Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00292-CV ___________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF B.C., A CHILD On Appeal from the 30th District Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. DC30-CP2025-1322 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION After a jury trial, the jury terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their daughter B.C.,1 finding three termination grounds for each parent: • endangering conduct, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E); • constructively abandoning B.C., see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N); and • criminal conduct resulting in Mother’s and Father’s convictions, imprisonment, and inability to care for B.C. for two years after the termination petition’s filing, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(P). The jury also determined that the Department of Family and Protective Services made reasonable efforts to return B.C. to Mother and Father, see id. § 161.001(f), and that termination was in B.C.’s best interest, see id. § 161.001(b)(2). In five issues, Mother complains that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative findings concerning (1) the Department’s reasonable efforts to reunite B.C. with Mother, id. § 161.001(f); (2) Mother’s endangering conduct, id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); (3) Mother’s constructively abandoning B.C., id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N); (4) Mother’s criminal conduct, id. § 161.001(b)(1)(P); and (5) B.C.’s best interest, id. § 161.001(b)(2). In three issues, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying (1) his motion under Section 262.114 to change B.C.’s placement to Grandfather, see id. § 262.114, and (2) his motion under Section 1 We use initials to identify the child, we refer to family members by familial relation, and we use pseudonyms for other parties. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). Grandfather is Father’s father. 2 263.401 to retain the suit on the trial court’s docket and set a new dismissal deadline, see id. § 263.401, which (3) Father claims collectively harmed him. Grandfather joins in Father’s arguments to argue that the trial court’s abuse of discretion by denying Father’s Section 263.401 extension motion and his motion to change B.C.’s placement to Grandfather probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. We will affirm. I. Background Mother and Father had one child together: B.C. When B.C. was born in June 2025, both Mother and Father were incarcerated. A few weeks later, the Department became involved when the friend Mother had asked to care for B.C. while Mother served a 12-year prison sentence reported to the Department that she was unsure how long she could care for B.C. The Department initiated a proceeding for B.C.’s protection, for her conservatorship, and for termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. By October 2025, the Department had placed B.C. with two of Mother’s relatives,2 who had previously adopted two of B.C.’s half-brothers. At some point, Grandfather attempted to intervene, but on the Department’s motion, the trial court struck Grandfather’s intervention petition. Then, ten days 2 During trial, Mother was asked whether the husband and wife with whom B.C. had been placed were relatives of Mother’s, and she answered, “Yes, ma’am.” No clarifying testimony was provided, but in a pretrial hearing, Father testified that the husband and wife were not “biological family.” Other documents indicate that B.C.’s adult female caregiver was Mother’s cousin. 3 before trial began, Father requested that the trial court place B.C. with Grandfather or conduct a home study on him, and 11 days before trial, Father separately asked the trial court under Section 263.401 to retain the suit on the trial court’s docket but to set a new dismissal date so that he could “illustrate his capacity to parent his child and [to] provide due process.” See id. § 263.401. The trial court denied both motions, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Mother testified. She had had eight children, including B.C., and her parental rights had been terminated to the other seven because of her drug use. She had tried to be reunited with her children but could not stop taking drugs. Mother admitted that she was addicted to drugs and stated that her drugs of choice were methamphetamines, fentanyl, and heroin. Mother also testified that she had repeatedly gone to prison and jail for drug and other offenses. She had known Father for a number of years when they became romantically involved in fall 2024. Like the fathers of her other seven children, Father had a criminal and substance-abuse history. Mother invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to testify when asked how often she and Father had used drugs in 2024. But she admitted that she and Father were arrested in October 2024 for “[f]entanyl and methamphetamines.” Mother was arrested again in November 2024. She was using fentanyl after having taken a home pregnancy test and telling Father that she was pregnant (with B.C.). Before the arrest, Father told Mother that he wanted her to go to rehab, and 4 Mother testified that she had hoped that Father would have gone too. But after her arrest, Mother was charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to 12 years’ confinement for possessing methamphetamine and fentanyl with the intent to deliver it. She was also convicted of hindering the apprehension of a fugitive—the father of one of her other children—for which she received a concurrent eight-year sentence. Mother gave birth to B.C. while she was in prison, and she asked a friend she had met in sober living to take care of B.C. until she had completed her 12-year prison sentence. At the time of trial, Father was serving a 35-year sentence3 and admitted to having 11 felony convictions, including for drug offenses, bail jumping, evading in a vehicle, and possessing a firearm as a felon. He had been imprisoned on his latest charges since 2024 and had never met B.C.4 Case Manager Tabitha Bowers testified at trial. She discussed the Department’s efforts to work with Mother and Father and to reunite B.C. with them. Bowers communicated with both parents through prison tablets and mailed them updates about B.C. Bowers also testified about the success of B.C.’s placement with her two half-brothers. She confirmed that the family members with whom B.C. had been placed wanted to adopt B.C. 3 He was also serving concurrent 15- and 10-year sentences. 