Full Opinion

Affirmed; Memorandum Opinion filed October 13, 2026. In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00045-CV IN THE INTEREST OF I.C.S., A CHILD On Appeal from the 256th District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-24-07441 MEMORANDUM OPINION Nanyamka Sims, mother of I.C.S., appeals a final order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR). Sims and I.C.S.’s father, Kai Clark, represented themselves at trial and now again in this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s final order. BACKGROUND I.C.S. was born in June 2023, and in May 2024, Clark filed this SAPCR. The suit included a request that the child’s surname be changed from Sims to Clark. In October 2024, the parties signed a partial Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA). See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071. The parties also signed a Subsequent Agreement, an addendum to the partial MSA. The Subsequent Agreement, signed four days after the MSA, contained additional agreed-to terms concerning the parties’ possession rights during certain holidays. Both the MSA and Subsequent Agreement were filed with the district clerk. At trial, the court took judicial notice of the parties’ partial agreement, and the parents informed the court that they had not reached an agreement as to the child’s last name. Both Sims and Clark testified, and the trial judge asked them questions. The parties offered no additional evidence. Based on the MSA and the parties’ testimony at trial, the district court rendered a final order, which, among other things, granted the name change requested by Clark. Sims appealed.1 ANALYSIS Sims raises twelve issues on appeal, which can be grouped together for purposes of our analysis as follows: (1) the name change is improper; (2) the restriction on her mother’s involvement in custody exchanges of possession is improper; (3) the restriction on the location of the custody exchanges is unreasonable; (4) the trial court failed to consider evidence of father’s behavior and motions filed by Sims; (5) the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law or otherwise justify the final order; (6) the trial court failed to incorporate the parties’ subsequent agreement into its final order; and (7) the trial court asked Sims vague questions that violated her due process rights. We will address each issue in turn. 1 After he failed to file a brief, we notified Clark by letter that the appeal would be considered on Sims’s brief alone. 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW In general, we review a trial court’s decisions in a SAPCR—including decisions on custody, visitation, and name-change requests—under an abuse of discretion standard. 2 See In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (“Most appealable issues in a family law case . . . are evaluated under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”); In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d 719, 723–27 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (decision on name change); Bennett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703, 706–08 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1976, no writ) (per curiam). The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of this Court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s actions. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985). Rather, a trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. at 241–42; In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d at 95. In family law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard of review overlaps the traditional sufficiency standard of review. In re K.L.M., No. 05-25-00829-CV, 2026 WL 1149319, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). As a result, legal insufficiency is not an independent ground of error, but rather a relevant factor in assessing whether a trial court abused its discretion. Id. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is insufficient to support its decision, we consider whether the trial court (1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its exercise of that discretion. Id. We conduct the applicable sufficiency review when considering the first prong 2 The Court received this appeal as part of a transfer order from the Supreme Court for docket equalization. Transfer of Cases from Courts of Appeals, Misc. Docket No. 25-9016 (Tex. Apr. 2, 2025); see Tex. Gov’t Code § 73.001. As a result, this Court is required to apply precedent from the court from which this case was transferred, the Fifth Court of Appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3; Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 255-56 (Tex. 2022). 3 of the test. Id. We then determine whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id. Name Change We first consider Sims’ complaint that the trial court’s decision to grant Clark’s request to change I.C.S.’s surname was improper. A party seeking a name change for a minor child must show both “good cause” for the name change and “how the change of name would be in the child’s best interest.” Id. “Good cause” in this context means a “legally sufficient reason.” Id. The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child. Id. “A parent’s interest and desire is only a secondary consideration.” In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 724. Therefore, we consider the factors that address the best interest of the child, not the needs of a particular parent, or customs or traditions. Id. at 725. The factors we may consider include (1) whether the changed name or present name would best avoid embarrassment, inconvenience, or confusion for the custodial parent or the child; (2) whether it would be more convenient or easier for the child to have the same name as or a different name from the custodial parent, either the changed name or the present