Full Opinion

Opinion issued September 22, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-26-00305-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF J.Z.L.-H., AKA J.L.-H., A CHILD On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-02987J MEMORANDUM OPINION The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed suit to terminate the parental rights of C.B. (“Mother”) and J.L.L. (“Father”) to their son, Junior.1 At a bench trial, the trial court found that both parents had engaged in conduct that endangered Junior, and that termination of their parental rights was in 1 We use an alias for the child. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). Junior’s best interest. The trial court entered a decree terminating their parental rights and appointing DFPS as Junior’s sole managing conservator. On appeal, Mother raises one issue arguing the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding regarding her.2 We affirm. Background Junior is Mother’s seventh child. The other six were all sixteen or younger at the time of the hearing in this case. None lived with Mother. One had been adopted, four were in foster homes with DFPS as the permanent managing conservator, and Mother had given one child to a family member under a power-of-attorney agreement to avoid a DFPS investigation. A. Initial Investigation and Foster Care DFPS began monitoring newborn Junior in June 2024 when he “had to be life flighted to a hospital.” The investigation was based in part on Mother’s positive drug test results in prior DFPS investigations related to her other children. But this time Mother tested negative and began providing a stable home. In November 2024, DFPS received a referral alleging medical neglect and neglectful supervision. Junior had developed breathing difficulty, but the problems resolved when he got to the hospital. Doctors diagnosed this as a “brief resolved 2 Father did not appear at the trial and has not appealed. 2 unexplained event” that does not seem to have been caused by Mother. Even so, Mother took Junior home against medical advice before doctors had completed all requested exams. After this hospital visit a DFPS caseworker was assigned to the case. The caseworker was aware of Mother’s “extensive history with the department regarding concerns of her mental health stability.” The investigation revealed that Mother had not taken Junior to some recommended follow-up doctor’s appointments. Mother agreed to a drug test as part of the investigation. After missing a couple of testing dates (which she blamed on transportation problems), Mother tested positive for cocaine in early December. This was the third time within a year that she tested positive for cocaine, including once while pregnant with Junior. Mother denied that she was using cocaine and claimed the positive result must have been from having relations with Junior’s father or from environmental exposure. Based on Mother’s history and the most recent positive drug test, DFPS was granted temporary managing custodianship in January 2025 and Junior was placed with a foster parent. B. Evidence at Trial 1. Evidence Regarding Mother At the December 2025 trial, evidence showed that Mother had partially complied with her service plan that year. She had engaged in more-or-less weekly 3 one-hour supervised visits with Junior where she showed appropriate behavior and Junior went to her for attention. Mother had an apartment that was child appropriate. She was receiving Section 8 funds so the housing situation seemed stable. Mother completed a psychological evaluation, which resulted in recommendations for therapy, substance abuse treatment, a psychiatric evaluation, and vocational counseling. She had attended counseling regularly since July 2025 and her therapist said she had been cooperative and made progress. Mother said the current psychiatrist diagnosed her with depression and anxiety. In 2007 she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, schizoaffective order, and manic depression, but Mother testified that beginning in May 2025 those were not part of her diagnosis. She had been prescribed psychotropic medication but was non-compliant with her medication at the time of trial. Mother said this was due to insurance problems. Mother had not started vocational counseling though that seems to have been due to a lack of providers. Mother was enrolled in a culinary certificate program that was set to start the month after trial. Mother completed a drug counseling course in June 2025, but tested positive for cocaine the same month. She had also submitted a diluted urine sample in May, which DFPS considers a positive drug test. 4 Mother’s caseworker testified Mother was unemployed and not looking for employment at the time of trial. Mother had previously worked as a delivery driver, but she had no driver license or insurance, and this job ended when her car was repossessed. Mother testified that she currently helped a friend work as a delivery driver, but she had not told her caseworker of this. 2. Evidence Regarding Mother’s Relationships with the Other Children The appellant’s first child, Child 1, was sixteen years old at the time of the hearing. DFPS became her temporary managing conservator in 2009, when she was around six months old, and permanent managing conservator in 2010. The issue at this time was that Mother did not have stable housing. Child 1 had gone through multiple placements with fictive kin between 2011 and 2014, and then lived in residential treatment centers from 2014 to 2021 before being placed in a non- adoptive foster home. Mother had contact with Child 1 for a while, but these visits would cause Child 1 to have emotional breakdowns if she believed Mother was ignoring her. These breakdowns caused some of Child 1’s placements to fall through, so in 2022 a court entered an order preventing Mother from contacting Child 1. That order was later modified and Mother began having therapeutic visits with her three months before trial. Those visits were going “very good.” 5 Child 2 was around fifteen years old at the time of trial. She was taken into DFPS custody at the same time as Child 1. Mother relinquished her rights to Child 2 when Child 2 was eight years old, then Child 2 was adopted. Child 3 was around thirteen years old at the time of trial. Child 3 never lived with Mother. Mother gave Child 3 to a family member under a power-of-attorney agreement. Mother testified the reason she gave Child 3 away was that there was already an active DFPS case and she did not want Child 3 taken into DFPS custody. Child 4, Child 5, and Child 6 were boys who came into DFPS care at the same time because Mother