FIMO USA, Inc. v. Gisselle Mabalot, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Juzzel Concepcion, and as Next Friend of S.C. and Z.C., Minors
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket05-26-00142-CV
JudgeGarcia
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 10, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-26-00142-CV
FIMO USA, INC., Appellant
V.
GISSELLE MABALOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JUZZEL CONCEPCION,
DECEASED, AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF S.C. AND Z.C., MINORS,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-10597
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Barbare
Opinion by Justice Garcia
In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, FIMO USA, Inc. (“FIMO”)
challenges the trial court’s denial of its special appearance. In two issues, FIMO
argues the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of general or
specific jurisdiction. As discussed below, we conclude the record supports the
exercise of specific jurisdiction and affirm the trial court’s order denying the special
appearance.
I. BACKGROUND
This products liability case arises from a workplace incident that occurred in
December 2022 during a project to install a communications cable on a 200-foot
tower in Parker County, Texas. A hoist grip, allegedly designed, manufactured,
marketed, and sold by FIMO was being used to install the communications cable on
the tower. When the cable was being lifted for attachment to the top of the tower,
the hoist grip allegedly broke and the cable fell, struck, and killed Juzzel Concepcion
(“Concepcion”).
Giselle Mabalot (“Mabalot”), Concepcion’s wife, sued several defendants
individually, as personal representative of her husband’s estate, and as next of friend
of their surviving children. The wrongful death suit asserts negligence and negligent
product liability, strict product liability, and implied warranty claims against
multiple defendants, including FIMO and Huber Suhner (“HS”).1 HS asserted cross-
claims against FIMO for indemnity.
FIMO filed a special appearance and answer subject to the special appearance.
The special appearance alleged that the court does not have personal jurisdiction
over FIMO because it lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to meet the
1
FIMO sold the hoist grip at issue to HS. HS sold the communications cable and FIMO’s hoist grip to
a Texas distributor, who sold it to Neticom (Concepcion’s employer).
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constitutional due process analysis under either a specific or general jurisdiction
analysis.
The trial court conducted a hearing and denied FIMO’s special appearance.
FIMO requested, but the court did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A nonresident defendant may challenge a Texas court’s personal jurisdiction
over it by filing a special appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. The plaintiff bears the
initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring the nonresident defendant
within the reach of the long-arm statute. LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d
341, 346 (Tex. 2023) (citing Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653,
658 (Tex. 2010)). The defendant then bears the burden to negate all bases of personal
jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Id. The defendant can negate personal
jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis. Id. It can present evidence that
contradicts the plaintiff’s factual allegations supporting the assertion of personal
jurisdiction, and the plaintiff can then respond with its own evidence supporting its
allegations. Id. Or the defendant can show that even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts
are true, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Id.
Although the trial judge acts as the factfinder and must resolve any factual
disputes in the special-appearance evidence, the judge must accept as true any clear,
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direct, and positive evidence presented in an undisputed affidavit. Elecs. Rsch., Inc.
v. Reyna ex rel. J.M.A., No. 05-24-01097-CV, 2025 WL 2076021, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas July 23, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Forever Living Prods.
Int’l, LLC v. AV Eur. GmbH, 638 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no
pet.), and Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Tr., 296 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. 2009)
(discussing circumstances under which evidence must be taken as true as a matter of
law)).
When we review a trial court’s order deciding a special appearance, we
review the trial court’s factual findings, whether express or implied, for legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence. Id. (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v.
Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794–95 (Tex. 2002)). In a legal-sufficiency review, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling and indulge
every reasonable inference that would support it. Id. The evidence is legally
sufficient if it enables reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding in
question. Id. In a factual-sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence and set the
finding aside only if the evidence supporting it is so weak, or the contrary evidence
is so overwhelming, that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Id. (citing Hoss v.
Alardin, 338 S.W.3d 635, 651 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)).
The ultimate question of whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over
a defendant presents a question of law that we review de novo. See BRP-Rotax
GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. 2025) (citing Old Republic
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Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018)). Where the “relevant
facts” are undisputed, “we consider only the legal question [of] whether [those] facts
establish Texas jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 558).
“A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a binding
judgment.” BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 103 (quoting LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346)).
Texas courts, specifically, exercise personal jurisdiction over litigants by reference
to the Texas long-arm statute and federal constitutional due-process guarantees. Id.;
Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 149 (Tex. 2013)). While
“[a]llegations that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute,” those
allegations “must also satisfy due-process requirements.” Id. at 104 (quoting
Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021)).
