City of Donna v. Daisy Torres and Anayeli Ortiz
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 13th District
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket13-24-00556-CV
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NUMBER 13-24-00556-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CITY OF DONNA, Appellant,
v.
DAISY TORRES AND
ANAYELI ORTIZ, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 139TH DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron
This interlocutory appeal arises from a motor vehicle accident involving a City of
Donna police officer who proceeded through a red light with his emergency lights
activated. The primary issues are whether the emergency exception to the Texas Tort
Claims Act applies, and if so, whether the record contains evidence that the officer was
driving with reckless disregard for the safety of others at the time of the accident. Because
the record establishes that the officer was responding to an emergency call and was not
driving recklessly, the Act does not waive the City’s governmental immunity. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s interlocutory order denying the City’s jurisdictional challenge and
render judgment dismissing the suit.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 5, 2022, at approximately 2:30 a.m., the local dispatch center
received a call about a fight in progress at a bar. City police officers Erik Gonzalez, Leslie
Herrera, and Gilbert Bustamante responded to the call from different locations. Officers
Herrera and Bustamante were on patrol, and because Bustamante was closest to the
location, he would eventually arrive at the scene first. Officer Gonzalez left the police
station and was driving northbound on North Daniel Salinas Boulevard (Salinas), toward
the Interstate Highway 2 (I-2) underpass, when the accident occurred. His emergency
lights were activated, but his siren was not. He later testified that, due to the nature of the
call, “a bar fight,” he chose not to activate his siren because he did not want the suspects
to flee the scene before he arrived. He believed, given the time of night and location, that
his flashing lights were sufficient to alert other motorists to his presence.
As he responded to the call, Officer Gonzalez “noticed the traffic was very light
because it was so late in the evening,” an observation corroborated by video evidence.
The speed limit on Salinas is 40 mph. 1 A recording from Officer Gonzalez’s body-worn
1 Officer Gonzalez testified that the speed limit on Salinas was 45 mph, but the Texas Peace
Officer’s Crash Report lists the speed limit as 40 mph, and the City takes that position on appeal.
2
camera shows that he hit a top speed of 78 mph on Salinas approximately thirteen
seconds before the accident occurred.
Meanwhile, appellees Daisy Torres and Anayeli Ortiz were traveling eastbound on
a one-way frontage road that runs parallel to I-2 and intersects Salinas just before the
underpass. A recording from Officer Gonzalez’s dashcam, which begins seven seconds
before the accident, shows that the light facing him on Salinas has already turned red as
he approaches the intersection. At the beginning of the video, Officer Gonzalez had
reduced his speed to 58 mph, and he continues to slow his vehicle as he advances toward
the intersection. For the first four seconds of the video, there are no other vehicles in the
camera’s view. There are no vehicles in front of Officer Gonzalez on Salinas, and there
are no vehicles entering the intersection from the frontage road. At the five-second mark
of the video, when Officer Gonzalez’s vehicle is approximately two car lengths short of
the stop line, Torres first enters the intersection and begins turning left onto northbound
Salinas. One second later, Officer Gonzalez, who has reduced his speed to 40 mph at
this point, continues into the intersection without stopping or reducing his speed further.
Neither vehicle appears to brake or take evasive action, and at the seven-second mark
of the video, the front right fender of Torres’s vehicle impacts the front left fender of Officer
Gonzalez’s vehicle, causing moderate damage to both vehicles, but Torres’s more so
than Gonzalez’s. Both vehicles were eventually towed from the scene.
Immediately after the collision, Officer Gonzalez reports the accident over the
radio. Not long after, Officer Bustamante says over the radio, “It was a couple arguing,
but they took off already.”
3
Officer Gonzalez apologizes to Torres several times at the scene, saying, for
example, “I was running to a call, ma’am, and I’m sorry, I didn’t see you guys.” When
other City police officers arrive on the scene, he also tells them that he “didn’t see the
vehicle.” Likewise, Officer Gonzalez later testified that he “looked left” but “did not see the
other vehicle’s headlights at all.” He said that, had he noticed Torres proceeding through
the intersection, he would have stopped his vehicle and activated his siren to get her
attention.