4 Because Father does not raise any sufficiency challenges, we need not detail his testimony. 5 Bowers testified that a child is endangered by a parent who abuses and sells drugs, has frequent arrests, and attempts to evade police to avoid arrest irrespective of whether the child is present when those things occur. Bowers opined that the parents’ plans for B.C. to remain in foster care until one of them was released from prison and achieved sobriety and stability would not provide permanency for B.C. and would prevent her from being adopted. She thus testified that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in B.C.’s best interest. A case supervisor similarly opined that she thought that termination was in B.C.’s best interest. After considering the evidence, the jury made specific affirmative findings that Mother and Father each had engaged in endangering conduct, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); had constructively abandoned B.C., see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N); and had engaged in criminal conduct resulting in Mother’s and Father’s convictions, imprisonment, and inability to care for B.C. for two years after the termination petition’s filing, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(P). The jury also found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to return B.C. to Mother and Father, and it found— concerning each parent—that termination was in B.C.’s best interest. Consistent with the jury’s findings, the trial court signed an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s rights to B.C. Father did not move for a new trial; Mother did. Mother, Father, and Grandfather have each appealed. We address each’s arguments in turn. 6 II. Mother’s Appeal Before turning to Mother’s five legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges, we must address whether she preserved these challenges in her new-trial motion. As we will explain, she has forfeited all but her factual-sufficiency challenge to the jury’s best-interest finding, and we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support that finding. A. Preservation In an appeal from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict, including a judgment terminating parental rights, a party cannot raise legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d); see also In re S.G., No. 01-18-00728-CV, 2019 WL 1448870, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2019, pets. denied); In re H.D.B.-M., No. 10-12-00423-CV, 2013 WL 765699, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 28, 2013, pet. denied). To preserve a legal-sufficiency challenge, a party must: (1) move for an instructed verdict; (2) object to the submission of a jury question; (3) move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (4) move to disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact question; or (5) move for a new trial. See In re D.J.J., 178 S.W.3d 424, 426–27 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); In re J.M.S., 43 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). To preserve a factual-sufficiency challenge, a party must move for a new trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2), (3); see In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also J.M.S., 43 S.W.3d at 62. 7 When a party moves for a new trial, the written motion must specify each ground relied upon “in such a way that the objection can be clearly identified and understood by the court.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 321; see In re J.A., No. 02-23-00129-CV, 2024 WL 3819373, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 15, 2024, pet. denied). “Generalit[ies are] to be avoided,” and “grounds of objections couched in general terms . . . shall not be considered by the court.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 322 (capitalization altered); see Santos v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 140 S.W.3d 397, 406 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“If objections asserted in a motion for new trial are stated too broadly, the trial court is under no obligation to consider the motion.”); D/FW Com. Roofing Co. v. Mehra, 854 S.W.2d 182, 189–90 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) (holding that, because the “appellant’s complaints in the motion for new trial did not alert the trial court that it was complaining about the possibility of a double recovery . . . , the trial court could not have been expected to address this issue”). While a sufficiency objection to a single jury issue without further detail will suffice to preserve error, RDJRLW, Inc. v. Miller, No. 02-16-00132-CV, 2017 WL 2590568, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.), a single objection to all the jury’s findings is too general and will not preserve error, see Arkoma Basin Expl. Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990–A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2008) (citing Biggers v. Cont’l Bus. Sys., Inc., 303 S.W.2d 359, 368 (Tex. 1957)); see also In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350– 54 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that termination cases are governed by the civil-procedure 8 rules and the “[i]mportant prudential concerns” behind applying the error-preservation rules in such cases). Here, Mother attempted to preserve error on her legal- and factual-sufficiency complaints by filing a new-trial motion. The one-page motion contained four grounds, which we quote: 1. The jury’s verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly unjust. 