STACY MOORE v. ABIGAIL HELTON
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketE2025-01059-COA-R3-CV
JudgeThomas R. Frierson, II, Judge
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/18/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
August 12, 2026 Session
STACY MOORE v. ABIGAIL HELTON ET AL.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamblen County
No. 22CV119 William E. Phillips, II, Judge
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No. E2025-01059-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________
In this action concerning personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile
accident, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff’s uninsured
motorist carrier after determining that the plaintiff had failed to properly serve the alleged
tortfeasor with process within the applicable statute of limitations. The court also found
that the plaintiff had forfeited her right to uninsured motorist benefits by settling her claim
with the tortfeasor’s liability insurer and releasing the tortfeasor from liability without
satisfying the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206. The plaintiff has
appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed; Case Remanded
THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.
MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.
Brett Cole, Alcoa, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stacy Moore.
Thomas L. Kilday, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Farmers Mutual
Insurance Company.
OPINION
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On November 10, 2022, the plaintiff, Stacy Moore, filed a complaint in the Hamblen
County Circuit Court (“trial court”) against Abigail Helton and Tennessee Farmers
Insurance Company c/o Farm Bureau Insurance, for personal injuries Ms. Moore sustained
in an automobile accident. Ms. Moore alleged that on March 30, 2019, Ms. Helton was
driving a 2012 GMC Sierra truck in Hamblen County and “negligently pulled into the path
[of] and collided” with Ms. Moore’s vehicle. Ms. Moore asserted that Ms. Helton had
failed to exercise due care and had failed to yield. Ms. Moore claimed to have sustained
injuries in the collision that were “continuing and/or are permanent in nature.”
Ms. Moore alleged that Ms. Helton had not maintained sufficient insurance
coverage to fully compensate Ms. Moore for her injuries. Ms. Moore acknowledged that
she had filed a claim with her underinsured motorist (“UM”) carrier, Tennessee Farmers
Insurance Company (“Farmers”), but she alleged that Farmers had “failed and refused to
pay” the claim. Ms. Moore also asserted that Farmers had acted in bad faith and had
breached its contract with her. Accordingly, Ms. Moore sought a judgment against Farmers
in the amount of $373,550, plus interest and costs.
On April 20, 2023, Farmers filed a motion to strike, requesting that all references to
Farmers be stricken pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206(a). Farmers
concomitantly filed a motion maintaining that Ms. Moore’s claims against it should be
dismissed based on (1) insufficient service of process, (2) failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, (3) expiration of the statute of limitations, and (4) Ms.
Moore’s prior act of executing a release regarding Ms. Helton. Farmers also submitted a
request for admission to Ms. Moore, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 36,
asking Ms. Moore to admit that she had signed a release in favor of Ms. Helton on March
23, 2020, which released all claims that Ms. Moore may have maintained regarding the
March 30, 2019 collision.
On October 31, 2024, Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that
judgment should be granted in Farmers’ favor as a matter of law by reason of expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations and Ms. Moore’s prior execution of a release in favor
of Ms. Helton, which purportedly “destroy[ed]” Farmers’ subrogation rights against Ms.
Helton. Farmers supported its motion by filing an affidavit from its representative, copies
of the insurance policy, a copy of the release signed by Ms. Moore, and other documents.
Farmers also filed a statement of undisputed material facts.
Ms. Moore filed a response in opposition to summary judgment. She attached her
own affidavit as well as that of her husband, wherein they both claimed that they had
engaged in multiple conversations with Farmers’ representative, Mark Broyles, and
Farmers’ attorney, David Tilson, regarding the Moores’ potential settlement with Ms.
Helton and Farmers’ subrogation rights. The Moores stated that Farmers had taken no
action to protect Farmers’ subrogation rights despite their communications and had never
objected to the settlement nor asserted that the settlement would harm Farmers’ interests.
The Moores also claimed that they had requested copies of the insurance policy and related
documents on numerous occasions and that their requests had been denied.