Ortiz, the passenger in Torres’s vehicle, complains at the scene of a head injury.
Torres initially says she is “okay,” but both she and Ortiz are later transported to an
emergency room by ambulance.
Corporal Herman Gonzalez with the City police department investigated the
accident. According to the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report he completed, the
weather conditions that night were clear, which is consistent with the video evidence. He
also reported that the light conditions were “dark but lighted.” The video evidence depicts
a well-lit intersection, with fast food establishments or gas stations on each corner before
and after the underpass, as well as overhead streetlights and traffic signals. A
Whataburger is located on Officer Gonzalez’s left as he approaches the intersection,
momentarily obstructing his view of vehicles driving along the frontage road. The
dashcam video shows that, as Officer Gonzalez passes the Whataburger, he has a
largely unobstructed view of the frontage road for approximately four seconds before
entering the intersection. Corporal Gonzalez ultimately concluded that both drivers were
partially at fault: Officer Gonzalez for failing to stop at the red light, and Torres for failing
4
to yield to an emergency vehicle, although neither driver received a citation.
Officer Gonzalez later acknowledged during his deposition that his department
requires officers to come to a full stop before proceeding through a red light while on
emergency calls. He further acknowledged that an internal investigation determined that
he violated the department’s policy by proceeding into the intersection without first coming
to a full stop.
Torres and Ortiz sued the City for vicarious liability, alleging Officer Gonzalez was
both negligent and reckless and that the City’s immunity was waived under either Section
101.021(1) or Section 101.055(2) of the Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 101.021(1), 101.055(2). As to Officer Gonzalez’s specific conduct, they alleged that
he was driving “in a negligent and reckless manner” by: “failing to keep a proper lookout”;
“failing to timely apply the brakes”; “operating his vehicle at a rate of speed that was
greater than an ordinary prudent person would have driven under similar circumstances”;
“failing to turn on his vehicle sirens”; “failing to blow [his] horn warning of imminent
danger”; “failing to maintain attention”; “disregarding the red light”; and “violating
applicable provisions of the Texas Transportation Code.”
The City filed a hybrid motion for summary judgment arguing that it retained
immunity based on the Act’s emergency exception. 2 The City claimed there was “no
2 The City separately argued that Officer Gonzalez was entitled to official immunity—and therefore
the City’s immunity was not waived—because he was performing a discretionary duty in good faith and
within the scope of his authority. See City of Houston v. Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. 2024) (“[T]he
governmental employer’s immunity is not waived if its employee is protected by official immunity.”); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(B) (providing that immunity is waived for motor vehicle accidents only
if “the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law”). Given our disposition,
we do not reach this alternative argument, which the City also advances on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.
47.1.
5
evidence” to contradict its assertion of the emergency exception and “no evidence”
demonstrating that Officer Gonzalez “acted with conscious indifference or reckless
disregard for the safety of others.” See id. § 101.055(2). The City also argued that the
evidence attached to its motion conclusively established the emergency exception’s
applicability and the City’s entitlement to immunity under that provision. Appellees
responded that the record raised two primary jurisdictional fact issues: whether Officer
Gonzalez was actively responding to an emergency call at the time of the accident, and
whether Officer Gonzalez’s conduct was reckless. Appellees filed a reply with additional
evidence, which we discuss in more detail below. Both sides principally relied on the same
evidence, which included the dashcam video, the footage from Officer Gonzalez’s body-
worn camera, Officer Gonzalez’s deposition, the call sheets from the bar fight and the
accident, affidavits from Officer Gonzalez and Corporal Gonzalez, and the Peace Officer’s
Crash Report from the accident.
The trial court denied the jurisdictional challenge, and this interlocutory appeal
followed. See id. § 51.014(a)(8).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
As a political subdivision of the State, the City is generally immune from suits for
money damages unless the Legislature has waived immunity for the type of claim
asserted. See City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2022). This
immunity from suit “implicates” the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Engelman
Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. 2017). Thus, when suing
a governmental entity, it is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the trial court’s subject
6
matter jurisdiction by identifying a valid waiver of immunity and affirmatively negating any
exception that may apply. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Tex. 2024).
