Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00264-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN THE INTEREST OF J.R., A CHILD ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Silva, Peña, and West Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña Appellant L.N. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child, J.R. 1 See TEX. FAM. CODE. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (N), 161.001(b)(2). By her sole issue, Mother challenges the factual 1 We refer to the parties and children by their initials in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). sufficiency of the evidence supporting that termination was in the best interest of her child. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings under Subsections (D) and (N). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History On April 10, 2024, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) initiated emergency removal proceedings, filing its original petition for protection of the child, for conservatorship, and for termination in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. The Department specifically sought managing conservatorship of J.R. and termination of Mother’s rights. 2 The affidavit in support of removal provided the following details. On February 12, 2024, the Department received a report that J.R. was not gaining weight. The report stated that “J.R. was in the 0.6 percentile in weight, the 2nd percentile in height, and the 0.05 [percentile] in head circumference.” Over the course of several months, pediatricians scheduled several appointments in response to J.R.’s condition and gave Mother care instructions, including “strict feeding schedule[s].” As detailed below, Mother missed several of J.R.’s appointments and his condition continued to worsen under her care. In December of 2023, when J.R. was approximately one month old, he was admitted to Driscoll Children’s Hospital (DCH) and diagnosed with failure to thrive. Pediatricians expressed concern that J.R. was inadequately gaining weight and that he was not being fed properly at home. J.R. was also throwing up and Mother was instructed to monitor his stool. 2 The trial court’s judgment also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of J.R.’s alleged fathers, who are not a party to this appeal. 2 In February of 2024, Mother and maternal grandmother, L.W., attended medical appointments and J.R. still reportedly “had extremely low weight gain.” Medical providers instructed Mother to keep a “strict record” of J.R.’s feeding. Nevertheless, J.R. was again admitted to DCH and diagnosed with moderate starvation. Mother was again instructed to monitor J.R.’s feeding, keep a feeding log, and attend a follow-up appointment. Mother did not attend the appointment and did not contact the medical provider. Mother later attended an appointment on March 8, 2024, but stated she “forgot” the requested feeding record. On March 18, 2024, the Department received another report regarding J.R.’s poor weight gain. Mother was again not able to produce any feeding records. The report provided that Mother did not “seem interested at the doctors’ visits” and L.W. would feed J.R. as opposed to Mother. The medical providers directed Mother to keep feeding records and she again failed to do so. When the Department contacted Mother and asked about J.R.’s feeding and missed appointments, Mother said that she was keeping a feeding record and missed the appointments because she did not have a ride. On March 20, 2024, J.R.’s pediatrician told the Department that it was likely J.R. would need to be readmitted to the hospital and that J.R.’s family had not rescheduled their missed appointment. That same day, a caseworker attempted to contact Mother at her apartment, but there was no answer at the door. The caseworker also received no answer on Mother’s phone and no call or text back. The apartment management informed the Department that Mother vacated her unit at least a month prior. Mother continued to miss J.R.’s medical appointments and did not return the Department’s or the medical providers’ calls. The caseworker made contact with Mother 3 on March 22, 2024, and asked her for J.R.’s feeding records. Mother stated she did not finish the food log because she fell asleep. On March 28, 2024, J.R.’s pediatrician contacted the Department, notifying them that Mother had missed another appointment and was not responding to the pediatrician’s calls. On April 4, 2024, J.R. was again admitted to DCH and diagnosed with severe starvation. J.R. began gaining weight after hospital staff administered his feedings. On April 12, 2024, the trial court signed an emergency order of removal, naming the Department as temporary sole managing conservator of J.R., and J.R. was placed in foster care. The Department developed a family plan of service, which provided that over the course of six months, Mother had to demonstrate that she was able to “provide [J.R.] with appropriate supervision and provide for his basic needs.” As part of her family plan of service Mother was required to: provide a safe, stable, appropriate home for J.R., participate in visitation with J.R., seek gainful employment, participate in parenting classes and individual counseling and undergo psychological evaluations, random drug testing, obtain a primary care physician and maintain contact with the Department. The plan also stated that Mother “is currently not medicated or seeking treatment for her Bipolar Disorder, Depression, and Anxiety which could lead to her not being able to properly care for [J.R.] which could lead to the child becoming injured, or lead to his death.” In June of 2024, the trial court issued an order returning J.R. to Mother. During this time, the caseworker reported that Mother was not following the DCH’s feeding instructions and not keeping feeding records. Mother also failed to select a pediatrician for J.R. Additionally, the caseworker noted that hospital staff believed Mother was 4 overfeeding J.R. before appointments, which was causing him to vomit. The caseworker reported that she visited Mother’s residence and observed there was no electricity or air conditioning, and Mother confirmed the electricity had been shut off. The caseworker also stated that Mother did not have enough formula for J.R. and he was still not adequately gaining weight. The caseworker also spoke with hospital staff, who informed her that they were concerned about J.R.’s brain development and dehydration. Overall, J.R. was regressing. On July 17, 2024, the trial court held an emergency status hearing and continued the family plan of service with J.R. in Mother’s care. From August through September, the