Our primary concern in personal-jurisdiction cases is “the constitutional right
to due process.” Id. (quoting LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346). As set forth by
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper
where the nonresident defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the forum
state “such that the maintenance of the suit” against it “does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. (citing 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Under the minimum-contacts prong of the analysis, we consider whether a
defendant has established contacts with the state by purposefully availing itself of
the privilege of conducting activities there, thereby invoking the benefits and
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protections of the forum’s laws. Elecs. Rsch., 2025 WL 2076021, at *2. Three
principles guide our purposeful availment analysis: (i) only the defendant’s contacts
with the forum are relevant—not the unilateral activity of another party or a third
person; (ii) the contacts must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or
attenuated; and (iii) the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by
availing itself of the jurisdiction. Id.
There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-
purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” BRP-
Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 104 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021)). In the present case, Mabalot concedes there is no general
jurisdiction. Therefore, our analysis focuses only on specific jurisdiction.
Specific personal jurisdiction, “covers defendants less intimately connected
with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims” than general jurisdiction
would allow. Id. (quoting Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at 359). The evidence must satisfy
a well-established two-prong test. See id. (citing LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 347).
First, the defendant must have taken “some act by which [it] purposefully avail[ed]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Texas], thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958)). Second, the claims must “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s
Texas-focused activities. Id.
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This case involves a foreign manufacturer. “No specific personal jurisdiction
exists over a foreign manufacturer whose product just happens to end up in the forum
state’ via the stream of commerce.” BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 104–05 (internal
punctuation omitted). “A Texas court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction
when the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state and the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to those forum
contacts.” Hyundam Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Swacina, 716 S.W.3d 167, 173 (Tex. 2025)
(cleaned up). There must be a substantial connection between the defendant’s
purposeful contacts with the forum and the operative facts of the litigation. LG
Chem. Am., 670 S.W.3d at 347; see Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221
S.W.3d 569, 585 (Tex. 2007). “[M]ere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient
connection to the forum.” TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 42 (Tex. 2016).
In some products liability cases, Texas courts have adopted the “stream-of-
commerce-plus” standard to establish whether purposeful availment exists. BRP-
Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 105. Under this standard, purposeful availment occurs when
a foreign defendant’s product ends up in Texas via the stream of commerce, the
product causes an injury in Texas, and “there is additional conduct evincing an intent
or purpose to serve the market in Texas.” Id. under the stream-of-commerce-plus
theory, “specific jurisdiction exists if the defendant places goods into the stream of
commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum state.’” Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 577).
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But the “act of placing a product into the stream of commerce does not establish
purposes availment unless there is additional conduct evincing an intent or purpose
to serve the market in Texas.” BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 105; LG Elecs., Inc. v.
Lovers Tradition II, LP, No. 05-19-01304-CV, 2020 WL 4281965, at *12 (Tex.
App.—Dallas July 27, 2020, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.). A defendant’s awareness of
its product’s sale or distribution in Texas, standing alone, does not create minimum
contacts that support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Hyundam Indus. Co., 716
S.W.3d at 173; see also Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 13 (explaining that defendant must
target Texas; “it is not enough that the defendant merely foresees [its] product ending
up there”). Likewise, proof of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts will not
suffice, nor will evidence of a third party’s unilateral activities. Hyundam Indus. Co.,
716 S.W.3d at 173; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575. The proof must show that the
defendant sought “‘some benefit, advantage[,] or profit by availing itself of [Texas]
jurisdiction.’” Hyundam Indus Co., 716 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting Moki Mac, 221
S.W.3d at 575).
Courts have identified several examples of “additional conduct” that meets
this standard. Such conduct includes “designing the product for the market in the
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.” Asahi
Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality
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op.); see also Shaik, 716 S.W.3d at 105 (describing examples of “additional conduct”
to establish purposeful availment); Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 10 (plus-factor conduct
may include “advertising in the forum state, soliciting business through sales
persons, or creating, controlling, or employing the distribution system that brought
the product into the forum state.” (citations omitted)); BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at
105 (creating, controlling, or employing the distribution system that brought the
product into the forum state); Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex.
2010) (listing examples of additional conduct). Similarly, when a foreign defendant
“solicit[s] business and distribute[s] its product in Texas,” it meets the stream-of-
commerce-plus standard. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14. A nonresident defendant does
not need to have officers or employees in Texas—the operation of a sales and
distribution network is sufficient to subject a nonresident to Texas’s jurisdiction. Id.
at 10.
