Fred C. Dance v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee

09/04/2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs November 5, 2025 FRED C. DANCE v. BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County No. 24-CV-68 Robert E. Lee Davies, Senior Judge ___________________________________ No. M2024-01757-SC-R3-BP ___________________________________ Tennessee attorney Fred C. Dance represented a client in a wrongful death action that eventually settled. Rather than promptly disburse the settlement proceeds to his client, he used the funds to pay for personal expenses while ignoring his client’s inquiries about the money. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that Dance had violated Rules 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Based on its finding that Dance had knowingly converted client property, the hearing panel recommended that Dance be disbarred. In this appeal, we consider whether disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Dance’s misconduct. As a preliminary matter, we clarify that in an appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(d), this Court reviews the hearing panel’s recommended punishment de novo rather than for abuse of discretion. We affirm the hearing panel’s finding that Dance knowingly converted client property and its application of aggravating and mitigating factors. But after considering the sanctions imposed in similar cases, we conclude that Dance should be suspended rather than disbarred. We therefore reverse the hearing panel’s judgment in part and suspend Dance from practicing law for five years, with three years to be served on active suspension. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d); Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J., and HOLLY KIRBY, DWIGHT E. TARWATER, and MARY L. WAGNER, JJ., joined. Fred C. Dance, Fairview, Tennessee, appellant, Pro Se. R. Davison Douglas, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Board of Professional Responsibility.  OPINION I. Fred C. Dance has been licensed to practice law in Tennessee since 1980. On May 25, 2021, the Board filed a petition for discipline against Dance. As relevant here, the Board alleged that Dance had violated Rules 1.4 (Communication), 1.8 (Conflict of Interests), 1.15 (Safekeeping Property and Funds), 4.1(a) (Truthfulness), and 8.4 (Misconduct) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.4, 1.8, 1.15, 4.1(a), 8.4. These allegations were based on a complaint filed by one of Dance’s clients, Christopher Pernishek.1 A. In 2016, Pernishek retained Dance to represent Pernishek and his siblings in a wrongful death action arising from their mother’s death. Dance agreed to work for a contingency fee—one-third of any eventual recovery—plus expenses. On May 31, 2017, Pernishek and his siblings settled with the defendant for $20,000. That same day, the defendant issued a check for $20,000, payable to Dance’s Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (“IOLTA”). Dance deposited the funds, and they were posted to his IOLTA on June 8, 2017. Before the deposit, the IOLTA’s balance was $121.35; after the deposit, the balance was $20,121.35. The deposit from the Pernishek settlement was the only deposit made in June. Three withdrawals were made from the IOLTA in June after the settlement funds were deposited. The first two withdrawals were checks payable to “Fred C. Dance” for $10,000 and $6,140, respectively. Dance testified that he made these withdrawals because he was having “money issues.” The third withdrawal was a check for $3,868 payable to “Harpeth School of Gymnastics,” one of Dance’s former clients. Dance maintained that this check was a disbursement of Harpeth’s share of a favorable judgment in another case. The three withdrawals together totaled $20,008, bringing the IOLTA’s balance at the end of June down to $113.35. Dance did not replace the settlement funds or disburse them to the Pernisheks for almost four years. On March 3, 2021, Pernishek filed a complaint against Dance with the Board. The complaint focused on Pernishek’s inability to “get ahold of Mr. Dance” and alleged that 1 The Board’s disciplinary petition also included a complaint alleging misconduct in a matter unrelated to the Pernishek complaint. But the Board later abandoned that complaint due to a lack of evidence. -2- Dance failed to “return calls or letters.” On March 9, the Board informed Dance of the complaint and requested a response. In early April, Dance and Pernishek discussed the matter in a series of text messages. Dance admitted fault in failing to disburse the funds and agreed to reduce his fee to ten percent of the settlement—$2,000. After this conversation, Dance sent a letter to the Board. He admitted that there was “no reason or excuse for me not reaching out to [Pernishek] long ago to discuss this case.” Dance claimed that he had not put the case on his follow-up list and therefore “just forgot” about it. He informed the Board of his conversation with Pernishek and indicated that the matter was resolved. On April 14, Dance deposited $18,000 in his IOLTA and issued a check in that amount to Pernishek. B. The Board filed a petition for discipline against Dance on May 25, 2021. A hearing panel of the Board held a disciplinary hearing on November 16, 2023. There was