Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 16, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00997-CR ——————————— JAMES REID SHARPLESS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 178th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1825879 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted James Reid Sharpless of indecency with a child by contact. Because Sharpless has previously been placed on deferred adjudication for indecency with a child, the trial court assessed Sharpless’s punishment at confinement for life.1 Sharpless raises four issues on appeal. In his first two related issues, he argues that the trial court’s statement during voir dire that an accused is “presumed to be innocent until guilt is established” violated Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.05, deprived him of due process and an impartial judge, and vitiated the presumption of innocence. In his third issue, he complains that the complainant’s mother was not the appropriate outcry witness because the child had first reported the sexual abuse to her grandmother. Finally, his fourth issue advances a complaint that the trial court erred by assessing a $100 fine because that fine was not orally pronounced at sentencing. We modify the judgment of conviction and affirm as modified. Background Sharpless and his wife Francis have several granddaughters, including complainant A.S. (Andrea) and her cousin A.G. (Amanda).2 Andrea and Amanda 1 Ordinarily, indecency with a child by contact is a second-degree felony with a punishment range of 2 to 20 years’ confinement. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1), (d); id. § 12.33(a). However, if a defendant convicted of this offense has a previous conviction for indecency with a child, the defendant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Id. § 12.42(c)(2). A defendant has been “previously convicted” for purposes of this section if he entered a guilty plea in return for a grant of deferred adjudication. Id. § 12.42(g)(1). 2 In this opinion we use pseudonyms for the child complainant, her mother, and her cousins to protect their privacy. 2 were both seven years old at the time of the incident leading to this proceeding, and they were ten years old at the time of trial. On Thanksgiving Day 2021, Andrea’s mother S.M. (Sandra) took her to Sharpless’s house to celebrate the holiday with extended family. After dinner, Andrea went home with Amanda’s family and spent the night at their house. On Friday night, Andrea called Sandra, begging Sandra to pick her up. Because of the late hour, Sandra told Andrea that she would pick her up early the next morning instead. When Sandra arrived at Amanda’s house on Saturday morning, both Andrea and Amanda were acting strangely. The girls “were very, like, close with each other,” and they both repeatedly pleaded for Sandra to allow Amanda to go home with them. Neither Sandra nor Amanda’s mother agreed to this, and Sandra left the house with Andrea. As soon as they got in Sandra’s car, Andrea disclosed that the girls had gone back to their grandparents’ house so they could go swimming, and while they were there Sharpless had “tickled her private.” Andrea related the sequence of events to Sandra: She said that they went to the grandparents’ house to go swimming. They were in the hot tub. Mr. Sharpless was in the hot tub with them. He had grabbed [Amanda] and was, like, holding her down in his lap. And [Andrea] got uncomfortable and tried to get—well, she went to get out to go to the big pool and was trying to get [Amanda] to go with her, and was like, “Come on” . . . So [Amanda] wasn’t able to get out of the 3 pool because Mr. Sharpless was holding her in his lap. So [Andrea] got back in the pool because she didn’t want [Amanda] to be by herself. . . . He touched them inappropriately. When Sandra asked for clarification concerning how Sharpless touched her, Andrea “grabbed her hand and rubbed it on her vaginal area.” Sandra returned to Amanda’s house and informed Amanda’s mother of what Andrea had disclosed. Amanda confirmed Andrea’s account, disclosing that Sharpless had touched them both inappropriately. Amanda’s mother—Sharpless’s daughter—called Francis to discuss the allegations. When Francis arrived at the house, she immediately said, “I know what happened” and “it’s not a big deal.” Francis unsuccessfully attempted to convince Sandra not to call the police, and she also offered to pay for therapy for Andrea. Andrea, Amanda, and Francis all testified. Andrea and Amanda testified consistently with Sandra’s testimony concerning Andrea’s outcry: they both testified that they were wearing their bathing suits while in the hot tub with Sharpless, and he touched both of them on their vaginas. The girls also agreed that they first told Francis about what had happened. Francis testified that she was indoors and could hear yelling. When asked if the girls told her “about what occurred that day,” she first stated, “No, not that I recall.” She later testified that the girls “told [her] they were touched” and that “[i]t was Grandad because he was in the pool,” but she did not remember “when and how that occurred.” 4 Sharpless’s adult granddaughter S.G. (Sonya) also testified. She testified that Sharpless began touching her inappropriately when she was six years old. She described several specific instances of sexual abuse, including an incident that occurred in a swimming pool when she was seven years old, the same age that Andrea and Amanda were when Sharpless touched them in the hot tub. The misconduct against Sonya led to a charge of indecency with a child. Sharpless pleaded guilty to that offense in 2011 and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for five years. The jury found Sharpless guilty of committing indecency with a child against Andrea. This appeal followed. Judge’s Comments During Voir Dire Sharpless’s first and second issues both complain about the trial judge’s statement during voir dire that “[t]he defendant is presumed to be innocent until guilt is established.” He contends that use of until rather than unless improperly conveyed the judge’s opinion of the case, deprived him of due process and an impartial judge, and vitiated the presumption of innocence. We address these two related issues together. A. Governing Law on Judge’s Comments During Trial “The trial judge shall maintain an attitude of impartiality throughout the trial.” Ex parte Scott, 541 S.W.3d 104, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). 