2. The evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support the jury’s findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1). 3. The evidence presented at trial was factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination of the parent[–]child relationship is in the best interest of the child. 4. The trial court committed reversible error during the course of the proceedings. On appeal, Mother attempts to present legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges to each of the jury’s three specific (b)(1) termination findings, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (P); the jury’s best-interest finding, see id. § 161.001(b)(2); and its reasonable-efforts finding, see id. § 161.001(f). But of the five issues Mother raises on appeal, she has preserved only her challenge to the factual sufficiency of the jury’s best-interest finding—by her third ground in her new-trial motion. She otherwise forfeited all her sufficiency complaints in her first five appellate issues. Grounds 1 and 4 are generalized challenges that do not focus the trial court on any specific findings or issues. Accordingly, grounds 1 and 4 preserved nothing for 9 review. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 322; J.A., 2024 WL 3819373, at *5; Ezenagu v. Olagundoye, No. 01-20-00334-CV, 2021 WL 4994376, at *6 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (holding that a new-trial motion did not preserve error because it generally complained about factual sufficiency without challenging any specific jury findings); In re C.E.M., 64 S.W.3d 425, 427–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (concluding that an instructed-verdict motion “on all grounds” was too general to preserve error in a termination case); D/FW Com. Roofing Co., 854 S.W.2d at 189 (concluding that a new-trial motion’s general factual-sufficiency point did not inform the trial court of a double-recovery complaint raised on appeal). In her second new-trial ground, instead of attacking each of the jury’s three specific termination findings, Mother globally complained about all the jury’s termination findings under Section 161.001(b)(1). By raising a generalized legal-sufficiency complaint without attacking each specific jury finding, Mother forfeited her legal-sufficiency complaint to the jury’s three specific termination findings. See Arkoma Basin Expl. Co., 249 S.W.3d at 387; Biggers, 303 S.W.2d at 368; In re S.C., No. 02-18-00422-CV, 2019 WL 2455612, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 13, 2019, pets. denied) (“By not challenging any of the jury findings on the four (b)(1) grounds in the trial court, Father forfeited any appellate complaint about them.”).5 5 The Supreme Court of Texas has recognized the significance of a parent’s evidentiary challenges to the endangerment grounds under Subsections (D) and (E) because of their potential impact on future termination proceedings. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019). We 10 Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues challenging the legal- and factual-sufficiency of the jury’s (b)(1)(E), (N), and (P) termination findings concerning Mother. Mother’s new-trial motion did not challenge the sufficiency of the jury’s reasonable-efforts finding, but she attempts to raise the issue on appeal. By not raising this specific sufficiency complaint first in the trial court, Mother has forfeited any appellate complaint about the jury’s reasonable-efforts finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d); C.E.M., 64 S.W.3d at 428 (concluding that a new-trial motion challenging an implied best-interest finding did not preserve error on the findings on the statutory predicate acts or omissions); H.D.B.-M., 2013 WL 765699, at *8 (holding that father’s ordinarily may not bypass analyzing the endangerment grounds in favor of examining an independent ground when a parent has challenged all the termination grounds. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 748. Yet in J.W., the Texas Supreme Court also stated that appellate review is required “when the parent has preserved the issue.” Id. (citing N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 237). Here, Mother’s new-trial motion did not preserve the issue. But in an abundance of caution, even were we to liberally construe Mother’s generalized sufficiency objections as specifically attacking the jury’s affirmative finding on termination ground (E), see Arkoma Basin Expl. Co., 249 S.W.3d at 388; R.W.K., No. 10-19-00200-CV, 2019 WL 5446062, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 23, 2019, no pet.) (addressing unpreserved sufficiency complaint); S.C., 2019 WL 2455612, at *4 (same), the evidence—particularly concerning Mother’s persistent drug use before B.C.’s birth and during Mother’s pregnancy with B.C. and her related drug convictions and resulting incarcerations—is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s endangerment finding under Subsection (E) by clear and convincing evidence, see In re J.W., No. 2-08-211-CV, 2009 WL 806865, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 26, 2009, no pet.) (discussing the endangering impact of a parent’s decision to use illegal drugs); see also In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tex. 2021) (“A parent’s criminal history—taking into account the nature of the crimes, the duration of incarceration, and whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions exists—can support a finding of endangerment.”). 11 charge objection to a single termination ground did not preserve his appellate complaints about the jury’s affirmative findings on any other statutory termination grounds). We overrule Mother’s first issue complaining that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding under Section 161.001(f). Finally, although Mother’s new-trial motion specifically challenged the factual sufficiency of the best-interest finding, Mother’s motion did not raise a legal-sufficiency challenge to that finding. We thus conclude that Mother has preserved her factual-sufficiency challenge but not her legal-sufficiency challenge to the best-interest finding. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 322; C.E.M., 64 S.W.3d at 428; H.D.B.-M., 2013 WL 765699, at *8; J.M.S., 43 S.W.3d at 62 (concluding that parents failed to preserve their legal-sufficiency challenges by not preserving error in the trial court, including by not filing a new-trial motion). We overrule Mother’s fifth issue to the extent that she complains about the legal sufficiency of the jury’s best-interest finding. B. Factual Sufficiency and the Jury’s Best-Interest Finding We now consider Mother’s sole preserved complaint—her factual-sufficiency challenge to the jury’s best-interest finding. The evidence is factually sufficient. 1. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(b), .206(a); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a 12 firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802. For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking termination must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent’s actions satisfy just one of the many predicate grounds that are listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest under Section 161.001(b)(2). Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). 2. Best Interest of the Child Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Evidence probative of a child’s best interest may be the same evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002); see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2). We also consider the evidence in light of nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining the child’s best interest: (A) the [child’s] desires . . . ; (B) the [child’s] emotional and physical needs[,] . . . now and in the future; 13 (C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the [child’s] best interest . . . ; (F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (G) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (H) the [parent’s] acts or omissions . . . indicat[ing] that the existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and (I) any excuse for the [parent’s] acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807. These factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors may not apply to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id. 3. Factual Sufficiency We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support terminating a parent–child relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). In a factual-sufficiency 14 review, we give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the factfinder’s judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the parent violated an alleged ground and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b); see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108. 4. Evidence and Analysis In weighing the Holley factors, we conclude that the evidence strongly shows a history of acts and omissions indicating that the existing parent–child relationship was not a proper one and that Mother was not able to provide for B.C.’s current or long-term emotional and physical needs. See 544 S.W.2d at 372. a. B.C.’s Desires The Department presented no direct evidence from B.C. Under such circumstances, the first Holley factor is ordinarily “considered to be neutral, weighing neither for nor against the trial court’s best-interest finding.” See In re C.W., No. 02-23-00414-CV, 2024 WL 637264, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 15, 2024, pet. denied). But the Department presented circumstantial evidence of B.C.’s desires by presenting evidence that she had bonded with her foster family, who had cared for 15 her and her half-siblings. As one Department witness testified, B.C. interacted with her placement family “[l]ike she has been there her whole entire life” and “is very attached and bonded to them.” Accordingly, the factfinder could have considered the evidence of B.C.’s bond with her foster family as “a reasonable proxy for [B.C.’s] desires.” In re E.T., No. 02-25-00545-CV, 2026 WL 179594, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 22, 2026, no pet.) (quoting In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)). The first factor supports the best-interest finding. b. B.C.’s Emotional and Physical Needs The evidence at trial showed that B.C. had been placed with maternal relatives, who had previously adopted two of B.C.’s half-brothers. Mother understood that B.C. got along well with her brothers, and she believed that they loved her. A case worker confirmed that B.C.’s brothers “adore[d] her” and that they had a normal sibling relationship. The case worker testified that B.C. was “very attached and bonded” to her caretakers and that they cared for her in their home. At the time of trial, B.C. had no special medical needs, but her caretakers ensured that she attended regular doctor’s visits. B.C.’s caretakers wanted to adopt her. We have said that “children need permanency and stability,” In re G.V., III, 543 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied), and we have stressed that a child needs “a stable home and engaged parents who d[o] not use 16 drugs,” In re G.M., No. 02-23-00061-CV, 2023 WL 4243349, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 29, 2023, pet. denied) (quoting In re M.J., No. 02-23-00026-CV, 2023 WL 3643673, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2023, no pet.)); In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). Here, the jury could have reasonably inferred from Mother’s repeated history of using drugs and incarceration that her drug use would likely continue and that she—unlike her current caretakers—could not meet B.C.’s current and future physical and emotional needs. See G.M., 2023 WL 4243349, at *8. This factor weighs in favor