Immunity from suit is properly raised in either a plea to the jurisdiction or a motion
for summary judgment. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tex. 2009). When, as here,
the parties dispute the existence of jurisdictional facts and submit supporting evidence,
our standard of review mirrors a traditional motion for summary judgment. 3 Maspero, 640
S.W.3d at 528. Under this familiar standard, we generally treat all evidence favorable to
the nonmovant as true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in
their favor. Id. at 528–29. Evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact if reasonable
and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions considering all the summary
judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex.
2007). If the evidence generates a fact question on the jurisdictional issue raised, then
dismissal is improper, and the issue should be submitted to a jury. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d
at 529. Conversely, if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact issue, the
jurisdictional issue becomes a question of law for a court to decide. Tex. Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).
Under the Act, the City is vicariously liable for personal injuries proximately caused
by an employee who negligently operates a motor vehicle during the scope of his
employment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1). This waiver of immunity is
3 We recognize the City also challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts through a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment, which has its own standard of review. See Town of Shady Shores v.
Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). However, when both parties bring forward evidence as part
of a hybrid motion, as occurred here, the “differing burdens are immaterial and the ultimate issue is whether
a fact issue exists.” Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Tex. 2013) (citing Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d
525, 527 n.2 (Tex. 2012)).
7
withdrawn, however, if the employee is “responding to an emergency call or reacting to
an emergency situation,” so long as “the action is in compliance with the laws and
ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance,
if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety
of others.” Id. § 101.055(2).
If the officer was responding to an emergency when the accident occurred, we
must first “assess whether any laws or ordinances apply to the emergency action at issue
in the case.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 449. If so, our “jurisdictional inquiry turns on whether
the officer’s action complied with the relevant law or ordinance.” Id.
When responding to an emergency call, a police officer may, among other
privileges, “proceed past a red or stop signal . . . after slowing as necessary for safe
operation” and “exceed the maximum speed limit . . . as long as the operator does not
endanger life or property.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 546.001(2), (3), 546.002(b)(1). When
exercising these privileges, a police officer is generally required to use audible or visual
signals “at the discretion of the operator in accordance with policies of the department or
the local government that employs the operator.” Id. § 546.003. However, a police officer
responding to an emergency call is authorized to operate an emergency vehicle without
using audible or visual signals if the officer has probable cause to believe that knowledge
of the officer’s presence will cause the suspect to evade apprehension. Id.
§ 546.004(c)(1)(A)(iii).
These express authorizations act as “safe harbors” by “removing any doubt that
undertaking those actions is categorically permissible, which makes it especially hard to
8
pin liability on an officer who undertakes them.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 454. Indeed,
though an officer exercising these privileges has a legal “duty to operate the vehicle with
appropriate regard for the safety of all persons,” liability only attaches if the officer acts
with “reckless disregard for the safety of others.” City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d
426, 431 (Tex. 1998); see TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.005. This is because “the Legislature
intended for emergency vehicle operators in emergency situations to be cognizant of
public safety, but only intended to impose liability for reckless conduct.” Martin, 971
S.W.2d at 431 (analyzing substantively identical predecessor to § 546.005 in context of
emergency exception and applying recklessness standard to claim involving a police
officer “proceeding through a red light when the accident occurred”). In this case, the
parties agree that if the emergency exception applies, then appellees must produce
evidence that Officer Gonzalez acted in a manner that showed “reckless disregard for the
safety of others.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.005(2).
Demonstrating reckless disregard “require[s] proof that a party knew the relevant
facts but did not care about the result.” City of San Antonio v. Harman, 201 S.W.3d 667,
672 n.19 (Tex. 2006) (collecting cases). “In nearly every case, the officer’s state of mind
will be inferred from the circumstances of his actions.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 457.