name; (3) whether the changed name or the present name would help identify the child as part of a family unit; (4) the length of time the surname has been used; (5) parental misconduct, such as support or nonsupport or maintaining or failing to maintain contact with the child; (6) the degree of community respect associated with the present or changed name; (7) whether the change will positively or adversely affect the bond between the child and either parent or the parents’ families; (8) any delay in requesting or objecting to name change; (9) the preferences of the child; (10) the age and maturity of the child; (11) when the child maintains the mother’s surname, assurances by the mother that 4 she would not change her name if she married or remarried; and (12) whether the parent seeking the change is motivated by an attempt to alienate the child from the other parent. Id. The determination of the child’s best interest in a name change is fact specific. See id. (citing Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1968) (court considers facts and circumstances of case in deciding best interest of child)). When, as in this case, the trial court does not issue findings of facts and conclusions of law in support of its decision to grant a name change, all facts necessary to support the judgment— including findings of good cause and best interest of the child—will be supplied by presumption, if supported by the evidence. In re K.L.M., 2026 WL 1149319, at *2; see Ad Villarai, LLC v. Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (“If the court fails to file findings in response to a proper and timely request, the court of appeals must presume that trial court made all findings necessary to support the judgment.”). At the time of trial, I.C.S was 18 months old, so the child had no preferences, the surname Sims had not been used for long, and changing the name would not create confusion. Sims testified that the relationship between Clark and the child was a “good” one. Although she testified that Clark had missed some possession time with I.C.S. and some medical appointments, Sims explained that her primary reason for opposing the name change was personal—she was concerned that having I.C.S. carry Clark’s last name would signify to the world that she had a child out of wedlock. Clark, on the other hand, wished for his son to carry his name to solidify the bond between father and child. That is the extent of the evidence before the trial court on this issue. Based on the evidence before the trial court, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the request to change the child’s surname to 5 Clark from Sims. The identification of the child as part of a family unit, and the positive effect on the father’s bond to the child weigh in favor of the name change. Because the child was only 18 months old at the time of trial, the child had used the surname Sims for a relatively short time. There was no evidence that the child was identified by his current surname in the community. Moreover, Clark’s testimony indicated that his reason for requesting the name change was the interest of the child and familial bonds, whereas Sims’s reason for opposing it was purely to protect her personal reputation. These facts were not outweighed by Sims’s testimony that Clark had missed some possession time and medical appointments, particularly since Sims admitted that he had a good relationship with I.C.S. See In re A.V., No. 05-20-00966- CV, 2022 WL 2763355, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”). The evidence in favor of the name change is not significant, but under the appropriate standard of review and the presumption in support of the trial court’s judgment, it is sufficient. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the child’s surname changed to Clark. We overrule appellant’s first issue. Possession Exchanges Sims also faults the trial court for restricting her mother from participating in exchanges of possession and for restricting the location of the exchanges to the “Dallas Southwest Patrol Division.” As to the trial court’s decision to restrict Sims’s mother, Clark testified that he previously filed assault charges against Sims’s mother, which were ultimately dismissed, and that although he now gets along with her, he would rather not have her involved in exchanges. Sims responded that it would help her to have her mother 6 involved in case Sims is unavailable for an exchange. The trial court nevertheless restricted Sims’s mother from participating in exchanges due to Clark’s past allegations and his discomfort with her involvement in the exchanges. As to the location, the trial court heard testimony that the parties, by agreement, had been conducting the possession exchanges at a particular police station. In the associate judge’s temporary orders, the location was referred to as the “Dallas Southwest Patrol Division.” Clark testified that the location was generally working, given the history of hostilities between him and Sims’s mother, even though the station was closer to Sims’s home. Sims did not present any evidence suggesting that the location imposed an unreasonable burden on her or that an alternative location would be better for the child. The Mediated Settlement Agreement did not designate a particular exchange location. The trial court heard both parties’ arguments and their evidence, and we cannot conclude that it abused its discretion in excluding Sims’s mother from possession exchanges. Similarly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in designated the Dallas Southwest Patrol Division as the location for custody exchanges. That is, the trial court had sufficient evidence to exercise its discretion and did not err in its exercise of that discretion. See In re K.L.M., 2026 WL 1149319, at *2. We overrule appellant’s second and sixth issues on appeal. Failure to Consider Clark’s Behavior and Other