Full Opinion

11/18/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE August 12, 2026 Session STACY MOORE v. ABIGAIL HELTON ET AL. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamblen County No. 22CV119 William E. Phillips, II, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01059-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ In this action concerning personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile accident, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier after determining that the plaintiff had failed to properly serve the alleged tortfeasor with process within the applicable statute of limitations. The court also found that the plaintiff had forfeited her right to uninsured motorist benefits by settling her claim with the tortfeasor’s liability insurer and releasing the tortfeasor from liability without satisfying the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined. Brett Cole, Alcoa, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stacy Moore. Thomas L. Kilday, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. OPINION I. Factual and Procedural Background On November 10, 2022, the plaintiff, Stacy Moore, filed a complaint in the Hamblen County Circuit Court (“trial court”) against Abigail Helton and Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company c/o Farm Bureau Insurance, for personal injuries Ms. Moore sustained in an automobile accident. Ms. Moore alleged that on March 30, 2019, Ms. Helton was driving a 2012 GMC Sierra truck in Hamblen County and “negligently pulled into the path [of] and collided” with Ms. Moore’s vehicle. Ms. Moore asserted that Ms. Helton had failed to exercise due care and had failed to yield. Ms. Moore claimed to have sustained injuries in the collision that were “continuing and/or are permanent in nature.” Ms. Moore alleged that Ms. Helton had not maintained sufficient insurance coverage to fully compensate Ms. Moore for her injuries. Ms. Moore acknowledged that she had filed a claim with her underinsured motorist (“UM”) carrier, Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company (“Farmers”), but she alleged that Farmers had “failed and refused to pay” the claim. Ms. Moore also asserted that Farmers had acted in bad faith and had breached its contract with her. Accordingly, Ms. Moore sought a judgment against Farmers in the amount of $373,550, plus interest and costs. On April 20, 2023, Farmers filed a motion to strike, requesting that all references to Farmers be stricken pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206(a). Farmers concomitantly filed a motion maintaining that Ms. Moore’s claims against it should be dismissed based on (1) insufficient service of process, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, (3) expiration of the statute of limitations, and (4) Ms. Moore’s prior act of executing a release regarding Ms. Helton. Farmers also submitted a request for admission to Ms. Moore, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 36, asking Ms. Moore to admit that she had signed a release in favor of Ms. Helton on March 23, 2020, which released all claims that Ms. Moore may have maintained regarding the March 30, 2019 collision. On October 31, 2024, Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that judgment should be granted in Farmers’ favor as a matter of law by reason of expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and Ms. Moore’s prior execution of a release in favor of Ms. Helton, which purportedly “destroy[ed]” Farmers’ subrogation rights against Ms. Helton. Farmers supported its motion by filing an affidavit from its representative, copies of the insurance policy, a copy of the release signed by Ms. Moore, and other documents. Farmers also filed a statement of undisputed material facts. Ms. Moore filed a response in opposition to summary judgment. She attached her own affidavit as well as that of her husband, wherein they both claimed that they had engaged in multiple conversations with Farmers’ representative, Mark Broyles, and Farmers’ attorney, David Tilson, regarding the Moores’ potential settlement with Ms. Helton and Farmers’ subrogation rights. The Moores stated that Farmers had taken no action to protect Farmers’ subrogation rights despite their communications and had never objected to the settlement nor asserted that the settlement would harm Farmers’ interests. The Moores also claimed that they had requested copies of the insurance policy and related documents on numerous occasions and that their requests had been denied. -2- In her summary judgment response, Ms. Moore posited that her release of the tortfeasor did not preclude her ability to pursue the UM claim because Farmers could not prove that it had been prejudiced and that her claim of bad faith by Farmers was independent of the UM provisions. Ms. Moore also filed a response to the statement of undisputed material facts. On December 16, 2024, Ms. Moore filed a motion seeking leave to amend her complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. Ms. Moore sought to add claims of tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. On April 9, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Farmers. In support, the court found that Ms. Moore and her husband had executed a full release of their claims against Ms. Helton on March 23, 2020, prior to the filing of Ms. Moore’s first lawsuit. In exchange for execution of the release, the Moores received payment of $25,000, representing the policy limits of Ms. Helton’s liability insurance policy. The court found no evidence in the record of an agreement between Ms. Moore and Farmers to submit Ms. Moore’s UM claim to binding arbitration regarding the issues of tort liability and damages nor of Farmers’ having declined arbitration. The court further found that Ms. Helton had never been served with process in the prior lawsuit Ms. Moore had filed against Ms. Helton and that such