Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 8, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00026-CR __________ ABEL SONNY VASQUEZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 106th District Court Dawson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 24-9292 MEMORANDUM OPINION The jury convicted Appellant, Abel Sonny Vasquez, of possession of methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams, a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d) (West Supp. 2025). Appellant pleaded “true” to the habitual offender enhancement allegations, the jury assessed his punishment at eighty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and the trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. In a single issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm. I. Factual and Procedural History At approximately 2:00 a.m. on March 12, 2024, Lamesa Police Department Officer Jose Armendariz pulled over a vehicle with a defective headlight. Two other officers accompanied Armendariz. The vehicle was registered to the driver, Holly Castillo. Appellant was seated in the front passenger seat. Castillo did not have her driver’s license, and she and Appellant were asked to exit the vehicle. It was then that Armendariz spotted a black bag containing a white crystal-like substance on the front passenger seat that Appellant had occupied. Officers also located a bag of marihuana between the front passenger seat and armrest. Castillo and Appellant were subsequently arrested for possession of marihuana and methamphetamine. At trial, the officers’ body camera recordings were admitted into evidence. In the recordings, Appellant admitted to using methamphetamine earlier that day. Although Appellant initially denied knowledge or possession of the drugs found in the vehicle, Appellant eventually told the officers: “It’s mine. It’s all mine. Whatever y’all find, it’s mine. It’s mine.” The methamphetamine weighed 4.97 grams. Appellant testified at trial that he and Castillo had “been smoking all day” and were headed to her house to smoke more methamphetamine when they were pulled over. Appellant maintained, however, that he did not know there had been methamphetamine in the vehicle and stated that if he had “known it was there, it would have never been found.” Appellant testified that he “would have ate it” or “t[aken] off running” rather than risk being arrested for possession. Appellant further explained that when he took ownership of the drugs found inside the vehicle, he had meant the marihuana—not methamphetamine. Appellant then testified that 2 he had, in fact, taken responsibility for the methamphetamine but had only done so because he had already been on parole and had “just g[iven] up on life.” He testified that he had since decided that he wanted help and wanted “to be a law-abiding citizen.” Appellant reiterated that he thought the methamphetamine was at Castillo’s house, he had no knowledge that there was methamphetamine inside the vehicle, and he had not seen the methamphetamine when he got into the vehicle because “[i]t was dark.” The jury returned a guilty verdict and assessed his punishment at eighty years of imprisonment. This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we 3 presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, appellate courts are not permitted to use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Instead, appellate courts must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A person is guilty of possession of a controlled substance if he or she intentionally or knowingly possessed the controlled substance. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.115(a). The Health and Safety Code defines possession as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Id. § 481.002(38). To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must show (1) that the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hughitt v. State, 539 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The evidence must establish that the accused’s connection with the drugs is more than just her fortuitous proximity to someone else’s drugs. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405–06; Hughitt, 539 S.W.3d at 538. 4 Texas courts have formulated the “affirmative links rule,” which provides that, “[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband.” Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)); see Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (listing affirmative links recognized by courts); see also Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12). The affirmative links rule is routinely employed to establish possession when the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the drugs are found. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406. “This rule simply restates the common-sense notion that a person—such as a father, son, spouse, roommate, or friend—may jointly possess property like a house but not necessarily jointly possess the contraband found in that house.” Id. The following links have been applied to infer knowledge relating to the contraband: (1) the accused’s presence when the search was executed; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the accused’s proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the accused was under the influence of a controlled substance when he was arrested; (5) whether the accused possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the accused made incriminating statements; (7) whether the accused attempted to flee; (8) whether the accused made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present; (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the accused indicated a 5 consciousness of guilt. Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (citing Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12). It is not the number of links that is dispositive; rather, it is the logical force of all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that is the determining factor. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. III. Analysis Appellant contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that he intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. We conclude that the cumulative force of the evidence could have led a rational juror to believe that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. The State presented evidence that Appellant had possessed the methamphetamine, stating that the drugs found inside the vehicle were his after officers found methamphetamine where he had been seated inside the vehicle. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (considering the accused’s proximity to the contraband and any admissions). Appellant additionally admitted to having smoked methamphetamine earlier that same day and stated he had been on his way to smoke more methamphetamine. See Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (considering the accused’s acquiescence that he had smoked cocaine earlier in the day in determining whether he had been in possession of cocaine that had been found in a room shared by him and his spouse). Although Appellant testified at trial that he had not, in fact, known of the methaphetamine in the vehicle and told the officers otherwise because he “gave up” on life, evidence is not insufficient merely because Appellant offered a different explanation of the facts at trial. See Reyes v. State, No. 11-24-00137-CR, 2025 WL 2484936, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Stastny v. State, No. 01-21-00641-CR, 2023 WL 2248723, at *6 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In this regard, it is the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the 6 testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts, and we defer to the jury’s determinations. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Parks-Hodges v. State, No. 11-24-00190-CR, 2026 WL 2117286, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 23, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Furthermore, while we observe the absence of some affirmative links in this case, this absence “does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against the affirmative links present.” See Mixon v. State, 481 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Jones v. State, 466 S.W.3d 252, 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)); see also Carmona v. State, No. 11-22- 00125-CR, 2023 WL 8631438, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding sufficient affirmative links were present, despite several missing links, including the lack of evidence that the drugs were in plain view, that she or her passenger were under the influence, that she made incriminating statements, that she attempted to flee, or that she possessed large amounts of cash). Because there was evidence that the contraband had been in plain view, Appellant had been in close proximity to the contraband, and Appellant had admitted ownership, there was evidence to support the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s contrary claims at trial. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162; see also Rodriguez v. State, No. 11-17-00214-CR, 2020 WL 1887716, at *3 (Tex. App.— Eastland Apr. 16, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that the jury was free to reject a codefendant’s claim of exclusive ownership of cocaine found inside a pickup where the appellant was also present). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that there is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed the 7 methamphetamine. See Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 417–18. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue. IV. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court. W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE October 8, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 8