B. Did Mabalot Meet her Initial Burden?
We first examine whether Mabalot pleaded sufficient allegations to bring
FIMO within the reach of the long-arm statute. LG Chem., 670 S.W.3d at 346. The
plaintiff’s minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the
nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed tortious acts in
Texas. Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2021, no pet.) (en banc). Here, Mabalot alleged the trial court had specific
personal jurisdiction over FIMO because it regularly does business in Texas by
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selling and delivering products in Texas. These allegations are sufficient to bring
FIMO within the Texas long-arm statute. See LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346; Polaris
Electronic Co. Ltd. v. Rasberry 353 LLC, No. 05-23-00382-CV, 2025 WL 2495046,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, the
burden shifted to FIMO to negate specific personal jurisdiction by either disproving
Mabalot’s allegations or by showing that her allegations, even if true, were legally
insufficient. See Steward, 633 S.W.3d at 129.
C. Did FIMO Purposefully Avail Itself of the Texas Forum?
FIMO’s special appearance was supported by the affidavit of David Lee
Harris (the “Harris Affidavit”), Country Manager of FIMO USA, Inc. Harris stated
that FIMO is a Georgia corporation registered in both North Carolina and Georgia
with its corporate headquarters in Lawrenceville, Georgia. FIMO has no physical
offices or warehouses in Texas and does not own or rent any real property in Texas.
FIMO is not registered to do business in the State of Texas and does not maintain a
registered agent for service of process in Texas.
Harris averred that FIMO sells its various products to manufacturers and
distributors and has not targeted Texas as a market specifically. FIMO does not have
advertising that is specifically targeted to businesses, manufacturers, distributors, or
customers in Texas, nor does it have any exclusive distributors or salespeople who
target Texas customers.
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Harris reviewed sales data over the previous four years and found that FIMO’s
sales to Texas customers were “significantly less than 1% of FIMO’s total revenue
over the past four years.” The sales data also reflects that in those years, none of the
manufacturers or distributors to whom FIMO has shipped or sold products in Texas
or who have purchased from FIMO using Texas business addresses have purchased
a hoist grip.
FIMO regularly sells hoist grips and other components to manufacturers and
distributors who assemble such products with communication cables and other
components. The manufacturers and distributors will typically choose a hoist grip to
match the size of cables to which they attach it. Hoist grips are sold individually
bagged and sized based on industry standards for different cable sizes. Typically, the
customer will assemble a hoist grip onto a cable and make other modifications, with
FIMO having no involvement with the use or assembly of the hoist grips after their
sale to manufacturers or distributors.
FIMO’s sales of hoist grips to HS were sold and delivered only in North
Carolina and not in Texas. FIMO had no involvement with any use, modification or
incorporation of any hoist grips into any assemblies or finished products
manufactured or assembled by HS after HS purchased hoist grips from FIMO. After
selling products to HS, FIMO received no information or documentation from HS
regarding the whereabouts of any hoist grips after HS took delivery of such products.
Similarly, FIMO received no information or documentation from HS regarding any
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purchasers of assemblies or manufactured products that incorporated the FIMO hoist
grips or how the finished product assemblies were used.
According to Harris, FIMO did not sell hoist grips to HS with any intention
or expectation that particular customers in Texas would purchase a finished product
manufactured by HS that incorporated a FIMO hoist grip as a component part.
Luca Tamberi, FIMO’s corporate representative, was deposed during the
jurisdictional discovery process. Tamberi testified that FIMO is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Fi.MO.Tec, S.p.a., an Italian company. FIMO was created for the
purpose of selling the parent company’s products throughout the United States.
FIMO has ten to fifteen customers in Texas that it has sold products to within the
past ten years and employs salespeople who have Texas as their territory.
FIMO’s website indicates that Dallas, Texas is a production platform location,
but Tamberi indicated that FIMO stores products at a Dallas warehouse and
distributes products from that warehouse. This is one of two physical locations in
the United States.
FIMO also has two employees that live and work in Dallas, Texas. One of
these employees is FIMO’s Commercial Director. The employees’ duties include
customer service, sales, and coordinating product operations such as shipping from
the Texas warehouse.
HS is FIMO’s only customer for hoist grips. FIMO supplied these hoist grips
to HS and HS has supplied over 2,000 of these FIMO hoist grips to Texas entities,
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either attached to their communication cables or sold separately. FIMO prepared
instructions for use of the hoist grip, which were provided to downstream
distributors and purchasers FIMO also sells components to customers in Texas.