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In her summary judgment response, Ms. Moore posited that her release of the
tortfeasor did not preclude her ability to pursue the UM claim because Farmers could not
prove that it had been prejudiced and that her claim of bad faith by Farmers was
independent of the UM provisions. Ms. Moore also filed a response to the statement of
undisputed material facts. On December 16, 2024, Ms. Moore filed a motion seeking leave
to amend her complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. Ms. Moore
sought to add claims of tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.
On April 9, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in
favor of Farmers. In support, the court found that Ms. Moore and her husband had executed
a full release of their claims against Ms. Helton on March 23, 2020, prior to the filing of
Ms. Moore’s first lawsuit. In exchange for execution of the release, the Moores received
payment of $25,000, representing the policy limits of Ms. Helton’s liability insurance
policy. The court found no evidence in the record of an agreement between Ms. Moore
and Farmers to submit Ms. Moore’s UM claim to binding arbitration regarding the issues
of tort liability and damages nor of Farmers’ having declined arbitration. The court further
found that Ms. Helton had never been served with process in the prior lawsuit Ms. Moore
had filed against Ms. Helton and that such lawsuit had later been voluntarily dismissed.
The court also found that Ms. Helton had likewise never been served with process in the
instant lawsuit.
The trial court noted that although a UM claim “sounds in contract and not in tort,”
the insured must still demonstrate that she is entitled to recover damages from the tortfeasor
as a prerequisite to recovery against the UM carrier. The court quoted from this Court’s
decision in Bates v. Greene, 544 S.W.3d 345, 349-50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), wherein this
Court stated:
In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206 it is incumbent that suit be
instituted against an uninsured motorist with service thereafter upon the
insured’s uninsured motorist carrier. See Hooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 682 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tenn. App. 1984). We find no provision in
Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) which requires that a claim by an insured
must be served upon an uninsured motorist carrier within one year from the
date of a motor vehicle accident so long as the statute of limitations has not
run against the uninsured motorist.
(quoting Buck v. Scalf, No. M2002-00620-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21170328 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 20, 2003) (explaining that if the statute of limitations had run against the
uninsured motorist, claims against the uninsured motorist and the UM carrier would be
barred). The trial court thus concluded that to maintain a cause of action against the UM
carrier, Ms. Moore would need to have a viable cause of action against the tortfeasor.
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The trial court determined that although Ms. Moore had filed her initial lawsuit
against Ms. Helton within the one-year statute of limitations and had caused a summons to
be issued to Ms. Helton, the summons had not been served within ninety days. Although
Ms. Moore had subsequently caused process to be reissued, she had again failed to obtain
service on Ms. Helton. Ms. Moore voluntarily dismissed that action by order entered on
November 23, 2021, more than fourteen months after the last summons had been issued.
Ms. Moore refiled her complaint within one year of the voluntary dismissal, and a
summons was issued to Ms. Helton but was not served. Although process was later
reissued, it was never served upon Ms. Helton. The trial court found that in both the initial
lawsuit and the current action, summonses to Ms. Helton had gone unserved for more than
one year, such that Ms. Moore had not complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
3, resulting in expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the claim against Ms.
Helton. Accordingly, the court concluded that Ms. Moore could not maintain a direct
action against Farmers because the statute of limitations against Ms. Helton had expired.
Regarding Ms. Moore’s release of her claims against Ms. Helton, the trial court
determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206 was controlling on the issue. The
court found that the parties had not complied with § 56-7-1206 because there was no
evidence that Ms. Moore and Farmers had an agreement to submit the UM claim to binding
arbitration, that Ms. Helton had agreed to cooperate with Farmers in such arbitration, or
that Farmers had agreed to waive its subrogation rights. The court further noted a dearth
of evidence demonstrating that Farmers had elected to decline arbitration and preserve its
subrogation rights by paying Ms. Moore the full amount offered by the liability insurer, as
provided in § 56-7-1206(k). The court thus concluded that Ms. Moore had failed to
preserve her UM claim against Farmers.