Filings Sims also complains that the trial court failed to consider evidence of Clark’s bad behavior, including, among other things, his alleged hostility and his failure to fulfill medical responsibilities toward I.C.S. and to adhere to possession schedules. But the record contains no evidence that the trial court failed to consider Sims’s 7 testimony concerning those issues. To the contrary, Sims testified concerning Clark’s failure to participate in medical appointments and a surgery for I.C.S. and concerning Clark’s failure to exercise possession of I.C.S. as scheduled. Although the trial court may not have given the weight to this evidence that Sims believes it should have, see In re A.V., 2022 WL 2763355, at *3, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the trial court failed to consider it. 3 Sims also raises a complaint regarding the trial court’s alleged failure to consider her Final Order Request, Motion To Include Prior Case Information, and other unidentified pending motions. Yet Sims fails to point out how she presented these requests and motions to the trial court, other than by filing them; how or when the trial court refused to rule on them; and whether she objected to the trial court’s refusal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(B) (to preserve error, record must show that complaint was made to trial court and, if court refuses to rule, that complaining party objected to refusal). Moreover, Sims fails to explain how she was harmed by the trial court’s alleged failure to consider her motions. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (harmful error). We overrule the issues Sims raises concerning the trial court’s alleged failure to consider evidence concerning Clark’s behavior and other motions and filings— issues three, four, five, seven, ten, and twelve. 3 In some of Sims’s issues, she alludes to a material change in circumstances. It is unclear whether Sims argues that material changes in circumstances caused the trial court to rule incorrectly or if she contends there has been a material change in circumstances since the trial court’s final order. Either way, this Court is not a proper venue for deciding such issues. To the extent there are material circumstances that have changed since the trial court’s final order, that is an issue Sims can raise at the appropriate time in the trial court in seeking modification of the trial court’s order. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.101. 8 Waiver of Remaining Complaints Parties who represent themselves are held to the same standard as a party represented by counsel. Guillaume v. EKRE of TX, LLC, No. 05-24-00316, 2025 WL 2694461, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sep. 17, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, to preserve her complaints for appeal, Sims had to raise them in a timely manner at the trial court and provide the trial court with the opportunity to rule on them. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 880 (Tex. 2014); In re Purported Lien or Claim Against Collin Taylor, 219 S.W.3d 620, 623 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). From the record before us, we conclude that Sims failed to raise the remainder of her issues with the trial court in a manner that preserves her right to raise them on appeal. First, Sims contends the trial court did not adequately explain its ruling and failed to make required findings. Sims requested findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court , see Tex. R. Civ. P. 296, but she failed to file a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 297. A party waives its right to challenge a trial court’s failure to file findings if it does not file a notice of past due findings as Rule 297 requires. Ad Villarai, LLC, 519 S.W.3d at 137. Because Sims did not comply with Rule 297, she has failed to preserve error on this complaint. We overrule appellant’s issue nine. Next, Sims argues that the trial court erred by failing to include parties’ agreement concerning holiday visitation in its final order. If a mediated settlement agreement meets the statutory requirements, a party is entitled to judgment on the MSA, and the trial court does not have discretion to decline to enter judgment on or deviate from the MSA. In re M.L.R., No. 05-15-00647-CV, 2016 WL 5791530, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(d). Despite this statutory mandate, however, rules governing 9 preservation apply to a complaint that a divorce decree deviates from a mediated settlement agreement. In re M.L.R., 2016 WL 5791530, at *4. Thus, a party complaining that a final order deviates from the terms of a mediated settlement agreement must inform the trial court of its objection to the final order in a timely filed motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment, a motion for new trial, or some other similar method. Id. Here, the record shows that Sims never filed a post- judgment motion objecting to the trial court’s deviation from the parties’ agreement concerning holiday visitation. Consequently, Sims failed to preserve error on this complaint. We overrule issue eight. Finally, Sims contends she was prejudiced by the trial court’s vague questions of her, raising due process concerns. But she fails to point out any objections to the trial court’s questions or which questions in the record she claims were vague. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). At trial, Sims asked if she could finish her response to a question, and the trial court refused her request, but that exchange shows no lack of understanding by Sims of the trial court’s questions. As such, Sims has waived error on this issue. We overrule issue eleven. CONCLUSION Having overruled Sims’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s final order. /s/ Scott K. Field Scott K. Field Justice Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. 10