Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 2, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— No. 01-25-00348-CV ——————————— CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant V. VONYAE Q. JORDAN, Appellee On Appeal from the 127th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-10196 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellee Vonyae Q. Jordan sued the City of Houston after his vehicle collided with a police car on the highway. The City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it is immune from suit. The trial court denied the motion. We reverse and render judgment dismissing Jordan’s suit for want of jurisdiction. Background In March 2022, Houston Police Officer Keith Taylor was assigned to work night shifts on a task force aimed at deterring street crimes associated with an auto- racing event in Houston. On the night of the accident, the weather was clear and there was little traffic, but most of the vehicles Officer Taylor observed were exceeding the speed limit and traveling “very fast.” The portion of the freeway where Officer Taylor was positioned has five lanes. Officer Taylor had his cruiser positioned just past an overpass that limits drivers’ visibility. Shortly before midnight, Officer Taylor observed a car driving over the overpass. As it reached grade level, the car passed Officer Taylor and came to a stop in the middle lane (lane three). The Houston Police Department classifies traffic hazards of this sort as a “priority two emergency call.” Officer Taylor “immediately believed that the conditions were ripe for another motorist to come over the overpass and slam into the back of the disabled vehicle” and “knew [he] needed to react immediately and reposition [his] police cruiser behind the disabled vehicle so if an accident occurred, it would be with the police vehicle rather than the disabled motorist.” Accordingly, he began driving his cruiser from the shoulder to reposition it behind the disabled vehicle. Officer Taylor kept his emergency lights on, activated his siren, and checked his rearview and side mirrors as he crossed the freeway. According to Officer 2 Taylor, when he entered lane two, a vehicle driven by Jordan swerved from the center lane into lane two to avoid the disabled vehicle. Jordan’s car collided with Officer Taylor’s cruiser, knocking off its side mirror. The police report of the accident states that Taylor’s vehicle had his emergency lights activated when he “began to merge into lane 3 of 5.” Per the report, Jordan “made an unsafe lane change and crashed into [Officer Taylor] as he “began to merge from lane 4 to lane 3.” Jordan was “issued a citation and released from the scene.” Video from Officer Taylor’s body camera shows that shortly after the accident, Jordan stated he intended to leave the scene, to which Officer Taylor responded, “You cannot leave,” “You hit me,” “You see the flashing lights?,” and “You hit a police car with flashing lights.” When Jordan told Officer Taylor, “You came into my lane,” Officer Taylor responded, “Yeah, because would you rather hit him, drilled him in the back?” and “Yeah, I did, because I was trying to get behind this car [the disabled vehicle].” Jordan tells a different story. According to Jordan, he “was driving straight down [his] lane” when he “did see a stalled vehicle[,] but it was notable and visible enough that there was no danger of [his] crashing into it[.]” In Jordan’s account, Officer Taylor’s vehicle moved into his lane “suddenly and without warning.” 3 Jordan sued the City for negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment, alleging he suffered personal injuries from the collision. The City moved for no-evidence and traditional summary judgment, arguing in part that Jordan could produce no evidence negating that the Texas Tort Claims Act’s (TTCA) emergency exception preserves the City’s immunity. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2). The trial court denied the City’s motion, and this interlocutory appeal followed. See id. § 51.014(a)(8). The TTCA Emergency Exception Among other issues, the City argues the trial court erred by denying the portion of the motion for summary judgment contending Jordan can present no evidence to negate the TTCA’s emergency exception. We agree. A. Relevant law The parties’ burdens and the de novo standard of review regarding the City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment are settled—in short, when the nonmovant fails to present more than a scintilla of competent evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the challenged elements, the “court must grant the motion.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see also City of Houston v. Kelly, No. 01-24- 00057-CV, 2025 WL 1521542, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). 4 The TTCA provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity for damages caused by the negligence of a governmental employee acting within the scope of his employment and arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 101.021(1). But the TTCA identifies several circumstances in which the immunity waiver does not apply, including the emergency exception, under which the waiver does not apply to a claim arising “from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others[.]” Id. § 101.055(2). The City’s no-evidence motion asserted that Jordan was unable to produce evidence that Officer Taylor (1) was not reacting to an emergency situation, (2) failed to comply with applicable laws and ordinances, (3) or acted recklessly. We consider whether Jordan presented evidence creating a fact issue on these elements. B. No fact issue created on whether it was an emergency situation The TTCA does not define “emergency call” or “emergency situation,” but courts have interpreted the term “emergency” broadly. See City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 672–73 (Tex. 2006); City of Houston v. Hussein, No. 5 01-18-00683-CV, 2020 WL 6788079, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 19, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g) (collecting cases). “[A]s commonly used, the term ‘emergency’ refers to unforeseen circumstances that call for immediate action[.]” Jefferson Cnty. v. Hadnot, 699 S.W.3d 787, 797 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2024, no pet.