Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-26-00142-CR The State of Texas, Appellant v. Maria Del Sol Lozada Miranda, Appellee On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Ellis County, Texas Judge A. Gene Calvert, Jr., presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2511770 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Maria Del Sol Lozada Miranda was charged with the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated, a second offense. She filed a motion to suppress any evidence that was “seized or obtained.” After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. But while preparing its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court reconsidered its oral ruling and granted Miranda’s motion. Because the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to suppress, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. BACKGROUND Miranda was driving on I-35 at around 1:00 a.m. when an officer with the City of Waxahachie, Texas Police Department ran her license plate. The officer discovered that Miranda’s registration had been expired for five months. He decided to pull her over. In the process of stopping her, the officer noticed some erratic driving issues. After he stopped and contacted Miranda, the officer noticed her glassy eyes and halted speech. The officer asked Miranda to perform some field sobriety tests, and after her completion of those tests, the officer arrested her. Miranda filed a motion to suppress raising generic issues of illegal detention/search and seizure, illegal custodial interrogation, denial of counsel, and lack of consent for her detention, search, or arrest. She asserted nothing specific to her case in these claims. At the hearing, the trial court asked Miranda’s counsel what issues would be addressed. Counsel replied that Miranda would contest the probable cause for the arrest and the HGN intoxication field test. The trial court repeated the issues to the State: So, State, as I understand it, primary issue is going to be related to probable cause for the arrest, and included in that is going to be that suppression of the clues relating to HGN testing. Are you prepared to go forward on that? (Emphasis added). State v. Miranda Page 2 The State was ready to proceed on those issues. The hearing consisted of questions by both sides about the officer’s reasons for the DWI arrest and whether he performed the HGN test correctly. At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally denied Miranda’s motion and determined that the jury could consider all of the officer’s observations because the complaints Miranda raised applied to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 1 However, in its “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress,” the trial court reversed its decision and granted Miranda’s motion to suppress due to the State’s failure to prove that the officer had stopped Miranda within the Waxahachie city “limits or boundaries.” MOTION TO SUPPRESS In its sole issue on appeal, the State asserts that the trial court erred by granting Miranda’s motion to suppress on a theory not raised by her in her motion or at the hearing. 2 We agree with the State. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d 1 The trial court initially determined that although the motion was denied, the officer could not testify about the contested clues of the HGN test. After additional discussion, the court reversed its decision on the HGN clues. 2 Miranda did not provide a brief to the Court in this appeal. State v. Miranda Page 3 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). While we afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, especially when those determinations are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor, we review pure questions of law as well as mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an assessment of credibility and demeanor de novo. Id. at 740-741. Because there are no credibility or demeanor determinations to be assessed for this issue, we conduct a de novo review. The reason for the ruling by the trial court in this case was not an issue raised or contested by Miranda in her motion to suppress or at the hearing. In this context, we agree with the Dallas Court of Appeals and its supporting authorities when it held: The State has no burden at a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress until the defendant alleges a theory of suppression on which the State bears the burden of proof. State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Although a trial court's ruling will be upheld on appeal if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, unalleged theories on which the State would have a burden of proof are not "applicable to the case" and do not support affirmation of the ruling. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d at 90); see also State v. Castanedanieto, 607 S.W.3d 315, 329-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). State v. Patel, 629 S.W.3d 759, 764-765 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.) (internal parentheticals omitted). Here, Miranda filed a generic motion to suppress. Nothing in it State v. Miranda Page 4 suggested that the officer was outside his jurisdiction and thus had no authority to make the initial stop. At the hearing, the trial court asked Miranda about the issues to be addressed and confirmed that the State was ready to address the two issues specifically raised by Miranda. Neither of those issues concerned the officer’s authority to stop Miranda’s vehicle. Further, neither the State nor Miranda asked the officer any questions regarding the stop other than brief questions about his reasons for doing so. Nothing was asked or argued later about whether the location of the stop was inside or outside the city limits. Thus, the State had no notice that the trial court would decide the motion to suppress based on whether the location of the stop occurred within the city limits or boundaries of the City of Waxahachie. As a result, the State's burden of production and persuasion with respect to such issue was never triggered. See State v. Castanedanieto, 607 S.W.3d 315, 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 87-88, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Patel, 629 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.). See also State v. Lujan, No. 08-17-00036-CR, 2018 Tex. App. Lexis 7950, *25-35 (Tex. App.—El Paso, Sept. 28, 2018) (not designated for publication), aff’d, 634 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Further, the State never had an adequate opportunity to develop a complete factual record regarding the trial court’s theory of State v. Miranda Page 5 suppression. See Esparza, 413 S.W.3d at 90; Patel, 629 S.W.3d at 765. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Miranda’s motion to suppress, because the theory relied on by the trial court did not provide a proper legal basis upon which to suppress all the evidence of intoxication in this case. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we sustain the State's sole issue, reverse the trial court’s order granting Miranda’s motion to suppress and suppressing all the evidence of intoxication obtained as a result of the traffic stop, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. LEE HARRIS Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 30, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Reversed and remanded Do Not Publish OTO6 State v. Miranda Page 6