attempted suicide while pregnant with Child 6 in 2021. Child 4 was eleven years old at the time of trial, and DFPS was his permanent managing conservator. Shortly after it took custody of Child 4, DFPS attempted to return him home. During that attempt, Mother got evicted from her sister’s house and sent Child 4, then aged seven, to retrieve a firearm that was sitting on the dash of her car. This incident resulted in criminal charges against Mother, but those were dismissed. Child 4 is diagnosed with bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and ADHD. Child 5 was seven years old at the time of trial. DFPS was his permanent managing conservator. He had diagnoses of autism, anxiety, and ADHD. At the time of trial Child 5 lived in a non-adoptive foster home. 6 Child 6 was four years old at the time of trial. DFPS was his permanent managing conservator. He was living in a foster-to-adopt home with the goal of adoption. Mother initially had supervised visits with the three boys but those ended in 2022 when a judge issued a no-contact order regarding Child 4 due to emotional abuse. A caseworker testified that Mother would “storm out of the visit,” which sent Child 4 into crisis and requiring his admission to a psychiatric hospital. These visits would cause Child 4 to “spiral out of control” and “believe[] that he doesn’t have to listen to anyone and that he doesn’t have to follow the regular rules.” At the time of trial Child 4 was living with fictive kin. Mother was having supervised therapeutic visits with Child 5 and Child 6 at the time of trial. A caseworker stated that at these visits Mother would focus her attention on playing on an electronic device with Child 5, leaving Child 6 free to “walk around the building terrorizing everybody.” The caseworker explained that Child 6 was “hyper” and “very energetic,” so when unsupervised he wandered the building hitting people and machines, and DFPS employees had to chase him down. 3. Evidence Regarding Father Father did not appear at trial and the trial court entered judgment terminating his parental rights. He did not appeal. 7 Father attended only one supervised visit with Junior, and that was early in the case. He had minimal contact with caseworkers or volunteers involved in this case, and did no work on any of the services in his family plan. DFPS admitted into evidence several criminal charges against Father, including unlawful carrying of a weapon, robbery, and assault of a family member. One charge for 2019 was for assault of a family member, with a prior conviction for assault of a family member, and Mother was the named complainant. Mother disclosed to a caseworker that Father was violent with her. Mother originally told caseworkers she had cut Father out of her life except for co-parenting; however, she later blamed her positive June 2025 cocaine test on having relations with Father. 4. Evidence Regarding Junior At the time of trial Junior was living with a foster parent who wanted to adopt him. Foster Parent had three adult children who had moved out of the house and attended college. Foster Parent was also fostering another infant and “other kids.” A volunteer child advocate testified that Junior was doing “extremely well” with Foster Parent. Junior attended daycare through the week. The child advocate testified that Junior had bonded with Foster Parent and the daycare workers, and that he was “thriving.” 8 Best Interest of the Child In a single point of error, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that terminating her parental rights was in Junior’s best interest. A. Applicable Law The natural right existing between a parent and child is of constitutional dimensions, frequently characterized as far more precious than any property right. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). But a parent may forfeit his or her parental rights based on his actions or omissions. In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 850 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Family Code Section 161.001(b) authorizes an “involuntary termination of parental rights if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence both that a parent engaged in one or more enumerated predicate grounds for termination and that termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700, 701–02 (Tex. 2022); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U), (b)(2). Because the burden of proof in termination proceedings is clear and convincing evidence, a heightened standard of review in an evidentiary challenge is required. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). Thus, under either legal sufficiency or factual sufficiency review, we determine whether the evidence is such that a trier of fact could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that its 9 finding was true. Id.; In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Under both standards, the factfinder remains “the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741. In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, weighs the evidence and resolves evidentiary inconsistencies and conflicts. In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (internal quotations omitted). In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, the evidence is factually insufficient if, “in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). The “distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 850. Because legal-sufficiency review looks only at the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding but factual-sufficiency review also considers 10 contrary evidence, a finding that the evidence is factually sufficient necessarily means the evidence is legally sufficient. D.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 440 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). B. Sufficiency The only finding Mother challenges on appeal is the best-interest finding. Because she does not challenge the trial court’s endangerment findings under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), we limit our review to the best-interest finding. Interest of A.B.-G., No. 01-24-00509-CV, 2024 WL 4982500, at *11-12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 5, 2024, pet. denied). The best-interest finding focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Several nonexclusive factors guide the factfinder’s best-interest determination, including: (1) the child’s emotional and physical needs; (2) present and future physical and emotional danger to the child; (3) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (4) those individuals’ plans for the child and the stability of the home; (5) the plans for the child by the agency seeking custody and the stability of the proposed placement; (6) the parent’s acts or omissions that may suggest the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (7) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id. (the “Holley factors,” citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). We may also consider the statutory factors set forth in Family Code section 263.307. 