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should avoid construing the emergency exception “to exclude emergencies the Legislature might have intended to include.” Hartman, 201 S.W.3d at 673. Applying these principles, Texas courts have held that police officers responding to obstructions on roadways qualify as “emergency situations.” See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Smith, 562 S.W.3d 75, 82–83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. denied) (“Texas appellate courts have concluded that claims arising from objects blocking lanes on highways were emergency situations, and the actions of government employees in response to these emergency situations fell within the scope of [the TTCA’s emergency exception].”). Jordan averred in his affidavit that the stalled vehicle “was notable and visible enough that there was no danger of my crashing into it nor do I believe there was a true danger of anyone else doing so.” But Jordan’s ability to see and avoid the disabled vehicle, and his personal belief that it was not a “true danger,” does not—without more—raise a fact issue on whether the vehicle stopped on the 6 highway created an emergency situation for purposes of section 101.055(2). Given the high speed that vehicles are driven on highways, and that drivers unfortunately often are not being fully attentive, a person’s ability to see a stalled vehicle does not support that an emergency situation did not exist. A stalled vehicle in the middle of the highway is an unforeseen circumstance that calls for immediate action whether it is avoidable or not, and to hold otherwise would exclude emergencies the Legislature might have intended to include in this exception. See Hartman, 201 S.W.3d at 673; see also Gordon v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., No. 02- 24-00538-CV, 2025 WL 2370936, at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] firsthand observation of [drivers] swerving was not required for the debris [on a roadway] to constitute ‘an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that call[ed] for immediate action.’” (citation omitted)).1 Jordan did not raise a material fact issue on this element. 1 Jordan also points to a part of Officer Taylor’s affidavit: “The weather was clear and the roads were dry. On this stretch, those conditions typically result in traffic traveling at high speeds. It was approximately 11:45 p.m. so it was dark, but the freeway was lit by overhead lights. There was almost no traffic, but the vehicles that were on the road were traveling very fast.” Jordan argues that Officer Taylor’s admission “there was notable visibility and low traffic” means there was no emergency. But again, the high speed of the vehicles on the highway, which Officer Taylor acknowledges, means the mere ability to see the stalled vehicle does not negate the emergency. 7 C. No fact issue created on whether Officer Taylor acted recklessly Because Officer Taylor was responding to an emergency situation, the emergency exception applies unless he did not act “in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, [his actions were] . . . taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2). The only law or ordinance Jordan identifies as having been violated by Officer Taylor is Texas Transportation Code § 546.005. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.005. Section 546.005 “largely corresponds” to the recklessness prong of the TTCA’s emergency exception. See City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 455 (Tex. 2024). The parties do not argue that application of section 546.005, as opposed to the recklessness prong, would lead to a different result here, so we consider whether the evidence raises a fact issue about recklessness. See Harris County v. Gariet, No. 01-24-00175-CV, 2026 WL 2575354, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The Transportation Code defines “reckless driving” as driving “a vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.401(a); see also City of Houston v. Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Tex. 2025). “[R]ecklessness for purposes of the emergency exception likewise involves a ‘willful or wanton disregard’ for the safety of others.” Gomez, 716 S.W.3d at 8 165 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 531 (Tex. 2022)). A “momentary judgment lapse” is not enough to establish reckless disregard, nor is “mere inattentiveness.” Id. at 165–66 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, invocation of the emergency exception’s recklessness standard requires conscious indifference or subjective awareness of an extreme risk. Id. at 165 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Relative to recklessness, Jordan points to parts of Officer Taylor’s body- camera video in which he (1) asked Jordan, “would you rather hit him, drilled him in the back?,” (2) said he came into Jordan’s lane because he was “trying to get behind this car [the stalled vehicle],” (3) said he was supposed to sit on the freeway with his lights on and “if I do something I’m going to get hit,” and (4) did not deny that he was the person who came into Jordan’s lane. These statements do not support a finding that Officer Taylor was acting with a “willful or wanton disregard” for the safety of others. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531. At most, they show Officer Taylor was involved in an accident with Jordan when Officer Taylor was trying to get his patrol car behind the stalled vehicle. “Mere involvement in a collision does not create an inference or conclusion that a driver is incompetent or reckless.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 461 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Jordan likewise did not raise a material fact issue on this element. 9 Accordingly, Jordan failed to present evidence negating application of the emergency exception. We sustain the City’s first issue, which means the City’s immunity from suit is not waived. We need not reach the City’s other issues. Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment granting the City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment based on the emergency exception and dismissing this case for want of jurisdiction. Andrew Johnson Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guiney and Johnson. 10