Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00219-CV IN THE INTEREST OF M.S., A CHILD On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-2025-FM-1380, Honorable Kara L. Darnell, Presiding October 6, 2026 CONCURRING OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ. I join the Court’s opinion. The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother, and rendition is required. I write separately to address the findings the Family Code required the trial court to make, and what follows from the findings it actually made. When the Department seeks termination under subsection (b)(1), the Legislature requires the trial court to show its work. The court “may not order termination of the parent-child relationship under Subsection (b)(1) unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence and describes in writing with specificity in a separate section of the order” that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(f). And when the Department is alleged to have made those efforts, but a continuing danger prevented the child’s return, the court “shall include in a separate section of its order written findings describing with specificity the reasonable efforts the department made to return the child to the child’s home.” Id. § 161.001(g). These requirements depart from the ordinary rules for findings after a bench trial. Ordinarily, findings are made only on request, address ultimate rather than evidentiary issues, and are not recited in the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, 299, 299a. Subsections (f) and (g) reverse each of those defaults. The findings are mandatory. They must describe the Department’s efforts with specificity. And they must appear in the order itself. Section 6 of the termination order is the trial court’s response to these requirements. After reciting the statutory standard, the court found that “those reasonable efforts include the following:” 6.2.1. The Department created a family service plan that is narrowly tailored to address any specific issues identified. 6.2.2. The Department made a referral for services, provided services, or paid for services. 6.2.3. The Department made the following additional reasonable efforts to return the child home to the parents: ______________________________. It is debatable whether findings 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 describe the Department’s efforts with the specificity the statute demands. They track form language and identify no particular plan, provider, referral, or service. However, even taking them as sufficient, they do not support 2 the judgment. No evidence shows a referral, a provided service, or a paid service. The caseworker testified that she drafted a plan. But nothing shows the plan was filed, approved, or delivered to Mother, and the caseworker conceded she never discussed it with her. A plan that never reached the parent cannot by itself establish reasonable efforts to return the child to her. I therefore agree with the Court that the evidence is legally insufficient and that rendition is required. However, the blank in finding 6.2.3 matters too. The order provided a place for the trial court to describe any additional efforts; the trial court left it empty. We should take the trial court at its word: it identified no other efforts. I acknowledge that ordinarily, a reviewing court may sustain a finding on any supporting evidence in the record and may imply or presume findings in support of the judgment. It can do so because the trial court was not required to say what it relied on. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 299; BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). In other words, the doctrine fills gaps where the trial court was not required to speak. Implied or presumed findings, however, have no place where a statute forbids that silence and requires the trial court to state, in its order, what it found. Were it otherwise, a trial court could simply recite the statutory standard and leave the reviewing court to divine the trial court’s findings from the record. Subsections (f) and (g) would then accomplish nothing. We do not read statutes to render their language meaningless. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008). Affirming on efforts the order does not describe would uphold the very order subsection (f) says a court “may not” render. 3 The Legislature told the trial court to show its work. We review the work the trial court showed, not what it could have shown. Because the evidence does not support the efforts the trial court found, rendition is required. Lawrence M. Doss Justice 4