The trial court summarized its ruling by stating in pertinent part:
[Ms. Moore] did not properly serve the alleged tortfeasor within the
applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, [Ms. Moore] settled her claim
with Ms. Helton’s liability insurer, and released Ms. Helton from liability
prior to filing her lawsuit and did not comply with the requirements of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 56-7-1206. Accordingly, [Ms. Moore] cannot now impose
liability on [Farmers]. [Ms. Moore’s] uninsured motorist claim, bad faith
claim, and breach of contract claim are all predicated upon imposing liability
on [Farmers]. As she cannot do so, [Farmers’] Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted, and [Ms. Moore’s] lawsuit is dismissed.
Ms. Moore filed a motion to alter or amend or for additional findings pursuant to
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 59. Ms. Moore asserted that she had properly
served Ms. Helton with process through Ms. Helton’s attorney. Ms. Moore further
proffered that the trial court had failed to acknowledge her standalone claim of breach of
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contract against Farmers. Farmers filed a response in opposition, arguing that Ms. Moore’s
assertions in her motion were “wholly unsupported by facts in the record” and unsupported
by applicable case law. On June 18, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying Ms.
Moore’s motion. Ms. Moore filed a notice of appeal with this Court on July 17, 2025.
Following entry of a show cause order by this Court concerning the lack of a final
judgment, the trial court entered an order of dismissal concerning the claims against Ms.
Helton on December 19, 2025. That order was submitted to this Court as a supplement to
the record, and this appeal proceeded.
II. Issues Presented
Ms. Moore presents the following issues for our review, which we have reordered
and restated slightly:
1. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that Ms. Moore’s UM
claim was barred, due to her failure to comply with the requirements
of Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206, without applying the
prejudice requirement established in Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d
845 (Tenn. 1998).
2. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
Farmers’ favor based on the court’s finding that Ms. Moore had failed
to effectuate timely service of process on Ms. Helton.
3. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that Ms. Moore could not
maintain a UM claim absent service upon the tortfeasor when
Tennessee law permits direct actions against uninsured motorist
carriers.
4. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Ms. Moore’s breach of
contract claim, which arose independently under the insurance policy
and was governed by a six-year statute of limitations.
III. Standard of Review
The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law; therefore,
our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Rye v. Women’s
Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); Dick Broad. Co. of
Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Kinsler v. Berkline,
LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tenn. 2010)). As such, this Court must “make a fresh
determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure have been satisfied.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. As our Supreme Court has
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explained concerning the requirements for a movant to prevail on a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56:
[W]hen the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively
negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by
demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment
stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. We
reiterate that a moving party seeking summary judgment by attacking the
nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than make a conclusory assertion
that summary judgment is appropriate on this basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule
56.03 requires the moving party to support its motion with “a separate
concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to
be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph and supported by a specific
citation to the record.” Id. When such a motion is made, any party opposing
summary judgment must file a response to each fact set forth by the movant
in the manner provided in Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a motion for
summary judgment is made [and] . . . supported as provided in [Tennessee
Rule 56],” to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but must respond, and
by affidavits or one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, “set
forth specific facts” at the summary judgment stage “showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The nonmoving party “must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. [v. Zenith Radio Corp.], 475
U.S. [574,] 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348 [(1986)]. The nonmoving party must
demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a
rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. If a summary
judgment motion is filed before adequate time for discovery has been
provided, the nonmoving party may seek a continuance to engage in
additional discovery as provided in Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after
adequate time for discovery has been provided, summary judgment should
be granted if the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage
is insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence the
nonmoving party comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on
hypothetical evidence that theoretically could be adduced, despite the
passage of discovery deadlines, at a future trial.
Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264-65. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, the trial
court must “state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion” for
summary judgment, and our Supreme Court has instructed that the trial court must state
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these grounds “before it invites or requests the prevailing party to draft a proposed order.”
See Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tenn. 2014). “Whether the
nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a defendant—and whether or not the nonmoving party
bears the burden of proof at trial on the challenged claim or defense—at the summary
judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in
the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party.’”
TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 889 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Rye,
477 S.W.3d at 265).
In an action addressing issues of uninsured motorist insurance coverage and breach
of contract, this Court has elucidated:
In order to resolve the issues presented, we must conduct a legal
analysis of the statutes covering uninsured motor vehicle coverage,
Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 56-7-1201 et seq. (“UM Statutes”) and the
contract of insurance, which involve questions of law that we review
pursuant to the de novo standard. Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp.,
Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000); Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d
88, 95 (Tenn. 1999). The primary rule of statutory construction is “to
ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.”
Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2
(Tenn. 1993); see also McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2002). Similarly, we review contractual issues de novo and reach our own
independent conclusions regarding their meaning and legal import.
Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 95; Hillsboro Plaza Enters. v. Moon, 860 S.W.2d
45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
Collazo v. Haas, No. M2011-00775-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 6351865, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 15, 2011).
IV. Execution of Release
Ms. Moore contends that the trial court erred by concluding that her UM claim was
barred due to her failure to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated §
56-7-1206 and failure to protect Farmers’ subrogation rights when executing the release
waiving all claims against Ms. Helton. Tennessee’s uninsured motorist statute, codified at
Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1201, et seq., provides that if a UM insurer makes
payment to its insured, “the insurer making payment shall, to the extent of the coverage,
be subrogated to all of the rights of the person to whom payment has been made.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 56-7-1204 (West August 14, 2008, to current). This statutory section further
provides that the UM insurer “shall be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of the person against any
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person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury or property damage for
which payment is made[.]” Id.
Ms. Moore’s insurance policy with Farmers also provides for subrogation rights
regarding UM coverage. The policy specifically states:
When we make payments to any person or entity under this Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, that person’s or entity’s rights of recovery from any other
person or entity become ours up to the amount paid. This includes the
proceeds recoverable from the assets of an insolvent insurer.
The policy further states that UM coverage will not be provided if the insured settles her
claim for bodily injury or property damage without Farmers’ written consent.
Regarding the execution of a release of a tortfeasor, Tennessee Code Annotated 56-
7-1206(f) and (g) (West October 1, 1999, to current), also contained within the uninsured
motorist statute, provide in pertinent part:
(f) [I]f a party or parties alleged to be liable for the bodily injury or death
of the insured offers the limits of all liability insurance policies
available to the party or parties in settlement of the insured’s claim,
the insured or the insured’s personal representative may accept the
offer, execute a full release of the party or parties on whose behalf the
offer is made and preserve the right to seek additional compensation
from the insured’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier upon
agreement of the insured or the insured’s personal representative to
submit the insured’s uninsured motorist claim to binding arbitration
of all issues of tort liability and damages, provided:
(1)(A) The offer must be for the sum of the limits of all liability
insurance policies providing coverage to the party or parties on
whose behalf the offer is made and in an aggregate amount that
is less than the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to the
bodily injury or death of the insured; or
(B) If, by payments to other injured parties, the limits of all liability
insurance policies providing coverage to the party or parties on
whose behalf the offer is made have been reduced to an amount
that is less than the limits of the insured’s uninsured motorist
coverage, the offer must be for the total amount of coverage
that remains available to the party or parties on whose behalf
the offer is made; and
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(2) If the settlement does not release all parties alleged to be liable
to the insured, arbitration of the uninsured motorist claim shall
not be conducted until the claims against all such other parties
have been fully and finally disposed of by settlement, final
judgment or otherwise.
