Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 8, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00077-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF E.J., A CHILD On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11369-CX MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of the mother 1 to her child, E.J. 2 In two issues, the mother, Appellant, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that: (1) termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest; and (2) the 1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the father. Only the mother appealed. 2 To protect the identities of the child and the child’s family members, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to return the child to her prior to the commencement of the final hearing, but a continuing danger existed in the home that prevented the return of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2), (f), (g) (West Supp. 2025). We affirm the trial court’s order. I. Termination Findings and Standards The Department must “clear[] a high bar” to terminate one’s parental rights. In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *6 (Tex. June 5, 2026); see also In re H.S., No. 24-0307, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8–9 (Tex. June 5, 2026). To support termination under this heightened standard, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019). In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The mother does not challenge these findings. The trial court further found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference 2 to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). II. Background and the Evidence Presented at Trial The Department opened an investigation when E.J. was born because his umbilical cord blood tested positive for cannabinoids. Shortly thereafter, Appellant began living at the Noah Project, a shelter in Taylor County. On March 5, 2024, the Department sought and was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the child. At the time of E.J.’s removal, Appellant admitted to postpartum methamphetamine use and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. E.J., meanwhile, tested positive for a marihuana metabolite and methamphetamine. 3 Appellant was unable to provide an appropriate relative/fictive kin placement option for E.J., so E.J. was placed in a foster home. The Department created a family plan of service for Appellant that was amended, approved, and adopted as an order of the trial court. Appellant was ordered to submit to random drug testing and test negative for illegal substances, participate in counseling, complete parenting and co-parenting classes once the father completed battering intervention and prevention (BIPP) courses,3 attend parent-child visitations, maintain stable employment, and obtain safe, stable, drug- free housing. Appellant admitted herself into Serenity House, a substance abuse treatment facility. On April 9, 2024, she completed parenting classes and on September 9, 2024, she completed a psychological evaluation. Appellant was referred to individual counseling but did not attend consistently. After Serenity House, Appellant briefly lived with a relative and then a friend, but the Department found neither residence to be an appropriate home. Appellant did not submit to drug testing between May 2024 and August 2024. In November 2024, Appellant admitted to using drugs again and tested positive for methamphetamine in early December and again in February 2025. She admitted herself into Serenity House a second time on February 6, 2025, and completed the program on March 6, 2025. A bench trial was held on February 26, 2025, but no transcript appears in the record. It is unclear from the record how often Appellant attended visitations with E.J. between E.J.’s initial removal and the February 2025 trial. On March 6, 2025 and before the trial court issued its February 2025 ruling, E.J.’s foster parents filed 3 Approximately six months prior to E.J.’s birth, E.J.’s father violated bond conditions that prohibited him from “going to or near” Appellant, the protected individual in a family violence case; E.J.’s father was later convicted of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.07 (West Supp. 2025). E.J.’s father has been convicted twice of assaulting Appellant. 4 a cross-petition seeking to intervene. The trial court issued a letter order on May 23, 2025, appointing the Department sole managing conservator. A final order was signed on June 30, 2025. On July 21, 2025, E.J.’s foster parents filed a motion for new trial, which was ultimately granted. The trial court held a bench trial on November 14, 2025, and it concluded on January 21, 2026. We briefly summarize the relevant testimony. Alma Cecilio, the 2INgage permanency case manager, testified that Appellant admitted to using drugs again in early 2025 after the initial trial. Then, on April 16, 2025, Appellant texted Cecilio to notify her that she had moved to San Antonio. Cecilio testified that calls and e-mails to Appellant went unreturned until August 13, 2025, when Appellant resumed communication. Appellant told Cecilio that she had enrolled herself in Rise Discipleship, a Christian-based sober living program, where she resided throughout the remainder of this case. Cecilio testified that Appellant informed her that she was employed through Rise Discipleship, working in exchange for room and board, and the program provided living accommodations for up to two years. According to Cecilio, however, Appellant’s last verified employment was in September 2024. Cecilio testified that while Appellant had largely completed her family service plan and consistently tested negative in the three months prior to trial, the Department was recommending termination given Appellant’s demonstrated history with substance abuse. Cecilio additionally noted that Appellant had only attended “40 percent of her parent-child” weekly visitations since E.J.’s removal, and E.J. had bonded with the foster family of twenty months, having resided with them since turning two months old. Cecilio testified