Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-24-00365-CV Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Appellant v. Kevion Rogers, Appellee On appeal from the 278th District Court of Madison County, Texas Judge Hal R. Ridley, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 19-16359 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) appeals from the trial court’s interlocutory order denying its plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (allowing appeal from interlocutory order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit”). We will affirm. Background Kevion Rogers sued TDCJ under the Texas Tort Claims Act (the TTCA), seeking damages for personal injuries that he claims were caused by a premises defect on TDCJ’s property. Rogers’s amended petition presents the following factual allegations: At all times material to this suit, Rogers was an inmate of TDCJ, and on or about May 25, 2017, he was in TDCJ’s custody at the Jim Ferguson Unit in Madison County. The unit oversaw the raising and slaughtering of pigs. On May 25, 2017, Rogers’s supervisor, TDCJ employee Officer Jeffrey Jarrett, ordered Rogers to go to the farrowing barn (the Barn) to get the “rub to put down so that the piglets wouldn’t slip after being born.” Rogers responded by telling Officer Jarrett that the rub was not in the Barn. Officer Jarrett told Rogers that if he nevertheless failed to obey the order, Rogers would be written up. Rogers therefore entered the Barn to search for the rub. Inside, much of the Barn’s ceiling “was exposed and was in an extreme state of disrepair.” Rogers ultimately found no rub inside the Barn. When Rogers then approached the Barn’s front door to exit the building, the Barn’s ceiling collapsed on him. “[W]ooden beams, metal rods, irrigation, and insulation” from the Barn’s ceiling fell directly onto Rogers’s head, “slamming him to the floor, rendering him unconscious.” The amended petition continues by alleging that, unbeknownst to Rogers at the time of the incident, earlier that morning, Officer Jarrett had been in Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 2 the Barn, and “there was water leaking, and the roof had partially collapsed.” Officer Jarrett turned off the running water at that time, but the water had caused serious damage to the roof structure. Despite being aware of these dangers, Officer Jarrett sent Rogers into the Barn without any warning. Rogers alleged in his amended petition that when the Barn’s ceiling collapsed on him, inmates from the surrounding barns heard the loud noise and ran over to see what had happened. Some of the inmates pulled Rogers out of the Barn. Other inmates ran to inform Officer Jarrett of Rogers’s condition. Officer Jarrett thereafter came to the scene of the incident, looked at Rogers, and stated, “I ain’t got time for this.” Officer Jarrett then got into his pickup truck and drove off, leaving Rogers, who had regained consciousness at some point, to sit and wait for transport. Rogers alleged in his amended petition that after almost two hours, “an employee named Schmidt” drove by him and asked him what had happened. Rogers told Schmidt that the Barn’s ceiling had collapsed on his head. Rogers further showed Schmidt the debris and asked for medical attention for his head injury. Schmidt told Rogers to get into his truck. Schmidt then contacted TDCJ employee Officer Jeremy Bridges on a walkie-talkie and told him that the Barn’s ceiling had fallen on Rogers’s head and that Rogers had sustained a head injury. Officer Bridges responded that Rogers “should be taken back to his bunk” where Officer Bridges “would take a look at [Rogers] later.” Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 3 Rogers alleged in his amended petition that he was then taken back to the main building. As he was escorted inside, Rogers was wheezing and had “mucus draining.” Rogers’s face was also continuing to bruise, and his eye and head were swelling. Rogers then went to his bunk but, given his medical condition, was not allowed to enter. Rogers therefore “turned back and made his way toward the front of the camp.” At that time, other inmates became concerned at Rogers’s swaying and stumbling and tried to assist him. Rogers then “fell to the ground, began to seize violently, began vomiting, and lost consciousness.” Emergency medical care was therefore sought for Rogers. Rogers’s condition required that he be transported by an air ambulance to the hospital. At the hospital, Rogers was diagnosed with “acute traumatic brain injury with cerebral concussion and acute respiratory failure due to allergies.” TDCJ thereafter filed its answer and denied the allegations in Rogers’s amended petition. TDCJ also filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which TDCJ argued that it is immune from Rogers’s suit. The trial court denied TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction, and this appeal ensued. Issue Presented In its sole issue, TDCJ contends that the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because Rogers “failed to establish a waiver of TDCJ’s sovereign immunity as to his premises liability claim where [Rogers] produced Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 4 no evidence that TDCJ had actual knowledge of the hazardous condition that caused his injury.” 1 0F Standard of Review A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law; therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam). A plea to the jurisdiction “may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). If a plea “challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” [Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.] Miranda, 133 S.W.3d [217,] 226 [(Tex. 2004)]. In determining whether the plaintiff has met that burden, “we liberally construe the pleadings, taking all factual assertions as true and looking to [the plaintiff’s] intent.” City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi, 469 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. 2015). 1 In the table of contents of its appellant’s brief, TDCJ also asserts: “TDCJ’s entitlement to sovereign immunity in this matter remains intact because TDCJ received neither formal nor actual notice of Roger’s [sic] claims as required under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101.” TDCJ, however, does not assert this argument in its issues presented for review, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), nor does TDCJ specifically address this argument in any other portion of the body of its brief. Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires the appellant’s brief to “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Id. R. 38.1(i). Because TDCJ’s brief contains no discussion or analysis beyond the mere assertion that TDCJ’s immunity remains intact because TDCJ did not receive the required notice of Rogers’s claims, we conclude that this argument by TDCJ is inadequately briefed, and we will not consider it. See id.; Zambrano v. Malone, No. 13-17-00022-CV, 2018 WL 549198, at *2 n.7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg Jan. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); El Paso Cmty. Coll. v. Lawler, 349 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied). Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 5 But when a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we look beyond the pleadings and consider evidence submitted by the parties “when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised,” even if the evidence implicates both the court’s jurisdiction and the merits of a claim. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. For a plea that challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, our standard of review generally mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment: a plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 221, 228. In determining whether the plaintiff has met that burden, “we take as true all evidence favorable to” the plaintiff and “indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the [plaintiff’s] favor.” Id. at 228. If the evidence and allegations create a fact question regarding jurisdiction, then a court cannot grant a plea to the jurisdiction, and the factfinder must resolve the fact issue. Id. at 227–28. But “if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue,” a court rules “on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. at 228. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020). Discussion Sovereign immunity generally deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit in which a party has sued the state or a state agency unless the Legislature has expressly waived sovereign immunity and, therefore, consented to suit. See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224–25. In the TTCA, the Legislature has included such a provision for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001–.109. The TTCA expressly provides: “Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by [the TTCA].” See Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 6 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.002, .025(a). The TTCA therefore creates a unique statutory scheme in which immunity from suit is co-extensive with immunity from liability. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224. Such a statutory scheme “effectively creates a situation in which evaluating whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in a given case may require a court to examine the merits of a plaintiff’s claims.” Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Edgin, No. 10-06- 00095-CV, 2007 WL 1165047, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Brooks, 180 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)); see Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224–26. We are faced with such a circumstance here and must determine whether jurisdiction exists by examining the elements of Rogers’s TTCA claim. The TTCA provides that a governmental unit in the state is liable for certain tort claims arising from a premises defect. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021(2), .022(a); Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 115–16 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam). When a TTCA claim arises from a premises defect, “the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a). Rogers has not alleged that he paid for the use of the premises in question here; therefore, we analyze his claim using a licensee standard. See, e.g., Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 391 (Tex. 2016). Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 7 The duty owed to a licensee requires that “a landowner not injure a licensee by willful, wanton or grossly negligent conduct, and that the owner use ordinary care either to warn a licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a dangerous condition of which the owner is aware and the licensee is not.” Id. (quoting State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992)). Here, Rogers did not allege willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct. Accordingly, to establish an immunity waiver on his TTCA claim, Rogers had to plead and, to the extent necessary, present evidence that: (1) a condition of the premises created an unreasonable risk of harm to him; (2) TDCJ actually knew of the condition; (3) he did not actually know of the condition; (4) TDCJ failed to exercise ordinary care to protect him from danger; and (5) TDCJ’s failure was a proximate cause of his injuries. See id. (quoting Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237). In its plea to the jurisdiction, TDCJ specifically challenged the second element of Rogers’s TTCA claim. TDCJ asserted that Rogers could not show a waiver of TDCJ’s sovereign immunity because TDCJ did not have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. To prevail on a premises-defect claim under the TTCA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual, not constructive, knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time of the incident. Id. at 391–92; City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 413–14 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 8 Knowledge of “a related condition that may create a danger at some time in the future” is not sufficient. Brooks, 180 S.W.3d at 707; see Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 392; Reyes v. City of Laredo, 335 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam). In determining whether a premises owner actually knew of the dangerous condition, “courts generally consider whether the premises owner has received reports of prior injuries or reports of the potential danger presented by the condition.” Univ. of Tex.