5 Before the return of the verdict, the judge shall not “make any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.05; Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (article 38.05 reflects “a devotion within the Texas adversarial system to the proposition that the judge is a neutral arbiter between the advocates” (quotation omitted)). This prohibition exists because “[j]urors are prone to seize with alacrity upon any conduct or language of the trial judge which they may interpret as shedding light upon his view of the weight of the evidence, or the merits of the issues involved.” Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quotation omitted). For a comment to be reversible error under article 38.05, the comment must be reasonably calculated to benefit the State or prejudice the defendant’s rights. Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 791; Joung Youn Kim v. State, 331 S.W.3d 156, 161 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“‘Reasonably calculated’ implies that the jury understands the comment to either endorse the State’s position or undercut appellant’s arguments.”). To be harmful, the comment must have affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). Although Texas statutory law “severely limits what a trial judge may say in front of the jury,” federal due process protections do not go as far and do not prohibit trial courts from summing up or commenting on the evidence. Rodriguez v. State, 6 728 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, pet. ref’d). But due process does place some limits: Judicial comments that convey bias regarding a defendant’s guilt and cause “serious prejudice” violate a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. Id. at 234–35. A trial court’s comments become improper for due process purposes when the court “takes on a role not permitted to a judge at common law—such as witness— or when the trial court takes on a permitted role—such as commenting on evidence— in a manner that shows partiality.” Id. at 237. We must evaluate the comments in the context of the course of the trial. Id. When viewed as a whole, the comments must have “amounted to an intervention that could have led the jury to a predisposition of guilt by improperly confusing the function of judge and prosecutor” to rise to the level of constitutional error. Id. (quoting United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413– 14 (5th Cir. 1998)). To demonstrate “serious prejudice,” there must be a showing of “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the verdict would have been different.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2014)). Context is important in assessing harm: we should consider isolated incidents in light of the entire record to avoid magnifying on appeal incidents “which were of little importance in their setting,” but if trial court intervened multiple times, this might “produce a cumulative effect greater than any individual comment would suggest.” Id. at 237–38 (quoting Rivera-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d at 113). 7 Finally, the U.S. Constitution also “prohibits a trial judge from making a comment in front of the jury that effectively destroys a defendant’s constitutional presumption of innocence.” Irsan, 708 S.W.3d at 607 (quotation and brackets omitted). The analysis for this claimed violation mirrors the analysis under article 38.05. See id. (“For all of the reasons the trial judge’s comment cannot be said to have affected Appellant’s substantial right to a presumption of innocence, it cannot be said to have ‘effectively destroyed’ that presumption.”). Relevant considerations include the brevity of the statement, whether the court emphasizes the importance of the presumption of innocence, and, if the comment occurs during voir dire, whether any veniremembers indicate that they cannot give the defendant the presumption of innocence. Id.; Rodriguez, 728 S.W.3d at 238. B. The Trial Judge’s Comment Did Not Convey Her Opinion of the Case, Deprive Sharpless of Due Process, or Vitiate the Presumption of Innocence During the trial court’s portion of voir dire, the trial judge explained that the prospective jurors would hear the court and the attorneys refer to “elements” of the offense, which the judge likened to ingredients of a recipe. Elements “combine to equal a criminal offense” and “are the things the State must prove.” The State “must prove every one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you to return a verdict of guilty.” If the State “fails to prove one of the elements or ingredients of the offense, then they have nothing.” And if the jury “find[s] that they 8 have not proved one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you acquit the defendant.” The judge then stated that the State had charged Sharpless with indecency with a child by contact, and she informed the prospective jurors of the elements of that offense. The judge continued and mentioned the presumption of innocence, although her wording drew an objection from defense counsel: The Court: The State is going to have to prove every one of those elements, or ingredients, for this offense. The burden of proof in this case, and really every criminal case, rests solely on the State throughout the trial and never shifts to the defendant. The State must prove each and every element of the offense