Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00421-CV Jensen Chelsea ANDERSON, Appellant v. Suzanne Tolbert SAKIEWICZ and Edward P. Sakiewicz, Appellees From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023-CI-24488 Honorable Nadine Melissa Nieto, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Delivered and Filed: November 10, 2026 REVERSED AND REMANDED; INJUNCTION DISSOLVED Appellant Jensen Chelsea Anderson appeals a May 14, 2026 order granting an injunction in favor of appellees Suzanne Tolbert Sakiewicz and Edward P. Sakiwicz. We reverse the order, dissolve the injunction, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. BACKGROUND This case revolves around property held by the Barbara Tolbert Revocable Trust (“the Trust”). Suzanne is Barbara Tolbert’s daughter and a co-trustee of the Trust, and Edward is 04-26-00421-CV Suzanne’s husband. Anderson is Suzanne’s niece and Barbara’s granddaughter. Both Suzanne and Anderson claim to be beneficiaries of the Trust, and we express no opinion as to the merits of those claims. The dispute underlying this appeal began in 2023, when Suzanne’s brother and co-trustee, Gordon Gerald Tolbert, sued Suzanne, Edward, and an associated entity, Sakabbage, L.L.C., alleging that those defendants had engaged in malfeasance regarding the Trust. Suzanne eventually filed a counterpetition against Gordon. The merits of Gordon’s and Suzanne’s claims against each other are not at issue in this appeal. We note, however, that nothing in our record indicates that those claims have been fully and finally resolved. Suzanne’s June 2024 second amended counterpetition alleged that Anderson had improperly “taken up residence” in property held by the Trust in Gonzales, Texas (“the Gonzales property”). The counterpetition requested a temporary injunction to “maintain, preserve, and protect” the Gonzales property and alleged that Gordon had not satisfied his duties as co-trustee, but it did not specifically seek any relief against Anderson. At that point, Anderson was not a party to the underlying litigation and had not entered any appearances in the trial court. The record appears to show that the trial court granted Suzanne’s request for a temporary injunction and that the injunction later expired on its own terms. On April 22, 2026, Suzanne and Edward filed a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction,” which sought relief directly against Anderson for the first time. The motion asked the trial court “to issue a restraining order and temporary injunction preventing [Anderson] from acting as Trustee for the Barbara Tolbert Revocable Trust and any other relief as necessary to cause [sic] [Anderson] from acting or representing herself as ‘Trustee,’ alienating property, spending funds, or otherwise using any of the corpus of the Barbara Tolbert Revocable Trust”; to -2- 04-26-00421-CV require Anderson to “immediately provide access to all property she currently holds” that is held by the Trust and “provide a sworn accounting of all business conducted as ‘Trustee’”; and to sanction Anderson and order her to pay Suzanne’s and Edward’s attorney’s fees. The motion did not ask the trial court to bar Anderson from the Gonzales property, and it did not request any relief on behalf of Gordon or Sakabbage. On May 11, 2026, Anderson filed an original answer and counterclaim. The trial court heard the “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction” on May 14, 2026. 1 After a brief hearing 2 in which it considered argument from Suzanne and Edward’s attorney and limited testimony from Anderson, the trial court announced that it was “going to grant the injunction and restraining order.” The same day, the trial court signed a written “Order Granting Restraining Order and Issuing Writ of Injunction” that provided, inter alia: IT IS ORDERED that the injunction requested by [Suzanne and Edward] is GRANTED. The injunction granted below shall be effective immediately and shall be binding on [Anderson]. . . . [Anderson] is therefore commanded to obey the order of this Court and to immediately desist and refrain from and is permanently enjoined from . . . [c]oming within 500 feet of the [Gonzales] property . . . [c]oming within 500 feet of [Suzanne or Edward] . . . [a]ffecting the [Gonzales] property . . . including but not limited to: changing the locks, disconnecting cameras or utility services, or in any way causing damage thereto . . . [p]ossessing or attempting to obtain or exercising control over any property contained in the Barbara Tolbert Trust . . . [e]xcluding [Suzanne and Edward] from the [Gonzales] property . . . [c]ommunicating or representing, in any way, that she has authority to act under [the Trust] or that she is a beneficiary of [the Trust][.] 1 Gordon’s attorney did not appear at the May 14, 2026 hearing. Gordon, who did appear, told the trial court that his attorney “didn’t feel a need to appear since today’s motion does not involve me, but instead it involves the defendants and our niece.” As noted above, the motion the trial court heard on May 14, 2026 did not request any relief on Gordon’s behalf, and the order the trial court signed after the hearing did not grant any relief to Gordon. Additionally, Gordon did not file an appellee’s brief or otherwise appear in this appeal. We therefore conclude that he is not a party to this appeal. 2 The reporter’s record of the May 14, 2026 hearing is eighteen pages long. -3- 04-26-00421-CV The order further provided that it “shall also serve as a written no trespass warning” to Anderson with regard to the Gonzales property. On May 28, 2026, Anderson filed a notice of interlocutory appeal challenging the May 14, 2026 order. 3 ANALYSIS On appeal, Anderson asserts five challenges to the May 14, 2026 order. In her first issue, she contends the order is a temporary injunction that is void for failure to comply with mandatory requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Is the Challenged Order a Temporary Injunction? We begin by addressing our jurisdiction to consider this interlocutory appeal. By statute, we have authority to review an interlocutory appeal from a temporary injunction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4). The trial court’s May 14, 2026 order “is an injunction” because it commands Anderson to refrain from engaging in several listed actions. Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). But the order is not styled as a temporary injunction, and its express language “permanently” enjoins Anderson from engaging in the listed actions. Because the order purports to be a permanent injunction rather than a temporary injunction, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review it on an interlocutory basis. See, e.g., Tex. S. Univ. v. Gilford, 277 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“We strictly construe statutes giving us jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals.”). To answer this question, we review the order’s “character and function” rather than its form. See In re Matter of 3 In both the underlying litigation and in this appeal, Suzanne and Edward have argued that Anderson is not a proper party to this case because she did not properly intervene below. Even if we accept that factual assertion, it is well- established that “nonparties [to the trial court proceeding] have a right to appeal from a judgment if they clearly have an interest in that judgment and if they are bound by the judgment.” In re Evans, 130 S.W.3d 472, 478–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig. proceeding). The order challenged in this appeal specifically names Anderson and orders her to take or refrain from taking certain actions. Accordingly, on June 10, 2026, we issued an order rejecting Suzanne’s and Edward’s suggestion that Anderson lacked standing to bring this appeal. -4- 04-26-00421-CV Marquart Tr., 675 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). This is especially true where, as here, the appellant contends the challenged injunction is void, because “if errors in the form of the order determined the order’s status, then those errors would deny review of the very defects that render the order void.” Qwest Commc’ns, 24 S.W.3d at 336. The trial court granted the challenged order based on Suzanne and Edward’s “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction,” which explicitly sought a temporary injunction. See Marquart, 675 S.W.3d at 64 (“The complained-of order followed a hearing on the parties’ respective applications for temporary injunctions and the pleadings seeking temporary injunctive relief.”). Furthermore, the order placed restrictions on Anderson and stated that those restrictions were to take effect immediately. Because nothing in our record indicates that the underlying lawsuit had been resolved by a final judgment when the trial court issued the challenged order, those restrictions necessarily “operate[] during the pendency of the suit” and thus “function[] as a temporary injunction.” Qwest Commc’ns, 24 S.W.3d at 337; Marquart, 675 S.W.3d at 64. On this record, “[w]e conclude the order’s character and function show it is a temporary injunction, which we have jurisdiction to review” in an interlocutory appeal. Marquart, 675 S.W.3d at 59. Is the Temporary Injunction Void? Having concluded the challenged order is a temporary injunction, we turn to Anderson’s assertions that the order is void because it violates mandatory provisions of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 provides, in part, that “[e]very order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. “The reason for requiring that an injunction order include a trial date is to prevent the temporary injunction from effectively becoming permanent without a trial.” EOS Res., Inc. v. Gutierrez, 75 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Tex. App.—San -5- 04-26-00421-CV Antonio 2002, no pet.). Additionally, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 684 provides that a temporary injunction order “shall fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 684. The procedural requirements of Rules 683 and 684 “are mandatory, and an order granting a temporary injunction that does not meet them is subject to being declared void and dissolved.” Qwest Commc’ns, 24 S.W.3d at 337. Both the Texas Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly and consistently reversed and dissolved as void temporary injunction orders that did not comply with Rules 683 and 684. See id.; InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 640–41 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 291 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. 1956); Marquart, 675 S.W.3d at 64–65; In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268, 271–73 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding); EOS Res., 75 S.W.3d at 52–53. The May 14, 2026 temporary injunction order at issue in this case does not set a trial date or an “amount of security to be given by the applicant[s].” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683, 684. As a result, it is void and must be dissolved. Marquart, 675 S.W.3d at 64–65. Suzanne and Edward argue that Anderson waived her complaints about the order’s non- compliance with Rules 683 and 684 because she did not raise those arguments below. This argument is factually incorrect—the record shows that Anderson objected in writing below that the order “completely fails to set a cash bond as required by TRCP 684[.]” But even if she had not, “[a]n order’s failure to meet the requirements of rule 683 renders the injunction order fatally defective and void, whether specifically raised by point of error or not.” Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). -6- 04-26-00421-CV For these reasons, we sustain Anderson’s first issue. Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive, we need not address Anderson’s remaining issues, which challenge the merits of the temporary injunction order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. CONCLUSION The trial court’s May 14, 2026 order is void for failure to comply with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 683 and 684. We therefore reverse the order, dissolve the injunction, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice -7-