11 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 n.29. Proof of each of these considerations is not a condition precedent to termination. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The analysis may include direct and circumstantial evidence, the totality of the evidence, and subjective factors. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Here, the weightiest factor is Mother’s history with her other children. Mother has lost or given up custody of six children. She has had no-contact orders for two of her children—one of which is still in place—because of her emotional abuse. Junior’s attorney ad litem explained the import of this history in closing argument: “[Mother’s] never been able to get her life together sufficiently for her children to be returned . . . [a]nd [Junior] just can’t wait eight or nine years like these other children have been waiting four years, five years, or eight or nine.” See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (noting past performance as parent was relevant for best-interest finding); In re J.J.G, No. 14-15-00094-CV, 2015 WL 3524371, at *7 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] June 4, 2015, no pet.) (“We may also consider the Mother's past performance as a parent in evaluating her ability to provide for the children and the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights would be in the children’s best interest.”); In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 333 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (emphasizing importance of past conduct as predictor of future behavior when making best-interest finding). While the record shows some positive 12 developments in Mother’s psychiatric treatment in 2025, testimony from caseworkers put this in the context of Mother’s partial compliance in earlier DFPS proceedings. In re M.G.D., 108 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“[E]vidence of a recent turnaround should be determinative only if it is reasonable to conclude that rehabilitation, once begun, will surely continue.”). A caseworker who had worked on Mother’s prior cases testified she had a history of “attempt[ing] to work the services right before court” but not being “consistent.” Testimony about Mother’s involvement with this case showed what a reasonable factfinder could find was a continuation of that pattern: she had gone to some therapy sessions but was not compliant with her prescribed psychotropic medication, she had no employment and seems to have spent much of the period earning money by driving illegally, and she had a positive drug test seven months after DFPS took Junior. In her brief, Mother argues that she could provide a stable home because she now has Section 8 housing. Even so, the evidence that Mother currently had stable housing does not outweigh the other evidence. In addition to all the evidence just discussed, she still had no employment or prospects of employment, her most recent employment had been illegal, her car had recently been repossessed, and she attributed being medically non-compliant to her inability to secure health insurance. See In re H.M.-W.J., No. 01-24-00396-CV, 2024 WL 4846848, at *22 (Tex. App.— 13 Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2024, pet. denied) (recognizing case law holding lack of stable employment as factor relevant to best-interest finding); In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (finding parent’s “lack of stable employment” factor supporting trial court’s ruling that termination was in child’s best interest). In light of Mother’s lengthy history of not providing a stable home to any of her other six children, a reasonable factfinder could still form a firm belief or conviction that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in Junior’s best interest even if Mother currently had a secure housing situation. Mother also points to evidence that DFPS was encouraging contact between her and Child 1 even as it sought to separate her from Junior. Mother criticizes this as an unprincipled policy choice on the part of DFPS to speed along Junior’s adoption while offloading its own conservatorship of Child 1. Even if this is true— which we do not address one way or the other—it would not make the evidence insufficient to support the trial court’s findings; the trial court’s findings concern Junior’s best interest, not Child 1’s. Moreover, what is in the best interest of a toddler is not always the same as what is in the best interest of a teenager, as young children need different types of parental involvement. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 824, 830-32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (affirming termination of parental rights for one-year-old even where parents maintained rights to older 14 children). Finally, Child 1 had not actually been returned to Mother at the time of trial; they were merely having supervised therapeutic visits. The no-contact order regarding Child 1 had been lifted only two months before trial. Mother’s marginally improved relationship with a teenage child—which still did not involve caretaking— is not the sort of evidence of Mother’s parenting ability to which a rational factfinder would be obliged to give great weight in determining what was in Junior’s best interest. The testimony established not just Mother’s negative parenting history but also the positive situation Junior was in with Foster Parent. The testimony shows Foster Parent had a successful track record of providing a stable home to children and had created a home environment where Junior was happy and thriving. Foster Parent’s desire to adopt Junior supports an inference that Foster Parent will provide a long-term stable home for Junior. Giving deference to the trial court’s role as factfinder, its duty to weigh evidence and make credibility determinations, as well as to the holistic nature of a best-interest finding, we hold the evidence factually sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. Because the evidence is factually sufficient it is necessarily legally sufficient. We overrule Mother’s sole point of error. 15 Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Clint Morgan Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. 16