Evidence of ordinary negligence will not suffice. Id. at 460. Additionally, “mere
involvement in a collision does not create an inference or conclusion that a driver is
incompetent or reckless.” Id. at 461 (citation modified). Rather, recklessness “requires a
showing that the driver committed an act he knew or should have known posed a high
degree of serious injury.” Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531. Even so, “we must tread carefully”
9
because emergency responses are inherently risky to other motorists, and “[l]aw
enforcement must retain discretion to assess and balance these risks using reasoned
judgment.” Id. at 531–32.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Officer Gonzalez Was Responding to an Emergency Call
As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree whether the record establishes that
Officer Gonzalez was responding to an emergency call at the time of the accident. The
distinction is significant because if the emergency exception doesn’t apply, appellees are
only required to produce some evidence that Officer Gonzalez was operating his vehicle
negligently, rather than recklessly, to overcome the City’s immunity from suit. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1). Appellees do not dispute that an active bar fight
constitutes an emergency under the Act, but they claim the record raises a genuine issue
of material fact about whether the emergency call had been cleared by the other officers
a few minutes prior to the accident—the implication being that Officer Gonzalez was
gratuitously exercising his emergency privileges when the accident occurred despite the
lack of an actual emergency.
To prove their point, appellees rely on three pieces of evidence the City produced
during discovery: the call sheet from the bar fight and the two videos. A call sheet is
essentially a police activity log with timestamps showing, for instance, when a call was
received, when an officer was assigned to the call, when they arrived at the scene, and
when the call was cleared. Officer Gonzalez testified that these activities are logged by a
dispatcher as calls come in and information is communicated over the radio. The call
10
sheet regarding the bar fight, which was attached as evidence to appellees’ response,
shows the following sequence of events:
Time (a.m.) Activity
2:30:00 Call received
2:32:18 Call sent to dispatch
2:32:19 Officer Herrera assigned
2:32:20 Officer Herrera en route
2:32:26 Officer Gonzalez assigned
2:32:27 Officer Gonzalez en route
2:32:58 Officer Bustamante assigned
2:32:59 Officer Bustamante en route
2:34:59 Officer Bustamante arrived at the bar
2:37:48 Officer Gonzalez de-assigned
2:37:55 Officer Herrera arrived at the bar
2:38:20 Call cleared
Officer Gonzalez testified that he was “de-assigned” or removed from the call after he
reported the accident over the radio. Likewise, Corporal Gonzalez testified that “the call
sheet reflects that Officer Gonzalez was de-assigned at 2:37:48 . . . because that is when
he called in the accident with Ms. Torres.”
Yet, appellees note that the dashcam video shows the “Current Time” as “2:42:12”
when the accident occurred. Also, the dashboard clock inside Officer Gonzalez’s vehicle,
as depicted in the bodycam video, shows a time of “2:42” immediately after the accident.
11
According to appellees, the call sheet and video evidence, when viewed together, raise
a reasonable inference that Officer Gonzalez “had already been de-assigned, the call had
been cleared, and there was no ongoing emergency at the time of the crash.” See City of
Edinburg v. Cazares, No. 13-25-00593-CV, 2026 WL 2444574, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that “the record evidence
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Villarreal was still responding to an
emergency at the time of the accident”).
When appellees raised this issue below, the City filed a reply with additional
evidence to explain the discrepancy between the timestamps on the call sheet and those
displayed on the videos. Corporal Gonzalez testified by affidavit that “call sheets are what
officers rely on for specific times, and we refer back to them for every report we generate
thereafter.” As an example, he cited his own Peace Officer’s Crash Report for the
accident, which “identifies the time of the accident as 2:37 AM.” With respect to the time
displayed on the dashcam video, Corporal Gonzalez said it was “chronologically
incorrect.” When asked about it during his deposition, Officer Gonzalez said he was
uncertain about the cause of the discrepancy, but he suspected “the times are off” on the
dashcam video.
The City also produced the separate call sheet from the accident, which shows the
call was “OFFICER INITIATED” and that dispatch received the information at “2:37:45.”
Notably, this was three seconds before the first call sheet says that Officer Gonzalez was
“de-assigned” from the bar fight, and thirty-five seconds before the bar fight was cleared.
The second call sheet also says that Corporal Gonzalez was assigned to the accident at
12
“2:38:23,” a factual impossibility if the accident occurred at 2:42.