no real dispute about whether Dance had improperly used the settlement funds. At the outset of the hearing, Dance’s counsel agreed that the issue was not whether misconduct occurred, but rather the appropriate punishment for that misconduct. When Dance testified, he freely admitted that he used the money in his IOLTA to settle various financial obligations. And he acknowledged that taking the funds “was not the right thing to do.” The only point of disagreement concerning the complaint’s factual allegations was whether Dance ignored Pernishek’s attempts to contact him. Pernishek and Dance agreed that Dance informed Pernishek that he had received the settlement check from the defendant. They also agreed that Dance told Pernishek that the settlement funds could not be disbursed to Pernishek until Dance notified the Social Security Administration of the settlement and gave that agency the opportunity to file a claim. Pernishek testified that he called Dance’s office every couple of weeks or months to check on the status of the disbursement. According to Pernishek, he could only reach Dance’s secretary or voicemail. Pernishek also testified that he left notes on Dance’s office door requesting that Dance call him. Dance, by contrast, testified that he received only one follow-up call from Pernishek a few months after Dance received the settlement check and never received any messages after 2017. He said that he simply forgot about the Pernishek matter due to some failure in his follow-up system. The hearing panel issued its findings and judgment on December 15, 2023. The hearing panel determined that Dance’s explanation regarding his failure to disburse the settlement funds to Pernishek—that he simply forgot about it when he did not receive a response from Social Security or Medicare or any follow-up communication from Pernishek—was not credible. The hearing panel instead credited Pernishek’s testimony that he had repeatedly tried to contact Dance to inquire about the status of the disbursement. The hearing panel concluded that Dance had violated Rules 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.15(a), -3- 1.15(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c). The panel determined that Dance had not violated Rule 1.8(h), however, and made no findings about Rule 4.1(a). Next, the hearing panel considered the appropriate punishment for these violations. The panel found that Dance had “knowingly converted client property” and “knowingly deceived his client into believing that he had maintained the money in his IOLTA account.” And it found that Pernishek and his siblings had suffered injury because their receipt of the funds was delayed and “their ability to receive any money . . . was put at risk dependent upon Mr. Dance’s personal solvency.” The panel determined that disbarment was the presumptive sanction under ABA Standards 4.11 and 4.61. ABA Standard 4.11 provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 4.11 (2d ed. 2019) [hereinafter ABA Standards]. And ABA Standard 4.61 provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a client.” Id. § 4.61. The hearing panel then considered whether any aggravating or mitigating circumstances existed that would justify a departure from the presumptive sanction. As for aggravating circumstances, the hearing panel found that Dance had a “dishonest or selfish motive” and “substantial experience in the practice of law.” It also considered his “prior disciplinary history of receiving a private informal admonition eight (8) or nine (9) years ago” but gave this circumstance only “slight” weight “given the number of years [Dance] ha[d] practiced law.” The hearing panel found no mitigating circumstances. It rejected Dance’s “payment of $18,000.00 to Mr. Pernishek after the filing of the Board complaint” as a mitigating circumstance because it was “forced or compelled restitution under ABA Standard 9.4(a).” Thus, the panel applied the presumptive sanction, recommending that Dance “be disbarred from the practice of law.” C. Dance timely filed a petition for review of the hearing panel’s decision in the Williamson County Circuit Court. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(a). He argued that the hearing panel’s finding that he had knowingly converted client property was erroneous and that the panel had therefore erred in applying ABA Standard 4.11. He also disputed the hearing panel’s findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors, contending that the panel had erred in finding that he acted with a selfish or dishonest motive and in overlooking “at least six (6) mitigating factors.” The trial court rejected Dance’s arguments and affirmed the hearing panel’s judgment, noting “the deferential standard of review that is binding on the trial court.” Dance appealed the trial court’s judgment to this Court pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(d). -4-  II. Before we can review the judgment below, we must determine our standard of review. We directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing “[w]hether the Court should apply a de novo standard—rather than an abuse-of-discretion standard—when reviewing the recommended punishment for ‘uniformity and ‘appropriateness’ in an appeal brought pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(d), as it does when reviewing the recommended punishment under Rule 9, section 15.4(b)–(c).” Order, Dance v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., No. M2024-01757-SC-R3-BP (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2026). Both the Board and Dance argued that we should review the recommended punishment de novo. We agree. There are two paths for this Court to review a recommended sanction for an attorney’s violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. First, if neither party appeals a recommendation of public censure, suspension, or disbarment, the Board must submit a proposed order of enforcement for our approval under Rule 9, section 15.4. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), (d). If we believe the proposed punishment is “inadequate or excessive,” then we must “issue an order advising the Board and the respondent attorney that [we] propose[] to increase or to decrease the punishment.” Id. § 15.4(c), (e). Second, either the Board or the attorney may appeal the hearing panel’s judgment to the trial court and then appeal the judgment of the trial court to this Court under Rule 9, section 33.1(d). Id. § 33.1(a), (d). When we review a recommended punishment under the first path—Rule 9, section 15.4—our review is de novo. In re Walwyn, 531 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tenn. 2017). This standard of review is appropriate “[g]iven our inherent authority to enforce the disciplinary rules for the legal profession, the mandate [in Rule 9, section 15.4] that we review the recommended punishment with a ‘view to attaining uniformity of punishment,’ and our ability to modify the judgment of the hearing panel.” Id. (quoting Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b)). Yet we have applied a different standard of review in appeals like this one that arise under the second path. When we review the judgment of a hearing panel under Rule 9, section 33.1(d), “[w]e apply the same standard of review as the trial court.” Gray v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 710 S.W.3d 664, 673 (Tenn. 2025).2 That standard of review—found in Rule 9, section 33.1(b)—permits reversal or modification of a hearing panel’s judgment only when: the hearing panel’s findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions on any issue brought up for review and relief are: (1) in violation of constitutional 2 By its terms, the standard of review in Rule 9, section 33.1(b) applies only to the trial court’s review of the hearing panel’s judgment. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b) (referring to “the trial court”). We seem to have adopted that standard in appeals to this Court as a prudential matter. -5-  or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the hearing panel’s jurisdiction; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5) unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b). We have applied that deferential standard of review not only to the hearing panel’s subsidiary factual findings and conclusions, but also to its recommended punishment. See, e.g., Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Sheppard, 556 S.W.3d 139, 151 (Tenn. 2018) (“We now consider the sanctions imposed by this Court in factually similar cases to determine whether the hearing panel abused its discretion in recommending that Mr. Sheppard be suspended rather than disbarred.”); Napolitano v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 535 S.W.3d 481, 503 (Tenn. 2017) (noting that “we will not change the Panel’s decision to impose a five-year suspension unless” one of the five prongs applies). We now reject this bifurcated approach and adopt a uniform standard of review for both kinds of proceedings. When reviewing a hearing panel’s recommended punishment for uniformity and appropriateness in an appeal under Rule 9, section 33.1(d), we will apply the same de novo standard of review that we apply under Rule 9, section 15.4. Two considerations compel this conclusion. First, both section 15.4 and section 33.1(d) require this Court to “review the recommended punishment . . . with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, §§ 15.4(b), 15.4(d), 33.1(d). In Walwyn, we relied on this language in section 15.4 in holding that our review of the recommended punishment under that section is de novo. 531 S.W.3d at 137. Indeed, it is hard to see how we could achieve statewide uniformity of punishment and appropriateness in each case absent de novo review. When we decided Walwyn, section 33.1(d) did not contain similar language requiring review for uniformity and appropriateness. But we amended section 33.1(d) in 2025 to add that language and cross-referenced section 15.4 in doing so. Order, In re Amends. to Rule 9, secs. 26.4 and 33.1, Rules of the Tenn. Sup. Ct., No. ADM2025-00078 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2025). Now that section 33.1(d) also requires review for uniformity and appropriateness, we should apply the same de novo standard when reviewing a recommended punishment under that section. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012) (“A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.”). De novo review is also logically necessary given that neither hearing panels nor trial courts are permitted “to base recommended attorney discipline sanctions on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases.” Doll v. Bd. of Prof. Resp., 691 S.W.3d 372, 383 -6- (Tenn. 2024). Rather, the hearing panel is instructed to “consider the applicable provisions of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a). And the trial court’s review of the hearing panel’s judgment is limited to the five categories of error identified in subsection 33.1(b). Id. § 33.1(b). Because hearing panels and trial courts do not consider uniformity in exercising their discretion, it makes little sense to apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a recommended punishment for uniformity and appropriateness. Second, when we review the recommended punishment for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, we are exercising our inherent authority and original jurisdiction over attorney discipline. “This Court’s inherent power under the Tennessee Constitution includes the authority to regulate and supervise the practice of law in this State.” Manookian v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 685 S.W.3d 744, 801 (Tenn. 2024); see also id. (collecting cases). Among other responsibilities, we “promulgat[e] and enforc[e] the rules that govern the legal profession.” Id. (quoting In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d 288, 294 (Tenn. 2021)). Our authority in this respect is plenary. See id. And because we have “the inherent and original power to prescribe the ethics rules governing the practice of law,” we also have the “‘original power to review’ the actions of the hearing panel ‘in interpreting and applying them.’” Id. at 801–02 (quoting Belmont v. Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 511 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Tenn. 1974)). A de novo standard of review better comports with our plenary role in attorney discipline matters than a deferential abuse of discretion standard. To be sure, the procedures we established under Rule 9 to enforce our disciplinary rules delegate significant discretion to the Board, as well as to the hearing panels the Board convenes to adjudicate alleged attorney misconduct. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, §§ 4, 6. But notwithstanding this delegation, “[t]he license to practice law in this State is a continuing proclamation by” this Court “that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and judicial matters, and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney and as an officer of the Court.” Id. § 1. Given our continuing responsibility to ensure that attorneys licensed in Tennessee are fit to practice law, we must be able to modify or reverse a hearing panel’s recommended punishment as we deem necessary. To sum up, we hold that our review of a hearing panel’s recommended punishment for uniformity and appropriateness under section 33.1(d) is de novo. We also review legal questions de novo. Gray, 710 S.W.3d at 673. But we “do not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing panel as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” Id. And we continue to review a hearing panel’s subsidiary findings and conclusions regarding rule violations, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the like under the deferential five-prong standard found in Rule 9, section 33.1(b). -7-  III. On appeal, Dance does not dispute the hearing panel’s determinations concerning his violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. He instead argues that the hearing panel imposed an inappropriate punishment. He raises four arguments in that regard: (1) that the hearing panel applied the wrong ABA Standard to determine the presumptive sanction; (2) that the hearing panel’s determination that he acted with a selfish or dishonest motive was erroneous; (3) that the hearing panel erred in finding no mitigating circumstances; and (4) that the sanction imposed was comparatively harsh relative to sanctions imposed in similar cases. We address each of these arguments in turn. A. To determine the appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct, “[t]he hearing panel ‘first identifies the presumptive sanction under the ABA Standards and then considers whether the presumptive sanction should be increased or decreased based on aggravating and mitigating factors.” Gray, 710 S.W.3d at 681 (quoting Dunlap v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 595 S.W.3d 593, 612 (Tenn. 2020)); see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a) (“In determining the appropriate type of discipline, the hearing panel shall consider the applicable provisions of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.”). “If there are no aggravating or mitigating factors, the presumptive sanction applies.” Dunlap, 595 S.W.3d at 612. Here, the panel applied ABA Standard 4.11. Dance argues that it should have applied 4.12 instead. ABA Standard 4.11 provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” ABA Standards § 4.11. By contrast, ABA Standard 4.12 provides that “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” ABA Standards § 4.12. The hearing panel “unanimously conclude[d] [that] Mr. Dance knowingly converted” client property and therefore that “there is no choice under the applicable law but that the presumptive sanction . . . is