lawsuit had later been voluntarily dismissed. The court also found that Ms. Helton had likewise never been served with process in the instant lawsuit. The trial court noted that although a UM claim “sounds in contract and not in tort,” the insured must still demonstrate that she is entitled to recover damages from the tortfeasor as a prerequisite to recovery against the UM carrier. The court quoted from this Court’s decision in Bates v. Greene, 544 S.W.3d 345, 349-50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), wherein this Court stated: In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206 it is incumbent that suit be instituted against an uninsured motorist with service thereafter upon the insured’s uninsured motorist carrier. See Hooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 682 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tenn. App. 1984). We find no provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) which requires that a claim by an insured must be served upon an uninsured motorist carrier within one year from the date of a motor vehicle accident so long as the statute of limitations has not run against the uninsured motorist. (quoting Buck v. Scalf, No. M2002-00620-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21170328 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2003) (explaining that if the statute of limitations had run against the uninsured motorist, claims against the uninsured motorist and the UM carrier would be barred). The trial court thus concluded that to maintain a cause of action against the UM carrier, Ms. Moore would need to have a viable cause of action against the tortfeasor. -3- The trial court determined that although Ms. Moore had filed her initial lawsuit against Ms. Helton within the one-year statute of limitations and had caused a summons to be issued to Ms. Helton, the summons had not been served within ninety days. Although Ms. Moore had subsequently caused process to be reissued, she had again failed to obtain service on Ms. Helton. Ms. Moore voluntarily dismissed that action by order entered on November 23, 2021, more than fourteen months after the last summons had been issued. Ms. Moore refiled her complaint within one year of the voluntary dismissal, and a summons was issued to Ms. Helton but was not served. Although process was later reissued, it was never served upon Ms. Helton. The trial court found that in both the initial lawsuit and the current action, summonses to Ms. Helton had gone unserved for more than one year, such that Ms. Moore had not complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3, resulting in expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the claim against Ms. Helton. Accordingly, the court concluded that Ms. Moore could not maintain a direct action against Farmers because the statute of limitations against Ms. Helton had expired. Regarding Ms. Moore’s release of her claims against Ms. Helton, the trial court determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206 was controlling on the issue. The court found that the parties had not complied with § 56-7-1206 because there was no evidence that Ms. Moore and Farmers had an agreement to submit the UM claim to binding arbitration, that Ms. Helton had agreed to cooperate with Farmers in such arbitration, or that Farmers had agreed to waive its subrogation rights. The court further noted a dearth of evidence demonstrating that Farmers had elected to decline arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights by paying Ms. Moore the full amount offered by the liability insurer, as provided in § 56-7-1206(k). The court thus concluded that Ms. Moore had failed to preserve her UM claim against Farmers. The trial court summarized its ruling by stating in pertinent part: [Ms. Moore] did not properly serve the alleged tortfeasor within the applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, [Ms. Moore] settled her claim with Ms. Helton’s liability insurer, and released Ms. Helton from liability prior to filing her lawsuit and did not comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206. Accordingly, [Ms. Moore] cannot now impose liability on [Farmers]. [Ms. Moore’s] uninsured motorist claim, bad faith claim, and breach of contract claim are all predicated upon imposing liability on [Farmers]. As she cannot do so, [Farmers’] Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and [Ms. Moore’s] lawsuit is dismissed. Ms. Moore filed a motion to alter or amend or for additional findings pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 59. Ms. Moore asserted that she had properly served Ms. Helton with process through Ms. Helton’s attorney. Ms. Moore further proffered that the trial court had failed to acknowledge her standalone claim of breach of -4- contract against Farmers. Farmers filed a response in opposition, arguing that Ms. Moore’s assertions in her motion were “wholly unsupported by facts in the record” and unsupported by applicable case law. On June 18, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying Ms. Moore’s motion. Ms. Moore filed a notice of appeal with this Court on July 17, 2025. Following entry of a show cause order by this Court concerning the lack of a final judgment, the trial court entered an order of dismissal concerning the claims against Ms. Helton on December 19, 2025. That order was submitted to this Court as a supplement to the record, and this appeal proceeded. II. Issues Presented Ms. Moore presents the following issues for our review, which we have reordered and restated slightly: 1. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that Ms. Moore’s UM claim was barred, due to her failure to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206, without applying the prejudice requirement established in Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998). 2. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in Farmers’ favor based on the court’s finding that Ms. Moore had failed to effectuate timely service of process on Ms. Helton. 3. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that Ms. Moore could not maintain a UM claim absent service upon the tortfeasor when Tennessee law permits direct actions against uninsured motorist carriers. 4. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Ms. Moore’s breach of contract claim, which arose independently under the insurance policy and was governed by a six-year statute of limitations. III. Standard of Review The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); Dick Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tenn. 2010)). As such, this Court must “make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. As our Supreme Court has -5- explained concerning the requirements for a movant to prevail on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56: [W]hen the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. We reiterate that a moving party seeking summary judgment by attacking the nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than make a conclusory assertion that summary judgment is appropriate on this basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule 56.03 requires the moving party to support its motion with “a separate concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph and supported by a specific citation to the record.” Id. When such a motion is made, any party opposing summary judgment must file a response to each fact set forth by the movant in the manner provided in Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a motion for summary judgment is made [and] . . . supported as provided in [Tennessee Rule 56],” to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but must respond, and by affidavits or one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, “set forth specific facts” at the summary judgment stage “showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. [v. Zenith Radio Corp.], 475 U.S. [574,] 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348 [(1986)]. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. If a summary judgment motion is filed before adequate time for discovery has been provided, the nonmoving party may seek a continuance to engage in additional discovery as provided in Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after adequate time for discovery has been provided, summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence the nonmoving party comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on hypothetical evidence that theoretically could be adduced, despite the passage of discovery deadlines, at a future trial. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264-65. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, the trial court must “state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion” for summary judgment, and our Supreme Court has instructed that the trial court must state -6- these grounds “before it invites or requests the prevailing party to draft a proposed order.” See Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tenn. 2014). “Whether the nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a defendant—and whether or not the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on the challenged claim or defense—at the summary judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party.’” TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 889 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265). In an action addressing issues of uninsured motorist insurance coverage and breach of contract, this Court has elucidated: In order to resolve the issues presented, we must conduct a legal analysis of the statutes covering uninsured motor vehicle coverage, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 56-7-1201 et seq. (“UM Statutes”) and the contract of insurance, which involve questions of law that we review pursuant to the de novo standard. Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000); Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999). The primary rule of statutory construction is “to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.” Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993); see also McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Similarly, we review contractual issues de novo and reach our own independent conclusions regarding their meaning and legal import. Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 95; Hillsboro Plaza Enters. v. Moon, 860 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Collazo v. Haas, No. M2011-00775-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 6351865, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2011). IV. Execution of Release Ms. Moore contends that the trial court erred by concluding that her UM claim was barred due to her failure to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206 and failure to protect Farmers’ subrogation rights when executing the release waiving all claims against Ms. Helton. Tennessee’s uninsured motorist statute, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1201, et seq., provides that if a UM insurer makes payment to its insured, “the insurer making payment shall, to the extent of the coverage, be subrogated to all of the rights of the person to whom payment has been made.