Finally, the City produced an extended version of the dashcam video that begins
when Officer Gonzalez leaves the department parking lot with his emergency lights
activated and continues well after the accident occurred. Approximately thirty-five
seconds before the accident, just after Officer Gonzalez turns onto Salinas, Officer
Bustamante reports over the radio that he has arrived at the bar. This is the only
communication between the officers over the radio before the accident.
On appeal, the City argues that the exact time of the accident is immaterial
because the two call sheets (as supplemented by the officers’ testimony) and the video
evidence both independently establish the same sequence of events—that Officer
Gonzalez was responding to an emergency call when the accident occurred, and the call
was cleared shortly after the accident. According to the City, this is the only reasonable
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence. We agree there is no genuine dispute
that Officer Gonzalez was responding to an emergency call at the time of the accident.
Although we generally view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
our deference is not absolute. Because “the test for legal sufficiency should be the same
for summary judgments,” our review of the summary judgment record “must credit
favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless
reasonable jurors could not.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823, 827 (Tex.
2005) (emphasis added). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which
is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
13
judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). For instance, when the nonmovant’s
version of events is “utterly discredited” by video evidence, the appellate court should
“view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape” rather than accepting a “visible
fiction.” Id. at 380–81 (citation modified); see Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 187 n.1
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (acknowledging “video recordings can be conclusive as to what
and how events transpired”).
Based on the record before us, we find appellees’ version of events incredible for
two reasons. First, to reach the conclusion that Officer Gonzalez was not responding to
an emergency call at the time of the accident, a factfinder would have to draw an
unreasonable inference from the evidence. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827.
Appellees’ version of events assumes that the timestamps on the first call sheet can be
combined with the times displayed on the videos to create an accurate timeline of events.
Like the City, their version relies on the fact that the dispatcher is accurately recording the
officers’ activities in real time, and thus Officer Gonzalez was actually removed from the
call at or near “2:37:48,” and the call was actually cleared at or near “2:38:20.” It also
presumes that the two clocks displayed on the videos were synced with the clock used to
generate the timestamps on the call sheets.
But it is clear from the record that these different pieces of evidence cannot be
synthesized in the way appellees suggest. For instance, the first call sheet says that
Officer Gonzalez was en route to the bar at “2:32:27,” yet the clock on the extended
dashcam video shows him pulling out of the department parking lot at “2:40:00.” Likewise,
the timestamps from the second call sheet, which were recorded by the same dispatcher,
14
show that the accident occurred prior to “2:37:45,” when the information was sent to
dispatch, but the video clocks depict the accident occurring several minutes later, at 2:42.
Simply put, the call sheets and the videos show the same events occurring at markedly
different times. For this reason, in a case where, by either party’s telling, the relevant
events occurred in a matter of minutes, no reasonable inferences or conclusions can be
drawn about the sequence of events by comparing the timestamps from the call sheets
with the times displayed in the videos. See Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 529.
Second, consistent with the City’s version of events, the video evidence in this
case definitively establishes that the accident occurred before the call was cleared. 4 It is
undisputed that Officer Bustamante was the first officer to arrive at the scene of the
reported bar fight and that he was the officer that cleared the call. The video evidence
captures the officers’ conversations over the radio from the time Officer Gonzalez left the
department parking lot until after the accident. Just prior to the accident, Officer
Bustamante announced that he had arrived at the bar. Shortly after the accident occurred,
he reported, “It was a couple arguing, but they took off already.” This sequence of events
in the video aligns with the timeline established by the two call sheets, as well as the
Peace Officer’s Crash Report and the testimony of Officer Gonzalez and Corporal
Gonzalez. Additionally, there is nothing in the record to contradict the City’s evidence that
Officer Gonzalez was removed from the emergency call because of the accident.
We conclude that no reasonable, fair-minded juror could look at the totality of the
summary judgment record and conclude that Officer Gonzalez was not on an emergency
4 Video evidence is not always conclusive; like other evidence, it has natural limitations depending
on the circumstances. Our holding is confined to what the video evidence in this case establishes.
15
call when the accident occurred. See Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 755.
B. No Fact Issue on Recklessness
The parties next dispute whether Officer Gonzalez exercised certain emergency
privileges in a manner that demonstrated “reckless disregard for the safety of others.”
