Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 01, 2026 In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-26-00106-CV KEN PAXTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS AND THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant V. DELIA GARZA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY, ET AL.; JOHN CREUZOT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DALLAS COUNTY CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ET AL.; AND BRIAN MIDDLETON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF FORT BEND COUNTY (268TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT), ET AL., Appellees On Appeal from the 419th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-25-003445 MEMORANDUM OPINION Nine months ago, we issued an opinion concluding the Attorney General lacked rule-making authority to promulgate rules contained within Chapter 56 of Title 1 of the Texas Administrative Code and in part affirmed a temporary injunction barring enforcement of the rules against the named parties. Paxton v. Garza, 729 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.);1 see 1 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 56.1–.10 (the Rules). The Rules require local prosecutors in Texas’s most populated counties to prepare and produce reports containing multiple categories of information regarding criminal matters. 1 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 56.1–.10. For the reasons explained in our prior opinion, we now affirm the trial court’s final summary judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief. On remand, both the Attorney General and the Appellees—consisting of district and county attorneys from Travis, El Paso, Dallas, Bexar, Harris, Fort Bend, and Williamson counties—filed cross motions for traditional summary judgment. The Appellees contended they were entitled to summary judgment on their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on multiple grounds. Primarily, the Appellees contended that the Rules were invalid pursuant to our prior holding that the Attorney General promulgated the rules without rule-making authority. The trial court granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied the Attorney General’s motion. The trial court’s order granting the summary judgment declared the Rules invalid and the promulgation of the rules ultra vires 1 The Attorney General sought review with the Texas Supreme Court of our ruling on the temporary injunction. After the trial court in this case granted the permanent injunction, the Texas Supreme Court—without considering the merits of the case—granted the petition for review; vacated our prior judgment; and dismissed the petition for review as moot. Paxton v. Garza, No. 26-0110 (Tex. May 29, 2026). The Court did not vacate our prior opinion. Id.; see also Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 790–91 (Tex. 2020) (“Texas practice contemplates that a court of appeals’ judgment may be vacated without also vacating the corresponding opinion . . . [F]uture litigants and courts are free to consult a vacated opinion and to rely on it if they find it persuasive. In vacating the court of appeals’ opinion without respect to the merits, we make no comment on its correctness.”). 2 acts. The order further permanently enjoined the Attorney General from enforcing the rules against the Appellees. The Attorney General again appeals to this Court; however, both parties agree that the issues raised in the present appeal are the same as those previously addressed in the prior appeal of the temporary injunction. The parties also agree that our previous ruling is dispositive of the current appeal. As such, the Appellees have moved for summary affirmance requesting the Court issue—without the parties submitting briefing—a short memorandum opinion affirming the trial court for the reasons stated in our prior opinion. The Attorney General responds that he appeals to preserve error but has no new arguments for this Court’s consideration that were not already resolved in the prior appeal. As such, the Attorney General also agrees that further briefing is unnecessary for resolution of the appeal. Because the facts are well known to the parties and the issues of law have already been determined by this Court, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. In promulgating the Rules, the Attorney General relied solely on Section 41.006 of the Texas Government Code, which provides: At the times and in the form that the attorney general directs, the district and county attorneys shall report to the attorney general the information from their districts and counties that the attorney general desires relating to criminal matters and the interests of the state. 3 In our prior opinion, we concluded that Section 41.006 of the Texas Government Code does not confer either express or implied rule-making authority on the Attorney General and that implementation of the Rules would cause the Appellees irreparable and imminent harm without adequate remedy. 2 Garza, 729 S.W.3d at 488–493. As such, for the reasons stated in our prior opinion, we hold the trial court properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law declaring the Rules invalid and granting the Appellees injunctive relief. See id.; see also Eriksen v. Nelson, 708 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, no pet.) (“[W]hen an appellate court remands a case for further trial court proceedings, the issues decided on appeal will be regarded as the law of the case and thus govern the case throughout its subsequent stages.”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The temporary administrative stay issued on June 22, 2026, is lifted and all pending motions are dismissed as moot. /s/ Scott K. Field Scott K. Field Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. 2 This appeal concerns only whether the Attorney General had authority to promulgate the Rules at issue, not whether the Attorney General has authority to obtain information on criminal matters from local district attorneys on an ad hoc basis. 4