Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00298-CR ___________________________ MICHAEL MOBLEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1650254 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Michael Mobley appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his deferred-adjudication community supervision and adjudicating him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In his only appellate point, Mobley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating him guilty because the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by committing a new criminal offense. We will affirm. I. BACKGROUND In April 2021, Mobley pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was placed on five years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. One of the terms and conditions of his community supervision was that he would not commit any new criminal offenses. On June 6, 2025, Mobley’s girlfriend, A.Y., called 911 and told the operator that Mobley had assaulted and strangled her. Responding officers noted that A.Y.’s neck was swollen; that she had injuries to her eye, backside, and right arm; and that she was missing a braid. A detective who investigated the case testified that A.Y. had explained what had happened approximately six times and that she had consistently maintained that Mobley had strangled her. The officers who responded to A.Y.’s 911 call ultimately placed her under arrest for outstanding warrants and for assaulting Mobley during their scuffle. A paramedic who treated A.Y. at the Tarrant County Jail testified that A.Y. had 2 complained of neck, throat, arm, and hand pain and had stated that her boyfriend had assaulted her. The paramedic noted that A.Y. had injuries to her neck that were consistent with her having been strangled. She also had scratches on her chest and swelling on her arms. After being treated by paramedics, A.Y. was taken to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Daniel Phillips. A.Y. told Dr. Phillips that she had been assaulted by her boyfriend and stated that she had been “struck in the left eye, strang[l]ed . . . , and then punched in the . . . abdomen.” Dr. Phillips observed that A.Y. had swelling in her neck and around her left eye and cheekbone and also had tenderness in her right chest wall. Dr. Phillips testified that A.Y.’s injuries were consistent with her having been assaulted as she had claimed. Based on A.Y.’s account of the June 6, 2025 incident, the State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication in which it alleged that Mobley had violated the conditions of his community supervision by committing seven different criminal offenses, including simple assault and family-violence assault. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B). At the hearing on the State’s petition, A.Y. recanted her prior allegations that Mobley had assaulted her. She testified that she had accidentally called 911 and that she had falsely accused Mobley of assaulting and strangling her. She claimed that she had injured herself by falling down while intoxicated and that Mobley had never 3 actually hit or strangled her. Mobley also testified, and he denied that he had ever hit or choked A.Y. After considering all the evidence, the trial court found six of the violations alleged in the State’s petition to be true,1 revoked Mobley’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of his underlying aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon offense, and sentenced him to twelve years in prison. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2); see also id. §§ 12.33(a) (setting forth a punishment range of two to twenty years’ imprisonment for second-degree felonies), 22.02(b) (classifying aggravated assault as a second-degree felony). This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION In a single point, Mobley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision because the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he had committed a new criminal offense. We disagree. A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated at least one of the terms and conditions of his community supervision. Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “This standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the 1 The State waived the second of the seven alleged violations at the start of the revocation hearing. The trial court found the remaining six allegations to be true. 4 defendant has violated” such a term or condition. Guerrero v. State, 554 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764). The trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, then the trial court abuses its discretion by revoking the community supervision. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94. B. Analysis As noted, the State alleged that Mobley had violated the terms of his community supervision by committing new criminal offenses during the June 6, 2025 incident, including simple assault and family-violence assault. A person commits simple assault by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another person. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1). And a person commits family-violence assault by impeding the normal breathing or blood circulation of a person with whom he has or has had a dating relationship by applying pressure to her throat or neck. See id. § 22.01(b)(2)(B). To support its allegations that Mobley had committed these offenses, the State presented evidence showing that: • A.Y. had called 911 on June 6, 2025, and had told the operator that Mobley—with whom she was in a dating relationship—had “hit” and “choked” her; 5 • Responding police officers observed that A.Y.’s neck was swollen; that she had injuries to her eye, backside, and right arm; and that she was missing a braid; • A.Y. had explained what had happened approximately six times to various police officers and the 911 operator, and she had consistently maintained that Mobley had strangled her; • A.Y. had injuries to her neck that were consistent with her having been strangled and had scratches on her chest and swelling on her arms;2 • A.Y. told her medical treaters—both the paramedic and Dr. Phillips—that she had been assaulted by her boyfriend; and • A.Y. specifically told Dr. Phillips that her boyfriend had struck her in the left eye and had punched her in the abdomen, and she had swelling around her left eye and cheekbone as well as tenderness in her right chest wall—injuries that were consistent with her having been assaulted as she claimed. Mobley argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient because A.Y. recanted her prior assault allegations at the revocation hearing and testified that she had falsely accused Mobley. But A.Y.’s recantation, standing alone, does not render the evidence insufficient. When a principal witness recants her prior allegations, the trial court—as the sole judge of the witness’s credibility—“is entitled to disbelieve that later statement and accept [her] earlier statement as true.” Moreno v. State, 1 S.W.3d 846, 853 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, pet. ref’d) (first citing Hoyos v. State, 951 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff’d, 982 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); and then citing Banda v. State, 727 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.)). 2 Photographs depicting A.Y.’s injuries were admitted into evidence. 6 Given the State’s evidence outlined above, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting A.Y.’s recantation, finding the State’s allegations that Mobley had committed simple assault and family-violence assault to be true, and revoking Mobley’s community supervision.3 See Journey v. State, No. 06-26-00025-CR, 2026 WL 1872651, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the appellant had violated his community supervision by committing a new offense even though the victim had recanted her allegations because the record contained other evidence to support the alleged new offense, including a responding officer’s testimony, the victim’s 911 call, and photographs of the victim’s injuries); Gonzalez v. State, No. 13-00-667-CR, 2001 WL 34394327, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 16, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that despite the victim’s recantation of her assault allegations, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation of appellant’s community supervision based on its finding that he had committed a new offense); cf. Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 469 n.3 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that “scholars have estimated that as many as 3 Although the State alleged that Mobley had violated his community-supervision terms by committing seven new offenses, the trial court only needed to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he had committed one of these alleged new offenses to revoke his community supervision. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 7 eighty to ninety percent of domestic[-]violence victims recant their accusation or refuse to cooperate with a prosecution” (internal quotations omitted)); Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 878 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (also recognizing that domestic-violence victims often recant or decline to cooperate). We overrule Mobley’s sole point. III. CONCLUSION Having overruled Mobley’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: October 8, 2026 8