–Pan Am. v. Aguilar, 251 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. 2008). However, “there is no one test for determining actual knowledge that a condition presents an unreasonable risk of harm.” Id. Actual knowledge can be proven through circumstantial evidence when it “either directly or by reasonable inference” supports that conclusion. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d at 415 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Tex. 2002)). Here, in its plea to the jurisdiction, TDCJ relied on Jeffrey Jarrett’s deposition testimony to support its position that it did not have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. Jarrett testified that he was hired by TDCJ in July 2016 and that, at the time of the incident on May 25, 2017, he was an agricultural specialist who “oversaw operations at the hog barn and feeder slab at the Ferguson Unit.” Jarrett explained that the “hog barn is the collection of barns across the street from the trusty camp.” Jarrett further Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 9 explained that the collection of barns includes six farrowing barns, one of which is the barn where the incident involving Rogers occurred (the Barn). Jarrett testified that the Barn was operational on the day of the incident. Jarrett explained that a farrowing barn is a “small enclosed barn” where fourteen or fifteen pregnant sows are generally held in individual crates. The sows deliver their piglets in the farrowing barn and raise them there for the first three to four weeks of the piglets’ lives. Jarrett, however, could not remember whether there were, in fact, pigs in the Barn on the day of the incident. Jarrett also testified about the layout of the Barn. Jarrett stated that when a person walks in the door of the Barn, there is a room where, for example, inmates can put their things. The farrowing crates are then located beyond the room. There are seven crates on each side with a walkway around them. Additionally, the Barn’s ceiling is “like the false tile ceiling.” No items were stored above the ceiling tiles, but chicken wire was holding insulation to the roof. When asked about the condition of the Barn around that time, Jarrett said that “it was not in bad shape. It was not in obviously decrepit, falling down, whatever, shape.” When then asked if there was any procedure for generally inspecting the condition of the barns, Jarrett replied that they would turn in a maintenance request if they saw something that needed to be Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 10 repaired. Jarrett explained, however, that he had never filled out a maintenance request for something to be fixed. Jarrett further denied being aware of “any work being performed” on the Barn in the days before the incident involving Rogers. Jarrett specifically denied being aware of any efforts to replace the crates in the Barn before the incident occurred, of any efforts to remove the insulation barrier before the incident occurred, or of any repairs being made to the Barn before the incident occurred. Jarrett then testified that at approximately 7:30 a.m. on the day that the incident occurred, he went to the Barn. Jarrett stated that when he walked into the Barn, he became aware that there was a water leak at that time. Jarrett explained that when he went into the Barn, “[t]here was water coming out of the ceiling.” Jarrett further described the scene as follows: “The ceiling was on the floor. . . . And the water leak was pouring out.” When asked to describe the amount of water that was coming through the ceiling, Jarrett stated, “The water hose flow, I believe. Just a regular amount.” When also asked from which part of the ceiling the water was coming out, Jarrett replied that it was “[a]bove the wall between the farrowing crates and the front room.” And when asked where he saw the fallen ceiling, Jarrett indicated that it was right at or next to the entryway. Jarrett then testified that after discovering the scene in the Barn, he shut the water off to the Barn. Jarrett also clarified that at that time, the Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 11 entire ceiling had not fallen but that a piece of the ceiling was still hanging. Jarrett stated that he thus pulled down the piece of the ceiling that was still hanging, which left a hole in the ceiling. Jarrett explained that the ceiling was “like there was a piece of tile missing.” Jarrett testified that he then “went back to [his] job doing the rest of [his] daily schedule.” Jarrett stated that he did not have any concerns about the remaining portions of the ceiling at that time. He explained that when he went back to his regular work schedule, there was nothing left hanging in the Barn. Jarrett specifically testified that he was not concerned that the remaining portions of the ceiling were going to collapse. He stated: “The one piece that had fallen was fine. The rest of the ceiling was fine.” Jarrett testified that at some point later that morning, he then told Rogers to go into the Barn and get the drying powder for the piglets. Jarrett stated that when Rogers came back from doing so, Rogers had dust on him and reported that “the rest of the ceiling fell in.” In response to TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction, Rogers presented the deposition testimony of Jeremy Bridges and Todd Swick. Swick testified that on the day of the incident, he was a “division level manager for manufacturing, agribusiness, and logistics” for TDCJ. In seeming contrast to Jarrett’s deposition testimony, Swick further stated that at the time of the incident involving Rogers, they were in the process of repairing the crates in the Barn Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 12 and of removing the insulation barrier from the ceiling in the area of the Barn above the crates. Swick explained that because they were replacing the farrowing crates, there were no pigs in the Barn on the day of the incident. Swick also explained that following the incident, he had “stuck [his] head in” the Barn and could see where they were replacing the insulation