Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 16, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00652-CV ——————————— MAHMOUD SALHA AND ABU ALI CAFE, Appellants V. 2020 HARWIN 59 SHOPPING CENTERS, LTD., HARWIN EXCHANGE CENTER, INC., AND MOHAMED A. SOHANI, Appellees On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-47567 MEMORANDUM OPINION The appellants, Mahmoud Salha and Abu Ali Café, LLC, sued the appellees, 2020 Harwin 59 Shopping Centers, Ltd., Harwin Exchange Center, Inc., and Mohamed Sohani for breach of contract, fraud, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), and relief in quantum meruit for alleged promises concerning repairs and consent to sublease. In five issues, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees and in awarding them their attorney’s fees. We affirm. Background On October 1, 2019, Salha and Café Dalida, Inc., executed a commercial lease with Harwin Exchange, acting through Sohani, its president, for a restaurant space on Richmond Avenue in Houston. The lease had a five-year term. The parties used a form promulgated by the Texas Association of Realtors to draft the lease. Lease provisions Pertinent to this appeal, the lease divides the responsibilities for and costs of repair and maintenance of the leased premises between the tenant and landlord. The landlord is responsible for roof repairs. If a roof repair is needed, “Tenant must promptly notify Landlord . . . in writing.” The tenant is responsible for “grounds maintenance, including landscaping and irrigation systems,” “parking areas and walks,” “[p]lumbing systems, drainage systems and sump pumps,” and “Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) 2 systems.” The tenant is also “required to maintain, at its expense, a regularly scheduled maintenance and service contract for the HVAC system.” The lease allows the landlord to “assign this lease to any subsequent owner of the [p]roperty.” The tenant, though, “may not assign this lease or sublet any part of the leased premises without Landlord’s written consent”; any attempt to do so “is voidable by Landlord.” And “regardless if the assignment or sublease is made with or without the consent of Landlord,” the “Tenant will remain liable for all of Tenant’s obligations under this lease.” As for the property’s condition on move-in, the tenant agrees that he “has inspected the leased premises and accepts it in its present (as-is) condition unless expressly noted otherwise in this lease or in an addendum.” The landlord “made no express or implied warranties as to the condition or permitted use of the leased premises or [p]roperty.” In a lawsuit between parties to the lease, “[a]ny person who is a prevailing party in any legal proceeding brought under or related to the transaction described in this lease is entitled to recover prejudgment interest, reasonable attorney’s fees, and all other costs of litigation from the nonprevailing party.” The lease also provides that it “contains the entire agreement between Landlord and Tenant and may not be changed except by written agreement.” 3 The parties’ dispute and proceedings below The appellants sued the appellees for breach of the lease, fraud, and violation of the DTPA. They also sought relief in quantum meruit. In their live pleading, the appellants complained that Sohani and Harwin Exchange did not notify them that the lease had been assigned to 2020 Harwin in January 2021 and that the appellees violated the lease by refusing to maintain or make improvements to the premises. Instead, the appellants spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to do so, yet the appellees refused to reimburse them. According to the appellants, Sohani also enticed them into making substantial improvements to the leased premises by promising them that they would have the right to sell their business and that he would approve a sublease. The appellants located a buyer for their business and pursued a sublease. As a condition for procuring Sohani’s consent to the sublease, the appellants executed an estoppel certificate in which they attested that the landlord was “[not] in default of the lease” and they “accepted the leased premises.” Ultimately, though, the appellees refused to consent to the sublease. After the sublease was rejected, the appellants notified their vendors and contractors that the appellees were unwilling to pay for the improvements and a materialmen’s lien was placed on the property. 4 After substantial discovery, the appellees moved for summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds. The grounds included: (1) recovery under quantum meruit was not available for matters covered by the lease; (2) the appellants were not entitled to recover their repair expenses under the lease terms; (3) the statute of frauds barred recovery on the oral promises they alleged; (4) the appellants were not entitled to recover on their fraud claim because they failed to replead it after the trial court granted the appellees’ special exceptions; and (5) the appellants’ DTPA claim failed because the DTPA did not apply to the lease transaction. The appellees also sought to recover their attorney’s fees. In its order granting the summary judgment motion, the trial court specified the grounds on which it dismissed the appellants’ claims. The trial court then held a hearing on the attorney’s fee request. The trial court’s final judgment awarded $23,580 for attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court and $15,000 for attorney’s fees on appeal. Summary Judgment A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, taking as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2017) (cleaned up). 5 The appellees filed a hybrid no-evidence and traditional summary-judgment motion. A no-evidence summary judgment motion shifts the burden to the nonmovant to produce evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the motion. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, “the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 681. A defendant-movant must either disprove at least one necessary element of the plaintiff’s theory of recovery or plead and conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense. Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Once the movant proves its right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a fact issue to defeat summary judgment. Id. Where, as here, the trial court’s order specifies the grounds on which summary judgment was granted, we generally limit our review to those grounds.1 W. Loop Hosp., LLC v. Houston Galleria Lodging Assocs., LLC, 649 S.W.3d 461, 480 (Tex. 1 The trial court recited numerous grounds in its order. We refer only to those necessary to adjudicate the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 6 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied); see Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625–26 (Tex. 1996). B. Discussion 1. Breach of lease In their first issue, the appellants assert that the appellees were not entitled to summary judgment on the appellants’ claim that the appellees breached the lease’s requirement that the landlord fix the electrical panel and wiring, plumbing, air conditioning and roof repairs. An action for breach of contract requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) an enforceable contract exists; (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered performance; (3) the defendant breached the contract; and (4) the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff damages. See USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 n.21 (Tex. 2018). In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the breach of contract claims for repairs to the premises’ electrical system, plumbing, and air conditioning “because maintenance and repair of those systems are assigned to the Tenant by the terms of the Lease.” The