disbarment.” While Dance admits that he dealt improperly with client property, he argues that there was insufficient evidence in the record for the hearing panel to find that he knowingly converted client property. In his view, the only evidence of his mental state was his admission “that he wrote checks to himself to pay personal bills or expenses.” This, he contends, was more consistent with a finding that he knew or should have known that he was dealing improperly with client property. We disagree. In the context of professional discipline, conversion is defined as “the appropriation of . . . property to a party’s own use in exclusion or in defiance of the owner’s rights.” Fam. Tr. Servs. LLC v. Green Wise Homes LLC, 693 S.W.3d 284, 306 (Tenn. 2024) -8- (citation modified).3 And the ABA Standards provide that an attorney acts with “knowledge” when he acts with “the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” ABA Standards, Definitions. Dance admitted that he withdrew funds from his IOLTA for personal expenses. That evidence is sufficient to support the hearing panel’s conclusion that Dance appropriated client funds for his own use. Further, given that the only significant funds in the IOLTA were from the Pernishek settlement and that Dance began withdrawing funds from the IOLTA a mere day after depositing the settlement check, the hearing panel easily could have inferred that Dance had “conscious awareness” that he was appropriating client property. There is also little question that a reasonable factfinder could determine that Dance knowingly appropriated the funds to the exclusion of or in defiance of the Pernisheks’ rights. Dance spent the Pernisheks’ money within two weeks of having deposited it in the IOLTA. He also failed to replace the funds or disburse them to the Pernisheks for nearly four years—and only when contacted by the Board and facing potential professional discipline. A reasonable factfinder also could have concluded that Dance acted knowingly instead of merely negligently. The hearing panel credited Pernishek’s account of his attempts to contact Dance over Dance’s claims that he had not heard from Pernishek in years. We decline to second guess the panel’s findings regarding witness credibility. See In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d at 298 (“Credibility and the weight given to evidence are questions of fact; our standard of review requires us to give deference to the findings made by the hearing panel.”). On these facts, it was reasonable for the hearing panel to conclude that “Mr. Dance intended to keep the [Pernisheks’] money for himself indefinitely unless and until he was forced to return it.” That conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, and it was neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion. We thus conclude that the 3 In Family Trust Services, we explained that only “tangible property” can be converted. 693 S.W.3d at 306. The Court of Appeals has suggested that generally “money is an intangible and therefore not subject to a claim for conversion,” but it also noted a possible “exception where the money is specific and capable of identification or where there is a determinate sum that the defendant was entrusted to apply to a certain purpose.” PNC Multifamily Cap. Institutional Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 90 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion § 16 (2012) (footnotes omitted)). Regardless of whether money can be subject to a claim for conversion under Tennessee common law, ABA Standard 4.11 clearly contemplates that client funds are capable of being converted. See ABA Standards § 4.11 annot. (“Some courts have established a bright-line rule that disbarment is the only appropriate discipline when a lawyer knowingly converts client funds.”). As our rules require the application of the ABA Standards, it is not necessary to determine whether or when money constitutes tangible property for the purpose of common law conversion. -9- hearing panel did not err in determining that the presumptive sanction was disbarment under ABA Standard 4.11.4 B. We next turn to Dance’s contention that the hearing panel erred in determining that he acted with a “dishonest or selfish motive.” According to Dance, our decision in Harris v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 645 S.W.3d 125 (Tenn. 2022), stands for the principle that “conversion of funds[] alone is not sufficient to establish dishonesty, fraud, or deceit.” Dance’s reliance on Harris is misplaced for several reasons. First, our decision in Harris merely quoted a hearing panel’s statement that “the fact of conversion alone did not demonstrate the sort of ‘dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation’ necessary to establish a violation of RPC 8.4.” 