that the Department’s goal was to have E.J. be adopted by the foster family. Although not parties to this suit, Cecilio also 5 expressed concern that Appellant had failed to reach out regarding her other three children, whom she had not seen in over a year. Samantha Dena, the Rise Discipleship women’s home director, testified that Appellant was doing “great” in the program, participating in classes, and attending counseling sessions. Dena confirmed that none of the individuals in the facility have children with them, and testified that, if the child were placed with Appellant, E.J. “would be the first.” The trial court recessed after Dena’s testimony, and proceedings resumed on January 21, 2026. When the final hearing resumed, Cecilio testified that Appellant had tested negative for substances, attended counseling, and attended visitations since November. E.J.’s foster mother testified that E.J. had become a part of her family. The foster mother testified that E.J. had no developmental delays and while he was evaluated by the Department for further services, no services were needed. E.J.’s guardian ad litem testified that the termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in E.J.’s best interest, and that it was in his best interest to remain in the foster parents’ home. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights and found termination to be in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). This appeal followed. III. Best Interest of the Child In her first issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in E.J.’s best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). The trial court, as the factfinder in this case, 6 was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. Therefore, we will not disturb its determinations so long as they are not unreasonable. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving the requisite due deference to the trier of fact, we hold that, based on the evidence in the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). While the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Id. at 547; see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371– 72. In some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d 7 at 547–48; see also H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *9 (Evidence that supports a finding under subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [s]ubsection (b)(2).”). This is particularly true if the evidence indicates that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. Relevant here, a parent’s pattern of substance abuse also “implicates most of the Holley factors,” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied), and can support a best interest finding due to the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the child[].” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–81 (Tex. 2024); see J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[D]rug use and its effects on the parent’s life and ability to parent and care for a child may establish an endangering course of conduct.”); In re R.R.L., No. 11-25-00263-CV, 2026 WL 616107, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Evidence of endangerment is relevant to the best interest analysis.). A parent’s use 8 of “so-called hard drugs” such as methamphetamine is treated differently than the use of “less destructive ones” like marihuana. E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 608. Here, E.J.’s umbilical cord blood was positive for cannabinoids, Appellant admitted to using methamphetamine, and E.J. tested positive for a marihuana metabolite and methamphetamine at only two months old. The trial court could have rationally concluded that Appellant risked E.J.’s safety and well-being by using cannabinoids and methamphetamine during pregnancy and shortly after his birth. In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (A parent’s drug use during pregnancy “supports a finding of direct injury to the child.”); In re B.B., No. 11-26-00072-CV, 2026 WL 2574854, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (Evidence of drug use during pregnancy or lack of care for the children bears on the best interest determination.). This endangerment and disregard for the child’s health and safety permitted the inference that Appellant is unable to meet the physical and emotional needs of E.J. in the future. See In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d 391, 402 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“In reviewing the parenting abilities of a parent, a fact finder can consider the parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children.”); see also In re S.B., 597 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied). Moreover, Appellant continued to use methamphetamine even after E.J.’s removal. One year after E.J. had been removed from the home, Appellant was still testing positive for methamphetamine. It is also significant that Appellant failed to submit to drug testing for several months in 2024 and 2025, submitting to drug testing only three months before trial. Appellant’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of the underlying termination suit, when she was at risk of losing her child, supports the trial court’s best interest finding. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551 (citing In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, 9 pet. denied)); B.B., 2026 WL 2574854, at *7 (Appellant’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of the underlying termination suit, when she was at risk of losing her children, supports the trial court’s best interest finding.). We additionally note that when trial commenced, E.J. was less than two years old and had resided with his foster family for twenty months. E.J.’s foster mother and Cecilio described E.J.’s development and attachment to the family. From this testimony, the trial court could rationally infer that E.J. had formed a strong bond with his caregivers, who had provided a safe, stable home for the child and were meeting his physical and emotional needs. When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider whether the children have bonded with their caregivers, are well-cared for by them, and whether the children have spent minimal time with a parent. In re I.G., 739 S.W.3d 913, 927 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2026, pet. denied). By contrast, Appellant attended less than half of her ordered supervised parent-child visitations. In the three months prior to trial, Appellant had attended just three parent-child visits by Zoom and no visitations occurred in the five months preceding that. A parent’s ability, desire, and motivation to visit with their child are considerations for the trial court in its best interest determination. In re D.K., 696 S.W.3d 787, 796–97 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.); see also In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“When a parent consciously decides to be present in his or her child’s life on a sporadic basis only and solely when it suits the parent to do so . . . this behavior in and of itself jeopardizes the child’s emotional wellbeing.”). Furthermore, Appellant’s plans for herself and the child were ill-defined. See In re G.M., 649 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“The fact finder may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and 10 determine whether the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined.”); In re E.G., 643 S.W.3d 236, 254 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.). Appellant did not have a permanent residence; rather, she lived on commercial property with the Rise Discipleship program. While Appellant discussed the prospect of living with a couple affiliated with the program if reunited with E.J., E.J. “would be the first” child living there, and the record does not establish that she had secured long-term, independent housing sufficient to provide a stable home after leaving the program. When compared to the Department’s plan for E.J.—to be adopted into a stable home environment by a family with whom he has bonded— this factor weighs heavily in favor of termination. See Holley, 577 S.W.2d at 371– 72; I.G., 739 S.W.3d at 928 (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children.” (citing In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.))). While “recent improvements made by [the parent] are significant, evidence of improved conduct, especially of [a] short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a [parent’s] long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.” J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346; see also In re M.A., No. 11-26-00054-CV, 2026 WL 2339171, at *13 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 13, 2026, no pet. h.); In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 479 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (“[R]ecent improvement alone is not sufficient to avoid termination of parental rights.” (quoting In re K.D.C., No. 02-12-00092-CV, 2013 WL 5781474, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.))). In this case, the trial court need not ignore Appellant’s periods of disengagement, inconsistent visitation efforts, lack of long-term stability, and repeated substance abuse simply because she substantially complied with her service plan requirements, when such compliance was insufficient to alleviate the Department’s and the trial court’s concerns for E.J.’s safety under the circumstances. 11 See In re G.H., No. 11-26-00012-CV, 2026 WL 1992098, at *7 (Tex. App.— Eastland July 10, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The trial court could have rationally concluded that preserving Appellant’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest here. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742 (considering the parent’s unstable and uncertain living situation in upholding the trial court’s best interest finding); In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2021) (stating that the Family Code “does not require termination when a severe restriction or limitation on access can also be in the best interest of the child while preserving the possibility that the parent and child may continue to have a relationship in the future”). Having considered the evidence as it relates to Appellant’s actions and inactions, the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, Appellant’s lack of demonstrable parental abilities and stability, and her drug use history, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. IV. Reasonable Efforts and Continuing Danger In her second issue, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return E.J. to her before seeking termination of her parental rights or deciding that a continuing danger remained in the home that prevented a return of the child to Appellant. See FAM. § 161.001(f). Pursuant to Section 161.001(f), the trial court may not terminate the parent- child relationship unless: [T]he [trial] court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that . . . the [D]epartment made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those 12 reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the parent. Id. Enacted in 2023, subsection (f) imports the phrase “reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent” from Section 161.001(b)(1)(N), the “constructive abandonment” statutory termination ground. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (f); In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied). Consistent with the prevailing judicial interpretation of that phrase, the Department’s implementation of a family service plan is generally considered a reasonable effort to return the child to a parent. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 (collecting cases); see also D.F. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 731 S.W.3d 726, 742–43 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, no pet.); In re H.B.S., No. 12-26-00007-CV, 2026 WL 960744, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 8, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (collecting cases). Moreover, the pertinent inquiry “is whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.” M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 (quoting In re J.A., No. 04- 20-00242-CV, 2020 WL 5027663, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)). The reasonableness of the Department’s efforts based on the facts and circumstances of each case must be balanced with the parents’ engagement and efforts, or, in some cases, a lack thereof. See id. at 332. As discussed above, the Department developed a service plan for Appellant, and the trial court ordered that Appellant complete services as part of the reunification process. Specifically, the Department required that Appellant maintain safe and stable housing, submit to drug testing as requested, participate in counseling, and attend visitations with E.J. The Department provided transportation for drug testing, arranged for Appellant’s psychological evaluation and counseling referrals, and worked with Appellant to arrange visits with E.J. The Department’s reasonable efforts also included asking Appellant for relative/fictive kin placement 13 options for E.J. Appellant, however, was unable to provide any appropriate option. See A.D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (concluding Department made reasonable efforts to return child to parent by developing service plan, attempting to communicate with parent, and attempting family placement). The testimony at trial further demonstrated that the Department’s caseworker attempted to engage with Appellant regularly throughout the case even though Appellant repeatedly changed residences and was recurringly unresponsive. This constitutes sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return E.J. to Appellant. See id.; see also, e.g., C.G. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00852-CV, 2019 WL 3367524, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin July 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding Department made reasonable efforts to return child to parent by developing service plan, attempting to communicate with parent, assisting parent with scheduling visits, and determining whether parent secured drug-free housing); H.B.S., 2026 WL 960744, at *7 (concluding the same). Additionally, sufficient evidence exists to support the finding that, despite these efforts by the Department, a continuing danger remained that prevented E.J.’s return to Appellant. FAM. § 161.001(f). Section 161.001(f) requires that the trial court “pay particular attention to more recent conduct and circumstances existing in the time period after removal,” during the Department’s reunification efforts, and “leading up to the ‘commencement of a trial on the merits[,]’ to determine whether the [Department] has met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that ‘a continuing danger remains[.]’” In re T.R.C., No. 09-26-00019-CV, 2026 WL 1953219, at *25 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 6, 2026, no pet.) (alterations in original) (quoting FAM. § 161.001(f)(1)); see In re T.R., No. 01-25-00924-CV, 2026 14 WL 958570, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, no pet.) (concluding, for purposes of a continuing danger analysis, “[a] parent’s prior conduct permits an inference that his endangering conduct will continue in the future”). Since E.J.’s removal, Appellant changed residences approximately seven times, continued to test positive for methamphetamine, and after admitting herself into a substance abuse treatment facility for a second time began using methamphetamine again after being discharged. Appellant then ceased communication with the Department and visitations for a five-month period. Because Appellant, not the Department, was responsible for the gaps in drug testing, such failure can be held against Appellant as evidence of continued drug use. See D.T. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00770-CV, 2019 WL 1526429, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 9, 2019, no pet.) (stating that missed drug tests can be presumed to be positive); see also In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (noting that factfinder could reasonably infer that parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug screening indicated that she was avoiding testing due to ongoing drug use (citing In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.))); cf. In re T.M., No. 11-25-00273-CV, 2026 WL 770620, at *11 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 19, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). Though Appellant tested negative in the three-month period after resuming contact with the Department, the trial court was permitted to consider Appellant’s substance abuse history throughout the pendency of this case— as well as her unstable employment and living accommodations—in determining that a continuing danger prevented E.J.’s return to Appellant. See K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *8 n.2; In re G.H., No. 02-26-00068-CV, 2026 WL 2066084, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 13, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that factfinder 15 could find continuing danger present by reasonably inferring that parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug screening indicated that she was avoiding testing due to ongoing drug use even where parent had tested negative throughout pendency of case after initially testing positive); In re A.J.L., No. 04-25-00651-CV, 2026 WL 1020548, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 8, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding continued danger remained where “at the time of the trial, concerns that led to removal—including substance abuse, instability, and unsafe conditions— remained unresolved”). Given the foregoing, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return E.J. to Appellant, but despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger to E.J. remained in the home that prevented his return. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. V. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE October 8, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 16