caseworker reported that Mother was still continually missing J.R.’s appointments and J.R. was losing weight or not adequately gaining weight. Mother had also not attended parenting classes. The Department stated in its notification to the trial court: “Due to the continued concerns, the instability, lack of communication, and parents[’] lack of compliance with services and medical appointments, the Department is requesting a placement change.” On September 9, 2024, the trial court placed J.R. at Valley Haven Shelter in Harlingen, Texas. On October 1, 2024, J.R. was placed in foster care after a hearing for review of his conservatorship appointment and placement. On November 27, 2024, the trial court issued another order finding that Mother was not willing and able to provide for J.R. with a safe environment and ordered that J.R. be moved to a foster home in Corpus Christi, Texas. On June 17, 2025, after a permanency hearing, the trial court ordered that J.R. remain in foster care and notified the parties of a setting for a trial on the merits. 5 B. Bench Trial A bench trial commenced on October 6, 2025, and concluded on December 11, 2025. The Department called Angelica Lopez, a caseworker assigned to J.R.’s case; Mother testified on her own behalf. The Department’s family plan of service was the only exhibit admitted during trial. The trial court took judicial notice of the district clerk’s record extrapolated above. Lopez testified that she was assigned to J.R.’s case in November of 2024 and was familiar with the surrounding events and circumstances. When asked about her observations and interactions with Mother, Lopez testified that Mother had missed about eighty visits3. Lopez stated that such behavior constitutes abandonment under the Department’s standards. Lopez also noted that during the visits, Mother “would either be on her phone or try to end the visits early.” Lopez explained that the Department offered Mother rides, bus passes, and other accommodations, but Mother did not utilize any of the transportation assistance. Lopez further detailed that the Department also offered Mother individual, home-based therapy and virtual resources to help her complete parenting classes and other services offered. Lopez stated that she received a letter from Gulf Coast Rehabilitative Services discharging Mother for lack of participation from their program. With respect to home visits, Lopez testified that Mother did not notify the Department that she had moved and the Department had difficulty locating her. When Lopez visited Mother’s most recent place of residence, the apartment management office informed her that she “absconded on the lease and owed a heavy bill.” Lopez further 3 Lopez later testified that there were 105 total visits, but she maintained that Mother had only attended four. 6 stated that when she looked inside the apartment, “there was animal feces everywhere. Urine. Hair. Clothing. A shopping cart. And, so, that was very concerning the way [Mother] had left the apartment.” Regarding J.R.’s foster placement, Lopez testified that J.R. had been in his placement since about December of 2024. Lopez stated that the foster mom had taken him to all of his medical appointments, including those for speech and physical therapy. She stated that J.R. has “blossomed” in foster care and observed a “tremendous change.” Lopez also explained that the foster family recently adopted another child and J.R. was bonding well with him such that she observed the “love that [the family] share[s].” Lopez stated that the foster family intended to adopt J.R. She explained that foster mother had plans for J.R.’s future regarding his education and health. Lopez also testified that she believed J.R. would regress if returned to Mother, stating “if he was removed from that environment[,] it would be a detriment to him.” Lopez further testified that she did not think that Mother could take J.R. to his medical appointments or otherwise meet his needs. Lopez explained that she did not witness any form of bonding between Mother and J.R., Mother had never called to inquire about J.R., she had not received any messages from Mother regarding J.R, and Mother had not wished J.R. a happy birthday. Further, Lopez re-urged that she believed Mother would not “be able to provide the resources sufficient to care for him at this point.” Lopez further testified that as of the date of trial, she had last seen Mother in April of 2025 during a home visit. Additionally, Mother’s last visit with J.R. was in June of 2025. Lopez explained that the Department had made several attempts since then to get in contact with Mother with no success and did not know where Mother resided at the time of trial. Lopez also stated that Mother had given 7 birth to another child in October of 2025, and the Department had received an intake report regarding that child. Mother testified on her own behalf. She stated that she did not attend visitations with J.R. because she was having health issues and losing weight. She further testified that she did not attend parenting classes because she was having issues with the bus and because the classes were concerned primarily with discipline and she did not “believe in discipline.” Mother stated that she currently lives with her boyfriend, her infant child, and mother L.W. When asked how she would provide for J.R. if he was returned to her, she stated that she would “put him in school or daycare” and “[t]ake him to all his appointments and make sure that he’s good.” Regarding her finances and employment, Mother testified that she is not gainfully employed and relies on her income from Social Security Disability. She explained that L.W. does not ask her to contribute financially to the household. Regarding her bond with J.R., Mother stated that J.R. was happy with her and she had videos of J.R. standing up and picking his head up on his own. When asked when she last visited J.R., Mother responded: “To be honest, I don’t remember.” Further, when asked why she had not called or messaged anyone from the Department to inquire about J.R., Mother stated that her phone had been off and she could not make calls. Lastly, when asked if she could care for J.R. if he was returned to her, Mother testified that she would get a job, put the children in daycare, and take them to their medical appointments. The trial court granted the Department’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. In its written order signed on March 3, 2026, the trial court found predicate grounds for termination under parts (D) and (N) of Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1). See 8 id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (N). It further found