645 S.W.3d at 132. We neither approved nor disapproved of this statement because no party had challenged it on appeal. Id. Dance argues that we should infer agreement from the Court’s silence given our inherent authority to review the hearing panel’s judgment. But Dance reads far too much into the opinion. Whether or not this Court could have reached the issue, the fact remains that this Court did not do so. When this Court is silent on an issue that was not appealed, its silence should not be taken as wholesale approval of the decision below. Second, Harris involved RPC 8.4, whereas this case involves ABA Standard 9.22. Id. at 131. The language in RPC 8.4 differs from that in ABA Standard 9.22. RPC 8.4(c) says that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 8.4(c). ABA Standard 9.22(b), by contrast, states that “[a]ggravating factors include . . . dishonest or selfish motive.” ABA Standards § 9.22(b). Both RPC 8.4 and ABA Standard 9.22 allow for consideration of dishonesty, but only 9.22(b) considers selfishness. Even if conversion alone were insufficient to establish dishonesty, that would not preclude a hearing panel from finding that Dance had a selfish motive. Here, evidence that Dance used settlement funds designated for the Pernisheks to pay for personal expenditures supports the hearing panel’s finding that Dance acted with a selfish motive. Third, the hearing panel’s conclusion that Dance had a dishonest motive was supported by evidence other than conversion alone. Dance told Pernishek that he was waiting on Medicare, while simultaneously “helping himself to all of the Pernishek 4 The Board notes that the hearing panel also relied on ABA Standard 4.61, which states that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a client.” Because we find that the hearing panel did not err in applying ABA Standard 4.11, we need not consider ABA Standard 4.61. - 10 - settlement proceeds within days after receipt into his IOLTA account.” He ignored Pernishek’s attempts to contact him for four years. And he “pretend[ed] that he simply ‘forgot’ to disburse the settlement proceeds” rather than admitting his misconduct. A reasonable factfinder could easily conclude from this evidence that Dance had a dishonest motive. The hearing panel therefore did not err by applying ABA Standard 9.22(b) as an aggravating factor. C. Dance’s arguments concerning mitigating factors fare no better. Dance contends that the hearing panel should have considered as mitigating factors (1) his long legal career free of discipline; (2) the remoteness of any prior offenses; (3) his cooperative attitude in the proceedings; (4) that his misconduct only involved one client; and (5) his acknowledgement that his behavior was wrong and his exhibition of remorse. We disagree. Dance’s argument concerning the absence of a prior disciplinary record under ABA Standard 9.32(a) fails for a simple reason: he previously received a private informal admonition. Although a private informal admonition is one of the less severe possible sanctions, it is still considered a disciplinary action. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 12 (listing private informal admonitions as one of the “types of discipline”); Beier v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 610 S.W.3d 425, 447 (Tenn. 2020) (finding that private disciplinary actions can preclude application of ABA Standard 9.32(a)). The panel was free to assign the private informal admonition little weight, as it did. But it was not required to give Dance credit for the “absence of a prior disciplinary record” when he in fact had a prior disciplinary record. As a backstop, Dance maintains that the hearing panel at least should have applied ABA Standard 9.32(m) concerning remoteness of prior offenses because his private admonition occurred “eight or nine years” ago. Although the hearing panel did not expressly apply ABA Standard 9.32(m), it considered the remoteness of his private admonition in deciding to “assign[] little weight to” the private admonition as an aggravating factor. A hearing panel does “not have to make a determination one way or the other on all aggravating or mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards”; it need only “consider the applicable provisions.” Meehan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 584 S.W.3d 403, 415 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a)). The panel did not err by considering the remoteness of Dance’s private admonition as part of its evaluation of aggravating factors. Dance’s argument under ABA Standard 9.32(e) regarding his purported cooperative attitude also misses the mark. “The application of this mitigating factor traditionally requires a finding that an attorney went above and beyond in cooperating with the Board.” Johnson v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 737 S.W.3d 276, 288 (Tenn. 2025). “And even then, it should typically be afforded little weight, as attorneys have a duty to cooperate with disciplinary authorities.” Id. at 289. Here, the panel found that Dance’s testimony was not credible. As - 11 - we explained in Beier, a finding that an attorney’s testimony was not credible weighs against a finding of cooperation. 610 S.W.3d at 447. Accordingly, the hearing panel did not err in declining to apply this mitigating factor. Nor did the hearing panel err by failing to consider as a mitigating factor that Dance harmed only one client—the estate of Pernishek’s deceased mother—rather than multiple clients. ABA Standard 9.3 does not identify the number of clients as a mitigating factor. Nevertheless, we have held that “the factors enumerated in Standard 9 are ‘illustrative rather than exclusive’” and that “[o]ther factors may also be considered.” Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Cowan, 388 S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Lockett v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 380 S.W.3d 19, 28 (Tenn. 2012)). But the fact that the hearing panel may consider unenumerated factors does not mean that the hearing panel must consider unenumerated factors. In any event, the hearing panel found that Dance’s misconduct injured at least three clients—Pernishek and his two siblings—by depriving them of the settlement proceeds for more than four years. Dance also claims that the hearing panel should have applied ABA Standard 9.32(1) because he acknowledged his wrongdoing. But that argument also fails. Dance points to his testimony acknowledging that he was “wrong” and that he “shouldn’t have taken the money out of the trust account.” But we have explained that “[r]emorse . . . means more than mere regret at having engaged in conduct that resulted in disastrous consequences to the offending attorney.” In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d at 303. Further, a hearing panel’s finding regarding a lawyer’s remorse “hinges on an assessment of his credibility.” Id. Here, the hearing panel was in the best position to determine whether Dance’s acknowledgment of wrongdoing was true remorse for his actions or mere regret that his actions had consequences. We therefore decline to substitute our judgment on this issue for that of the panel’s. D. After determining that Dance knowingly converted client property and weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the hearing panel found that Dance should be disbarred. We review the panel’s recommended sanction de novo, “with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d). We agree with the hearing panel’s conclusion that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors—three aggravating factors and no mitigating factors—favors the presumptive sanction of disbarment. But as part of our review for uniformity, we must also compare the recommended sanction to sanctions imposed in similar cases. Dance cites seven cases in arguing that disbarment is a comparatively harsh sanction: In re Hickman, 673 S.W.3d 188, 204 (Tenn. 2023) (one-year suspension, with - 12 - six-month active suspension); Waggoner v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 673 S.W.3d 227, 243 (Tenn. 2023) (two-year suspension, with eighteen-month active suspension); Beier v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 610 S.W.3d 425, 449 (Tenn. 2020) (two-year active suspension); Board of Professional Responsibility v. Sheppard, 556 S.W.3d 139, 153 (Tenn. 2018) (sixty-day suspension, followed by two-year probation); Napolitano v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 535 S.W.3d 481, 505 (Tenn. 2017) (five-year suspension, with one-year active suspension); Waggoner, No. 2016-2561-9- AW, at 19 (Bd. Pro. Resp. Mar. 17, 2017) (three-year suspension); and Milligan v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 166 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tenn. 2005) (two-year suspension). The Board counters that these cases are “inapposite, readily distinguishable, and afford [Dance] no relief.” In the Board’s view, our decision in Board of Professional Responsibility v. Barry, 545 S.W.3d 408, 428 (Tenn. 2018) (disbarment), is more on point. 1. First, a preliminary matter. The Board observes that Dance cites cases involving presumptive sanctions other than disbarment and urges us to disregard those cases in our comparative review. Dance argues that we should review all cases involving comparable underlying facts, regardless of the presumptive sanction. We agree with Dance that our cases involving different presumptive sanctions need not be excluded from our comparative review provided they involve similar underlying conduct. The cases the Board relies on—Meehan and Manookian—do not hold otherwise. True, in Meehan we distinguished a case that applied ABA Standard 5.11 from a case that applied ABA Standard 5.12. See 584 S.W.3d at 417–18. But ABA Standard 5.11 concerns lawyers who “engage[] in serious criminal conduct” involving particular enumerated offenses, as well as “any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,” whereas ABA Standard 5.12 concerns lawyers who “knowingly engage[] in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11.” ABA Standards §§ 5.11–.12. That is, the two standards apply to mutually exclusive underlying conduct. Other ABA Standards, by contrast, apply to overlapping conduct. Meehan does not foreclose our consideration of comparative cases involving different presumptive sanctions that apply to similar conduct. Manookian likewise excluded certain cases from its comparative review because they involved both different underlying conduct and different presumptive sanctions. 685 S.W.3d at 807 (finding two cases inapposite where “[n]either involve[d] misconduct consisting of victimizing opposing counsel and their families” and “for both, the presumptive sanction under the ABA Standards was suspension, not disbarment”). Although Meehan and Manookian do not require that we exclude cases involving different presumptive sanctions, they do counsel caution. We must examine cases involving different presumptive sanctions carefully to ensure that the underlying conduct - 13 - is sufficiently similar. And given the lodestar role the