(g) Parties proposing to accomplish a settlement pursuant to this section
shall comply with the following requirements and conditions:
(1) Upon request, the insured or the insured’s personal
representative or attorney shall provide the liability insurance
company or companies providing coverage to the party or
parties to be released, the name and address of the insurance
company or companies providing the insured with uninsured
motorist coverage, the policy number or numbers and the limits
of uninsured motorist coverage available to the insured;
(2) The liability insurance company or companies providing
coverage to the party or parties to be released shall give written
notice of the offer to the insured’s uninsured motorist insurance
carrier or its attorney, provide verification of the coverage
upon request and confirm to the uninsured motorist insurance
carrier or its attorney that the party or parties to be released will
agree in writing to cooperate with the uninsured motorist
insurance carrier in connection with the arbitration of the
uninsured motorist claim; provided, that the uninsured motorist
insurance carrier will agree to waive its subrogation rights
against the party or parties to be released;
(3) The insured or the insured’s personal representative or attorney
shall give written notice to the uninsured motorist insurance
carrier or its attorney of the insured’s intent to accept the offer
and agreement to submit the uninsured motorist claim to
binding arbitration;
(4) After receipt of both of the notices referred to in subdivisions
(g)(2) and (3), the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall
have thirty (30) days to give notice to its insured or the
insured’s personal representative or attorney and the liability
insurance carrier or carriers or their attorneys that it consents
to the settlement, that it will agree to binding arbitration of the
insured’s uninsured motorist claim and that it will waive its
subrogation rights against the party or parties to be released in
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exchange for their written agreement to cooperate in
connection with the arbitration;
(5) Upon receipt of the notice required by subdivision (g)(4), the
insured may proceed to execute a release of the party or parties
on whose behalf the offer was made and upon execution of the
release, receive payment of the settlement proceeds; and
(6) The notices required by subdivisions (g)(2), (3) and (4) shall
be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by some
other method pursuant to which the sender receives written
verification that the notice was received.
***
(k) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section relating to binding
arbitration, after receipt of both of the notices referred to in
subdivisions (g)(2) and (3), the uninsured motorist insurance carrier,
at its option, may elect to decline binding arbitration and preserve its
subrogation rights; provided, that within thirty (30) days after receipt
of both of the notices, it pays the insured the full amount of the offer
made by the liability insurance company or companies providing
coverage to the party or parties seeking the release. Acceptance of the
amount by the insured shall not operate as a release of the liability
insurance carrier’s insureds, nor shall it prevent or preclude the
insured from seeking additional compensation from the insured’s
uninsured motorist insurance carrier. Upon acceptance by the insured,
the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall be subrogated to the
extent of its payment and further subrogated to the extent it is required
to make further payments of compensatory damages under the
uninsured motorist coverage of its policy. Upon final disposition of
the case, the liability insurance carrier or carrier, shall reimburse the
uninsured motorist insurance carrier in the amount of policy limits
applicable to the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the offer
was made or in the amount of the judgment rendered against the
defendant or defendants, whichever is less. In the event the judgment
is in favor of the defendant or defendants, the uninsured motorist
insurance carrier shall not be entitled to reimbursement for any
amounts paid its insured pursuant to this subsection (k). In the event
the judgment exceeds the liability insurance coverage available to the
defendant or defendants, the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall
be subrogated against the defendant or defendants to the extent of
payments it is required to make in excess of the liability insurance
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coverage. The uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall be entitled
to credit for the total amount of damages collected by the insured from
all parties alleged to be liable for the bodily injury or death of the
insured whether obtained by settlement or judgment and whether
characterized as compensatory or punitive damages.
(Emphasis added.)
As the trial court found, Ms. Moore presented no evidence of compliance with these
statutory provisions when she executed the release concerning Ms. Helton on March 23,
2020, prior to the filing of her first lawsuit. The record contains a dearth of evidence
demonstrating that Ms. Moore agreed to submit the UM claim to binding arbitration
pursuant to subsection (f); that she provided the liability insurance company with the name
and address of the UM carrier, policy number, and limits of UM coverage pursuant to
subsection (g)(1); or that the mandatory written notices required by subsections (g)(2) and
(g)(3) were sent to Farmers.1 In addition, Ms. Moore has presented no evidence that
Farmers had either (1) consented to the settlement and agreed to waive its subrogation
rights pursuant to subsection (g)(4) or (2) declined binding arbitration and preserved its
subrogation rights while paying Ms. Moore the full amount of the offer made by the
liability insurer pursuant to subsection (k).