of termination. c. Emotional and Physical Danger to B.C. “A continuing pattern of illegal drug use . . . implicates most of the Holley factors and will support a finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest.” E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 607. Mother has a long history of using dangerous illegal drugs and has been unable to stop using them, despite having her parental rights terminated to her other seven children and despite repeatedly being confined in prison and jail for drug-related crimes. She even admitted to using fentanyl while knowing that she was pregnant with B.C. Although she claimed to have wanted to go to rehab in October 2024, she was instead arrested for “[f]entanyl and methamphetamines” and received a 12-year prison sentence. In sum, Mother’s continuous drug use poses a danger to B.C. See id. (collecting cases holding that a parent’s continuing drug usage supported multiple Holley factors, including endangering the parent’s child); see also In re A.A., No. 13-25-00157-CV, 17 2025 WL 2475157, at *12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 27, 2025, no pet.) (“The trial court was also permitted to measure Father’s future conduct by his past conduct in determining whether termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interest.” (citing In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied))). By contrast, the Department’s proposed permanent placement presented a safe and stable home for B.C. with two of her half-siblings and the adoption-motivated foster parents with whom she had formed strong bonds. See G.M., 2023 WL 4243349, at *8. This factor supports termination. d. Parental Abilities of the Individuals Seeking Custody B.C.’s young age places a premium on the parental abilities of those seeking custody and on the stability of her future home. See In re K.W., No. 02-24-00082-CV, 2024 WL 3461749, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 18, 2024, no pet.). Both case workers testified that B.C.’s foster parents had been meeting her needs and explained why they thought it was in her best interest to remain with them. The jury was also entitled to consider the evidence of Mother’s historical drug use, her inability to quit using drugs, her previous child–parent terminations based on her drug use, her repeated convictions leading to confinement, and her inability to meet B.C.’s basic needs—like housing—for the foreseeable future. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009) (stating that the factfinder is entitled to consider a parent’s history of drug use and irresponsible choices); E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 607; In re A.F.R., 18 No. 01-20-00355-CV, 2020 WL 6140181, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 20, 2020, pet. denied). This factor favors termination. e. Programs Available to Promote B.C.’s Best Interest Mother testified that she had sent at least three parenting packets back to the Department and provided certificates of classes she had taken in prison, including ones about substance abuse and parenting. She also testified about taking parenting courses during her prior six termination cases and admitted that she could not recall how many times she had relapsed since completing a 2011 substance-abuse class while she was previously imprisoned. The case worker testified that she had provided Mother nine parenting packets and that she had received only two back from Mother. Although the case worker acknowledged that she could not testify about Mother’s specific parenting abilities with B.C., she stated that Mother had been offered multiple services and opportunities with her prior children and with B.C. and had consistently demonstrated bad parenting abilities. On the other hand, B.C.’s foster parents provided a stable, loving home and wanted to adopt her. This factor weighs in favor of termination. See In re B.K.G.D., No. 01-20-00057-CV, 2020 WL 3821086, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 2, 2020, pet. denied) (concluding that “parental abilities” and “programs available” factors weighed in favor of termination when parents had completed “some, but not all, of” their required services and potential adoptive parents were able to meet child’s 19 needs); In re J.O., No. 11-19-00088-CV, 2019 WL 3822198, at *2–3 (Tex. App.— Eastland Aug. 15, 2019, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support best-interest finding when record reflected that adoption-motivated foster parents met the child’s needs). f. Plans for B.C. Mother did not want the jury to terminate her parental rights because she wanted a chance to be in B.C.’s life after she was released from prison, but the earliest time would be after B.C. had turned six. Mother conceded that B.C. could not be placed with her while she was in prison and that her life circumstances had created an unsafe situation for B.C. She thought that if she made parole in 2030 and lined up a job, she would likely go to her father’s house. Mother agreed that B.C. was safe and well cared for in her placement, and the Department’s witnesses testified that B.C. would be safer with Mother’s parental rights terminated. The Department’s plan was for B.C.’s foster parents to adopt her and to keep her with her two half-brothers if the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights—a result the foster parents wanted. A case worker opined that B.C. might not ever be adopted if she remained in foster care awaiting Mother or Father (1) to be released from prison and (2) to achieve sobriety and stability. See In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children.”). This factor favors termination. 