that termination was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “[I]nvoluntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights” and divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). “A parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his child is of constitutional magnitude.” Interest of J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 740 (Tex. 2022). Accordingly, “termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized,” In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014), and “involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20 (Tex. 1985). “A court may terminate a parent’s right to his child if it finds by clear and convincing evidence both that (1) the parent committed an act prohibited under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. Interest of J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012). Clear and convincing evidence means “the degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. “This heightened burden of proof affects the standard of review in an evidentiary challenge on appeal.” Interest of J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741. When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination, we ask whether the evidence “is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 9 conviction about the truth of the [Department]’s allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). In conducting this review, we consider whether “in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses as the “the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Interest of J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). Thus, we “look at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266) (citation modified). B. Applicable Law The best-interest prong of the termination inquiry “is child-centered and focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and development.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). The Supreme Court of Texas has identified several nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in determining the child’s best interest, known as the Holley factors. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parenting abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by those individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the 10 parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is an improper one; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id. Evidence that is probative of grounds for termination may also be probative of the best interest of the child. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. Not all factors must weigh in favor of termination, “particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” Id. at 27. Further, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id. C. Best Interest of the Child In her sole issue on appeal, Mother argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the child. For the following reasons, we overrule Mother’s sole issue and conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. First, as to the child’s desires, J.R. was just over two years old at the time the trial court issued its order terminating parental rights. The general rule applies that we may consider whether a child has bonded with his foster family where the child is too young to express his desires. See, e.g., In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“The factfinder may consider whether a child who is too young to express herself has bonded with her foster family, is well-cared for in her foster placement, and has spent minimal time with her biological parents as a proxy for the child’s desires.”); Interest of N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (acknowledging the same); see also Interest of O.J.G., No. 13-25- 11 00145-CV, 2025 WL 1912201, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 10, 2025, pet. denied). The record shows that the Department placed J.R. in a foster home in December of 2024 after an ongoing concern that J.R. was suffering from failure to thrive and starvation. Lopez testified that J.R. bonded with his foster mother and brother and observed shared love and happiness. Lopez also testified that she witnessed a “tremendous change” in J.R. while under foster mother’s care and that he had “blossomed.” Lopez detailed that foster mother ensured J.R. attended his medical appointments with pediatricians as well as speech and physical therapy appointments. Foster mother also made health and education plans for his future. Further, Lopez testified that J.R.’s emotional needs were being met in the foster home Lopez also believed that removing J.R. from foster care and placing him back with Mother would be detrimental. Lopez further testified that while J.R. was under the Department’s care, Mother missed about eighty to one hundred visits and only attended four, which the Department categorized as abandonment. Lopez also testified that as of the date of the bench trial, which occurred in December of 2025, the most recent visit Mother had with J.R. was about six months prior in June of 2025. During those visits, Lopez testified that she did not observe any bonding and did not believe that there was a maternal bond established between Mother and J.R. While mother testified that she did have a bond with J.R. and that he was happy with her, Mother also testified at trial that she did not remember the last time she visited J.R. Additionally, Lopez stated that Mother had not called or messaged to inquire about 12 J.R. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also In re A.V.G.-P., No. 10-23-00294-CV, 2024 WL 1327908, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.) (“[A] parent’s failure to regularly visit his children after removal may support a finding that termination of the parent’s rights is in the children’s best interest.”). As to the second, third, and fourth factors, the Department presented evidence regarding the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs, the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child, and the parenting abilities of the individuals seeking custody. As mentioned above, Lopez testified that the Department received a report that in December of 2023, when J.R. was about two months old, he was diagnosed with failure to thrive and moderate starvation. On November 27, 2024, the trial court issued another order finding that the child’s parents were not willing and able to provide J.R. with a safe environment. While still under Mother’s care, J.R. was hospitalized twice thereafter and diagnosed with severe starvation. Medical providers also advised the Department that J.R. would likely need hospitalization