barrier. Bridges then testified that on May 25, 2017, he was a program supervisor who oversaw the day-to-day activities on the farm at the Ferguson Unit and that, as such, Jarrett reported to him. Similarly to Swick, Bridges testified that on the day of the incident, they “were in the process of remodeling” the Barn. More specifically, Bridges explained that they were replacing the “worn out” crates in the Barn with new ones. Bridges was not exactly sure when the process had begun but explained that it was a process that took “a couple of months.” Additionally, Bridges testified that before the day of the incident involving Rogers, they “had removed the ceiling out of ” the Barn to provide better ventilation for the sows and the piglets. Bridges stated that the work had started “a couple of months” before the incident. When asked who had performed the work of removing the ceiling, Bridges replied that it was “[his] staff and offenders.” Bridges further explained that after the incident, they realized that the Barn could have been considered a construction zone at the Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 13 time of the incident due to the remodeling and that the inmates should have been wearing hard hats when entering the Barn. Bridges nevertheless testified that he was unaware of any water leaking in the Barn before the incident involving Rogers. Bridges explained that before the incident, Jarrett had not informed him of the water leak or of the ceiling collapse that he had discovered earlier on the morning of the incident. But Bridges confirmed that the day after the incident, he had filled out an Injury Corrective Action Form, and, based on what Jarrett had told him, Bridges documented that the incident involving Rogers occurred around 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. Bridges further testified that he inspected the Barn after the incident and that at that time, there was “very little” of the ceiling remaining. In response to TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction, Rogers also presented his own statements about what happened on the day of the incident. In a statement that he had written to the warden on the day following the incident, Rogers explained that Jarrett had told him to get some “disinfectant sand” for the newborn piglets from the storage room in the righthand corner of the Barn. Rogers then stated that while he was walking out, the “whole” Barn ceiling collapsed on top of him, causing him to black out. Additionally, in an affidavit, Rogers asserted in relevant part that he went into the Barn to the storage room, looked for the powder for the piglets, saw that the powder was not there, and “turned around to leave the barn.” Rogers then stated in his affidavit, “I Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 14 hollered to the others that the item wasn’t there, and that’s when I was hit in the head from above by the falling ceiling and items.” Rogers stated that, shortly thereafter, he spoke with Jarrett. Rogers explained that when Jarrett asked him if he wanted to see a doctor, he responded, “Yes I need to go to the infirmary, the hell, a whole ceiling just fell on me!” TDCJ contends that the dangerous condition here was the specific compromised insulation panel of the Barn’s ceiling that ultimately fell on Rogers. TDCJ then argues that the evidence shows that TDCJ actually knew of only “potentially antecedent or related conditions; namely, the on-going farrowing crate replacement and the initial collapse of a different insulation barrier panel.” We agree with TDCJ that simply showing that it had actual knowledge of the initial ceiling collapse in the Barn was not sufficient on its own to establish that TDCJ had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition that allegedly injured Rogers. The second element of Rogers’s TTCA claim requires TDCJ to have had actual knowledge of the compromised portion of the ceiling that eventually collapsed and allegedly caused Rogers’s injury. See Brooks, 180 S.W.3d at 707 (“Proof of actual knowledge requires a finding that the State knew of the dangerous condition that caused the injury.” (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below, we believe that the evidence Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 15 here created a fact question regarding whether TDCJ had such actual knowledge. TDCJ points to Tarrant County v. Carter–Jones, No. 02-17-00177-CV, 2018 WL 547588 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.), as “instructive as to what constitutes an antecedent/related condition and the degree of locational specificity required to establish actual knowledge.” In Carter–Jones, the plaintiff sued Tarrant County under the TTCA for personal injuries she suffered when she slipped and fell on water in a hallway of the Tarrant County Corrections Center. Id. at *1. The evidence showed that about an hour before the plaintiff fell, a Tarrant County employee had seen a puddle of water directly in front of a locked men’s restroom. Id. “The restroom is in an alcove that is separated from the hallway where [the plaintiff] fell by a wall with an opening directly in front of the restroom.” Id. The employee explained that when she happened upon the puddle, it was roughly two feet long and confined to the alcove; it did not extend into the hallway. Id. The employee additionally said that she did not see any water moving or hear any water flowing when she first encountered the puddle. Id. After the plaintiff fell, however, the employee discovered that the puddle in the alcove had expanded beyond its original location behind the partition and into the hallway. Id. Based on the foregoing, the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it argued that it retained immunity from the plaintiff’s claim because Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 16 the evidence showed that it did not have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition before the plaintiff fell. Id. at *1, 4. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals ultimately agreed. Id. at *6. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals initially clarified that the “condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm to [the plaintiff] and that caused her injury was the water in the hallway, not the water in the alcove.” Id. at *4. The court then determined that the evidence did not reasonably support an inference that the County actually knew that water was on the hallway floor. Id. at *5. The court reasoned that when the employee saw the puddle an hour before the plaintiff fell, the puddle was small and confined to the alcove. Id. The court further noted that, critically, the employee did not see any water moving or hear any water flowing, Id. The court then stated that the employee’s “knowledge of motionless water in the alcove, five feet from the hallway, thus does not suffice to establish that the County had actual knowledge of the hallway water that [the plaintiff] fell on an hour later.” Id. We believe that the present case is distinguishable from Carter–Jones. First, in Carter–Jones, the evidence showed that the water that caused the plaintiff’s injury and the puddle that the employee had seen an hour before the plaintiff fell were located in different areas. See id. at *1, 5. Here, however, there is evidence that reasonably supports the inference that the part of the Barn’s ceiling that fell on Rogers was in the very same area as the part of the Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 17 ceiling that had initially fallen and had been discovered by Jarrett earlier that morning. In his deposition testimony, Jarrett described the layout of the Barn. He stated that when a person walks in the door of the Barn, there is a room where, for example, inmates can put their things. He explained that the farrowing crates are then located beyond the room. Jarrett thereafter explained where in the Barn he discovered the initial ceiling collapse. Jarrett testified that the water leak was coming out of the ceiling in the area “[a]bove the wall between the farrowing crates and the front room.” Jarrett also indicated that he saw the fallen ceiling right at or next to the entryway. And Jarrett described the ceiling after pulling down the piece that remained hanging after he shut the water off as looking “like there was a piece of tile missing.” The testimony of Bridges and Swick then indicated that by the day of the incident, the only area of the ceiling with an insulation barrier that could have collapsed was the area located above the room in the Barn, not the area above the crates. Bridges testified that by the day of the incident, they “had removed the ceiling out of ” the Barn to provide better ventilation for the sows and the piglets. Swick clarified that the insulation barrier that was being removed from the ceiling was in the area over the crates, not the room in the Barn. Swick further testified that following the incident involving Rogers, he had Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 18 “stuck [his] head in” the Barn and could see where they were removing the insulation barrier. Swick stated that the insulation barrier had been removed up until about where “that little area room was.” Rogers then explained in his own statements that he had gone to the room in the Barn to look for the powder for the piglets. In his statement dated the day after the incident occurred, Rogers reported that while he was walking out, the “whole” Barn ceiling collapsed on top of him. Rogers then stated in his affidavit that he was in the room in the Barn and “turned around to leave the barn” “when I was hit in the head from above by the falling ceiling and items.” 2 1F Although Rogers did not identify the specific compromised insulation panel of the ceiling that fell on him, we believe that the foregoing evidence reasonably supports the inference that the part of the ceiling that fell on Rogers and the part of the ceiling that had initially fallen were in the same location. Next, in Carter–Jones, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals emphasized that the employee stated that she did not see any water moving or hear any water flowing when she first encountered the puddle. See id. at *5. Here, however, there is evidence showing that Jarrett discovered an active water leak about only an hour before the incident. In fact, at one point, Jarrett described the water as “pouring out” of the ceiling when he discovered it. And although 2 TDCJ also attached photographs to its reply to Rogers’s response to its plea to the jurisdiction that showed the room in the Barn after the incident with considerable debris on the floor, including at least one ceiling tile. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 19 Jarrett testified that he shut the water off to the Barn, Jarrett knew that the water leak was severe enough at that time to have already caused a portion of the Barn’s ceiling to fall. Accordingly, we conclude that Rogers has presented evidence that reasonably supports the inference that Jarrett knew of the compromised portion of the ceiling that collapsed and allegedly injured Rogers. We acknowledge that in his deposition testimony, Jarrett essentially denied having actual knowledge of the compromised portion of the ceiling that fell on Rogers. But in determining whether Rogers met his burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether TDCJ had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition here, we must take as true all evidence favorable to Rogers and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in Rogers’s favor. See Rangel, 595 S.W.3d at 205. After considering the evidence here under the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the evidence created a fact question about whether TDCJ had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. See id.; Stewart, 249 S.W.3d at 415. TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction in which TDCJ argued that it is immune from Rogers’s suit was therefore properly denied, and TDCJ’s sole issue is overruled. See Rangel, 595 S.W.3d at 205. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 20 Conclusion Having overruled TDCJ’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s interlocutory order denying TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction. MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 22, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Harris, and Justice Westerfeld Affirmed CV06 Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rogers Page 21