FIMO exhibited its products at a Texas conference. FIMO’s website stated
that the exhibit at that conference would introduce its new modular fixing device for
fiber optic cables, and show its full range of fixing for radiating cables.
FIMO insists that it did not specifically target Texas differently from other
markets. A nonresident defendant’s decision to “serve the ʻfifty states’ demonstrates
a purposeful effort to serve the United States market, which includes Texas.”
LeBlanc v. Kyle, 28 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).
Indeed, as the Texas Supreme Court has observed:
The defendant need not single Texas out in some unique way to satisfy
constitutional dictates. To hold that a nonresident who has directed
activity to every state is not amenable to jurisdiction in any state would
unduly constrain the authority of state courts to hold nonresidents
accountable for their in-state conduct and would convert the specific
personal-jurisdiction analysis into a wholly subjective inquiry into the
defendants’ state of mind.
Hyundam, 716 S.W.3d at174 (quoting Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d
at 420).
In using the phrase “specifically target,” BRP-Rotax did not establish a new,
higher requirement that targeted activities toward Texas be exclusive, different, or
direct. See BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 104–111 (noting the court’s holding broke no
new ground). Rather, the Court in BRP-Rotax reiterated the plus-factor standard that
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“[r]elevant ‘additional conduct” must show “‘targeting’ Texas in particular, not
merely passive awareness of a likelihood—even a substantial likelihood verging on
certainty—that products may eventually arrive in our State.” Id. at 105. The degree
of FIMO’s contacts with other jurisdictions is not relevant to this analysis. See State
v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Tex. 2023) (personal
jurisdiction is a forum-specific inquiry, and a defendant’s contacts with other states
do not negate purposeful availment of this jurisdiction regardless of whether out-of-
state contacts are more, less, or exactly the same.”).
The record reflects that FIMO specifically targeted Texas here. FIMO
maintains a business presence in Texas, storing and distributing products from its
Dallas distribution center. FIMO relies on the fact that it does not own the
distribution center and points to the absence of testimony established that the hoist
grips at issue were stored in or shipped from the Dallas facility. Ownership of the
distribution center, however, is not required. See BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 107.
Unlike BRP-Rotax, FIMO chose the Dallas facility and it is one of only two physical
locations in the U.S. See id. at 108 (Texas repair facility selected by independent
distributor not the nonresident defendant). The distribution is part of FIMO’s overall
Texas footprint. See id. at 107.
In addition, FIMO employs sales representative in Texas, solicits business in
Texas, and has a Texas customer base. Tamberi admitted that one of the Texas
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employees was “taking care about looking after some customer relationships but also
the shipment from Texas,” and he included sales in customer relations.
FIMO emphasizes the testimony establishing that it generally assigns sales
representatives to the United States as opposed to specifically assigning them to
Texas. This fact, however, does not negate the other factors establishing a deliberate
choice to serve the Texas market. Over the past ten years, sales have been made to
ten or fifteen Texas customers. Moreover, Tameri testified that sometimes these
customers are distributors responsible for distributing FIMO’s products in Texas.
The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that utilizing an independent distributor
or sales agent satisfies the “additional conduct” standard because the nonresident
defendant “reap[s] substantial economic gains through [the independent
distributor’s] sales.” Id.
FIMO insists that its sales in Texas are minimal and insignificant. But the
evidence shows that in addition to direct sales, FIMO sold indirectly to Texas
customers through HS, including at least 2,000 hoist grips. FIMO also drafted the
instructions for the hoist grips to be passed down to the end user that Mabalot
contends were inadequate.
FIMO also attended and exhibited at a Texas conference to market a new
device. The FIMO website advertises Texas as a production and distribution
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facility.2 This evinces an intent to target the Texas market. See BRP-Rotax, 716
S.W.3d at 104–05 (conduct evincing an intent to serve the Texas market).
Nonetheless, FIMO argues that this case “is even more obviously outside the
‘narrower class of claims’ for which specific jurisdiction is proper than BRP-Rotax.”
We disagree.
In BRP-Rotax, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the argument that BRP-
Rotax (an Austrian manufacturer) purposefully availed itself of Texas by
participating in a distribution scheme with an indisputably independent Bahamian
company (Kodiak) in which it held no ownership interest. BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d
at 111. In that case, the argument for jurisdiction over Rotax was based on indirect
contacts, including a distribution agreement with Kodiak covering the United States,
Central America, and most of South America, Kodiak establishing a repair facility
in Texas, Rotax’s noninteractive website, and the fact that hundreds of the Rotax’s
engines were ultimately registered in Texas. See id. at 106. Neither company had
any distribution centers or distributors, direct or indirect, in Texas. Id. There was no
evidence that the nonresident defendant ever itself sent anything to Texas. Id. The
distribution agreement showed that Kodiak, not Rotax was wholly responsible for
establishing the Texas facility and had the right to do so anywhere in the territory,
2
Tamberi testified that the FIMO website is inaccurate in stating that production occurs in the
warehouse. This does not address the fact that the website creates the impression that FIMO products are
made in Texas.