charged, the ingredients, beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is presumed to be innocent until guilt is established by legal evidence received before you in the trial of this case beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense: Your Honor, I apologize for interrupting the Court. I just object to the use of the word “until” because it presumes that my client’s guilt would be established. I would say that “unless” would be the more appropriate word. The Court: I think they are both used. The Court also instructs the jury that it would be unless or until guilt is established by legal evidence received before you in the trial in the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge then informed the prospective jurors that “the presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant.” She explained the importance of this presumption: 9 That’s why you must listen very carefully to the evidence. As the defendant sits here today, he is—he is innocent. We must presume him innocent. That’s the law. If you were sitting here on trial, you would be presumed innocent. If I was sitting there on trial, I would be presumed innocent. That’s a protection for all of us. It’s a Constitutional right, and we have to respect that. It’s very important and central to our idea of justice. So sitting here right now, could everybody maintain the presumption of innocence? Remember, in order to go from a presumption of innocence to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you have to hear— anybody remember? Evidence, right? Have you heard any evidence? No. Are you going to hear any evidence today? No. The judge concluded her portion of voir dire by informing the prospective jurors of the defendant’s right not to testify and reminding the panel that the defendant “is not required to prove himself or herself to be innocent.” On appeal, Sharpless complains that the trial judge’s use of the word until— “The defendant is presumed to be innocent until guilt is established by legal evidence received before you in the trial of this case beyond a reasonable doubt”—conveyed the judge’s opinion that Sharpless was guilty, deprived him of due process, denied him an impartial judge, and vitiated his presumption of innocence. He points out that the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure both phrase the presumption as applying to prohibit conviction unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial judge should have used this phrasing instead. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 2.01; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.03. He argues that use of 10 the word “until” conveyed the judge’s opinion that Sharpless’s guilt would be established and a guilty verdict was a foregone conclusion. We do not agree. As the State points out, the trial judge was correct when, in response to defense counsel’s objection, she stated that both “unless” and “until” are used when describing the presumption of innocence. Courts from the United States Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals to this Court have all used “until” when stating the presumption. See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005) (“First, the criminal process presumes that the defendant is innocent until proved guilty.”); Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“As a result, an alibi is sufficiently embraced in a general charge to the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent until he or she is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Wiseman v. State, 223 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (quoting Deck). Furthermore, the trial judge’s comment must be considered in context.3 The trial judge repeatedly informed the prospective jurors that the State had to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction. Much like how the failure to add chocolate chips to cookie dough meant no chocolate chip 3 We note that the trial judge’s instruction on the presumption of innocence in the written jury charge tracked the statutory language: “The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge. All persons are presumed to be innocent, and no person may be convicted of an offense unless the state proves each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .” 11 cookies (to use the judge’s analogy), the State’s failure to prove an element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt meant no conviction: “If you find that they have not proved one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you acquit the defendant.” The judge also emphasized that the burden of proof rested on the State and never shifted to Sharpless, who was not required to prove himself innocent. The judge further stated that the presumption of innocence alone was sufficient to acquit a defendant. As Sharpless “sits here today, he is—he is innocent. We must presume him innocent.” The judge reminded the prospective jurors that evidence is necessary “to go from a presumption of innocence to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and the panel had not yet heard any evidence.4 When considering the context of the trial judge’s statements, we conclude that the judge’s use of “until” rather than “unless” did not improperly convey the judge’s opinion of the case and therefore did not violate article 38.05.5 We further conclude 4 During defense counsel’s portion of voir dire, the trial judge returned to this topic: “I want to make sure that every juror understands that the presumption of innocence is just the baseline before you hear any evidence. If you hear evidence that supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you would find the defendant guilty. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence controls; do you understand that?” After an exchange with a prospective juror who stated that they believed Sharpless was “not innocent right now without hearing any evidence,” the judge reiterated the role of evidence: “You don’t have anything to base that on except for the indictment, and we talked about the indictment being no evidence of guilt, right? . . . [Y]ou have to have evidence in order to move off of the presumption of innocence.” 5 We also note that a panel of this Court previously reached this same conclusion in an unpublished memorandum opinion. See Randolph v. State, No. 01-08-00266-CR, 2008 WL 5178860, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 11, 2008, no pet.) 12 that the comment did not show partiality on the part of the trial judge such that the comment improperly deprived Sharpless of due process. Finally, we conclude that the comment did not “effectively destroy” Sharpless’s presumption of innocence, especially in light of the judge’s emphasis that Sharpless was presumed innocent as he “sits here today” and the prospective jurors had not yet heard any evidence. We hold that the trial judge did not err by using “until” rather than “unless” when describing the presumption of innocence. Proper Outcry Witness In his third issue, Sharpless argues that Sandra—Andrea’s mother, who testified as the outcry witness—acknowledged that Andrea first told her grandmother Francis that Sharpless had touched her inappropriately. He therefore contends that Sandra was not the appropriate outcry witness; rather, Francis was. A. Requirements for Determining Appropriate Outcry Witness Generally, an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is inadmissible hearsay. TEX. R. EVID. 801, 802. But Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 creates an exception for outcry statements made by child complainants in a prosecution for sexual offenses against children. TEX. CODE CRIM. (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Here, nothing in the record indicates that the venire meaningfully distinguished ‘unless’ from ‘until’ in the context in which the trial court used it during voir dire such that the use of ‘until’ negatively affected Randolph’s presumption of innocence.”). 13 PROC. art. 38.072, § 1; Bays v. State, 396 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). An outcry witness may permissibly testify to a statement by the child that describes the alleged offense if the witness is “the first person, 18 years of age or older, other than the defendant, to whom the child . . . made a statement about the offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072, § 2(a). To qualify as an outcry statement, the child’s disclosure “must include more than a ‘general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was going on.’” Perez v. State, 695 S.W.3d 843, 848–49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. ref’d) (quoting Buentello v. State, 512 S.W.3d 508, 517 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d)). The disclosure must “in some discernible manner describe[] the alleged offense.” Buentello, 512 S.W.3d at 517 (quoting Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). “This furthers the societal interest in curbing child abuse by preventing the designation of a person who only received a vague suggestion of abuse over a later-in-time person who received a more detailed account of sexual abuse.” Id.; see Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91 (“[T]he societal interest in curbing child abuse would hardly be served if all that ‘first person’ had to testify to was a general allegation from the child that something in the area of child abuse was going on at home.”). For an outcry statement to be admissible, the trial court must hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury and determine “that the statement is reliable based 14 on the time, content, and circumstances of the statement.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072, § 2(b)(2). The trial court has “broad discretion” in determining the admissibility of outcry testimony. Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 92; Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 894 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (“A trial court’s designation of an outcry witness will be upheld when supported by the evidence.”). When a defendant challenges the State’s choice of outcry witness by arguing that a different witness was the first person to whom the child made a statement, the defendant bears the burden to establish that witness was the appropriate outcry witness. Buentello, 512 S.W.3d at 517; see Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91–92 (upholding trial court’s designation of CPS specialist as outcry witness rather than child’s teacher and noting that defense counsel did not recall teacher in attempt to establish her as proper outcry witness, nor did counsel elicit testimony from child concerning specifics of statement made to teacher). B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining Sandra Was the Appropriate Outcry Witness During the outcry witness hearing, Sandra testified that she is Andrea’s mother. Over the Thanksgiving holiday in 2021, she picked Andrea up from her aunt’s house. As soon as Andrea got in Sandra’s car, she made a statement about being sexually abused. Specifically, she told Sandra that Sharpless “tickled her private area.” Andrea told Sandra “the whole story from start to finish”: 15 She told me that she was in the pool with her cousin, and [Sharpless] had put her cousin, [Amanda], on his lap. And [Andrea] got uncomfortable and tried to get out of the pool to go to—or the hot tub to go to the big pool. And—hmm—she was, like, trying to get [Amanda] to go with her. And Mr. Sharpless was holding [Amanda] and would not let her leave. So [Andrea] got back into the pool where he touched her private. Andrea then told Sandra that after she and Amanda got out of the pool, “they went and told their grandmother,” Francis. Andrea told Sandra that she “told [Francis] what happened, but she didn’t go into detail what she said to her. She