Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00243-CV CITY OF LAREDO, Appellant v. Maria DEL CARMEN LARA, Appellee From the 341st Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025CVA000750D3 Honorable Rebecca Ramirez Palomo, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 30, 2026 AFFIRMED This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s order denying the City of Laredo’s plea to the jurisdiction. The City raises two issues on appeal. It argues the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because the pleadings and jurisdictional evidence establish (1) there was no waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act because there was no governmental use of tangible personal property, and (2) there was no nexus between the injury or damage and use of the property. 04-26-00243-CV BACKGROUND This appeal arises from a tort action filed by Appellee, Maria Del Carmen Lara, against the City. On April 24, 2023, at the intersection of Zapata Highway and Boulanger, the City’s wastewater crew was repairing sewer pipes. The wastewater crew was repairing a six-inch lateral sewer pipe when the pressure in the line caused a pipe to roll into the middle of the street. According to a statement Rene R. Reyes provided to the City of Laredo human resources department, risk management division, “[A] group of people behind [Del Carmen Lara’s] vehicle signal [sic] to the rest of the traffic to stop.” Someone in a vehicle behind Del Carmen Lara honked, and Del Carmen Lara moved forward. Del Carmen Lara rolled over the pipe that had rolled into the road, and the pipe became lodged under her vehicle. On April 14, 2025, Del Carmen Lara filed her original petition. Del Carmen Lara subsequently amended her petition three times, seeking to assert a claim against the City for negligent use of tangible property. After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and the City appeals. LEGAL STANDARD “Governmental immunity generally protects municipalities and other state subdivisions from suit unless the immunity has been waived by the constitution or state law.” Val Verde Hosp. Dist., 708 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex. 2019)). The Texas Tort Claims Act sets forth a limited waiver of governmental immunity, making a governmental unit liable for personal injury and death caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021(2), 101.025. -2- 04-26-00243-CV The City, seeking to assert governmental immunity, filed a plea to the jurisdiction. See Barrera v. Uvalde Cnty., No. 04-24-00461-CV, 2026 WL 517516, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 25, 2026, pet. denied) (“The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to ‘defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.’”) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004)). We review that plea de novo because whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Val Verde Hosp. Dist., 708 S.W.3d at 761; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In doing so, we first look to the plaintiff’s pleading to determine if it alleges facts that affirmatively establish the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007). But when, as here, a plea challenges jurisdictional facts rather than merely the pleadings, courts consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. In that way, a plea to the jurisdiction may resemble a traditional summary judgment motion by attaching evidence that conclusively negates jurisdiction. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447–48 (Tex. 2024); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). If the City’s plea conclusively negates jurisdiction, the burden then shifts to Del Carmen Lara. City of San Antonio v. Peralta, 476 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). Then, to survive the plea, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding jurisdiction. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 447–48; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28; Fossil Grp., Inc. v. Harris, 691 S.W.3d 874, 882 (Tex. 2024). We, therefore, review the pleadings and jurisdictional evidence to determine whether the City has conclusively negated jurisdiction. If the City has conclusively negated jurisdiction, we then determine whether Del Carmen Lara raised a fact issue regarding the Tort Claims Act’s immunity waiver. -3- 04-26-00243-CV Waiver of Immunity 1. USE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY Waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act requires negligence or a wrongful act or omission of an officer or employee acting within the scope of his employment, where the negligent conduct “involve[s] ‘some condition or some use’ of tangible personal property under circumstances where there would be private liability.” McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 513 (quoting Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. 1983)). To determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for use of tangible personal property, we look to the actual nature of the dispute. Barrera, 2026 WL 517516, at *3; McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 513. Here, Del Carmen Lara alleges the City negligently used tangible personal property when a pipe being repaired during a wastewater operation rolled into the roadway, causing her injuries. However, the City argues the pipe in question was not in use by the wastewater repair crew at the time of the collision. Reyes, a utilities crewman in the Sewer Department for the City, stated in his affidavit that on the day of the incident, the wastewater crew was repairing a sewer line when pressure in the line caused the pipe to roll away into the road. He states in his affidavit that the crew was “not doing anything with the pipe at the time it rolled into the street.” However, in a statement Reyes submitted to the risk management division, Reyes stated “we were taking off the equipment and the small one slipped away in the middle of the street.” Here, the City’s burden was to provide proof negating jurisdiction by demonstrating immunity was not waived as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see also McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 517. The City did not carry its burden. Instead, the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the wastewater crew was using the pipe when it rolled into the roadway. -4- 04-26-00243-CV We note that Texas courts have consistently held that a governmental unit “uses” tangible personal property if it puts or brings the property into action or service or employs the property for a given purpose. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. 2020); McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 513. Reyes’ inconsistent statements fail to conclusively establish that the crew was not using the pipe. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 517. 2. NEXUS AND PROXIMATE CAUSE The City argues that the pleadings and evidence conclusively establish that there is no nexus between the City’s use of the water pipe and Del Carmen Lara’s damage or injury. The City argues water pressure caused the pipe to roll into the street out of the crew’s control, and that it was Del Carmen’s failure to heed the crew’s warnings that caused her injury, not the presence of the pipe in the street. We disagree. A use of property that merely furnishes the condition making the injury possible is insufficient; the use must actually cause the injury. Val Verde Hosp. Dist., 708 S.W.3d at 762; Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 588; see also McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 517. Proximate cause has two components: cause in fact and foreseeability. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 518; City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. 2016). At this stage, we determine only whether the evidence raises a fact question regarding the causal relationship between the use of the property and the resulting injury. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 518; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Tex. 2015). Water pressure was a foreseeable consequence of the wastewater repair work the crew was performing that day, and the evidence shows that the waterpipe moved into the roadway because of pressure in the line while the crew was actively performing the wastewater repair. On this record, the City’s evidence does not conclusively establish that the pressure-related movement of the pipe -5- 04-26-00243-CV was independent of the crew’s use of the pipe. The City claims that the wastewater crew warned Del Carmen Lara not to proceed. However, Mr. Reyes’ affidavit is not consistent with the statement he made to the City risk management division. In his affidavit, Mr. Reyes states that crewmembers flagged motorists to stop. The affidavit does not clarify if Del Carmen Lara was one of the motorists flagged to stop. By contrast, in the statement Mr. Reyes made to the risk management division two years earlier, he states that a group of people behind Del Carmen Lara’s vehicle signaled for motorists to stop. At a minimum, the City’s conflicting evidence leaves a fact question regarding the causal relationship between the City’s use of the property and Appellee’s resulting injuries. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 447–48; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28; Fossil Grp., 691 S.W.3d at 882. The foreseeable effect of the water pressure on the pipe, together with the City’s conflicting evidence, therefore, raises a fact question as to whether the crew’s use of the pipe bore the required causal connection to Appellee’s injury. CONCLUSION After reviewing the pleadings and the evidence, we hold that a genuine issue of material fact regarding jurisdiction remains. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. Lori Massey Brissette, Justice -6-