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which the Court noted was “a space so vast that even Texas looks small.” Id. at 108.
The court noted that, “[w]hat is initially striking about each of these provisions is
that none evinces an objective or purposeful intention of Rotax to do anything in
Texas. Id. at 108–09 (emphasis in original).
The facts presented here are also unlike those presented in Hyundam, in which
the Court rejected the argument that Hyundam’s designing of its product specifically
for the North American market constituted purposeful availment of Texas because
Texas is part of the large region that constitutes North America. Hyundam, 716
S.W.3d at 173–74. In this case, while the FIMO sales force may have targeted the
entire U.S., there was additional deliberate conduct that focused on Texas. See id.
(the purposeful contacts with Texas rather than the larger geographic region in which
Texas sits are relevant to the jurisdiction inquiry).
In the instant case, the record reflects that FIMO has both direct and indirect
contacts with Texas. The combination of these contacts establishes that FIMO
specifically targeted the Texas market sufficient to meet the stream-of-commerce-
plus standard. See Procarsa S.A. de C.V. v. Blue Racer Midstream, LLC, No. 05-23-
00901-CV, 2024 WL 5066084, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 11, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Therefore, FIMO purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within Texas, and invoked the benefits and protections of its
laws.
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D. Do Mabalot’s Claims Relate to FIMO’s Contacts With Texas?
Next we consider whether Mabalot’s claims relate to FIMO’s Texas contacts.
The relatedness component of the specific jurisdiction inquiry requires that the
plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 361 (2021);
Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 9. In other words, there must be a substantial connection
between a defendant’s contacts with Texas and the operative facts of the litigation.
Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 874; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 584–85. “A substantial
connection can result from even a single act.” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 151. “The
‘arise from or relate to’ requirement lies at the heart of specific jurisdiction by
defining the required nexus between the nonresident defendant, the litigation, and
the forum.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579. A strict causal relationship between the
defendant’s activity in the forum and the litigation is not required. Luciano, 625
S.W.3d at 14. Rather, the phrase “or relate to” “contemplates that some relationships
will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at
361–362. The operative facts of the litigation are those that would be the focus of
the trial. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585. To determine the operative facts of the
litigation, we must consider the claims involved in the litigation. Retamco
Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. 2009). In
products liability cases, “the operative facts of the litigation ultimately focus on
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous when it left the manufacturer’s
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possession.” Semperit Technische Produkte Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Hennessy, 508
S.W.3d 569, 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
Mabalot alleged that the hoist grip FIMO designed, manufactured and
marketed was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because it was not
properly rated to hold the weight of the cable at heights of 200 feet or in the
alternative, the hoist grip was damaged prior to being placed onto the
communications cable, and such damage rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous. Mabalot claims the hoist grip was also defectively marketed because
there was a lack of warning and/or instruction regarding the safe use of the hoist grip
at heights of 200 feet and this defect was a producing cause of Concepcion’s death.
Mabalot further alleged that FIMO was negligent by (a) failing to provide an
adequate hoist grip, (b) failing to provide adequate warnings and instructions, (c)
failing to properly inspect the product before delivering it to end users, and (d)
failing to properly test the product. Mabalot also alleged that the hoist grip was not
fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was used.
As explained above, FIMO purposefully availed itself of Texas. It served a
market for its product in Texas and its product failed here. See Ford Motor Co., 592
U.S. at 363; Morgan, 670 S.W.3d at 348. Mabalot’s theories of liability arise out of
or relate to FIMO’s activities in Texas, and the trial court therefore correctly
impliedly concluded that the relatedness requirement was satisfied. See Ford Motor
Co., 592 U.S. at 362–63; Morgan, 670 S.W.3d at 348; Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14.
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The trial court did not err in concluding that it has specific jurisdiction over FIMO
in this suit. FIMO’s first issue is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled issue one, we need not address the second issue concerning
general jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47. The trial court’s order denying the
special appearance is affirmed.
/Dennise Garcia/
DENNISE GARCIA
JUSTICE
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