if Mother maintained her quality of care. See Interest of A.H., 679 S.W.3d 817, 833 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied) (“The circumstances that led to the child’s removal may be considered as part of the parent’s past neglect or inability to meet the child's needs.”); see Interest of L.S.R., No. 13-25-00012-CV, 2025 WL 1587794 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 5, 2025, no pet.) (considering the same). Additionally, J.R. was diagnosed repeatedly with inadequate weight gain and failure to thrive after consistently not gaining appropriate weight. Medical providers advised Mother of J.R.’s specified needs numerous times and Mother failed to follow their instructions and recommendations. Mother routinely missed J.R.’s medical appointments 13 and did not have contact with his medical providers. Mother was asked multiple times to keep a log of J.R.’s feedings but could not provide it due to various excuses. While still under Mother’s care, J.R. was hospitalized three times and his condition worsened from moderate to severe starvation. The evidence also showed Mother did not follow the hospital’s feeding instructions regarding preparing J.R.’s formula, suggested feeding plans, or keeping feeding records, and hospital staff believed Mother was overfeeding J.R. before appointments causing him to vomit. Further, Lopez testified that she visited Mother’s previous residence and observed animal feces and urine all over the apartment. Mother had abandoned the apartment, owing rent, and did not notify the Department of her change of residence. Overall, Lopez urged that J.R. would regress if removed from the foster family and returned to Mother, stating “if he was removed from that environment[,] it would be a detriment to him.” Lopez further testified that she did not think that Mother could take J.R. to his medical appointments or otherwise meet his needs. The Department ultimately removed J.R. after several months of monitoring Mother. While in Mother’s care, she was given a family plan of service, but the Department continued to report concerns that the child was improperly cared for and that Mother was not abiding by the plan. It also had concerns that J.R. could potentially suffer injuries or death arising from Mother’s untreated Bipolar Disorder, Depression, and Anxiety. See In re A.H., 679 S.W.3d 817, 833 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied (“A parent’s past neglect or inability to meet the child’s physical or emotional needs may be considered when analyzing her parenting ability.”). As previously mentioned, Mother missed eighty visitations and only attended four. During those visits, Lopez did not observe maternal 14 bonding between Mother and J.R. and observed that Mother “would either be on her phone or try to end the visits early.” See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 824 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“Parental absence or lack of involvement is especially telling with respect to the best interest of very young children, like babies and toddlers, due to their inherent vulnerability and particular need for parental attention and nurturing.”). Under the fifth factor, considering the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the child’s best interest, Mother did not utilize any resources the Department made available. Lopez testified that J.R. was initially placed in foster care in Hidalgo County but relocated J.R. to Nueces County so that Mother would be able to attend visits. Mother was given resources to attend visitations, such as bus passes and rides, but did not utilize them. As to J.R.’s medical appointments, Mother was offered transportation assistance but likewise did not utilize those. Mother did not accept any of the assistance that the Department offered. Lopez testified that Mother was also given individual therapy through Gulf Coast Rehabilitative Services, but that she was discharged for lack of participation. Mother testified that she did not complete the classes or services because they were concerned primarily with discipline and she did not “believe in discipline.” In regard to the sixth and seventh factors considering the plans for the child by those individuals or by the agency seeking custody and the stability of the home or proposed placement, undisputed evidence showed that J.R. was thriving and happy in his current placement. Further, Lopez testified that J.R. had bonded with his foster brother and mother, and they were interested in adopting J.R. See In re G.A.C., 499 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. denied) (“[A] child’s need for permanence through 15 the establishment of a ‘stable, permanent home’ has been recognized as the paramount consideration in determining best interest.”). Additionally, Lopez testified that the Department has an open investigation of an additional child that Mother gave birth to in October of 2025. Mother testified that at the time of trial she lived with her mother, boyfriend, and infant child. When asked how she would provide for J.R. if he was returned to her, she stated that she would “put him in school or daycare” and “[t]ake him to all his appointments and make sure that he’s good.” In regard to her finances and employment, Mother testified that she does not have a job and relies on her income from Social Security Disability, and that L.W. does not ask her to contribute financially to the household. Lasty, we consider the eighth and ninth factors as to the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is an improper one and considering any excuses for the parent’s acts or omissions. Mother testified that she did not visit J.R. because she had ongoing health issues and was losing weight. She also alleged that visits would be inexplicably canceled when she was already on the bus on the way to the visitation. Mother had a similar excuse regarding her failure to attend parenting classes. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“[W]hen the Department has introduced evidence probative of parental unfitness, the factfinder may draw an adverse inference against a parent who does not respond with a valid excuse for his or her acts or omissions by presenting additional evidence or counterargument based on existing evidence.”). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have determined that termination was in the best interest of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; TEX. 16 FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Thus, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the judgment. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice Delivered and filed on the 1st day of October, 2026. 17