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1204 (West August 14, 2008, to current). This statutory section further provides that the UM insurer “shall be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of the person against any -7- person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury or property damage for which payment is made[.]” Id. Ms. Moore’s insurance policy with Farmers also provides for subrogation rights regarding UM coverage. The policy specifically states: When we make payments to any person or entity under this Uninsured Motorist Coverage, that person’s or entity’s rights of recovery from any other person or entity become ours up to the amount paid. This includes the proceeds recoverable from the assets of an insolvent insurer. The policy further states that UM coverage will not be provided if the insured settles her claim for bodily injury or property damage without Farmers’ written consent. Regarding the execution of a release of a tortfeasor, Tennessee Code Annotated 56- 7-1206(f) and (g) (West October 1, 1999, to current), also contained within the uninsured motorist statute, provide in pertinent part: (f) [I]f a party or parties alleged to be liable for the bodily injury or death of the insured offers the limits of all liability insurance policies available to the party or parties in settlement of the insured’s claim, the insured or the insured’s personal representative may accept the offer, execute a full release of the party or parties on whose behalf the offer is made and preserve the right to seek additional compensation from the insured’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier upon agreement of the insured or the insured’s personal representative to submit the insured’s uninsured motorist claim to binding arbitration of all issues of tort liability and damages, provided: (1)(A) The offer must be for the sum of the limits of all liability insurance policies providing coverage to the party or parties on whose behalf the offer is made and in an aggregate amount that is less than the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to the bodily injury or death of the insured; or (B) If, by payments to other injured parties, the limits of all liability insurance policies providing coverage to the party or parties on whose behalf the offer is made have been reduced to an amount that is less than the limits of the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage, the offer must be for the total amount of coverage that remains available to the party or parties on whose behalf the offer is made; and -8- (2) If the settlement does not release all parties alleged to be liable to the insured, arbitration of the uninsured motorist claim shall not be conducted until the claims against all such other parties have been fully and finally disposed of by settlement, final judgment or otherwise. (g) Parties proposing to accomplish a settlement pursuant to this section shall comply with the following requirements and conditions: (1) Upon request, the insured or the insured’s personal representative or attorney shall provide the liability insurance company or companies providing coverage to the party or parties to be released, the name and address of the insurance company or companies providing the insured with uninsured motorist coverage, the policy number or numbers and the limits of uninsured motorist coverage available to the insured; (2) The liability insurance company or companies providing coverage to the party or parties to be released shall give written notice of the offer to the insured’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier or its attorney, provide verification of the coverage upon request and confirm to the uninsured motorist insurance carrier or its attorney that the party or parties to be released will agree in writing to cooperate with the uninsured motorist insurance carrier in connection with the arbitration of the uninsured motorist claim; provided, that the uninsured motorist insurance carrier will agree to waive its subrogation rights against the party or parties to be released; (3) The insured or the insured’s personal representative or attorney shall give written notice to the uninsured motorist insurance carrier or its attorney of the insured’s intent to accept the offer and agreement to submit the uninsured motorist claim to binding arbitration; (4) After receipt of both of the notices referred to in subdivisions (g)(2) and (3), the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall have thirty (30) days to give notice to its insured or the insured’s personal representative or attorney and the liability insurance carrier or carriers or their attorneys that it consents to the settlement, that it will agree to binding arbitration of the insured’s uninsured motorist claim and that it will waive its subrogation rights against the party or parties to be released in -9- exchange for their written agreement to cooperate in connection with the arbitration; (5) Upon receipt of the notice required by subdivision (g)(4), the insured may proceed to execute a release of the party or parties on whose behalf the offer was made and upon execution of the release, receive payment of the settlement proceeds; and (6) The notices required by subdivisions (g)(2), (3) and (4) shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by some other method pursuant to which the sender receives written verification that the notice was received. *** (k) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section relating to binding arbitration, after receipt of both of the notices referred to in subdivisions (g)(2) and (3), the uninsured motorist insurance carrier, at its option, may elect to decline binding arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights; provided, that within thirty (30) days after receipt of both of the notices, it pays the insured the full amount of the offer made by the liability insurance company or companies providing coverage to the party or parties seeking the release. Acceptance of the amount by the insured shall not operate as a release of the liability insurance carrier’s insureds, nor shall it prevent or preclude the insured from seeking additional compensation from the insured’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier. Upon acceptance by the insured, the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall be subrogated to the extent of its payment and further subrogated to the extent it is