record 21 does not reflect that DCAD viewed the $725,000 data point—or the prior actual sale price of either property—as the sole criteria for determining the value of either property. We could therefore affirm the summary judgment based on the Property Owners’ failure to present any contextual evidence about the $725,000 data point’s origin or use and their failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence of a clerical error. See id. But even taking at face value Ray’s and Urbanek’s claim of either a “mechanical data error” or “transcription error,” the Property Owners still did not overcome DCAD’s summary judgment motion concerning their clerical error claim. DCAD argued in its motion that the Property Owners’ claimed error was not clerical but instead reflected a “judgment-based disagreement with value that . . . cannot be corrected under [Section] 25.25(c).” On this point, we agree. The Tax Code outlines two types of clerical errors, including “mistake[s] or failure[s] in writing, copying, transcribing, entering or retrieving computer data, computing, or calculating.” Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(18). But the statute specifically states that a “‘clerical error’ does not include an error that is or results from a mistake in judgment or reasoning in the making of the finding or determination.”11 Id. We 11 The specific statement about a mistake in judgment or reasoning is found under Subsection B of the disjunctive A–B “clerical error” definition, but by the statute’s using a semicolon, the word “however,” and then restating the term “clerical error,” we construe the final clause of the statutory definition as applying to both Subsections A and B. Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(18); see Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at 39 (explaining that punctuation can serve as “a permissible indicator of 22 offer two case scenarios to compare a clerical error to a mistake in judgment or reasoning. In one scenario, a taxpayer submitted information to a taxing authority listing its equipment’s value at $13,000,000 instead of $1,300,000 because an employee had incorrectly filled out a form. Comdisco, Inc. v. Tarrant Cnty. Appraisal Dist. & Appraisal Review Bd. of Tarrant Cnty., 927 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ ref’d). The digit-grouping comma was off one place because of that form-filling error. Id. at 328. In such a scenario, this court determined that the misplaced comma was a clerical error that could be corrected via a Section 25.25(c) motion. Id. In the other scenario, a taxpayer provided an estimated value of its inventory’s market value but failed to account for depreciation. Stacy Family Enters., Inc., 2013 WL 6564299, at *1. Instead of arguing that the appraisal district had “transposed any numbers, copied the wrong figures, or committed any errors in adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing,” the taxpayer sought to “revise the methodology it used to calculate its renditions.” Id. at *4. This court concluded that the taxpayer’s “desired correction to the appraisal roll [was] not ministerial or objective; instead [it sought] a substantive re-evaluation of the property’s market value.” Id. (citing Anderton, meaning” (first quoting Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. 2016); and then citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 147 (2012))); see also Stacy Family Enters., Inc., 2013 WL 6564299, at *5 (“An error in judgment does not fall within the bounds of either subsection of 1.04(18).”). 23 26 S.W.3d at 543). Thus, the taxpayer had not shown a clerical error, and this court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment ruling against the taxpayer’s Section 25.25(c) motion. Id. This case is more closely aligned with the second scenario. See id. Assuming someone incorrectly input the $725,000 sale price of the Country Run Lane property, that figure was being used as an underlying data point while DCAD and the Property Owners negotiated a resolution of the 2024 value disputes. See Tex. Tax Code § 1.111(e). Because a property’s sale price does not automatically equate to the property’s market value and, in this case, merely formed a data point underlying the judgment and reasoning that led to the agreed-upon values, any correction in the sale price data point would have necessarily involved a substantive re-evaluation of market value, which is not a clerical error. See Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d at