Tennessee law is clear that when “the insured releases the tortfeasor thus destroying
the insurance carrier’s subrogation rights, then the insured has not only breached the
contract of insurance with the insurer but has also destroyed the insurer’s statutory rights.”
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 867 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1993). “We are of the opinion that in so doing, the insured forfeits any rights of
recovery against the insurance carrier.” Id.; see Doss v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., No.
M2000-01971-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1565883, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2001) (“If
an insured destroys an insurer’s subrogation rights after payment, the insured forfeits any
rights of recovery against the insurance carrier.”).
This Court’s decision in Johansen v. Sharber, No. M2017-00639-COA-R3-CV,
2018 WL 833306, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2018), is instructive and factually similar
to the case at bar. The Johansen plaintiff was a passenger in an ATV accident wherein she
was injured and the driver of the ATV was killed. See id. The plaintiff filed a tort action
against the driver’s estate, naming her uninsured motorist carrier as an additional
1
Our Supreme Court has previously recognized that use of the word “shall” in a statute “indicates that the
legislature intended the requirements to be mandatory, not directory.” See Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc.,
382 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tenn. 2012); see also White v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. W2019-00918-
COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 886139, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2020) (finding that the notice requirement
in Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1206(g)(2) is mandatory and must be satisfied in order to trigger the
UM carrier’s obligation to make an election under the provisions of subsections (g)(4) or (k)).
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defendant. See id. During the pendency of that action, and without her uninsured motorist
carrier’s approval or agreement, the plaintiff executed a release of her claim against the
driver’s estate. See id. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s release of her claim against the
driver’s estate had extinguished the uninsured motorist carrier’s subrogation rights, thereby
releasing the UM carrier from any liability to the plaintiff based on her uninsured motorist
policy. See id. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment to the uninsured
motorist carrier. Id. at *3.
On appeal in Johansen, this Court explained that the language of the release was
unambiguous and that the plaintiff had “acknowledged complete and full satisfaction of
the claim for medical bills and personal injury filed against the Estate” and had released
the personal representative from any further liability concerning the plaintiff’s claim. Id.
at *6. As such, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, implicitly agreeing
with the trial court’s determination that when the plaintiff “relinquished her rights through
the execution of the Release, she also extinguished the rights of [the uninsured motorist
carrier] under its claim for subrogation.” Id. at *2, 6.
Similarly, here, Ms. Moore and her spouse executed a release on March 23, 2020,
which unambiguously released Ms. Helton from “all claims, suits, demands, damages,
costs, actions or causes of action arising from any personal injuries and property damages
. . . as a direct or indirect result of the accident” that occurred on March 30, 2019. Because
Ms. Moore failed to follow the mandates of Tennessee Code Annotated 56-7-1206(f) and
(g) before executing the release, she compromised Farmers’ statutory and contractual
subrogation rights and, as a result, cannot now seek to recover UM benefits from Farmers.
See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 867 S.W.2d at 323; Johansen, 2018 WL 833306, at *6;
Doss, 2001 WL 1565883, at *3.
Ms. Moore argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
Farmers’ favor without considering the “prejudice requirement established in Alcazar v.
Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998).” In Alcazar, the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist
carrier denied coverage for an accident, claiming that the plaintiff had breached the
insurance policy’s provision that required timely notice of an accident. Id. The insurance
company claimed that the plaintiff had violated this provision by failing to provide the
insurer with notice regarding the accident’s occurrence for more than one year. Id. at 847.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the uninsured motorist carrier, and
the Supreme Court reversed, determining that untimely notice of an accident would not
relieve the insurer from liability unless the insurer was prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 856.