required to make further payments of compensatory damages under the uninsured motorist coverage of its policy. Upon final disposition of the case, the liability insurance carrier or carrier, shall reimburse the uninsured motorist insurance carrier in the amount of policy limits applicable to the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the offer was made or in the amount of the judgment rendered against the defendant or defendants, whichever is less. In the event the judgment is in favor of the defendant or defendants, the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall not be entitled to reimbursement for any amounts paid its insured pursuant to this subsection (k). In the event the judgment exceeds the liability insurance coverage available to the defendant or defendants, the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall be subrogated against the defendant or defendants to the extent of payments it is required to make in excess of the liability insurance - 10 - coverage. The uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall be entitled to credit for the total amount of damages collected by the insured from all parties alleged to be liable for the bodily injury or death of the insured whether obtained by settlement or judgment and whether characterized as compensatory or punitive damages. (Emphasis added.) As the trial court found, Ms. Moore presented no evidence of compliance with these statutory provisions when she executed the release concerning Ms. Helton on March 23, 2020, prior to the filing of her first lawsuit. The record contains a dearth of evidence demonstrating that Ms. Moore agreed to submit the UM claim to binding arbitration pursuant to subsection (f); that she provided the liability insurance company with the name and address of the UM carrier, policy number, and limits of UM coverage pursuant to subsection (g)(1); or that the mandatory written notices required by subsections (g)(2) and (g)(3) were sent to Farmers.1 In addition, Ms. Moore has presented no evidence that Farmers had either (1) consented to the settlement and agreed to waive its subrogation rights pursuant to subsection (g)(4) or (2) declined binding arbitration and preserved its subrogation rights while paying Ms. Moore the full amount of the offer made by the liability insurer pursuant to subsection (k). Tennessee law is clear that when “the insured releases the tortfeasor thus destroying the insurance carrier’s subrogation rights, then the insured has not only breached the contract of insurance with the insurer but has also destroyed the insurer’s statutory rights.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 867 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). “We are of the opinion that in so doing, the insured forfeits any rights of recovery against the insurance carrier.” Id.; see Doss v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., No. M2000-01971-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1565883, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2001) (“If an insured destroys an insurer’s subrogation rights after payment, the insured forfeits any rights of recovery against the insurance carrier.”). This Court’s decision in Johansen v. Sharber, No. M2017-00639-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 833306, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2018), is instructive and factually similar to the case at bar. The Johansen plaintiff was a passenger in an ATV accident wherein she was injured and the driver of the ATV was killed. See id. The plaintiff filed a tort action against the driver’s estate, naming her uninsured motorist carrier as an additional 1 Our Supreme Court has previously recognized that use of the word “shall” in a statute “indicates that the legislature intended the requirements to be mandatory, not directory.” See Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tenn. 2012); see also White v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. W2019-00918- COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 886139, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2020) (finding that the notice requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206(g)(2) is mandatory and must be satisfied in order to trigger the UM carrier’s obligation to make an election under the provisions of subsections (g)(4) or (k)). - 11 - defendant. See id. During the pendency of that action, and without her uninsured motorist carrier’s approval or agreement, the plaintiff executed a release of her claim against the driver’s estate. See id. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s release of her claim against the driver’s estate had extinguished the uninsured motorist carrier’s subrogation rights, thereby releasing the UM carrier from any liability to the plaintiff based on her uninsured motorist policy. See id. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment to the uninsured motorist carrier. Id. at *3. On appeal in Johansen, this Court explained that the language of the release was unambiguous and that the plaintiff had “acknowledged complete and full satisfaction of the claim for medical bills and personal injury filed against the Estate” and had released the personal representative from any further liability concerning the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at *6. As such, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, implicitly agreeing with the trial court’s determination that when the plaintiff “relinquished her rights through the execution of the Release, she also extinguished the rights of [the uninsured motorist carrier] under its claim for subrogation.” Id. at *2, 6. Similarly, here, Ms. Moore and her spouse executed a release on March 23, 2020, which unambiguously released Ms. Helton from “all claims, suits, demands, damages, costs, actions or causes of action arising from any personal injuries and property damages . . . as a direct or indirect result of the accident” that occurred on March 30, 2019. Because Ms. Moore failed to follow the mandates of Tennessee Code Annotated 56-7-1206(f) and (g) before executing the release, she compromised Farmers’ statutory and contractual subrogation rights and, as a result, cannot now seek to recover UM benefits from Farmers. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 867 S.W.2d at 323; Johansen, 2018 WL 833306, at *6; Doss, 2001 WL 1565883, at *3. Ms. Moore argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in Farmers’ favor without considering the “prejudice requirement established in Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998).” In Alcazar, the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier denied coverage for an accident, claiming that the plaintiff had breached the insurance policy’s provision that required timely notice of an accident. Id. The insurance company claimed that the plaintiff had violated this provision by failing to provide the insurer with notice regarding the accident’s occurrence for more than one year. Id. at 847. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the uninsured motorist carrier, and the Supreme Court reversed, determining that untimely notice of an accident would not relieve the insurer from liability unless the insurer was prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 856. We find Ms. Moore’s reliance on Alcazar to be unavailing. The Alcazar Court was not asked to adjudicate any issue regarding subrogation rights or execution of a release. Moreover, as the Supreme Court pointed out in a subsequent case, Alcazar dealt solely with interpretation of an insurance contract provision; it did not involve interpretation of a - 12 - statute. See Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tenn. 2000). As applicable here, Tennessee’s uninsured motorist statute clearly states what must be accomplished by the parties to achieve a settlement of the insured’s claim against the alleged tortfeasor while still protecting the UM carrier’s subrogation rights and allowing the insured to pursue UM benefits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206. Ms. Moore failed to comply with the statutory requirements when executing a release of her claims against Ms. Helton and thereby forfeited her UM benefits. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 867 S.W.2d at 323; Johansen, 2018 WL 833306, at *6; Doss, 2001 WL 1565883, at *3. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Farmers. Ms. Moore’s issues regarding the trial court’s alternative holding concerning lack of proper issuance and service of process are pretermitted as moot. V. Breach of Contract Claim Finally, Ms. Moore contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing all of her claims, including her claim of breach of contract. Ms. Moore advances the position that because insurance policies are contracts, she should be allowed to pursue her claim alleging a breach of that contract by Farmers. According to Ms. Moore, her breach of contract claim was “based upon [Farmers’] failure to provide coverage and benefits owed under the policy,” and the trial court “improperly collapsed Plaintiff’s contractual claim into its analysis of the uninsured motorist claim and failed to recognize that the breach of contract claim stands independently.” A careful review of Ms. Moore’s complaint reveals that her claim of breach of contract was predicated on Farmers’ refusal to pay UM benefits. As our Supreme Court has instructed, a “Court determines the nature of a claim by examining the ‘gravamen’ of the action,” which “‘refers to the substantial point, the real purpose, or the object of an action,’ and not the ‘designation or form litigants ascribe’ to it.” Haddon v. Vanlier, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, No. M2023-01151-SC-R11-CV, 2026 WL 1291979, at *3 (Tenn. May 12, 2026). This Court has further explained that although “[t]echnically, an insured’s action against his or her own uninsured motorist coverage carrier is a breach of contract action,” “UM insurance recovery cases are typically a hybrid that also involve tort law principles” such that to “recover, the insured must demonstrate that the uninsured driver was negligent, that the claimed injuries were caused by that negligence, and that those damages exceeded the amount paid by the insurer.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Bloodworth, No. M2003-02986-COA-R10-CV, 2007 WL 1966022, at *34 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2007). See Haddon, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1291979, at *4 (explaining that UM carriers “generally, are not contractually obligated to pay [their] insureds damages unless and until the tortfeasor is found legally liable.”). In the case at bar, Ms. Moore did not prove Ms. Helton’s legal liability regarding the accident; instead, Ms. Moore settled her claim with Ms. Helton without establishing any fault on Ms. Helton’s part. The release signed by Ms. Moore specifically states that - 13 - “[n]o Releasee admits any liability,” and Ms. Helton is the sole releasee listed. Accordingly, Ms. Helton’s legal liability has not been established. See, e.g., Collazo, 2011 WL 6351865, at *8 (explaining that when an alleged tortfeasor is released in an agreement with the insured and “does not admit any degree of liability,” the alleged tortfeasor’s liability has not been established). Ergo, Farmers is not contractually obligated to pay Ms. Moore UM benefits. See Haddon, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1291979, at *4. Ms. Moore’s breach of contract issue is thus without merit. VI. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Farmers. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Stacy Moore. This case is remanded to the trial court for collection of costs assessed below. s/Thomas R. Frierson, II ___________________________