Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 2, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00956-CV ——————————— KEITH GORDON, Appellant V. OSAZE ARHUNMWUNDE, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 24-CCV-075392 MEMORANDUM OPINION In this forcible-detainer case, Keith Gordon, the tenant under a lease of certain real property in Katy, Texas, appealed a judgment awarding possession of the property, and money damages, to the landlord under the lease, appellee Osaze Arhunmwunde. If a defendant in a forcible-detainer action is no longer in possession of the real property, then an appeal on the possession issue is moot unless the defendant asserts a potentially meritorious claim of right to current possession of the property. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship provides a basis for the lower court to determine the right to possession without resolving the question of title, thus allowing the lower court to exercise jurisdiction. Crawford v. Sharif, No. 01-24-00239-CV, 2026 WL 233135, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). An executed writ of possession in our record shows that Gordon no longer possesses the property. We issued a notice advising that this appeal may be moot and requesting that Gordon file a response addressing mootness. In his response, Gordon recognizes that the lease “establishes the contractual origin of [his] possession” of the property. Moreover, as he did in his appellate briefing, Gordon mentions various documents (that were not presented during trial in the county court at law) which he asserts prove he has title to and a present right to possession of the property or prove the underlying courts lacked jurisdiction because a title dispute is involved. The mere existence of a title dispute does not deprive a justice court or county court at law of jurisdiction; rather, a justice or county court on appeal is deprived of jurisdiction only if “the right to immediate possession necessarily requires the resolution of a title dispute.” Pina v. Pina, 371 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (quoting Bruce v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 352 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied)) (internal 2 quotations omitted). Where an independent basis for possession exists, such as a landlord-tenant relationship, jurisdiction remains proper regardless of any title claim. See id.; Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Here, the courts below had jurisdiction over this case because the possession issue turned on the landlord-tenant lease, not resolution of any title dispute. Gordon provides no reason why he has a potentially meritorious claim of right to current possession, nor does he challenge the part of the judgment awarding Arhunmwunde a money judgment. Thus, the issue of possession is moot. We vacate the part of the lower court’s judgment addressing entitlement to possession of the property and dismiss the appeal from that part as moot. See Stubblefield v. 2500 Houston, LLC, No. 0-5-24-00302-CV, 2025 WL 1018711, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 4, 2025, no pet.). In all other respects, we affirm the county court’s judgment.1 Andrew Johnson Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guiney and Johnson. 1 We dismiss all other pending motions and requests as moot. 3