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.005.
1. Failure to Activate Siren
First, appellees fault Officer Gonzalez for relying only on his emergency lights to
alert other motorists to his approach. In their view, Officer Gonzalez not only should have
activated his siren, but was required to do so under the circumstances. They rely on a
provision in Chapter 547 of the Transportation Code stating that an “operator of an
authorized emergency vehicle shall use the siren, whistle, or bell when necessary to warn
other vehicle operators or pedestrians of the approach of the emergency vehicle.” Id.
§ 547.702(b). As the argument goes, because Officer Gonzalez’s emergency lights did
not alert Torres to his presence and an accident ensued, it must have been necessary for
Officer Gonzalez to use his siren.
At the outset, it is not clear to us that this provision in Chapter 547, which broadly
concerns equipment standards for all types of motor vehicles, see id. §§ 547.001–.802,
constitutes a law “applicable to emergency action,” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 101.055(2). In any event, Officer Gonzalez testified that he elected not to activate his
siren because he was concerned that doing so could result in the suspects fleeing the
scene before he arrived, which is a discretionary decision expressly permitted by Chapter
16
546. 5 TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.004(c)(1)(A)(iii). He also said he considered the time of
day and traffic conditions in making his decision to proceed with only his emergency lights
activated, a fact we discuss in more detail later.
Appellees respond that Officer Gonzalez should have activated his siren once he
became aware that Officer Bustamante had arrived at the scene because the element of
surprise was lost at that point. As previously discussed, roughly thirty-five seconds before
the accident occurred, Officer Bustamante announced over the radio that he had arrived
at the bar. But that was the full extent of Officer Gonzalez’s knowledge about the situation.
At that point, without further communication from Officer Bustamante, Officer Gonzalez
didn’t know whether the scene was secure. Officer Gonzalez testified that bar fights are
particularly dangerous for responding officers because they can involve large numbers of
intoxicated people. He also testified that he was not far from the scene at the time of the
accident, estimating his distance at one and a half to two miles away. As the Texas
Supreme Court explained, “the very nature of emergency action . . . calls for split-second,
fact-specific decisions in unpredictable situations.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 454. On this
record, we cannot say that Officer Gonzalez violated Section 546.004 by failing to activate
his siren once he became aware that Officer Bustamante had arrived at the scene. On
the contrary, because this decision was within the bounds of his statutory discretion, the
alleged omission is insulated from liability under the Act. See City of Houston v. Gomez,
5 Officer Gonzalez gave conflicting accounts during his testimony about whether department policy
granted him broad discretion to activate only his lights on emergency calls, which would have been an
additional safe harbor. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.003 (providing that an officer who proceeds past a
red light while responding to an emergency call “shall use, at the discretion of the operator in accordance
with policies of the department or the local government that employs the operator, audible or visual signals”
(emphasis added)).
17
716 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam) (explaining that “because [the officer]
enjoyed discretion about whether to activate his emergency lights, any dispute over
whether he did so cannot demonstrate recklessness”).
2. Proceeding Against a Red Light
Officer Gonzalez was statutorily authorized to proceed through the red light “after
slowing as necessary for safe operation.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.001(2). Appellees
contend that Officer Gonzalez failed to comply with the “slowing as necessary for safe
operation” part of the statute and that he did so in a manner that showed conscious
indifference to the safety of other motorists. They cite his speed as he approached and
entered “a major intersection.” They also argue it is reasonable to infer Officer Gonzalez
failed to “check for cross-traffic” because he didn’t yield after their vehicle entered the
intersection first.
Because it is “relevant to the recklessness inquiry,” we cannot ignore evidence that
an officer engaged in risk assessment. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 461. Such evidence is “a
key indicator that an officer was not reckless.” Id. at 458. Officer Gonzalez’s actions
leading up to the accident show that he “engaged in some degree of risk assessment.”
Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 532. Officer Gonzalez exceeded the speed limit by 38 mph
approximately thirteen seconds before the accident and then gradually and continuously
slowed his speed as he approached the intersection, finally entering it at the posted speed
limit of 40 mph. 6 Rather than braking reflexively or performatively at the verge of the
6 We note that Officer Gonzalez was permitted to exceed the speed limit under the circumstances.
See TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 546.001(3), 546.002(b)(1). A police officer’s decision to exceed the speed limit
while responding to an emergency call is not inherently reckless. See City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640
S.W.3d 523, 532 (Tex. 2022) (explaining that “a police officer’s speeding and swerving during a pursuit are
18
intersection, Officer Gonzalez steadily and significantly reduced his speed, showing a
measured degree of caution. 7 See Delgado v. Cameron County, No. 13-23-00098-CV,
2024 WL 5087387, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 12, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (finding a fact issue on recklessness in part because video evidence showed
the officer entering a busy intersection at “a high rate of speed” after only a “quick
application of his brakes”). These were not the actions of someone who “did not care
about the result.” Harman, 201 S.W.3d at 672 n.19.
Moreover, we must view Officer Gonzalez’s speed in relation to other conditions,
such as weather and traffic. See Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 458 (“Adverse weather conditions,
roadworks, or the presence of pedestrians could make some speeds reasonable or
negligent in one chase but inordinately risky and reckless in another.”). We must pay
“careful consideration” to Officer Gonzalez’s “perception of the facts at the time of the
event.” Id. at 457 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Tex.
2022)). There were no adverse weather conditions that night, and Officer Gonzalez
correctly observed that “traffic was very light because it was so late in the evening.” While
the intersection is undoubtedly congested at other times of day, the video evidence
depicts a nearly deserted roadway, with no cross-traffic entering the intersection for
several seconds as Officer Gonzalez approaches the red light. Officer Gonzalez also
believed that his emergency lights would be sufficient to warn other motorists because
not inherently reckless actions [because] [e]xceeding the speed limit is part and parcel of a police chase”).
Speeding alone will raise a fact question on recklessness only in exceptional cases, and the officer’s speed
must be judged in context. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 458 (Tex. 2024).
7 We are not suggesting that simply reducing speed before proceeding against a red light will
always insulate an officer from liability. As always, context is king.
19
flashing red and blue lights are particularly noticeable at night.
The dashcam video shows that appellees entered the intersection first and that
Officer Gonzalez continued into the intersection without yielding or taking evasive action.
Appellees argue this shows that Officer Gonzalez failed to maintain a proper lookout,
despite his statements to the contrary. While we agree this is a reasonable inference to
draw from the evidence, “[f]ailure to pay attention is a paradigmatic example of negligence
and does not by itself constitute reckless conduct.” Id. at 460. In the context of emergency
responses, the Act does not waive immunity for momentary lapses in judgment. Maspero,
640 S.W.3d at 531. Although we have described the accident in granular detail, the Court
has the benefit of pausing, rewinding, and replaying the dashcam video to extract that
information. When played without interruption, the video depicts an accident that unfurls
within a few seconds. While the evidence raises questions about whether Officer
Gonzalez could have done more to prevent the accident, it does not create a reasonable
inference that he was acting with reckless disregard for the safety of his fellow motorists.
3. Violation of Department Policy
Finally, appellees contend that “the City cannot invoke the emergency exception”
because Officer Gonzalez violated his department’s emergency-response policy by failing
to come to a full stop before proceeding against a red light. The Supreme Court of Texas
previously rejected this very argument because the emergency exception is conditioned
on an officer’s compliance with “laws and ordinances,” and a police department’s internal
policies are neither. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 530; see also City of Laredo v. Varela, No.
04-10-00619-CV, 2011 WL 1852439, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 11, 2011, no
20
pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that an officer’s failure to adhere to department policy requiring
emergency vehicles to come to a complete stop did not raise a fact issue as to whether
officer acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others). Although a violation of
departmental policy may result in internal discipline for the officer, such a violation is
“immaterial to the legal question before us.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 456. Therefore, Officer
Gonzalez’s violation of department policy is not a basis upon which immunity can be
waived.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s interlocutory order and render judgment dismissing the
case for want of jurisdiction.
JENNY CRON
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
19th day of November, 2026.
21