just said she told her grandmother—or they told the grandmother.” On cross-examination, Sandra again agreed that Andrea said that she first told Francis about the incident. The State argued that Sandra was the appropriate outcry witness because Andrea “did go into detail that went into an actual offense” when she spoke with Sandra. By contrast, when Andrea and Amanda told Francis, they “only told Francis that they were touched, but they didn’t go into any details about where they were touched or any details alleging any offense.” Defense counsel, on the other hand, argued that Francis was the appropriate outcry witness, noting that Sandra confirmed on both direct and cross-examination that Andrea had spoken to Francis about the offense first. Defense counsel did not call any witnesses during the outcry witness hearing—such as Andrea, Amanda, or Francis—to testify to what the girls told Francis about the offense. 16 In rejecting defense counsel’s argument that Francis was the appropriate outcry witness, the trial court reasoned that “[t]here’s a difference, though, in knowing something happened and knowing the details that were expressed in [Sandra’s] statement.” The court overruled Sharpless’s objection and permitted Sandra to testify as the outcry witness. We conclude that on the record before it, the trial court did not abuse its “broad discretion” in determining that Sandra was the appropriate outcry witness. 6 See Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 92. Although Sandra acknowledged that Andrea and Amanda told Francis “what happened,” the trial court had no further information concerning what the girls told Francis. The court did not know whether the girls told Francis enough details to “describe the alleged offense” or whether they merely told her that Sharpless “touched them.” In the absence of more specific information about what Andrea told Francis, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that Andrea told Francis only a “general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was 6 We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling in light of what was before the trial court at the time of the ruling. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Petriciolet v. State, 442 S.W.3d 643, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). We note, however, that Francis’s later testimony supported the trial court’s outcry witness ruling. When asked whether Andrea and Amanda told her “about what occurred that day,” Francis first answered, “No, not that I recall.” Shortly thereafter, when asked whether she remembered “that day of any disclosures of sexual abuse,” she responded that the girls “told me they were touched” and that they said “[i]t was Grandad because he was in the pool.” She agreed with the prosecutor that she did not remember “when and how that occurred.” She provided no further details about any disclosures of sexual abuse. 17 going on,” but she told Sandra more specific information that “in some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.” See id. at 91; Bargas, 252 S.W.3d at 894–95 (concluding that forensic interviewer, not child’s grandmother, was appropriate outcry witness because child’s statements to grandmother “were no more than a general allusion that abuse had occurred,” while child went into detail during later forensic interview); Schuster v. State, 852 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d) (concluding that psychologist, rather than child’s mother, was appropriate outcry witness because when child first spoke with mother, she was “so upset” she could not say anything more than defendant “had touched her”). Pronouncement of Fine Finally, Sharpless argues that the trial court erred by imposing a $100 “Child Abuse Prevention” fine in the judgment of conviction without orally pronouncing that fine as part of his sentence. The State concedes that imposition of the fine was erroneous. We agree. The trial court must orally pronounce sentence in the defendant’s presence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.03, § 1(a). When the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment conflict, the oral pronouncement controls. Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“A trial court’s pronouncement of sentence is oral, 18 while the judgment, including the sentence assessed, is merely the written declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement.”). A fine is punitive in nature and is part of a defendant’s sentence. Anastassov v. State, 664 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Because a fine is part of a sentence, it “generally must be orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence.” Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 767. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires a person convicted of indecency with a child to pay a $100 fine on conviction of the offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.0186(a). This fine must be orally pronounced at sentencing to be properly included in the written judgment of conviction. Rodriguez v. State, — S.W.3d —, No. 01-23-00721-CR, 2025 WL 1373693, at *16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 13, 2025, pet. ref’d). The jury found Sharpless guilty of indecency with a child. Under article 102.0186, he was required to pay a $100 fine upon conviction as part of his sentence. However, the trial court did not mention this fine when it orally pronounced Sharpless’s sentence in open court. Because the trial court did not do so, the written judgment of conviction conflicts with the oral pronouncement of sentence, and the court erred in including the fine in the judgment. See id. 19 Conclusion We modify the judgment of conviction to delete the $100 “Child Abuse Prevention” fine and affirm the judgment as modified. David Gunn Justice Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Gunn. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 20