Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 6, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-26-00511-CV ——————————— REINALDO J. AGUIAR MARCANO, Appellant V. GLORIA ESPINA, Appellee On Appeal from the 387th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 25-DCV-328122 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Reinaldo J. Aguiar Marcano, proceeding pro se, has filed multiple notices of appeal challenging various orders. On May 12, 2026, appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging (1) “February 22, 2026-Additional Temporary Orders”; (2) “December 17, 2025-Orders Granting Sanctions”; and (3) “October 15, 2025- Temporary Orders.” On May 13, 2026, appellant filed notices of appeal challenging the above-mentioned orders; (4) “April 14, 2026-Order to Appear”; and (5) “April 11, 2025-Temporary Restraining Order [a]nd Order Setting Hearing [f]or Temporary Orders.” On May 19, 2026, appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging (6) “‘Income With[h]olding For Support’ order signed on February 24, 2026.” On May 20, 2026, appellant filed notices of appeal challenging the above-mentioned February 24, 2026 order and (7) “January 27, 2026-Order on Agreed Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel.” We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. “[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding jurisdiction is fundamental in nature and cannot be ignored). Whether we have jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). A final judgment or other appealable interlocutory order is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. See Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd. P’ship v. Roger T. Fridholm Revocable, Living Tr., 434 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Villarreal v. Zukowsky, 54 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (“[A]ppeals 2 may be had only from final orders or judgments, and interlocutory orders may be appealed only if permitted by statute.”). If an appeal is from an interlocutory order over which we lack jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d at 763. Here, none of the orders being challenged purport to be final or otherwise appealable orders.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1; see also Villarreal v. Zukowsky, 54 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (“[A]ppeals may be had only from final orders or judgments, and interlocutory orders may be appealed only if permitted by statute.”); see also Hudson v. Aceves, 516 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.) (“temporary orders in divorce case[] . . . not subject to interlocutory appeal.”) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.507)). On August 18, 2026, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that his appeal was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction unless, within ten days of the date of the notice, he filed a written response demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction 1 As previously noted, even if the most recent challenged orders were appealable, appellant’s notices of appeal were not timely filed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (requiring notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after judgment or final order is signed or ninety days after judgment or final order is signed if party timely files in the trial court, motion for new trial or to modify), 26.3 (allowing extension of fifteen days after deadline to file notice of appeal). 3 over his appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Appellant’s response did not establish that we have jurisdiction over his appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss all pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan. 4