Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-26-00462-CV Liam Burgess, Appellant v. Arthur Andersson and Rebecca Andersson, Appellees FROM THE 250TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, NO. D-1-GN-25-002769, THE HONORABLE CORY LIU, JUDGE PRESIDING ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM Appellant Liam Burgess filed a notice of appeal on May 14, 2026, stating that he seeks to appeal from the order signed on the appellee Anderssons’ motion for summary judgment on April 29, 2026. He also states, “Before filing this Notice of Appeal, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Nonsuit Without Prejudice nonsuiting Defendant Sunniva LLC d/b/a Aqua Clear Pool Care. That nonsuit made the summary judgment final and appealable.” Upon review of the clerk’s record filed in this appeal, however, the Court noted that Burgess’s notice of nonsuit was not filed until May 7, 2026—after the trial court signed the order granting the summary-judgment motion, which was filed only by the Anderssons, not by Sunniva. The order stated in its entirety: “Defendants’ traditional motion for summary judgement is GRANTED. This is a final appealable order that disposes of all claims.” The time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case runs from a signed judgment or order, not from the filing of a pleading or a notice of nonsuit. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1; Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). “When a judgment is interlocutory because unadjudicated parties or claims remain before the court, and when one moves to have such unadjudicated claims or parties removed by severance, dismissal, or nonsuit, the appellate timetable runs from the signing of a judgment or order disposing of those claims or parties.” Farmer, 907 S.W.2d at 496; see also, e.g., Smith v. McCorkle, 895 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“A docket entry does not constitute a written order.”). Appellate timetables run from the date that the trial court signs an order of dismissal, not from the date a nonsuit is filed, even when the signing of such an order is purely ministerial. In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (citing Farmer, 907 S.W.2d at 496). In other words, the trial court’s summary-judgment order, which did not state that it disposed of all parties, and which, in fact, did not dispose of Burgess’s claims against Sunniva, who remained a defendant at that time, is not a final and appealable order in the absence of an order disposing of those claims. See In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (“[A] judgment rendered without a conventional trial on the merits is not final unless (1) it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or (2) it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do so.” (Emphasis added.)). We also note that the summary-judgment order lacks “decretal language setting forth what specific relief was being granted.” See, e.g., Walker v. Dertien, No. 03-23-00769-CV, 2025 WL 3481337, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 4, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because interlocutory summary-judgment order, which later 2 became final because remaining claim was nonsuited, lacked decretal language); see also Mendoza v. Louisiana Stone, L.L.C., No. 07-15-00133-CV, 2015 WL 6285563, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (“Given this situation [an order granting summary judgment but lacking decretal language], [Rule 27.2] allows us to grant the trial court opportunity to modify the order from which appeal was taken to make it final.”). In some cases, after providing 10 days’ notice to the parties, we may dismiss an appeal for want of jurisdiction in the absence of a signed, written order. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a); see also, e.g., Cobb v. Campbell, No. 03-20-00037-CV, 2020 WL 828652, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re X.M.P., No. 05-18-01416-CV, 2019 WL 180698, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing without prejudice to filing new notice of appeal after trial court signs judgment); see also Ganesan v. Reeves, 236 S.W.3d 816, 817 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) (explaining that appellate courts are not required “to docket and hold an appeal open until there is an appealable judgment or order at some future date”). However, in an appropriate case, we may abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a signed, written order. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, No. 03-19- 00542-CV, 2019 WL 7042942, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 20, 2019, order) (per curiam); O’Kroley v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 11-17-00339-CV, 2018 WL 2212950, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 10, 2018, order) (per curiam). In this case, Burgess’s notice of nonsuit disposed of his remaining claims against defendant Sunniva. Under these circumstances, complying with the requirement to obtain a signed final and appealable order will aid this Court in confirming our jurisdiction over the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.2 (“The appellate court 3 may allow an appealed order that is not final to be modified so as to be made final and may allow the modified order and all proceedings relating to it to be included in a supplemental record.”). Accordingly, we abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to allow Burgess to obtain a signed final and appealable order. 1 A supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s order, or, if no order has been signed, a status report from Burgess shall be filed with this Court no later than October 26, 2026. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c)(1). If a supplemental clerk’s record containing a signed final and appealable order or a status report is not filed in this Court by October 26, 2026, we may dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). It is so ordered on September 25, 2026. Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis Abated and Remanded Filed: September 25, 2026 1 We note that in the absence of a signed appealable judgment or order, the trial court retains its plenary power. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d) (“The trial court, regardless of whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment within thirty days after the judgment has been signed.”). This Court retains jurisdiction to consider our jurisdiction over this appeal. See In re Washington, 7 S.W.3d 181, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (holding that once notice of appeal, whether timely or untimely, is delivered to trial-court clerk for filing, “any further determination concerning appellate jurisdiction must be made by the appellate court”). If a final order is signed by the trial court, we will treat Burgess’s May 14, 2026 notice of appeal as a premature notice of appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.1, and subsequent actions taken in this appeal as relating to that final order under Rule 27.2. See Tex. R. 27.2 (“The appellate court may treat actions taken before an appealable order is signed as relating to an appeal of that order and give them effect as if they had been taken after the order was signed.”). 4