We find Ms. Moore’s reliance on Alcazar to be unavailing. The Alcazar Court was
not asked to adjudicate any issue regarding subrogation rights or execution of a release.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court pointed out in a subsequent case, Alcazar dealt solely
with interpretation of an insurance contract provision; it did not involve interpretation of a
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statute. See Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tenn. 2000). As
applicable here, Tennessee’s uninsured motorist statute clearly states what must be
accomplished by the parties to achieve a settlement of the insured’s claim against the
alleged tortfeasor while still protecting the UM carrier’s subrogation rights and allowing
the insured to pursue UM benefits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206. Ms. Moore failed
to comply with the statutory requirements when executing a release of her claims against
Ms. Helton and thereby forfeited her UM benefits. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 867
S.W.2d at 323; Johansen, 2018 WL 833306, at *6; Doss, 2001 WL 1565883, at *3.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Farmers.
Ms. Moore’s issues regarding the trial court’s alternative holding concerning lack of proper
issuance and service of process are pretermitted as moot.
V. Breach of Contract Claim
Finally, Ms. Moore contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
and dismissing all of her claims, including her claim of breach of contract. Ms. Moore
advances the position that because insurance policies are contracts, she should be allowed
to pursue her claim alleging a breach of that contract by Farmers. According to Ms. Moore,
her breach of contract claim was “based upon [Farmers’] failure to provide coverage and
benefits owed under the policy,” and the trial court “improperly collapsed Plaintiff’s
contractual claim into its analysis of the uninsured motorist claim and failed to recognize
that the breach of contract claim stands independently.”
A careful review of Ms. Moore’s complaint reveals that her claim of breach of
contract was predicated on Farmers’ refusal to pay UM benefits. As our Supreme Court
has instructed, a “Court determines the nature of a claim by examining the ‘gravamen’ of
the action,” which “‘refers to the substantial point, the real purpose, or the object of an
action,’ and not the ‘designation or form litigants ascribe’ to it.” Haddon v. Vanlier, ___
S.W.3d ___, ___, No. M2023-01151-SC-R11-CV, 2026 WL 1291979, at *3 (Tenn. May
12, 2026). This Court has further explained that although “[t]echnically, an insured’s
action against his or her own uninsured motorist coverage carrier is a breach of contract
action,” “UM insurance recovery cases are typically a hybrid that also involve tort law
principles” such that to “recover, the insured must demonstrate that the uninsured driver
was negligent, that the claimed injuries were caused by that negligence, and that those
damages exceeded the amount paid by the insurer.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Bloodworth,
No. M2003-02986-COA-R10-CV, 2007 WL 1966022, at *34 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29,
2007). See Haddon, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1291979, at *4 (explaining that UM
carriers “generally, are not contractually obligated to pay [their] insureds damages unless
and until the tortfeasor is found legally liable.”).
In the case at bar, Ms. Moore did not prove Ms. Helton’s legal liability regarding
the accident; instead, Ms. Moore settled her claim with Ms. Helton without establishing
any fault on Ms. Helton’s part. The release signed by Ms. Moore specifically states that
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“[n]o Releasee admits any liability,” and Ms. Helton is the sole releasee listed.
Accordingly, Ms. Helton’s legal liability has not been established. See, e.g., Collazo, 2011
WL 6351865, at *8 (explaining that when an alleged tortfeasor is released in an agreement
with the insured and “does not admit any degree of liability,” the alleged tortfeasor’s
liability has not been established). Ergo, Farmers is not contractually obligated to pay Ms.
Moore UM benefits. See Haddon, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1291979, at *4. Ms.
Moore’s breach of contract issue is thus without merit.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Farmers. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Stacy Moore. This case
is remanded to the trial court for collection of costs assessed below.
s/Thomas R. Frierson, II
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