lease provides that “Tenant will pay for the HVAC services under this lease.” The lease defines “HVAC services” as “heating, ventilating, and air conditioning of this lease premises.” The lease also designates the tenant as responsible for maintaining and repairing plumbing and electrical 7 systems. The appellants do not confront this ground for dismissal or address the applicable lease terms. The lease makes the landlord responsible for roof repairs. If repairs are needed that are the landlord’s responsibility to repair, the lease requires that “Tenant promptly notify Landlord” in writing of the need for repair. The trial court determined, and the record shows, that there “is no evidence that Plaintiffs gave the Landlord a written request for repair of the roof as the Lease requires.” The appellants complain that the landlord refused to reimburse them for roof repairs, but the lease contains no provision imposing any reimbursement obligation on the landlord. And to the extent the appellants asserts that the landlord had an obligation to repair the roof before they moved into the leased premises, the lease expressly belies that assertion, stating that the tenant “accepts it in its present (as-is) condition.” The appellants make no viable argument challenging the trial court’s reasons for dismissing these breach-of-contract claims. We overrule their first issue. 2. Refusal to consent to the sublease In their second issue, the appellants assert that the appellees failed to comply with their oral agreement requiring them to consent to the sublease. The trial court dismissed this claim “as being prohibited by the Statute of Frauds.” The record shows that the proposed sublease was to begin January 1, 2018 and end January 31, 2020. A lease of real estate for a term longer than one year is 8 subject to the statute of frauds and is required by law to be in writing. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 26.01(a) (1), (b)(5). Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that any oral agreement to the sublease was unenforceable. We overrule the appellants’ second issue. 3. DTPA and fraud claims In their third issue, the appellants maintain that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their DTPA and fraud claims. The elements of a DTPA claim are: (1) the plaintiff was a consumer; (2) the defendant violated a specific provision of the DTPA; and (3) the violation was a producing cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.,919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996); see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(a). The DTPA does not apply to a claim that arises from a transaction or set of transactions relating to the same nonresidential project if the total consideration by the consumer amounts to more than $500,000. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.49(g); AES Valves, LLC v. Kobi Int’l, Inc., No. 01-18-00081-CV, 2020 WL 1880781, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Among other reasons for dismissing appellants’ DTPA claim, the trial court determined that dismissal was appropriate because the DTPA did “not apply to the Lease transaction whose consideration totals more than $500,000.” 9 The lease provides for an initial 60-month term with “base monthly rent” of $8,700 to be paid by the tenant, for a total of $522,000. The appellants assert that the “base rent” figure used by the trial court is wrong, but the lower figure they cite is for “rate per rentable square foot,” not the “base monthly rent” amount which appears on the same page of the lease and was used by the trial court to calculate the total consideration owed under the lease. The appellants also assert that they are entitled to reconsideration of their fraud claims, which the trial court dismissed because their live pleadings did not comply with its order on special exceptions. The appellants do not challenge this reason for dismissal or the trial court’s special exception ruling. As the appellants state no viable basis for reversal, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing the appellants’ DTPA and fraud claims and overrule their third issue. 4. Quantum meruit The appellants next assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their request for recovery in quantum meruit. “Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy based on the principle of unjust enrichment.” Champion Food Serv., Inc. v. ProAlamo Foods, L.L.C., 738 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. 2026). The right to recover in quantum meruit “arises by law under some circumstances when the parties have neglected to form an express agreement.” 10 Id. “Accordingly, recovery in quantum meruit is generally not available when the parties have a valid contract.” Id. The trial court dismissed the appellants’ request for relief in quantum meruit “because they relate to the same services covered by the Lease.” The appellants acknowledge in their brief that the lease covered repair of the premises. We hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing the appellants’ quantum meruit claim for this reason and overrule their fourth issue. Attorney’s Fees In their fifth issue, the appellants assert that the trial court erred in awarding the appellees their attorney’s fees. The appellants first assert that the appellees failed to segregate the work performed on claims for which they were entitled to recover attorney’s fees from their work on those for which they were not. Attorney’s fees are recoverable only when allowed by statute or the parties’ contract. Hillegeist Fam. Enters., LLP v. Hillegeist, 667 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.); see Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310 (Tex. 2006). For this reason, a fee claimant must segregate attorney’s fees that are recoverable from those that are not. Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017) (citing Chapa). The lease allows the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees in any legal proceeding “brought under or related to the transaction described in this lease.” The 11 appellees prevailed on all claims and, at the hearing on attorney’s fees, sought to recover attorney’s fees for all claims. The appellants do not contend that their claims did not relate to the transaction described in the lease. The appellants did not file any written objection to the appellees’ request for attorney’s fees. At the hearing, while cross-examining defense counsel on his fee testimony, plaintiffs’ counsel questioned whether defense counsel failed to segregate invoicing for “one specific cause of action versus the other.” Defense counsel confirmed that he “included attorney’s fees for . . . defending all four claims,” noting that “there was no need to do that.” Plaintiffs’ counsel also questioned whether defense counsel had included fees incurred in connection with nonsuited parties in his fee request. Defense counsel stated he had, but the related fee entries were “shown in the detailed billing” and “wouldn’t be that difficult to pull out.” The appellees requested a total of $31,574.87 in attorney’s fees for their representation in the trial court. The trial court awarded $23,580 in attorney’s fees. The amount of the award is less than the amount requested and indicates that billing records provided to the trial court adequately segregated the recoverable fees from the unrecoverable ones. The appellants also complain that the attorney’s fee issues were not submitted to a jury. But they did not timely request a jury trial on attorney’s fees or timely 12 object in the trial court to proceeding without a jury. Accordingly, this complaint is not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). We overrule the appellants’ fifth issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Clint Morgan Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. 13