20 g. Stability of the Home and Proposed Placement Under the Texas Family Code, “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(a). At the time of trial, B.C. “had been placed in a stable home, and the plan was for her to be adopted into that family.” See In re V.S., No. 02-22-00063-CV, 2022 WL 2252775, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2022, pet. denied) (citation modified). Evidence about placement plans and adoption is relevant to the child’s best interest. In re J.A.B., No. 2-06-404-CV, 2007 WL 3037720, at *6 n.40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2007, no pet.). The evidence established that B.C. interacted well with her placement family and that her needs were being met. See V.S., 2022 WL 2252775, at *6. In contrast, Mother’s history of drug use and her past and current confinement left her with no relationship with B.C. and no ability to provide for B.C.’s basic emotional and financial needs. This factor weighs in favor of termination. h. Acts or Omissions Indicating that the Parent–Child Relationship Was Not Proper We have discussed at length Mother’s prior drug use, but one point bears mentioning again—Mother’s knowing use of fentanyl while pregnant with B.C. Such horrific conduct with B.C. was not an isolated situation as the record indicates that Mother had used drugs while pregnant with another of her children, and that baby had tested positive for methamphetamines. Given an unborn child’s helplessness and 21 vulnerability, in finding that termination was in B.C.’s best interest, the jury was entitled to reasonably place more weight on Mother’s decision to use fentanyl while pregnant with B.C. See E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 609 (citing A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 825). More so, the jury could have made that finding based on Mother’s admitting to making the same indefensible choice with one of her prior children. See id. (“[D]rug use under these circumstances shows either an inability or unwillingness to place the responsibilities of parenthood ahead of the parent’s desire to use drugs.”). This factor weighs in favor of termination. i. Excuses Mother testified about her own childhood trauma and her beginning to use drugs at a young age as a coping mechanism. She admitted that she was not trying to make excuses for her past behavior and said, “All I can do is become a better person and not go back to the things that I was doing.” She explained how being in prison had enabled her to remain sober for 18 months, which was the longest she had ever not used drugs. She also testified to her efforts to take classes in prison and expressed a desire “to become a better person” and “to improve [her]self.” Even with Mother’s sobriety and personal desires to be a better person—which are noble and worthy goals—the jury was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination. j. Holding Considering the record as a whole, we conclude that the Holley factors weigh against Mother. We hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief 22 or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in B.C.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2); H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. We overrule the remainder of Mother’s fifth issue. III. Father’s Appeal Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, he complains about (1) the Department’s placement of B.C. with mother’s relatives and B.C.’s half-brothers and the trial court’s denial of his Section 262.114 motion to change that placement to Grandfather, (2) the trial court’s denial of his Section 263.401 motion to extend the dismissal date, and (3) harm that Father claims resulted from these two denials. We will explain why Father cannot prevail on these three issues. A. Father’s Denied Section 263.401 Extension Request In his second issue, Father asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion under Section 263.401 to retain the Department’s termination suit on the court’s docket and to set a new dismissal deadline because he was making progress on the court-ordered service plan but needed additional time to complete remaining requirements. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). We conclude that Father did not show an abuse of discretion. Termination proceedings have a dismissal deadline. See id. § 263.401(a). Before a trial on the merits has commenced, Section 263.401(b) governs extending that deadline for up to 180 days. See id. § 263.401(b). 23 We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a Section 263.401(b) extension request for an abuse of discretion. In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth), pet. denied, 260 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2008). We must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding principles or whether it acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or by misapplying the law to the case’s facts. Id.; see Huynh v. Blanchard, 694 S.W.3d 648, 674 (Tex. 2024); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985). We focus on • the child’s needs, • whether extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child’s remaining in the Department’s temporary custody, and • whether continuing that temporary custody is in the child’s best interest. In re C.G., No. 02-20-00087-CV, 2020 WL 4518590, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2020, pet. denied) (citing In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g)). Father has 11 felony convictions and is concurrently serving 35-year, 10-year, and 15-year prison sentences. In his pretrial motion to retain the case on the court’s docket and to set a new dismissal date, Father explained that during his incarceration he had completed numerous classes that were part of his service plan. He claimed that he “ha[d] a parole review date . . . less than one month from the currently scheduled jury trial[] and still within the one-year statutory guideline for CPS cases.” Father 24 asked for the extension to allow him “the opportunity to [demonstrate] his capacity to parent his child and [to] provide due process.” During a hearing on his motion, Father took the stand and acknowledged his criminal history—including the fact that he had been on parole when he had committed a new criminal offense—and the fact that he had been incarc